cooperation between the Airborne units and the troop-carrier units was excellent. Nevertheless, the operation failed for several reasons. The German strength and ability to react was certainly underestimated. This, coupled with the poor weather on the days following the initial assault, the loss of critical radio communication and some basic flaws in the plan, led to the 1st Airborne Division's failure to gain and hold the last objective, the bridges at Arnhem. The decision by the Royal Air Force to avoid the expected enemy anti-aircraft flak in the vicinity of Arnhem and to drop the British 1st Airborne Division nearly seven miles to the west of the town, is still the subject of much debate. Needles to say, the [British] Airborne forces did not fare well, even against the single mechanized battalion that blocked their advance to Arnhem. Subsequent mobile German reserves crushed the light Airborne forces west of Arnhem before the XXX British Corps could linkup. Despite the [Mech Force] failure at Arnhem, the Allies, in a matter of days, still cut a 60 miles deep corridor into the German northern flank, spearheading a significant advance in the Allies lines. The operation proved that the Airborne theory of warfare was effective and that big Airborne operations were worth the enormous effort and resources involved in mounting them. (41)

[Editor: Ironic isn't it that the Airborne held out for days on end waiting for the "mech" forces--the failure at Arnhem was with XXX Corps not having the agility in the first place to swim---requiring the bridges in the first place. Had they had a BMD/M113 Gavin type swimming AFV these forces could have crossed the Dutch rivers at any spot of their choosing, then built their own bridging--like the Indians did to win the war in East Pakistan in 1971. Those that want to fight comfortable war without risk invariably take too long to get their toys together and the enemy is waiting for them in ambush.]

www.youtube.com/watch?v=o44BvtQxOV4

The best planned and executed Airborne operation of the war was also the last. Operation Varsity had two Airborne divisions, the British 6^th and the American 17^th, drop within range of friendly artillery on the far bank of the Rhine River in support of the Second Army's river crossing near the town of Wesel. Because of the expected anti-aircraft fire, the Paratroopers were to be delivered as quickly as possible. By flying tight formations using Vs of V (virtually nine airplanes abreast), the troop-carriers reduced the time required to airdrop a Regiment to 10 minutes. (42) At 1000 hours, 24 March 1945, almost 19,000 men were delivered onto four drop zones and four landing zones within 40 minutes. This massive airdrop was accomplished using primarily the C-47 [and some new C-46] aircraft which has a troop carrying capacity of only 20 men, less than one-seventh that of our current C-141B aircraft (20 versus 155 Paratroopers). Given the time (four years) and the resources, the Allied Airborne forces evolved into a powerful tactical weapon. With each operation, more and more of the difficulties of executing Airborne warfare were overcome. The final operation, Operation Varsity, was a tribute to their successful development of the vertical envelopment. Meanwhile, the development of the Soviet Airborne had regressed.

Unlike the Western Allies, the Soviets were unable to develop their Airborne forces during the war. As noted earlier, the rapid evolution of the Soviet Airborne in the 1930s, under Marshal Tukhachevsky, was cut short by the purges of Stalin in 1937-1938. Still, the Soviets had a fairly substantial Airborne force during the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-40, six 3,000 man Airborne Brigades and three 1,660 man Airborne regiments, well over 20,000 Airborne troops. Despite the numbers, the development of Airborne doctrine had stopped in 1938. The Airborne forces used in Finland were either wiped out or achieved insignificant gains in the overall progress of the battle. They failed for many of the same reasons the American Airborne failed in Sicily:

[Editor: OOPS! the author needs to be consistant with his own writings here. The only failure at Sicily was in the Air Delivery means, NOT the Airborne itself]

general inexperience, unskilled pilots, poor communications and widely dispersed delivery. Yet, unlike the Americans following Sicily, the Soviet High Command lost confidence in the Airborne concept and halted Airborne operations in Finland, committing its Airborne forces as infantry. This set a precedent for its later extensive use of Paratroopers as infantrymen in World War II. (43) The Soviets did take advantage of the mobility of their Airborne forces during the unopposed occupation of Romania in June of 1940. In response to the collapse of France in May-June of 1940, three Airborne brigades were deployed forward of the advancing ground forces to capture important points and to maintain order. (44)

In the year before Hitler launched his attack against the Soviet Union, there was a major reappraisal of the Soviet Armed Forces at the highest levels. The lessons of the Spanish Civil War, the Finnish campaign and Germany's stunning successes in France and Belgium led to the conclusion that, "modern war...called for a large armored and Airborne forces because they were so mobile." (45) The new Soviet Commissar of Defense, S.K. Timoshenko, reinforced the need for Airborne forces when he said:

The experience of the World War II in the West showed that the high tempo and success of an operational offensive were secured by the massive use of tanks, aviation and artillery in cooperation with motorized forces and Airborne forces. The development of a tactical penetration into an operational-strategic one was made possible by introduction of mobile forces into the penetration and by operations of Airborne forces. (46)

The Soviets rushed to heed Timoshenko's words. The Ministry of Defense established a special Airborne administration, taking the Airborne forces away from the control of the Red Army air force, and increasing the size of the force from six brigades to five corps, totaling almost 100,000 men. But like the rapid expansion of the American Airborne, these forces were undermanned, poorly equipped, inadequately trained and lacked transport aircraft. On 22 June 1941, Operation Barbarrossa caught the Soviet Airborne forces in the middle of their expansion. (47)

The rush of German successes in the initial months of the war, the lack of transport aircraft and the elite nature of the forces resulted in the Soviet High Command's commitment of these forces as motorized infantry units. They were used to support crumbling units in

key locations and to block deep penetrations of advancing German panzer units. Several other factors also contributed to the use of the Airborne as infantry. First, Germany maintained air superiority for much of the war. Second, with the Soviet Union on the defense and in retreat, the opportunity for offensive Airborne operations during the first year of the war was very limited. Third, the priority for the use of the transport aircraft early in the war was to evacuate heavy industry to points beyond the Urals. Finally, with such a substantial threat to the very existence of the Soviet Union, the High Command was unwilling to leave a large number of infantrymen out of action until the combat situation favored their use.

Despite the competing requirements for the use of their Airborne troops and the significant resources required with their use as an Airborne force, the Soviets included Airborne forces in their first major counterattack, the Moscow counteroffensive (December 1941 to June 1942). The German drive for Moscow had fallen short and the Germans were exhausted. Their casualties in men and equipment were high. The Soviets were undoubtedly aware of the German condition and anxious to ensure the security of Moscow. The plan was to throw all available forces at the German Army Group Center in an attempt to drive it away from Moscow and destroy it. With the bulk of the ground forces attacking the German army group from the front, an entire Soviet Airborne corps was dropped into the army group's rear, near the town of Vyaz'ma, to aid in the encirclement and destruction of the enemy. The operational use of the Airborne forces was a bold attempt to follow the prewar prescription for success, offensive deep battle. Unfortunately for the Soviets, the Airborne operation failed for several reasons and of the 14,000 men who jumped into Vyaz'ma only 4,000 survived the ordeal. (48)

The failure of the Soviet 4^th Airborne Corps at Vyaz'ma was the result of poor planning, insufficient firepower, limited mobility and significant weather constraints. The planning was hasty and incomplete. The planned movement of the aircraft and personnel was confusing at best. Of the 600 aircraft needed to execute the initial Brigade airdrop in one lift, only 62 were assigned. (49) The coordination between the Airborne force and the main front linkup force was nonexistent. The lack of artillery and heavy weapons substantially diminished the Airborne force's striking power. Additionally, the heavy snows (up to three feet deep) and harsh temperatures (-22' to -50'F) significantly affected the foot mobile Airborne units and resulted in their encirclement by the more mobile German forces. These German units were given plenty of time to respond to the initial assault, which took six days to complete. The foot mobility and limited firepower of the Soviet Airborne thwarted the High Command's ambitious plans and its first operational use of Airborne forces ended in disaster. (50)

The Soviets conducted their second and final operational level Airborne assault of the war in September 1943 during the Soviet advance to the Dnepr River. Three Airborne Brigades were ordered to secure a bridgehead over the Dnepr River, south of Kiev, to support the Soviets' crossing of the Dnepr in pursuit of the withdrawing Germans. This operation failed for many of the same reasons the Vyaz'ma operation failed. However, the most significant flaw in the operation was in the Soviets' estimate of the German opposition. While reconnaissance of the objective area three days prior to the operation revealed very little German activity, on the day of the airdrop the Airborne force was met by almost five German Divisions. Of the 4,575 men that jumped, over 60% were lost. "It is understandable that the Dnepr operation was the Soviets' last major Airborne operation. Even compared to the Vyaz'ma

ordeal of 1942, the Dnepr operation is a classic case of how not to conduct and Airborne operation." (51)

The Soviets' experiences at both Vyaz'ma and Dnepr revealed the weaknesses of their Airborne forces: the shortage of lift aircraft, the inability to deliver the forces accurately and the inability of the light units to compete with the German firepower and mobility. The continued shortage of lift aircraft and manpower ruled out further large-scale Airborne operations, whose chances the Soviets rated as only marginal. For the remainder of the war the Airborne forces would serve in a role that the Soviet Army was more accustomed and better trained to perform, namely, infantry ground operations.(52)

Although their operational use of Airborne forces had ended,, the Soviets still used occasional tactical assaults, particularly diversionary airdrops, because those types of Airborne missions had proved successful earlier in the war. Throughout the war, the Soviets used tactical and special purpose Airborne forces for the following missions: to divert the enemy's attention away from the planned main attack, too disrupt the enemy's withdrawal, to block key enemy supply and/or communications routes, to secure airfields forward of a main assault for follow on airland forces, to reinforce encircled forces, to secure key industrial, military and strategic points forward of exploitation forces, and to raid key enemy facilities such as communication centers or airfields. These operations, generally quite successful, rarely exceeded 500 men in strength and were normally conducted within 100 kilometers of the front lines. For example, on the night of 24 October 1942, forty naval Paratroopers raided the German airfield at Maikop. German bombers and fighter aircraft flying from the field were causing severe problems for the Soviets in the Transcaucasus. Within an hour, the force destroyed 22 and damaged another 20 of the 54 aircraft at the airfield before being driven off the by the Germans. (53) As will be discussed later in this paper, the majority of these small tactical Airborne operations would now be conducted as air assaults, using helicopters.

In spite of the diminished use of large-scale airdrops, the Soviets still recognized the value of operational Airborne operations under the right circumstances. Their Field Regulation of 1944 continued to embrace the theoretical use of Airborne forces developed in the 1930s by declaring, "Airborne troops . . . characterized by a high degree of mobility, powerful automatic armament, ability to appear quickly and suddenly and to conduct battle in the rear of the enemy."(54) After detailing the specific missions of the Airborne, the regulation added the important caveat that, "successful employment of Airborne troops requires careful preparation and effective cooperation with aviation, partisan detachments and mobile troops."(55) The lessons learned from Vyaz'ma and Dnepr were carefully woven into the new regulation. Although Airborne operations from 1944 to the end of the war were very limited, the 1944 regulation captured the essence of their war experiences. During the postwar years, the Soviets would provide the Airborne forces with the means to fulfill their future tactical, operational and strategic missions.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has provided some of the background needed to understand the evolution of Airborne forces. There are many reasons for the successful use of Airborne forces and many "lessons learned" from the Airborne failures. The next chapter will address how the Soviets and the Americans took the same information and developed two completely different Airborne forces.