The forces of UNITA used HUMMWV-mounted 106mm Recoilless rifles to decisive effect in the 1990 battle of Mavinga. U.S. Army 5th Special Forces Group "Green Berets" used 106mm RR mounted HMMWVs to storm back into Kuwait with Arab coalition forces they were advising. The 106mm RR is a battle winner from the jungles of Vietnam to the deserts of Israel, the airfield at Entebbe...Both the Israeli Defense Force and Taiwan make their own 106mm RRs and ammo. Swedish Bofors 3A-HEAT-AT rounds are effective beyond 1600 meters and defeat the latest tank armor. The Canadians and Americans make laser sighting systems that can give moving target-first shot, kill accuracy for the 106mm RR. We have hundreds of 106mm RRs in storage. Let's obtain/buy some and supply them to U.S. Army Light/Air Assault/Airborne Division "Delta" weapons companies before it is too late. Since this web page was made in 1997, its already too late. The U.S. Army's light units are in Iraq getting clobbered without M8 Armored 105mm Gun System light tanks and too few M1 Abrams heavy tanks to go around.

7. Develop amphibious HMMWV like DUKWV

Its rather sad that the U.S. Army has forgotten all about the troubles it had in WWII and Vietnam crossing streams and rivers and coming ashore from the sea. The only armored vehicle it has that can swim is the M113 Gavin which could even be made to swim in the ocean, and the unarmored M973A1 SUSV. Its time the Army gets the "lead out" and develop an amphibious version of the HMMWV at least for its Cavalry units so we are not stuck again like we were in 1995, on the opposite bank of the Sava River and unable to cross in our heavy tanks without engineers building a bridge. We also had several HMMWVs take unexpected plunges into rivers in Iraq, drowning some of our Soldiers.

8. Develop indestructible, non-flammable, solid foam tires not "run flats" and pneumatics

We used solid foam inserts in our A/ETB tires for the Operation Dark Claw parachute assault. Why not a soft foam insert or solid tire requiring no air to keep its shape? This would make tires imperious to broken glass, debris, shrapnel, bullets etc. A vehicle that is stuck is a dead vehicle with dead men inside it. An Army needs wheeled vehicles for support roles but in combat rubber tires is madness (see post-Somalia firefight photos above).

No-More Flats
Cyclo-Manufacturing
1438 S. Cherokee St.
Denver, CO 80223
(303) 744-8043

This is why tracks are better than wheels in general and why your light/Airborne unit needs to get M113A3s if enemy contact is expected.

9. Stealth IR signature, sounds

The latest BAT submitions fired from Multiple Rocket Launchers (MRLs) look for engine noise. Its not long before the enemy MRLs will have this capability--silencing the vehicles you are in by sandbagging and special factory coatings need to be determined. This means we need to get hybrid electric-drive HHMWVs and M113 Gavins perfected and in service: their use would be very close to the way diesel-electric submarines operate; use motor engines for covering large distances, turn on the electric for stealth in combat. Its vital for HMMWVs in a direct-fire anti-armor role like those with TOW-FOTT and LOSAT to mask their infared signatures using cold/hot firing positions and using FLIR camouflage covers.

10. Gunshield for gunner operating weapon mount on top

We have known since the 1963 battle of Ap Bac that gunners exposed torso out firing weapons from vehicles are prime enemy targets; if they can be stopped they can win. We put shields around the M551 Sheridan light tank to form a "crows nest" why not for the HMMWV and FMTV? The new MP up-armored HMMWV web page shows a gun shield fitted but doesn't mention it in the text. ????? Or is this yet another example of peacetime non-chalance? The O'Gara and Hess web page shows the U.S. Army M1114 Up-Armored HMMWV with only the rear hatch armored to protect the gunner's back. The U.S. Air Force's M1116 Up-Armored HMMWV has a completely armored gun position depicted below:

HMMWV Gunner Shields w/LVOSS, NSN: 2510-01-498-4996 PN: 57K4470

The above is NSN, etc. for the .50 cal M2 HMG gunshields.

Military Sales - John Mayles
Direct Line: (513) 881-9899
e-mail: jmayles@ogara-hess.com
www.ogara-hess.com/intl/ohio.htm

O'Gara-Hess & Eisenhardt
9113 Le Saint Drive
Fairfield, Ohio 45014
(513) 881-9800
(800) 697-0307
fax: (513) 874-2558

A participant in Operation Just Cause writes in to a www.newsgroup:

"I was at Quarry Heights. Snipers killed a TC who was part of the security team on the first night, and I was awakened by the sounds of a firefight one morning that seemed like it was only 500 meters away. Made my .45 with one magazine and 20 rounds seem just a little inadequate."

11. Send A/ETB mobile scouts ahead to secure the routes from ambush: the British "mole" tactic

The British Army doesn't try to clear convoy routes as they go along with the supplies/troops trying o get through. They first send a completely armed-to-kill armored force through the route to clear a safe path for the convoy to follow. One then the other, not a little of both at the same time.

We can improve on this by sending security scouts on A/ETBs and hybrid-electric M113 Gavins to silently move ahead and secure roads from ambushes/mines before the soft-skin convoys leave.

12. CAMOUFLAGE YOURSELF AND YOUR VEHICLES

QUESTION: Why are Army vehicles in Iraq not being painted in tan?

PROOF:

It was an "urgent operational requirement" in the first gulf war, why not today?

www.gulflink.osd.mil/medsearch/FocusAreas/carc_paint.shtml

CARC Paint

For Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the U.S. shipped thousands of vehicles and other pieces of equipment to the Persian Gulf. Much of the equipment had the three-color "woodland" camouflage scheme designed for the European Theater. These dark colors would be easy to spot against the backdrop of the barren desert environment. Consequently, there was an urgent operational requirement to repaint incoming equipment with tan-colored paint to provide desert camouflage protection. Another operational requirement was protection against chemical warfare agents which were believed to be in the Iraqi weapons inventory.

The military established painting operations in Saudi Arabia to paint vehicles tan with so-called chemical agent resistant coating (CARC) paint. CARC is a polyurethane paint that provides superior durability, extends service life for military vehicles and equipment, provides surfaces with superior resistance to chemical warfare agent penetration, and greatly simplifies decontamination.

DoD occupational safety and health guidance called for proper personal protective equipment, including respiratory equipment, to protect painters who employ spray painting equipment. Several compounds in CARC formulations, if taken into the body in sufficiently high concentrations, may cause short- and long-term health effects. The most notable of these compounds is hexamethylene diisocyanate (HDI), which hardens the paint. Solvents used in CARC and paint thinners, as well as solvents used to clean equipment, can be hazardous via skin contact and breathing. Exposures to solvents can lead to dizziness, rashes, and nausea. However, the proper wear of personal protective equipment greatly decreases the risks associated with exposure to solvents.

Exposure to high concentrations of aerosolized HDI during spray painting leads to immediate respiratory irritation and watery eyes. Long-term exposure can cause or aggravate respiratory problems, in particular, asthma. The use of personal protective equipment, such as respirators, coveralls, eye protection, gloves, and head coverings, can prevent or minimize exposures to HDI during spray painting. The HDI in polyurethane paint does not present a hazard after the paint dries and cures, unless it is exposed to heat sufficient for thermal decomposition of the coating, such as welding.

Some of the spray painting sites established in Saudi Arabia lacked the appropriate personal protective equipment to assure safe spray-painting operations. Several spray painters at these sites reported short-term symptoms, including coughing, eye and throat irritation, skin rashes, headaches, and nausea. Some veterans believe exposure to CARC contributed to their long-term health problems. The Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses investigated CARC use during the Gulf War to examine the extent of exposures to this material.

REFERENCES

Office Of The Special Assistant To The Deputy Secretary Of Defense For Gulf War Illnesses. Environmental Exposure Report: Chemical Agent Resistant Coating (CARC), July 27, 2000

SEARCH THIS SITE

More information about CARC usage during the Gulf War can be found on GulfLINK where the Search tool (Search Site) will identify many original documents.

Yet another BS obstacle...so you cannot even touch up rust on vehicles because it has to be "CARC" paint that is HAZMAT and has to be applied in a shop to OSHA standards yadda yadda bullshit. So now men are dying in Iraq in easily targeted vehicles....

Right?

Wrong!

THERE IS A WAY TO CARC PAINT YOUR VEHICLES IN THE PROPER CAMOUFLAGE COLOR!!

The following is a google.com cache "snap shot" of a U.S. Army Madigan Medical Hospital web page on CARC paint that has conveniently "disappeared" from the www. It reveals that units can indeed CARC paint their vehicles safely and abiding by Army regulations.

Ergonomic Issues | Chemical Agent Resistant Coating Painting | Brake Shoe Inspection |  Staff MAMC home page > preventive medicine > industrial hygiene > home page Industrial Hygiene Chemical Agent Resistant Coating Can I spot paint our unit's vehicles? What are the colors I can use? What are some cautions I need to be aware of before painting? What kinds of personal protective equipment do I need to use when painting? What are the specifications for ordering decals?  Purpose. This provides guidance for safe spot or touchup painting using Chemical Agent Resistant Coating (CARC) paint. General. Unit-level painting is limited to touch-up or spot painting using a brush or roller. As stipulated in TB 43-0242, CARC Spot Painting, dated 1 January 1991, Units are not allowed to completely repaint vehicles or spray paint any portion. Moreover, TG No. 144, Guidelines for Controlling Health Hazards in Painting Operations, states that touch-up painting is done to prevent corrosion, not for purely cosmetic reasons. If the paint is marred, but not deep enough to see bare metal, you do not need to paint. Units are only authorized to use single component CARC paint. The table below lists NSNs for single component CARC. Make sure you read the Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) for each paint/solvent used. Back to top Color Color Number NSN Size Green* 34094 8010-01-229-7546 1 Qt Can Brown* 30051 8010-01-229-7543 1 Qt Can Black* 37030 8010-01-229-7540 1 Qt Can Sand 33303 8010-01-234-2934 1 Qt Can Aircraft Green 34031 8010-01-246-0717 1 Qt Can Tan 686 33446 8010-01-276-3638 1 Qt Can * Color for 3-color camouflage system Back to top Warnings. Solvents used in CARC and other paints are flammable. Never paint near open flames or where there are sparks, like welding or grinding. Never apply CARC to surfaces that will exceed 400° F (Exhaust pipes, engine manifolds, etc.). Heating painted surfaces releases toxic gases, vapors, and metal fumes. If the existing paint requires surface preparation, manual "wet" sanding is the recommended method (Old paint may contain lead or chromate's). "Wet" sanding eliminates the need for respiratory protection. According to the Preventive Maintenance Magazine dated April 1996, decals are a possible alternative to using CARC for bumper numbers. See page 3 for decal NSNs. Potential Exposures. HDI, a component in CARC, is a potential sensitizer especially to asthmatics. Soldiers who are asthmatic should not apply CARC, as a severe life threatening allergic reaction may occur. Controls. Chemical overexposures do not occur when applying CARC outdoors using a brush or roller. Respiratory protection is not required for outdoor brush or roller painting. However, personnel must don chemical goggles, NBC gloves, a hat, and cover arms to prevent skin contact (NSNs provided below). If Commanders desire respiratory protection nonetheless, the M40 NBC mask may be used. This applies only for operations performed outdoors-involving one quart of CARC per person, per day. DOL Repair Activity Division accomplishes all other painting operations (i.e. using more than one quart per person per day, spray-painting, painting in areas with restricted airflow (inside/under vehicles). Back to top Personal protective clothing and equipment required: NSN Cloth coveralls/BDU (Sleeves down) Not provided Goggles, chemical splash NSN 4240-00-052-3776 Head covering (BDU hat) Not provided Gloves, TAP, Type II: Size XS8, NSN 8415-00-753-6550 Size S9, NSN 8415-00-753-6551 Size M10, NSN 8415-00-753-6552 Size L11, NSN 8415-00-753-6553 Size XL12, NSN 8415-00-753-6554 Treat any leftover paint as hazardous waste. Contact the DPW Hazardous Waste (Compliance) Office at telephone 967-3268 for disposal instructions. Preventing unnecessary waste is very easy - Do not spot paint until you have enough area that will use up a one-quart can. Because once the can is open the paint starts curing and hardens within hours. Resealing does not stop the curing process. For further inquiries, please contact the Industrial Hygiene section at 968-4331. Back to top Decal Ordering Specifications.  Lusterless black pressure sensitive decals, NSN 7690-01- Letter 1 inch 11/2 inches 2 inches 3 inches 4 inches A 030-7126 031-4660 031-9543 031-9559 032-4595 B 030-5778 031-4661 031-5535 031-9560 032-4596 C 030-5779 031-5221 032-2428 031-9561 032-4597 D 030-5780 031-6394 032-2430 031-9562 032-4598 E 030-5781 031-5523 031-9544 031-9563 032-4599 F 030-5782 031-5524 031-5537 031-9564 032-4600 G 030-5783 031-4662 031-5538 031-9565 032-4601 H 030-5784 031-4663 031-5539 031-9566 032-2452 I 030-8542 031-4664 031-5540 031-9567 032-2453 J 030-5785 031-4665 031-5541 031-9568 032-2454 K 030-5786 031-4666 031-5542 032-0739 032-1404 L 030-8543 031-4667 031-5543 032-0740 032-1405 M 030-7816 031-4668 031-5544 031-9545 032-2438 N 030-8544 031-4669 031-5545 031-9546 032-1406 O 030-8545 031-4670 031-5546 031-9547 032-3712 P 031-6395 031-5525 031-5547 031-9548 032-2439 Q 030-8546 031-5526 031-5548 031-9549 032-2441 R 030-8547 031-5527 031-5549 031-9550 032-1407 S 030-8548 031-5528 031-5550 031-9551 032-2443 T 030-8549 031-5529 031-5551 031-9552 032-2445 U 030-8550 031-5530 031-5552 031-9553 032-2447 V 030-8551 031-5531 031-5553 031-9554 032-2449 W 030-8552 031-5532 031-5554 031-9555 032-1408 X 030-8553 031-5533 031-5555 031-9556 032-2451 Y 030-8554 031-4671 032-1400 031-9557 032-4593 Z 030-8555 031-4672 032-0727 031-9558 032-4594 Number 1 inch 11/2 inches 2 inches 3 inches 4 inches 1 030-8550 031-4673 032-0728 031-9559 032-4595 2 030-8557 031-4674 032-0729 031-9560 032-4596 3 030-8558 031-4675 032-2421 031-9561 032-4597 4 030-8559 031-4676 032-2422 031-9562 032-4598 5 030-8560 031-4677 032-1401 031-9563 032-4599 6 030-8561 031-5534 032-2423 031-9564 032-4600 7 030-8562 031-4678 032-2424 031-9565 032-4601 8 030-8563 031-4679 032-2425 031-9566 032-2452 9 030-8561 031-4680 032-0730 031-9567 032-2453 0 030-8565 031-4681 032-0731 031-9568 032-2454 Back to top

______________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Madigan Army Medical Center  Security and Privacy Notice  |  Medical Disclaimer  |  External Links Disclaimer Caring Beyond the Call of Duty Last Update:  10/01/2003 12. Have a FULLY EQUIPPED Combat LifeSaver (CLS) in every vehicle 13. Better Convoy Security Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP) Last Dingo's CONVOY DEFENSE TTP While soft-skin vehicles can be air-delivered to our Paratroopers, so can light tracked APCs. Keeping them intact will not be easy on the sensor and fire swept, non-linear battlefield. They are not APCs. Get M113A3s for these missions. Prepare for the worsed-case scenario, harden and arm your soft-skins. If M113 Gavin hulls are good enough that you put them on the BACK of trucks for protection, WHY NOT GET THE M113 vehicles themselves? 14. U.S. Army Training MUST CHANGE for non-linear warfare in the 21st Century Recent combats prove that soft-skin vehicles following in the trace of combat vehicle forces seeking to BYPASS pockets of enemy resistance to take out the enemy's centers of gravity are vulnerable to ambush. Sandbag hardening must be an annual CTT task done by EVERY DAMN U.S. Army unit. Convoys must integrate Escape & Recovery (E&R) plans so units have an option other than fighting or dying---the ability to split up into 2-man buddy teams and make their way back ro pre-stocked Rally Points (RPs). Its time to wake up and take war seriously weith EVERY unit allowed to be as lethal and as well prepared as they can be ("high speed") and the smug egotistical Army "pecking order" be damned. This means so-called "support" units with machine gun mounts etc. on their trucks--if that means they look sexy and like "rat patrol" instead of looking defeated and downtrodden as per their social standing in the Army pecking order its too fucking bad. From the strategypage.com: January 13, 2004: American troops in Iraq have quickly developed procedures and tactics to counter road side bombs and ambushes by hostile Iraqis. This has made attacking American convoys a lot more dangerous to the attackers, and reduced U.S. casualties considerably. First, the convoy should have at least five vehicles and they should have extra armor plate or Kevlar blankets attached to protect the crew. The troops in the convoy should carry lots of ammo for their weapons (this means a dozen or more 30 round magazines for each M-16, and as many 200 round belts of ammo for each light machine-gun and several dozen rounds for each M203 40mm grenade launcher.) Get some AT-4 bunker buster rocket launchers if you can. Rig up ring or pedestal mounts for light or medium (7.62mm) machine-guns. If you can get .50 caliber machine-guns, install them on ring mounts in the lead truck. Your largest truck should be in the lead, ready to push through a roadblock if that seems likely to work. The lead vehicle should have an NCO or officer trained to make quick decisions on whether to drive around a barrier or push on through. Troops should all be assigned a direction to watch while the convoy is moving. A training area has been set up in Kuwait where troops in moving trucks can practice firing at targets. If ambushed, convoy troops must know to get out as much firepower at the enemy is (or is likely to be) as quickly as possible. The Iraqi attackers are usually not very disciplined, and their attack often falls apart if it is met with heavy fire from the trucks. It's also important that convoys check with the commanders of areas they are passing through, to let them know when the convoy will be in the area and to get radio frequencies and other information so the convoy can call for help from local troops if there is an ambush. The local commanders can also often arrange to have any of their troops or aircraft (including UAVs) escort the convoy for part of the way. The local commanders also know better who the bad guys are in their area and often have information on where ambushes or roadside bombs might be. It's common practice for combat units to have a QRF (quick reaction force) ready to go at all times to help one of their patrols, or a passing convoy.Military Police often escort convoys, usually forming the advance and rear guard. The idea advanced guard is two heavily armed hummers moving 300-500 meters in advance of the convoy. The advance guard checks out suspicious items (possible roadside bombs or men waiting in ambush.) If possible, another two hummers should follow the convoy by the same distance, for Iraqis have attacked the rear vehicle in convoys with machine-guns and RPGs. For this reason, the last vehicle in the convoy should always be one with armed troops facing the rear. If someone suspicious appears from the rear, blast them. The rules of engagement in Iraq have been aggressive, allowing troops to shoot when in doubt, even if an innocent Iraqi gets killed from time to time. This also encourages Iraqi drivers to stay a respectful distance from American convoys. American trucks move thousands of tons of material along Iraqi roads each day. Most of it is moved by troops who do this regularly. These troops receive training before they are assigned to convoy duty, and are briefed before the convoy moves out. On any day, only a few percent of the convoys out there will encounter any hostile behavior (usually rocks thrown at them.) Actual ambushes are rare, and the combat troops and MPs are always looking for roadside bombs and armed Iraqis trying to set up an ambush. Most of the roadside bombs and ambushes are discovered this way, and neutralized. But it's only because of these careful preparations that the American casualty count has been kept so low. The Iraqi attackers suffer far more casualties. American intelligence knows this because they monitor the fees the attackers are often paid to make these attacks. Week by week, Iraqis demand, and get, higher fees for attacking American convoys. It's a risky business, and American troops want to keep it that way. 2004 Sad Summary/Conclusion: U.S. Army still hasn't learned its lesson about vehicles in non-linear warfare: has TRACKS but tells Congress it only can up-armor HMMWV trucks 2 years from now The Army's absurd request for expensive "armored" HMMWVs cannot be armored adequately to protect against RPGs, IEDs and will easily burn up when hit. Their rubber tires will easily catch fire mingling with fuel to create an inferno. The non-sense that armored HMMWVs protect in Iraq fails to realize that the enemy is by choice attacking unarmored HMMWVs; if we squander money/time and have only armored HMMWVs, the enemy will start attacking and destroying them (see photo of knocked-out armored HMMWV above). Furthermore,the HMMWV's poor cross-country mobility, inability to swim will be made even worse when fitted with several pounds of armor. America's Army must be able to fight anywhere in the world and this means in the mud, across rice paddies, and off roads/trails where wheeled vehicles are easily ambushed. The answer is to replace trucks with M113 Gavin TRACKS that can be fitted with the armor nececcary to be RPG-resistant with full cross-country,amphibious mobility. The Army's Tofflerian wheeled computer centralized bureaucracy fantasy is a dismal failure; if you must have computer map screens put them in TRACKED armored vehicles that can PHYSICALLY fight and maneuver and survive the PHYSICAL battlefield of reality. Don't use computers as mental crutches for weak co-dependants who long for WWII-style linear battlefields that don't exist. The making soft-skin vehicles somewhat combat-ready tips depicted here are based on the assumption that they can be done IMMEDIATELY, as in TODAY, not tomorrow or 2 YEARS FROM NOW. Our troops in Iraq/Afghanistan don't have 2 YEARS they need armor protection N-O-W. Yet the Army has lied recently to the American Congress and the American people saying all they can do is up-armor some HMMWV trucks after Congress gives them a big pile of money and even then they'll NEVER be RPG or land-mine resistant. The U.S. Army is indeed lying when it portrays all they can do is provide at best vulnerable rubber-tired wheeled "up-armored HMMWV" trucks to our troops in Iraq after $250, 000 each and 2 years. Maybe the Army's senior leaders don't know all of the vehicles they have, but its doubtful. This is a national security issue that EVERY member of our Congress/Senate needs to know about and act in a bi-partisan way to fix it now. Our Soldiers in combat in Iraq/Afghanistan need TRACKS not trucks---today, not years from now. The Army has THOUSANDS of thick-skinned M113 Gavin light tracked Armored Fighting Vehicles sitting unused in storage that "as-is" are far better than up-armored rubber-tired HMMWV trucks and can be made RPG landmine resistant with extra armor for a few thousand dollars which the Army refuses to buy since it wants to waste $$$BILLIONS on new HMMWVs and Canadian-made Stryker armored cars (trucks) with thin skins. Fortunately, its not too late to fix this; we should stop payment towards further Stryker purchases and upgrade M113 Gavins instead--General Dynamics has failed contract specifications blatantly and one numerous occasions with the Army "lowering the bar" for them. The Iraq guerrillas are not going to "look the other way" at these vulnerabilities. Please do what's right for America's troops and the defense of our people. Contact your Congressman/Senator today! CONTACT CONGRESS: www.geocities.com/paratroop2000/wwwcongress.htm Pictures of up-armored M113 Gavins used by our NATO allies: www.geocities.com/equipmentshop/m113combat.htm 1. The U.S. Army is having its Soldiers drive around Iraq in doorless, fabric-sided HMMWV, fiberglass/thin metal FMTV truck and soon "Stryker" rubber-tired armored cars (essentially trucks) and losing men's lives and limbs daily to roadside bombs; primarily old artillery shells exploding SIDEWAYS into our exposed men. Some Soldiers are foolishly driving around Iraq in gasoline-powered captured or government-provided civilian automobiles; so far 3 are dead from this absurd practice; the situation has gotten out of hand. Official total casualties dead, wounded, accidents is 9,200 people; ruined. This weekend it appears the enemy in Afghanistan has started to command-detonate land mines under unarmored HMMWV trucks when they pass by, maiming a Soldier who lost a leg. When shock journalist Geraldo Rivera can see this and Army generals can't something is very wrong with our military leadership. The Army has THOUSANDS of M113 Gavins, some in war stocks, others simply in STORAGE (see microsoft excel spread sheet in another email). The M113 Gavin as-is has a THICK 1.5" armored skin, metal road wheels and steel tracks with rubber pads. THIS IS FAR MORE ARMOR PROTECTIVE than even "armored HMMWVS" that do not exist yet. You can add applique' armor all around to protect against RPGs and under the belly against running over a land mine. M113 Gavins assigned to the 4th ID and 1AD are already kicking butt in Iraq but need this extra armor and gunshields. The 82nd Airborne and 101st Air Assault in Iraq and in Afghanistan 10th Mountain Divisions DO NOT HAVE ANY ARMORED VEHICLES. This is when over 13,000+ thick-metal hulled M113 Gavin light tracked armored vehicles rolling on metal road roadwheels/tracks are sitting unused in war stocks/storage but could be fitted with extra armor all-around to defeat RPGs and underneath to resist land mines to save our men's lives, BUT THE ARMY IS NOT SUPPLYING ITS MEN IN IRAQ THESE THINGS. Instead the Army has wasted several $BILLION dollars on Canadian-made Stryker rubber-tired armored cars with thin metal skins when it could have adequately armor upgraded the thousands of thicker-skinned M113 Gavins it has and had everyone riding safely inside them in Iraq like the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) does; who incidentally do not lose a man a day in combat areas. Clearly, our Army is too set in its ways to admit it was wrong and to take bold, corrective action to save our men's lives and limbs. Furthermore, simple common sense things like sandbagging and painting your vehicles TAN is also not being done. Photographic proof: http://us.news1.yimg.com/us.yimg.com/p/rids/20031114/i/r2556915053.jpg We have an Army manual stating how to do it, but apparently many units in Iraq are not even trying to protect their men: FM 55-30, ARMY MOTOR TRANSPORT UNITS AND OPERATIONS is the Army's "Bible" for hardening vehicles: www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/55-30/toc.htm specifically: checkout Appendix O at the Reimer Library: www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/55-30/appo.htm Painting dark green helicopters and ground vehicles light gray or tan if they fly/drive during the daytime is not being done, either. The status quo is smugly thought of as being "adequate" as ones and twos of our men are getting killed by command detonated land mines, RPGs and small arms fire attacks each day. The Army is NOT doing ALL it can to win the fight and protect Soldiers' lives and anyone saying otherwise is incorrect. 2. The roadside bomb attacks in Iraq are taking place along a long stretch of highway termed the "Main Supply Route" that only has a handful of Military Police (MPs) checking it for roadside bombs as the combat infantry and engineer troops are kicking down doors in the cities playing "SWAT team/Delta Force" looking for Saddam and his cronies. To secure the MSR we need thousands of COMBAT troops constantly checking for mines and laying ambushes at night to make it safe for our truck drivers to pass. Not having our troops live inside buildings/palaces inside Iraqi cities where they inflame the civilians and instead having them stay in fortified camps along the MSR would free more troops to sweep the roads and do the raids looking for war criminals. 3. The entire U.S. military to include the Army NO longer has 2-seat manned observation fixed-wing aircraft in Iraq to constantly surveil the MSR and are too stubborn to admit that rotary-wing helicopters are too difficult to keep flying in adequate numbers in dirty conditions and too loud and short-ranged to catch the enemy laying road-side bombs. Currently we've lost 491 dead and 1,957 wounded in Iraq, at the current rate of 100 dead/300 wounded per month, by next June when we are set to leave Iraq, we will have suffered 1,200 DEAD and 3,600 wounded or 4,800 people destroyed, all because of Army incompetence. Today the total is 9,200 casualties if you count all injuries and accidents. An Army Division ruined when the Army only has 10 active duty divisions. What the final total will be by June 2004 could be 30,000 or higher at current rates. These are preventable not "acceptable" casualties. Because our men's lives are in dire danger we are calling on Congress to assert civilian control over the U.S. military and pass legislation to force them to supply ALL of our men with the TRACKED armored vehicles, extra armor, gunshields and fixed-wing observation aircraft they need to save their lives and beat the guerrillas in Iraq. "Tracks not trucks: properly armor/arm our men in Iraq NOW" Main Points: 1. Create Engineer Cavalry (ECAV) units; 1st ECAV (for 82nd Airborne), 2nd ECAV (for 101st Air Assault) with light tracked armored vehicles and all the equipment necessary ro defeat roadside bombs and send immediately to Iraq 2. Buy applique' armor, gunshields for M113s/armored MP HMMWVs in Iraq, develop armor/gunshield kit for FMTV supply trucks; ALL OTHER soft-top HMMWVs and FMTVs replaced by up-armored M113 Gavins 3. Replace majority of HMMWVs/FMTVs in Iraq with 500 x uparmored M113A3 Gavins ASAP. A proportional number of M113 Gavins sent to Afghanistan to help the 10th Mountain Division. 4. Officially name M113 the GAVIN after WWII hero General James M. Gavin (Pennsylvania native) who conceived it, so this vehicle gets the respect it deserves so the Army fully exploits it to get the job done and save men's lives 5. Open up M113 Program Manager office again at Anniston Army Depot so 50% of the Army's armored vehicle fleet gets the attention it deserves 6. Allocate funds in Army Defense budget to finish upgrading ALL M113A2s to up-armored, up-engined M113A3 or A4 Hybrid-Electric standards 7. Send at least one squadron of USAF OT-37 jet trainers/pilots with Army observers in right seats to Iraq immediately to get air cover over the MSR in Iraq (Within 60 days) 8. Modify 24 x T-37/A-37s into OA-37C, and the 113 x unused T-3 Firefly observation aircraft to create several Army Air Cav Troops, then train these aircrews and send to Iraq/Afghanistan to meet interim Air Observation requirements (12 months) 9. Buy T-6B version of T-6A Texan II trainers, designate as OV-6Bs, for 2 more Army Air Cav Troops for the Army objective global Air Observation requirements (24 months) 10. Put back immediately into service the former SOUTHCOM 7 x unused C-27A Spartan transports sitting in the boneyard at Davis-Monthan AFB under U.S. Army ownership/control to create an "Airborne Main Supply Route" in Iraq flying safely above roadside ambushers to resupply our troops. As soon as possible these C-27As should be upgraded by Lockheed-Martin of Georgia to C-27J propfan configration to meet the Army's Aviation Restructuring Initiative Multi-Mission Medium Tactical Transport (M3T2) requirements for 54 aircraft. Details: www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/c-27.htm www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/m3t2.htm Snow Aviation of Ohio can also be tasked to take unused C-130A transports also in storage at the Davis-Monthan AFB "boneyard" and put them into operation to create the needed Aiborne MSR in Iraq to reduce the current 300+ ground truck resupply convoys to a more defendable size and number.. 11. Cancel further Canadian Stryker armored car purchases to fee several $BILLION dollars to fund the "Tracks not trucks" for Iraq initiative 12. Cut Army "Future Combat System" R&D program waste, divert funds to "Tracks not trucks: Armor our men in Iraq NOW" program applying technology to existing platforms in combat now in Iraq 13. Identify and promote outspoken reformers like Col Douglas MacGregor (author; "Breaking the Phalanx, "Transformation under Fire") to General Officer rank who are trying to fix America's Army but are getting passed over for promotion due to professional jealousies and bureaucratic corruption; track them and protect them from status quo-defending milicrats so they can create an Army that gets the job done (Win the War on Terrorism) and at same time takes care of the men. 14. Create a "Congressional Military Reform Information Council" (CMRIC) of reformers who will provide Congress with truth about Pentagon weapons, tactics and employment to counter lies and "spin", and identify milicrats in DoD who are standing in the way of progress to true military excellence. CMRIC would report directly to both Senate and House Armed Services Committees to enable them to better understand truth about our military since most representatives have no military backgrounds. 15. Authorize SFC Smith the Congressional Medal of Honor for his life-saving heroism in combat in Iraq Sgt. 1st Class Paul R. Smith, 33 11th Engineer Battalion, 3rd Infantry Division Tampa, Florida Smith, a Combat Engineer, was shot while manning a .50 caliber machine gun to fend off an attack by Iraqi soldiers near the Baghdad airport on April 4, 2003. He has been nominated for the Medal of Honor for his actions. However, there is more to his story. We are worried that his deserved CMH will be downgraded to a lesser medal given without national media/public ceremony to deny any positive publicity for the tracked M113 Gavin which out-performed the wheeled Stryker in tests. Despite this, the Army's leadership under Gen Shinseki still opted for the inferior wheeled vehicle wasting BILLIONS of dollars resulting in 50% of the Army's armored vehicle fleet not getting things like RPG, underbelly applique' armor and gunshields that could have saved SFC Smith's life so he could be a living hero. The monies we've squandered on Stryker could have insured ALL Army Soldiers went to Iraq with rifle-caliber bullet resistant Interceptor Body Armor (IBA). We are certain SFC Smith would be alive if he had a state-of-the-art TC's gunshield on his M113 Gavin: www.geocities.com/equipmentshop/m113combat.htm Is he not going to get the CMH because it would make the M113 Gavin look good and threaten the inferior Stryker armored car?; or simply that his story would raise questions as to why the Army during the 4 years of General Shinseki stopped all maintenance/upgrade funds, and additional armor for the entire M113 fleet? 16. By act of Congress "Soldier" should be spelled with a capital "S" in all official U.S. Government administrative paperwork etc., same thing for USAF "Airmen" and Navy "Sailors"; if we respect the sacrifices our brave men and women make to keep our country free, then we should be willing to lift our fingers in honor of them and render the proper keystroke of respect when talking about them. Save your own life: the Army won't The Army has THOUSANDS of M113 Gavin tracks sitting in storage that could be used as non-linear warfare vehicles and the ARMY REFUSES TO SUPPLY THESE EN MASSE TO REPLACE TRUCKS IN IRAQ TO DRAMATICALLY REVERSE THE SITUATION IN IRAQ. Its the Army's fault because our senior leaders are anti-tracked vehicle afflicted with the wheels 'n computer sickness I described earlier. Below is a form letter we've written to help several Soldiers run up through the chain of command pleading for M113 Gavins which lists the specific locations of M113s in CENTCOM, other war stocks and where they are in storage in CONUS. (e-mail us for these facts). Sample Letter to your Chain of Command (where M113s are in CENTCOM etc.) DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXX 17 January 2004 SUBJECT: Immediate M113 vehicle plus-ups for xxxxxxx deployment to Iraq FROM: 1. ____ x M113 light tracked armored fighting vehicles and ____ x M2 .50 caliber heavy machine guns be supplied to my unit in addition to our existing equipment in light of our new mission as provisional infantry. These equipments are in Army war-stocks and I request in writing an answer to this request. If FORSCOM receives this request I am confident it will be supplied to my men to accomplish the mission and save lives. The following explains why this additional equipment is needed. 2. Why is our Army accepting daily casualties in Iraq, Soldiers in Arlington Cemetary and walking around Walter Reed missing limbs when we have thousands of 11-ton M113 thick-skinned, tracked armored vehicles sitting in storage that could prevent these deaths and maimings? We have strong national backing behind the troops, but we're slowly pissing away national will (center of gravity) to casualties we didn't have to sustain. The current thinking for remedying casualties is to don more heavy gear, operate in larger units, buy more up-armored HMMWVs, put Stryker into the fray and slap make-shift armor kits again on vulnerable rubber-tired vehicles. EXPENSIVE, slow-to-field, doesn't protect the majority of our troops. NOT A RECIPE FOR SUCCESS. The solution for the non-linear battlefield where the enemy can attack in any direction at any time is not more Balkan-style "presence patrols" in inadequately or unprotected HMMWVs/Stryker wheeled vehicles. We are taking dozens of casualties simply "driving to contact". Even up-armor HMMWVs cannot sustain an RPG. What can? Is cheap? What'll work---Now? M113 Gavins---tracked armored fighting vehicles. 3. Our Army has thousands of 1.5" to 1.75" thick-skinned, 11-ton, metal road wheels, steel-tracked M113A3s are widely availability in war stocks to include CENTCOM and older M113A2s are unused storage here in CONUS (attached excel spreadsheet) and can be made land mine/RPG resistant. This information is compelling and should be forwarded with our request to FORSCOM. M113s in war stocks (Army Prepositioned Sets) [M113 Gavins in war stock data write to us if you are a Soldier needed it: itsg@hotmail.com] 4. Cost to to add underbelly and RPG protection to M113 is small; less than $78,000. Much of this add-on armor is already in the supply system. M113 Gavin RPG resistant applique' armor Passive Armor: www.rafael.co.il/division/ordnance/arm_prod_line/passive.html Active Armor: www.rafael.co.il/division/ordnance/arm_prod_line/reactive.html M113 Gavin underbelly armor Belly Armor Kit / Cage No. 80212, P/N 4240277 Chapter III: Growth of U.S. Armored Forces in Vietnam www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/Vietnam/mounted/chapter3.htm "To reduce mine damage to M113's, "belly armor" kits arrived in 1969. When this supplemental armor was applied to M113's and Sheridans, it protected them from mine blast rupture, saved many lives, and gave the crews added confidence" M113 Gavin Gunshields NSNs Track Commander's Cupola Shield Kit, Machine Gun / 2510-00-121-8990 Shield, Protective / 2510-01-006-4587 TC's cupola gunshields + side gunshields for the two troop hatch MGs The NSN number for the complete Gun Shield Kit including the cargo hatch side shields is NSN 2590-00-121-8990. AMDF price is $11,708.00. Check the Army supply system for availability(?) If the "system" doesn't have the shields (likely) the DSC bids for someone to make them like they did in 1999: 25 - SOL:SHIELD KIT, MACHINE GUN (10/29/99) http://www.fbodaily.com/cbd/archive/1999/10(October)/29-Oct-1999/25sol001.htm COMMERCE BUSINESS DAILY ISSUE OF OCTOBER 29,1999 PSA#2465 Defense Supply Center Columbus, PO Box 16595, DSCC-PBAB, Columbus, OH 43216-6595 25 -- SHIELD KIT, MACHINE GUN SOL SP075000R2737 DUE 121799 POC For Information Only, Point of Contact -- Carol Black Phone:614-692-1346 Fax: 614-692-1577 NSN: 2590-00-121-8990, YPC99201000244. Shield Kit, Machine Gun. Made in accordance with Army drawing 11660854 and all current related data. Full and open competition applies. Quantity is 52 each to be delivered within 150 days after date of award to Richmond, Va. All responsible sources may submit an offer which shall be considered. See note(s) 12 and 26. Copies of this solicitation are available at the address above or by faxing 614-692-2262 or e-mailing: incoord @ dscc.dla.mil and will not be available until 15 days after this notice is published in the CBD. Requests should include the company name, address and solicitation number(s). The small business size standard is 750 employees. Technical drawings/bid sets are available from DSCC-VTCD via one of the following medias: internet at http://abiweb.disc.dla.mil; facsimile at 614-692-2344; e-mail at drawings @ dscc.dla.mil or by mail at Defense Supply Center Columbus, ATTN: DSCC-VTCD, P O Box 3990, Columbus, OH. 43216-5000. Requests should include theRFP number, opening/closing date, NSN, Purchase Request number (e.g. YPC), Buyer's name and your complete name and address. FEDERAL, MILITARY AND COMMERCIAL SPECIFICATIONS CANNOT BE PROVIDED BY DSCC. Proposed procurement contains a 100% option for increase quantities. This is an unrestricted acquisition. While price may be a significant factor in the evaluation of offers, the final award decision will be based upon a combination of price, delivery, past performance and other evaluation factors as described in the solicitation. Estimated issue date is 18 Nov 99. Posted 10/27/99 (W-SN395719). (0300) Loren Data Corp. http://www.ld.com (SYN# 0194 19991029\25-0001.SOL) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 25 - Vehicular Equipment Components Index Page However if you don't want to waste months playing with DSC because your men are getting shot at in places like Iraq/Afghanistan, United Defense, the maker of the M113 Gavin can deliver 44 kits in 20-22 weeks. Their price would be around $8,000 per kit, saving you about 4K per kit. Understand that cost does not come into play when we are talking about the safety of our troops but $176,000 buys a hell of a lot of beans and bullets...or better yet more gunshields! POC: Mr. Tom Reuter United Defense M113 Field Service & Spares (800) 235-0015 Ext: 825 cell @ 256-453-7049 5. M113s are simple to operate and maintain. You could train a Soldier in a week quite well. You don't have 1 DA or civilian contractor per company running around like in SBCTs. The class IX is already in our supply system. The M113 is a multi-purpose vehicle: CSS, INF, ENG, MED. If you want to understand urban ops with a permissive and non-permissive environment blurring, and how to operate in it, look at Israel which oprerates thousands of up-armored M113s and doesn't lose a man a day in combat operations like we are in Iraq. Things Israelis know: a. Tracked "Tanks rule"! b. Tanks rule only when working well with infantry c. Helicopters are great killers: but fly high, fly irregular patterns to avoid shoot-downs. The Longbow is great for precision interdiction. Paint them light tan or gray so they are harder to detect, track and hit during the day time. d. HUMINT is decisive. e. Snipers are far more crucial than home station training, manning, employment lend them to be f. Muslim culture: if it looks bad ass- it is bad ass! Current enemy thinking: "Attack it if it has wheels, if it has tracks, leave it alone, it will shoot back and kill you" g. That ugly, primitive, simple tracked IDF M113 still is ubiquitious and highly successful: it's heavily armored, it dismounts SOF and infantry, engineers to achieve decisive effects Are we willing to lose more men than the Beirut barracks to IEDs and RPGs because our leaders are too worried about careers or the funding of Stryker to ask the hard questions of a caring Combat Commander: Why can't I have M113s? They are sitting in storage awaiting a use. Would we rather have me and my men die than weld or strap plates to the side of my HMMWV or wait for expensive and inadequate kits? A Ford Explorer SUV has better armor! SSG Paul Johnson, 1-505 was KIA in Iraq from an IED. He didn't die right away. He died after a few minutes from burns. His HMMWV was blasted and burned. An up-armored M113 would have kept rolling and he'd be alive today. 6. HQDA PAO spokesman, Major Tallman recently stated in a DEFENSE WEEK article "that no ground commander has requested M113s". This is not accurate, WE and many others ARE REQUESTING more M113s to fully equip our Soldiers with armored mobility and a means to aggressively fight back behind gunshields. Our men are going into harm's way and do not need to be put off with bureaucratic excuses about "MTOEs" and "TRADOC procedures"; we need the tools we require to accomplish the mission and get our men home alive and well. If combat commanders knew M113s were available even more would request them. However, there is no reason why upgraded M113s couldn't be supplied immediately to us as a "test case" that could be expanded to be applied to the rest of the Army. 7. Iraqi Freedom Key Facts to Date * 250 Soldiers killed by RPGs and IEDs in unarmored 3-ton HMMWV, 10-ton FMTV and thin-skinned 20-ton Stryker trucks or on foot that could have been saved had they been in up-armored M113s * 2000 Soldiers wounded and maimed from all types of attacks, specific causes not known, but at same ratio as KIAs would likely mean 1000 Soldiers could have been saved disfigurement had they been in up-armored M113s * Rebuilding up-armored but still thin-skinned 4+ ton HMMWVs will require two years which at current casualty rates will mean 250 more dead and 500 more wounded by next June's planned major troop reductions * Up-armored HMMWVs severely stressed by weight their engine and suspension systems are not designed to handle will be even more road-restricted than current HMMWVs and will incur drastically higher operations and maintenance costs negating any desired cost advantages * M113A3 tracks and engines can easily accept the extra armor/gunshield weights necessary to attain land mine/IED and RPG protection without excessive O & M costs * Enemy is not targeting up-armored HMMWVs with weapons mounts, it's not accurate to assume up-armoring will protect our Soldiers when we know vehicle is too light to not be tossed into air by land mines/IEDs and cannot be armored to protect against RPGs * If we up-armor all our HMMWV trucks at a cost of $250,000 each, the enemy will be forced to discover that they are NOT adequately landmine/IED and RPG protected and incur more friendly casualties despite 2 years and $239 million dollars * Up-armoring M113s will cost $78,000 per vehicle and make them far more protected from land mines/IEDs and resistant to RPGs than any existing Army wheeled vehicle and this can be done in a matter of weeks * The up-armored M113s are far more cross-country mobile than any wheeled vehicle to fully traverse the entire desert-urban terrain of Iraq to render more effective pre-emptive convoy security clearing of land mines/IEDs and small-arms/RPG ambushes * M113s have a lower center-of-gravity than Army wheeled vehicles. M113s can swim and at least float if they should drive into an Iraqi river or marsh saving Soldier lives now being lost in roll-overs. 8. There may be built-in resistance to upgrading M113s within those that prescribe to the former CSA's wheeled vision but their private agendas should not matter when we can and should save lives and limbs with upgraded or even as-is M113s. It would be highly embarrassing to the Army that Soldiers were killed/maimed just because a mere 10 more M113 armored vehicles were denied a commander headed for combat. 9. Upgraded M113s would have a "home" in our Army after Iraq for non-linear war The Stryker armored car purchase is very expensive at $3 million per vehicle and only affects 5 brigades out of 33 in the active Army. If a larger number of M113s were upgraded to get the majority of our troops out of trucks in Iraq, there is an easy "home" for them in the current/future force post-Iraq: supply them to the Delta Weapons Companies and Scout platoons in our light/heavy Divisions who now use inadequate HMMWV trucks for anti-tank and security missions. M113s are fully C-130 air-transportable, combat-loaded to include parachute air-drop. Furthermore, Light Sapper Combat Engineer units with HMMWV trucks transformed to upgraded M113s would be able for the first time to breach under armor using rocket line clearing charges and greater safety. Their brethren, Heavy Division Sappers use old M113s now and need upgraded M113s, too. These M113s could be fitted with hybrid-electric drives, band tracks and the full C4I digital networking features now only resident in the 4th ID and a handful of Stryker wheeled brigades, transforming the rest of our Army to "Future Combat System" capabilities. 10. Specific Requirements XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 11. POC for this memorandum is (xxx) xxx-xxxx Soldier XXXXXXXXXX unit XXXX UPI.com November 14, 2003 U.S. Casualties From Iraq War Top 9,000 By Mark Benjamin, United Press International WASHINGTON -- The number of U.S. casualties from Operation Iraqi Freedom -- troops killed, wounded or evacuated due to injury or illness -- has passed 9,000, according to new Pentagon data. In addition to the 397 service members who have died and the 1,967 wounded, 6,861 troops were medically evacuated for non-combat conditions between March 19 and Oct. 30, the Army Surgeon General's office said. That brings total casualties among all services to more than 9,200, and represents an increase of nearly 3,000 non-combat medical evacuations reported since the first week of October. The Army offered no immediate explanation for the increase. A leading veterans' advocate expressed concern. "We are shocked at the dramatic increase in casualties," said Steve Robinson, executive director of the National Gulf War Resource Center. Of the non-combat medical evacuations: -- 2,464 were for injuries, such as those sustained in vehicle accidents. -- 4,397 were due to illness; 504 of those were classified as psychiatric, 378 as neurological, and another 150 as neurosurgery. "We are especially concerned about the psychological and neurological evacuations from this war," Robinson said. "We request a clarification of the types of illnesses people are suffering from so we do not have a repeat of the first Gulf War. We need to understand the nature and types of illnesses so scientists can determine if significant trends are occurring." Army Surgeon General's Office spokeswoman Virginia Stephanakis told United Press International Thursday that it is misleading to combine psychiatric and neurological problems. Some of the neurosurgery might be operations on the spinal cord, for example. "Those are apples and oranges," she said. She also said that some troops evacuated for psychiatric reasons later returned after getting a rest. In early October, the Army Surgeon General's office said 3,915 Soldiers had been evacuated from Operation Iraqi Freedom for non-combat injuries and illnesses, including 478 with psychological problems and 387 for neurological reasons. The new total of 6,861 reported non-combat evacuations is a rise of 57 percent since then. The latest data on non-combat evacuations includes 1,628 orthopedic (bone) injuries. Other leading causes for evacuations include: 831 surgeries for injuries; 289 cardiology cases; 249, gastrointestinal; 242, pulmonary (lung); 634, general surgery; 319, gynecological; 290, urological; 37, dental. Stephanakis said the pulmonary problems included Soldiers who suffered from pneumonia as part of a cluster investigated by the Army in August. The numbers don't include service members treated in theater or those whose illnesses -- such as Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder -- were not apparent until after they returned to the United States. ********************************************* ARMY: $250,000 per HMMWV that will NEVER be RPG resistant. Rolls on air-filled rubber tires. Needs 2 years to produce them. COMMON SENSE: $25K per vehicle and in 30 days we could have RPG resistant M113 Gavins rolling on steel tracks with rubber pads and metal road wheels IN IRAQ SAVING LIVES AND WINNING FIREFIGHTS. Uncertainty rules at AM General [Armored Humvee Manufacturer] http://209.157.64.200/focus/f-news/1031083/posts Indianapolis Star ^ | November 28, 2003 | Ted Evanoff DETROIT -- The battle for Iraq has been a mobile fight where many of the 130,000 U.S. troops rely on the Humvee army truck made in Mishawaka, Ind., to get through deserts, swamps and ambushes. Now the U.S. Army's Tank-armament and Automotive Command in suburban Detroit wants more Humvees toughened to withstand bullets and metal fragments sprayed by explosives. In a program that would bring the vehicle far beyond its 1985 origin as a sturdy replacement for the jeep, military planners intend to nearly triple orders for Humvees plated in protective high-tech layers called armor. It would mark the first time that AM General Corp.'s 700-employee Humvee plant would devote nearly half of its annual production to an armored vehicle. And it comes as company owner Renco Group of New York decides whether to sell its now-valuable truck business. As the only source of a workhorse truck in wide use during a war, South Bend-based AM General could fetch as much as $1 billion. While the future ownership of the largest defense contractor based in Indiana remains unsettled, the Iraq campaign has spotlighted its work truck. "The Army would like more M1114s and they'd like them fairly quickly, but that has not yet shaken out," said AM General spokesman Craig MacNab, referring to armored Humvees by the model designation. Mishawaka workers would assemble the base vehicle for shipment to the Cincinnati-area plant of O'Gara-Hess & Eisenhardt. A producer of armored limousines and security vehicles, the firm is owned by Armor Holdings Inc. of Jacksonville, Fla. The Ohio plant would add protective steel layered between ceramic, woven fabric and high-tech plastic coats designed to disperse explosive forces. An armored Humvee loaded with communication gear, standard equipment and a turbocharged 6.5-liter General Motors diesel costs about $250,000, compared to $150,000 for the unarmored vehicle. Through summer, about 90 U.S. casualties in Iraq were reported in unarmored Humvees that had nosed into combat zones. Up to now, few of the 140,000-plus Humvees produced over the years in Mishawaka have been armored. Capable of assembling more than 20,000 vehicles a year, AM General makes about 4,000 to 6,000 Humvees a year, including foreign orders, and 600 to 800 of the consumer versions sold by General Motors Corp. as the Hummer H1 luxury sport-utility. In a separate Mishawaka plant, AM General also makes GM's Hummer H2, a smaller sport-utility resembling the H1 and sold only to consumers. Last year, Armor Holdings' Ohio plant fitted 623 Humvees. This year, an expanded plant expects to armor 800 of the trucks, company executives told stock analysts in early summer. With the various appropriation bills moving through Congress, the number in 2004 could more than triple. AM General's MacNab said some reports forecast volumes could rise to 220 a month, or 2,640 armored Humvees in a year. In addition, the $87 billion Iraq reconstruction measure includes $177 million for 700 Humvees and spare parts. The Army's tank command near Detroit can have those vehicles armored as well, MacNab said, although the size of the Ohio plant appears to limit the number of vehicles it can handle to about 220 a month. Despite the war, AM General has had no production boom. Humvees survived the campaign to quickly seize Baghdad largely unscathed. But since the spring offensive, Humvees have been in a spate of ambushes. And many of the vehicles, including those in Afghanistan, are in constant use, approaching the end of their 15-year life cycle. "The prospect is bright there will be an increase rather than a decrease in orders," MacNab said. More orders would not automatically lead to hiring more workers. AM General could push back production of regular Humvees while it produces a year's worth of armored models in a few months. With its distinct low and square profile, Humvees are the military's first replacement for the jeep, the small off-road vehicle pioneered in the 1930s. The Pentagon's original Humvee specifications called for a 1.25-ton truck capable of easily climbing a sheer wall 23 inches high with 2,500 pounds of cargo, fuel and Soldiers. The result was a short truck, about as long as the 189-inch Honda Accord midsized sedan. But it was wider than the extra-large Chevrolet Suburban sport-utility. And its four-wheel-drive system, four-speed GM automatic transmission and independent suspension could move it over rock piles and out of deep mud impassable to most SUVs. Today, Humvees look much alike. The silhouette is set off by a small vertical front windshield, purposely vertical to cut down on sun glare that might be seen from aircraft. Despite the common profile, the vehicles come in about 50 styles. All have the all-terrain drive system. Most are built for particular duties. Their cabins are designed for either soldiers, rockets, machine guns, ammunition, weapons, wounded or radios. One version has a rear cabin slanted down like a hatchback car to avoid blasts from the vehicle's rocket launcher. One of the lightest models, at 6,500 pounds, is made for commandos and has no doors or sides. It contains machine gun mounts and hooks on the back for water and ammunition bags. The heaviest, at 12,100 pounds, uses a beefier suspension to carry a small house for a heavy load of radios, cell phones, satellite communications gear and sometimes radar. Military officials had considered a larger truck in the 15,000-pound range. Its bigger cabin would house more Soldiers and more electronic gear for them to operate. So far, those plans haven't solidified. Apparently because of the war's cost, a pair of other projects are on hold -- the next-generation Humvee and a hybrid-electric model. The hybrid was intended to reduce fuel use by uniting a large electric motor and smaller diesel. Even though AM General may be up for sale, U.S. Department of Defense officials have expressed no concern about the Indiana company's possible change of hands, MacNab said. The Humvee plant is managed by Carter Hamilton, formerly manager of GM's transmission plant at Willow Run, Mich., which supplies the Humvee. AM General owner Renco Group has considered selling the Indiana truck business to raise funds for an underfunded pension fund at its troubled steel mill at Warren, Ohio. WCI Steel Inc., formerly part of Republic Steel, sought protection from creditors in September while it drafts a reorganization plan under federal bankruptcy law. General Motors has an option to buy 40 percent of AM General. The option was included to protect GM's supply of Hummers when it bought the brand marketing rights in 1999 from AM General. GM's Hummer division has had the corporation's lawyers review the situation, but GM has taken no action. "We've been aware it's up for sale, or at least he's been testing the waters to see the value of AM General," said GM Hummer spokesman Pete Ternes, referring to Ira Lennert, the New York financier who controls Renco. Many automotive analysts doubt GM would take over AM General. If it is for sale, GM would probably bring in a partner such as giant Ontario auto parts maker Magna International Inc. to run the Indiana truck business, said auto analyst Chris Struve of the credit rating agency Fitch & Co. of Chicago. In recent years, GM has spun off divisions and sought joint venture partners in an effort to conserve cash. Renco asked several potential investors early this year to consider buying the truck business. Legal rulings say Renco must cover WCI's $100 million pension deficit, said Gary Hubbard, a spokesman in Washington for the United Steel Workers of America union. Renco owns Kentucky coal, Missouri lead and Utah magnesium mines. But the mining firms have deep legal or financial problems, leaving AM General as the one profitable line within Renco. In November, WCI came up with $5 million for its quarterly payment to the pension fund. And the steel mill's creditors lost a legal challenge in which they demanded Renco make the pension payment rather than WCI. Surviving the legal challenge may have taken some pressure off Renco to sell the truck business. Renco spokesman Jon Goldberg said no effort is currently under way to divest AM General. Lennert, a billionaire regarded as one of the wealthiest people in America, acquired both WCI and AM General from the former LTV Corp. Call Star reporter Ted Evanoff at 1-313-417-9215. *************************************************************** So here is the Army Iraq plan: hand-off the Iraq mess to the Reserves/National Guard and make them ride to their deaths in up-armored wheeled HMMWV wheeled trucks. The perfect bureaucratic answer. 1. Reservists can screw up and no regular Army careers will be threatened 2. Wheeled HMMWVs will be cheap to operate so monies can be spent on toys for the regular Army Soldiers 3. Nobody changes, light infantry remains screwed up w/o armored mobility 4. Easier on logisticians who don't have to move any of the tracked AFVs which have saved our men's lives and kicked the enemy's butts like the recent ambush the 4th ID thwarted killing 46 Iraqi guerrillas. If this is not a set-up for FAILURE, what is? Reserve, NG To Take Iraq Combat Associated Press November 26, 2003 WASHINGTON - The Pentagon's plan for replacing the 130,000 American troops in Iraq with a fresh contingent early next year will shrink the force by 20 percent, change its makeup and place more of the combat burden on the National Guard and Reserve. If carried out as planned, the switchout will result in a more mobile force, perhaps better suited to the guerrilla-style war that is taking a sobering toll in U.S. deaths and injuries. The first changes in that direction will be seen even before the newly designated replacement force arrives. A contingent of 5,000 Soldiers in a combat team called the Stryker Brigade, from Fort Lewis, Wash., is training in Kuwait to prepare for duty in Iraq. They are equipped with a new, speedier lightly armored troop carrier and sophisticated communications tools to enable Soldiers to more effectively locate guerrilla threats. The Stryker Brigade is likely to see action in the so-called Sunni Triangle, the area between Baghdad, Ramadi and Tikrit where resistance to U.S. forces has been the deadliest. "It is absolutely optimized for this kind of fight," said Lt. Gen. Richard Cody, the Army's deputy chief of staff for operations, who is overseeing the Army's provision of fresh forces. The Army is calling on the National Guard and Reserve to contribute more next year - and not just in supporting roles. Three Guard infantry brigades will be there, of which at least two will see combat. Nearly 40 percent of the 105,000 troops in the new force will be National Guard and Reserve. That compares with about a 20 percent share in the current force of 130,000 troops. And it won't be just Army reservists; the marines plan to use about 6,000 of their Citizen-Soldiers. The main replacement force will arrive over a four-month period, from January through April. They will be lighter and more agile than the units they replace; they'll have two-thirds fewer tanks and Bradley armored troop carriers, trading firepower for mobility. An armored division like the 1st Cavalry Division, for example, will equip two of the three battalions in each of its brigades with Humvee utility vehicles instead of tanks and Bradleys. The 1st Cavalry, based at Fort Hood, Texas, will actually be larger than a normal division, since it will operate with the 39th Infantry Brigade of the Arkansas National Guard. The switch away from heavy armored forces has created such demand for Humvees that the Army is pulling every available one (fortified with add-on armor) out of bases in the United States and Europe, Cody said. The Army is so stretched for soldiers that it is imposing "stop-loss" on all units designated for duty in Iraq, Kuwait and Afghanistan. That means those troops cannot leave the service even if they planned to retire. The clamp will remain for the duration of their duty in Iraq plus three months beyond, Cody said. The 1st Cavalry likely will be responsible for the Baghdad area, replacing the 1st Armored Division. The 1st Infantry Division, coming from several locations in Germany, will be joined by the 30th Infantry Brigade of the North Carolina National Guard. They probably will operate in place of the 4th Infantry and 101st Airborne divisions in northern Iraq, including the Kurdish area. The Bush administration had counted on getting a multinational division to replace the 101st Airborne, but that has not panned out. Multinational divisions led by Britain and Poland will continue operating in the less volatile south-central and southeastern parts of Iraq. Elements of the 1st marine division, joined by one active-duty Army brigade, are expected to be assigned to western Iraq, including the Fallujah area that has been especially hostile to U.S. forces. The 1st marine division played a major role in the invasion of Iraq in March and capture of Baghdad in April, then operated in south-central Iraq until handing off responsibility to the Polish-led group in September. The Army, which has shouldered most of the burden in Iraq in recent months and taken almost all of the casualties, is stretched so thin around the world that it will have to extend Soldiers' tours of duty in Afghanistan to make the Iraq 2004 rotation plan work. The 10th Mountain Division had been scheduled to end a six-month tour in Afghanistan in February, but will stay three months longer. Its designated replacement, the 25th Infantry Division, will serve for 12 months instead of the previously planned six months, Army officials said. FEEDBACK! E-mail 1st TSG (A) 1997 update from Stewart and Stevenson, maker of the FMTV: "RE: In response to your questions from May 18th. We do not have anti-mine kits yet. The Army is talking about such kits, but development has not yet begun. Same for the center-line troop seats and a quick latch tailgate. S&S could do such a set-up, but no one has asked for it yet." Dave Christensen [2003] An Army officer writes in: "When elements of V Corps arrived in Kuwait this time last year they had brand new GREEN vehicles. Those things were so pretty it was a shame to have to use them. And people are now starting to see it as a problem? The big problem I see is that for all the years the military has known that the [Middle East] ME would be our major engagement area they continue to paint everything green. Exposure to CARC is not a joke and those short-term effects will manifest themselves as long-term health effects. CARC is as dangerous as the chemicals it is supposed to protect us from. Lets get some of those bureaucrats that's forcing this issue to come out and ride with the troops for awhile---in Iraq. The simple solution since chemical weapons attacks are not likely is to use commercially available paint and stencil in big letters NON CARC PAINT." From : xxxxxx Sent : Saturday, July 16, 2005 1:44 PM To : itsg@hotmail.com Subject : Sir, Thank you so much for your insights "I'm currently a cadet in an ROTC program with a desire to become an armor officer when I get my commission. I have to say I agree 110% of everything you mentioned in your website. Your insights are among greatest military minds and of most experienced Soldiers. It is a shame that the U.S. Army is not led by men of your caliber, instead, our troops are cursed with men like General Shinseki, Donald Rumsfeld, and the rest of the pencil-pushing bureaucrats in the Pentagon that continues to needlessly sacrifice our finest volunteered warriors by betraying them with 3rd rated armor and vehicles. When I become an armor officer, I will apply everything I've learned from you to ensure that my troops are among the best protected warriors. When I was an E-4 specialist, I was fortunate enough to be deployed to Landstuhl Medical Center, Germany where my job was to help care for our maimed and wounded warriors from down range. It aches my heart to see first hand the consequences of these fine men and women to be forced into patrols and convoys in those stupid coffin on wheels knowns as the M1114 Hummvee. It angers me even more to see that after 2 years and our K.I.A now at nearly 1,500, those pen pushing bureaucrats in the Pentagon have yet to take our troops out of the Humvee and put them into the M113 Gavins. Where are America's great generals as in WW II? Why in the 21st Century must the U.S. Army be plagued with some of the most incompetence generals whose mentalities are still stuck back in the U.S. Civil War ? i.e......."Line up the Troops, SHOOTS, AND WAIT TO GET SHOT" ! This is same mentality of our generals and commanders have when they put our troops into the Humvee, run up and down a highway waiting for an E.I.D. to go off ! THEY ARE KILLING US TO EASY ! AND WE ARE LETTING THEM ! I had always been an advocates of armored vehicles when the War started, and it shocked me to see half a dozen of soldiers packed into a bare frame Humvee driving down the roads of Iraq. When the I.E.D. starts to become a daily fact of life, I even proposed the idea of "Concealed Patrols" to an infantry captain in an casual talk. I remember him brushing off my idea at first, then said that "this war is going to be fight the way the Corporations want it...... they want to put Humvee out there to be meals for I.E.D so they can build newer and better Humvees at the expense of soldier's lives." The idea was to have our troops patrol in Iraqi civilian vehicles to eliminate the bulky Humvee profile that the insurgents look for when the detonate the I.E.D. These disguised patrols will have concealed and synchronized strobe lights for IFF purposes and each unit will fuction the same way unmarked police vehicles does. Such tactics will allow us to blend in and use the enemy's greatest advantages agaisnt them. In this unconventional war, only unconventional thinking and pragmatic minds will prevail." xxxx Private Murphy's View Want Murphy in Your Pocket? On your desk? Return to U.S. Army Airborne Equipment Shop