The
Battle for Reconaissance
THE
NEED FOR MOBILE LONG RANGE SURVEILLANCE TEAM CAPABILITIES
Iraq 1991.. .
The Desert Storm air campaign has been
underway for days.. the Iraqi Air Defense System's command, control and radars
have been destroyed or suppressed. A coordinated air defense mixing fighter
aircraft, guns (AAA) and missiles (SAMs) isn't possible. A low-level strike of
A-6E Intruders from the USS Saratoga hits targets in Iraq under 1,000 feet at
600+ miles per hour. They encounter thick AAA ranging from small arms to 57mm
rapid-firing cannon and hand-held SA-16 SAMs. Every Intruder is shot down
except the flight leader who limps back severly damaged. These losses cause
U.S. Central Command to direct that all U.S. aircraft fly attack
missions from at least medium altitude (above 5,000 feet) to avoid enemy air
defense weapons. The Royal Air Forces' Tornado aircraft continue low-level
strikes at supersonic speeds but heavy losses force them to medium altitude
attack profiles when their laser targeting pods become available.
In Iraq, there is few areas of broken terrain
to fly low-level terrain masking flight profiles; and presently we have no way
of suppressing all small arms, AAA and hand-held SAMs that an enemy infantry
force could have; though an Airborne smokescreen
capability would be a start for parachute insertions. Thus the tactic of
vertical stand-off was employed to offset our lack of low-level air
supremacy-superiority yes, complete control, no.
Getting LRS teams into named
areas of interest
If small, fast moving (600 MPH +) jets found
it impossible to survive at low-altitude in an Iraq-type environment, how will
the C-130 at half the speed (300 MPH) and twice the size be able to survive to
fly to drop zones within a day's march distance of enemy-held NAIs for the air
delivery of LRS teams? When AC-130 gunships rescued marines trapped by the
Iraqi attack on Khafji, one was shot down by a SA-16 SAM, when it stayed on
station into daylight hours.
In Bosnia, C-130s were successful airdropping
food at night at 10,000 feet using free-drop and delayed opening parachutes. If
LRS teams are military free-fall qualified, they could use vertical stand-off
and enter the NAI without endangering the C-130 but the enemy will have
"painted" the aircraft with radar and been alerted to the general
insertion area when the plane slows down to drop speed.
As time goes on, the use of vertical
stand-off will decrease in effectiveness as enemy weapons/sensor ranges
increase. What is needed is a way to regain clandestine LRS team entry where no
radar, visual or infared detection is possible-a tactic of horizontal
stand-off, where LRS teams airdrop away from enemy air defenses. The low foot
mobility (3 MPH) of LRS teams causes planners to drop them close to or on top
of the objective within about 25 miles or a day's marching distance. 25 miles
away from a NAI surrounded by long-range and mobile Air Defense Artillery is
not enough to insure aircraft survival and mission accomplishment. LRS teams do
not have the entire night available for an approach march-they must dig,
construct and camouflage a hide site invisible to the naked eye before
dawn.
If helicopters are available, they could fly
the LRS team from very-low altitudes (5 -10 feet) by avoiding enemy forces
horizontally using a carefully planned route. As the world urbanizes,
ultra-low-level flight which was used to get Special Forces recon teams into
Iraq will not be possible. Even with closed terrain, helicopters make noise
that easily alerts the enemy that we have soldiers on foot nearby. Helicopters
will not always be available-especially during the initial days of an Airborne
assault. We need another stand-off platform.
Keeping LRS teams in named areas of
interest
D-minus one; Operation Desert Storm...A 160th Special Operations
Aviation Regiment (160th SOAR) Blackhawk helicopter flying under 10 feet
above ground level flies in a recon team from the 5th Special Forces Group
(Airborne). WO Randy "Bulldog" Ballwanz's Special Reconaissance (SR)
team moves a short distance on foot to their hide site observing an Iraqi
highway and begin digging furiously-they must be done by sunrise. After dawn,
an elderly man and his daughter spot their hide site and walk towards it
despite their camouflage. The SF Team leader chooses not to kill the Iraqi villagers,
who promise not to tell others in their community of the Americans being
nearby. Compromised, the team moves on foot to a new location 500 meters away.
Within minutes Iraqi military trucks full of armed Soldiers converge on the
team's old and new positions. The SF team leader snipes and kills the Iraqi
commander and a fierce firefight begins. The SF SR team uses a signal mirror to identify their position so a USAF
F-16C Fighting Falcon can drop ordnance on the Iraqis, preventing them from
being over-run or having to split up to escape and evade (E & E). The SF
team is rescued in the nick of time by a Blackhawk helicopter, which is damaged
by gunfire.
The Jungle; Vietnam.. marine recon teams are
continually ambushed after inserting into large open landing zones (LZs) from
helicopters. The Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army units maintain physical
control of the battlefield by mining/booby-trapping likely 125 and having
scouts to warn of incoming helicopters. Unable to do anything about helicopter
noise, Recon teams accept "compromise" as a way of life and take
steps to evade the enemy via dummy insertions and to move on despite enemy
detection.
The tropics..
An opponent to the newly elected president,
masses a mechanized force to assault the capital for a coup. He keeps his force
moving in their "technicals" (civilian trucks
with machine guns, recoilless rifles mounted) to prevent targeting by U.S.
survillance assets from the air/space. The 82d Airborne is sent in to secure
the capital and airport. Their secondary mission is to find, fix and destroy
the rebel forces but the Division's LRS teams are only configured to recon from
static-hide sites.
The Mountains, prelude to the Second
Korean War...
Saboteurs infiltrating by radar-invisible
AN-2 "Colt" aircraft parachute into key ports/ airfields denying
their use to U.S. reinforcements. A massive artillery barrage blows holes in
the South's defensive lines, where thousands of light infantry swarm through
intent on over-running the South and uniting it by force in under 7 days.
Knowing that U.S. air power will try to stop their advance, the North Koreas
stay dispersed and moving. Ahead, their scouts scour the countryside looking
for dug-in LRS teams. Their mobile air defense artillery scans the skies
looking for U.S. Paratroopers. They know that U.S. precision guided munitions
will need accurate ground reconnaissance to be fully effective.
Even if LRS teams can get by the North
Korean's counter-reconaissance efforts, if they stay in static positions, they
will be soon over-run and isolated. Low on food, it
will be difficult if not impossible to extract them in the middle of the
enemy's attack echelons. Even if helicopters were available for duties other
than transporting infantry to the front.
Where is the enemy's focus of main effort?
The 82d Airborne Division flying to drop zones to establish blocking positions
needs to know. To know they need "eyes on the ground" which means LRS
teams. Without ground mobility, the only LRS teams able to be emplaced are soon
over-run by the rapid North Korean advance; these teams operating as part of
the 2d Infantry Division are only expected to be combat effective for a matter
of hours before their batteries run low.
We must fight for
reconaissance
Future adversaries have studied the Gulf War
and realize that U.S. firepower
is dependant upon accurate reconaissance. To think that remote sensors and unmanned
aerial vehicles with "soda straw" vision are going to be able to
see the enemy without him being alerted (re IDF naval commando raid
in 1997 that was compromised by UAVs) is dangerous.To think that a
competent enemy is going to allow us to insert/extract LRS teams without a
fight is naive. We must "fight" for our reconaissance by being more
flexible, mobile and unpredictable.
1. To gain reconaissance, we need MOBILE LRS
teams who do not depend on motor vehicles (helicopters, trucks, airplanes) to
deliver them close to or on top of NAIs. It is motor vehicle insertion into
predictable locations that compromises LRS teams in the first place; LZs, road
junctions etc. Motor vehicles are noisy, give off heat/dust signatures visible
to the naked ears/eyes for miles away and even more apparent to an enemy equipped
with thermals/night vision devices. The growing Air Defense threat makes close
delivery by motor vehicle untenable.
2. To maintain reconaissance, we need MOBILE
LRS teams that can move to alternate hide sites if compromised-to withdraw a
team just because it has been spotted is the same as surrendering the
battlefield to the enemy and a sign of tactical inflexibility. Plans do not
survive the realities of war. Move on and improvise. To stay in the immediate
area after being detected awaiting a helicopter extraction under fire is
dangerous. Even the ballistic-protective Blackhawk helicopter isn't
bullet-proof; this was sadly learned from the recent combat in Somalia. Helicopter emergency extractions often result in more dead
and wounded men trapped behind enemy lines, in some ways making matters worse.
Mobile Reconaissance capabilities via
folding All-Terrain Bicycles
LRS teams can become highly mobile (5-20+
MPH) by using folding All-Terrain "Mountain" Bicycles. In the Aug-Sep
1998 issue of U.S. Army Armor magazine, it was reported that bike scouts
have been operating non-folding, air-filled tire mountain bikes from 8x8
wheeled Light Armored Vehicles to give motorized forces a "recon"
capability before the motor vehicle's signature gives the force's presence away
to an alert enemy. Likewise, ATB mobility can be used to air insert outside of
earshot of enemy air defense artillery and then move from low-threat areas into
high threat areas keeping a healthy horizontal stand-off. Once the stand-off
distance is traversed in a few hours, the ATBs are folded, camouflaged and
cached in the same manner a SEAL team does to its stealthful mobility platform
(rubber boats). The LRS team approach marches the final distance to the hide
site in extreme stealth on foot. This will insure the team is not detected in
any way during insertion; the delivery aircraft do not have to fly high for
vertical stand-off nor fear every weapon from rifles to SANS hitting them from
low-level flight-so normal static-line parachuting can be used.
If the team should get compromised, it can
return back to its ATBs and use them for high cross-country mobility to move a
significant distance between them and their pursuers-they could move to another
hide site to complete the mission or to a pick-up zone (PZ) where the
extraction helicopter doesn't have to face intense enemy fire. ATBs could even
be used to exfiltrate all the way back to friendly lines.
LRS teams have used ATBs in the past in
Germany, (Radfahrtruppes) but the concept got a poor reputation when bikes
broke down, leaving the team in a bad position. This was because the ATBs were
not MILITARIZED to meet military demands. The 1st Tactical Studies Group
(Airborne) has put together a rapidly-folding ATB that doesn't have air-filled
tires that can go flat. Our non-profit group has used off-the-shelf parts like
solid foam filled tires to prevent ATB field break-downs. The militarized ATB
costs about $360 retail and can be painted with radar-absorbant paint available
from the supply system to make it radar resistant.
The important improvement over the ATBs tried
in years past is foldability. The ATB by being able to fold in seconds to
half-size allows it to be jumped attached to the LRS Paratrooper as a lowering
line load, en masse using 2 A-21 door bundles and/or carried on/off aircraft
and ground vehicles. It subliminates itself into other transport vehicles and
compacts for clandestine storage in caches. Just like a rubber boat can be
deflated to reduce its size. Another improvement is the Extreme Terrain Bike
(ETB) with 10 inch wide tires that can traverse soft sand and snow that would
force Soldier cyclists on narrow tire ATBs to dismount to push their bikes like
a cart.
Darby All-Terrain
All-purpose Cart/Sleds
Some LRS units are using General William O.
Darby All-Terrain, All-Purpose Cart/Sleds (ATACSs) like the UT2000to TOW rather than
carry hide site materials and food/water. Using ATACS boosts team ground speed
to 4-7 mph and allows greater amounts of supplies to be carried versus
manpacking. The UT2000 is also a sled for snow operations and can be used as a
Stokes litter/evac cart to MEDEVAC a wounded LRS team member by a hovering
helicopter. The ATAC has super-wide tires to traverse most snow and sands.
Thellie Camouflage Suits
The 1st TSG (A) has proven that bikes/carts
can be visually camouflaged using ghillie strips during Operation Prove Tactical
Mobility at Fort Bragg, NC in 1995. This can be taken a step further by the
LRS team members wearing commercially-available "Thellie" camouflage
suits that render them invisible to detection by enemy forward looking infared
(FLIR) devices.
Teledyne Brown
Thellie Home Page
Technological advances have greatly reduced
the cost of infrared sensors, resulting in widespread use of very sophisticated
surveillance and targeting devices by military forces throughout the world.
Teledyne Brown Engineering, long an R&D leader in camouflage for visual and
RF suppression, has developed products for countering these infrared devices.
Of particular value is our Thellie Suit,
designed to suppress the signature of the human body in the visual through
thermal infrared bands. This suit enables the wearer to blend into the
background when viewed through the best performing infrared imaging devices.
The alternating pictures show images from
visible and infrared sensors of a Soldier in standard field uniform (left) and
in the Thellie Suit (right).
Constructed of lightweight fabrics in
configurations that allow proper ventilation of body-produced heat, the Thellie
Suit enables the wearer to freely and comfortably accomplish mission demands.
The suit conforms to normal criteria placed on qualified military equipment.
The material can also be in a poncho or blanket configuration.
The name "thellie" is a combination
of "thermal" -- denoting the suit's IR suppression capability -- and
"ghillie" -- the name for Irish and Scottish gamekeepers who used
homemade camouflage suits to stalk game poachers.
This product is available only to authorized
customers in U.S. Government agencies.
For additional information, contact:
Jerry C. Edwards
jerry.edwards@tbe.com
256-726-1000 ask operator to connect you
Lightweight LRP rations
Ironically, the U.S. Army supply system has
dehydrated LRP rations that weigh half as much as MREs
(20
meals per box instead of just 12) that could be ordered by LRS units to
lighten their mission loads as well as increase their surveillance time. But
many LRS units are unaware of these items and Soldier
on with the messy, heavy MREs. LRP NSN: 8970-00-926-9222. LRPs come 16 per a
case compared to just 12 meals per MRE case.
Better water logistics
Water is a major thorn in the side of deep
recon units. In the Gulf war, British SAS recon team "Bravo Two Zero"
trudged on foot from CH-47 Chinook helicopters
into a desert hide site with 50 pound 5 gallon water cans in hand. They were
eventually detected and E & Ed with the Iraqi Army in hot pursuit. Had they
been equipped with Human Powered Vehicles (ATBs, ATACSs) this may have been avoided
entirely. One handicap that can now be corrected is the clumbsy 5 gallon
plastic water can which can be replaced with a 5 gallon
collapsible water bag. These bags are disposable as well costing only .80
cents each and have been field proven by the U.S. Army's 25th Light Infantry Division ("Tropic Lightnings") in
Hawaii. Click on the link supplied to learn the details of how to order these
water bags and how they can be used to support LRS team operations.
Another problem area is parachute injuries
from landing on hard plastic 1 quart canteens and their general bulk and
noisiness. This problem can be solved by using flexible 1 quart canteens:
New
G.I. flexible one-quart canteens
Ordering Information
The Lighthouse Store
P.O. Box 14959 Seattle, WA 98114 - 0959
Voice (206) 322-4200
TTY (206) 324-1388
Fax (206) 329-3397
www.lighthousestore.com
Stock # Description Unit Cost
CN 0040 1-quart canteen, collapsible $7.20
NSN 8465-00-NIB-0041
Canteens come with NBC mask drinking tube
interface cap.
Add your state sales tax, and
shipping/handling for the box needed to send the number of canteens you
ordered.
PROBLEM SOLVED!!!!
In fact, the flexible 1-quart canteen greatly
improves the water flow through the drinking tube of your M40 Field
Protective Mask because the canteen body can be squeezed. Edgewood Arsenal
Tests (Chemical Biological Defense Command) showed 2 times the water flow rate
while drinking through the new Joint Services Protective Mask using the
flexible 1-quart canteen compared to old, hard-shell plastic canteens.
Waste absorbption products
There are several products available
commercially that can absorb body waste material completely to bolster LRS team
hide site hygiene/sanitation practices as well as improve their signature
reduction to avoid enemy detection. Several of these products are now DOD
approved and have National Stock Numbers (NSNs) so unit supply NCOs can order
them.
Army Logistician, Jan-Feb 1995 reports:
The Defense Construction Supply Center (DCSC)
Columbus, Ohio stocks absorbption products made by American Innotek© Inc, 1565
Creek Street Suite 108, San Marcos, Ca 92069 (619) 471-1549 FAX: -2270
Homepage: http://briefrelief.com, Email: roland@briefrelief.com They are:
Disposable Urinal Bag, NSN 4510-01-379-0177
$2.15
Solid Waste System NSN, 4510-01-379-1341
$2.92
Daily Restroom Kit NSN, 4510-01-379-0190
$5.99
Each of these products fit into the BDU pocket. POC is Maxine Copeland, DSN 850-1258 or
commercial (610) ???-1258.
The problem with these is a LRS team will
need multiple bags to handle multiple waste events. The costs to a unit will
rise accordingly. These devices are good for one time use on board an aircraft
or on a flightline while rigged for a parachute jump, but not extended field
use. American Innotek© Inc has a larger "Disposa-John©" which is
based around a 5 gallon bucket NSN 4510-01-379-1341 for multiple uses by several
people over time, say in a LRS team hide site or Armored Fighting Vehicle
(AFV). However the bucket does not collapse, though it could be used in
conjunction with the modified MRE ration case which does collapse described
below.
MRE Porta-Latrine
A inexpensive, simpler and compacting latrine
can be created using a MRE case. The MRE case and
sleeve flattens until needed, ideal for a LRS team already over-loaded with
mission gear. A small box of scoopable cat litter inexpensively obtained from a
grocery store, 100 mph tape and a heavy duty trash bag are all that are needed.
The MRE Porta-Latrine is prepared by cutting
two holes on one nd of the box's narrow side and where the sleeve will slide
over. This is where you will do your "business".
Next, you arrive on the scene and are well
underway digging your hide site. Dig a small hole in a corner of the hide site
for the team's porta-latrine to sit half-way into the ground. The MRE
Porta-Latrine will act as a small seat to sit on while doing your
"business". Unflatten the MRE case and tape its flaps into an open
position. Place the trash bag into the hole and tape down onto the sides of the
entry hole. Slide the sleeve over with its hole aligned with the other hole.
Tape sleeve down. Insert entire porta-latrine into its recessed hole position.
Pour kitty-litter into the hole to line trash bag for absorbption when used.
After each use, pour a little kitty litter into the hole.
The MRE Porta-Latrine will last for at least
a week's worth of a LRS team's food/drink generated waste. The MRE
Porta-Latrine will work very well within the confines of an AFV, so the vehicle need not have to stop in order for
crewmen and/or dismounts to have to relieve themselves--a tactical advantage.
When the LRS team is done, the MRE
Porta-Latrine can be left in place with the last kitty litter poured into it to
absorb odors, and the hide site filled in if time/mission permits. The AFV crew
can bury their MRE Porta-Latrine when the situation permits.
Putting it all together
At the battle of Gettysburg, Buford's cavalry
were the first to gain the heights that proved crucial to victory. They were
mobile enough to arrive before the enemy's main body and its scouts. The same
challenge faces us in Korea, where another mobile light infantry force backed
by armored fighting vehicles threatens to swarm and over-run the
airfields/ports of the South before U.S. forces can deploy. U.S. Airborne
forces will be key to the defense of the South because they can deploy by
parachute directly into blocking positions. But these forces constitute the
strategic reserve of the U.S. and must be employed carefully; LRS teams must go
in first and determine the enemy's main effort and provide targeting
information for our air power enemy infantry will not be as easily detected as
50 ton tanks in the open desert. Our LRS teams need to be mobile enough to
avoid enemy air defenses and detection. Once on the ground, they need organic
mobility to re-position to meet new intelligence demands and to insure mission
accomplishment and survival. The stealthful mobility platform for ground
movement is the folding all-terrain bicycle just as the rubber boat is to water
and the parachute is to the air.
Today's folding ATBs can be combined to other
mobility platforms to create unpredictable infiltration/exfiltration routes.
The team mobility plan can be modified according to the mission, enemy, terrain
etc. ATB/ATACs are low-cost mobility devices that can be easily purchased by
individual units using their own funds. A suitable folding ATB and parts is
available retail to meet military demands. 1st TSG (A) has developed an airdrop
bag for parachute jumping as a lowering line load attached to the Paratrooper.
ATBs/ATACs can be dropped as door bundles or as rear ramp CDS bundles. We have
already conducted a major Airborne operation DARK CLAW where the
folding ATBs wwere airdropped attached to the Paratrooper. Upon landing, the
ATB was quickly unfolded and cycled into action. Other ATBs were airdropped as
a rear ramp skid bundle to prove that technique. After a simulated hostage
rescue, the 1st TSG (A) team exfiltrated 30 miles back to Ft. Bragg to demonstrate
the high mobility inherent to ATB equipped teams. ATBs can be used now during
daily physical fitness training to build stamina and cycling skills and during
field training exercises to perfect movement/cache techniques.
The use of today's multiple-speed, fat tire
ATBs by police/military units is growing; the British 5th Airborne Brigade,
Special Air Service, Gurkhas, the Dutch Royal Marine Corps uses a folding ATB
for rubber boat raids, the Swiss have 3 elite infantry regiments on bikes. The
Thai Air Force Commandos are studying folding ATBs for airfield seizure
missions. There is no reason why LRS teams must make the Hobson's choice
between noisy motor vehicle transport or slow foot travel; an option with
speed/stealth is available that is affordable and possible today: the ATB and
the ATAC.
References
Rick Atkinson; Crusade;
Houghton-Mifflin, 1993
William Smallwood; Warthog; 1993
usmc Research paper * 92-0002 Armor/Antiarmor
Operations in Southwest Asia
Mountain Bike Sept/Oct 1993; Secret Weapon,
page 82
S.W.A.T. November 1993 page 62
Letter to ITSG from U.K. 5th Airborne
Brigade, 1993
ESPN Bicycling program on Swiss Bicycle
regiments
DTIC File # AD A211 795 "Human Powered
Vehicles in Support of Light Infantry Operations"; Major Stephen Tate U.S.
Army
The Discovery Channel American
Commandos, 1998, (1-800 765-0066 $19.95)
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