ARMY AFTER THE CHINOOK: THE COMPOUND HEAVY LIFT HELICOPTER
"Imagination is more important than knowledge"
--Albert Einstein
1962.
The Cuban missile crisis,
JFK, James Bond premiered in "From Russia with Love". The Cold War.
Cars still had tail fins. And Boeing Vertol using concepts by Frank Piasecki
created the CH-47 Chinook
twin rotor helicopter. The CH-47D is the current model in the Army's
conventional forces inventory. There is an advanced MH-47E model that is
designed to support special operations. The Army acquired the CH-47 on or about
1963. Boeing Vertol developed the tandem rotor from earlier designs built by
legendary Frank Piascki whose company built the earlier "bananna"
tandem design known as the CH-21 used in the early
days of the Vietnam war.
The CH-47 is still offered
to commercial markets but its high maintenance cost stemming from the numerous
transmissions associated with the tandem rotor concept has limited its market
share.
The CH-47 has enjoyed
relatively good success in the world's military markets where the aircraft's
advantages in center of gravity limits, rear ramp area loading, excellent speed
and sling load to horse power ratio make up for the high maintenance cost of a
two rotor aircraft.
The CH-47D model in the
Army were mainly rebuilt "super C models" and are already about 10
years old! The Army is attempting to execute a service life extention program
(SLEP) that will for the third time upgrade rotor hubs, engines and flight control
systems. This program has not started yet and will probably extend the life of
the current 435 aircraft fleet to about 2015-2020.
There is a movement afoot
to begin design work on the CH-47's replacement. Several proposals have been
floated by the Army After Next (AAN) office from Fort Monroe VA.
The Army will probably not
make a decision until 2004-2005
We are hoping the Army will
see the light that 21st century maneuver doctrine needs to evolve to AIRmechanization. This
would require utimately replacing our Chinooks and Blackhawks with a 250+ knot
self-deployable rotorwing aircraft capable of delivering a 15-ton armored
vehicle and scores of smaller under 7-ton Wiesel or Bv206S AFVs to decisively 3D maneuver on
enemies and defeat them. Its a given that this aircraft should be able to carry
2 or more 4x4 HMMWVs inside EASILY, something the V-22
cannot even carry one.
The recent discovery from
NAVAIR combat developer George Spangenberg that in the '70s we almost had
a 18-20 ton three-engined CH-54/53E SkyCrane heavy lifter for the USMC to self-recover
other CH-53Ds and for the Army to lift ISO containers and light tanks is
troubling. The Army insisted on an overly large XCH-62 SkyCrane derived from
the tandem rotor Chinook that could lift the then 22.5 ton Mechanized Infantry
Combat Vehicle, the overweight precurser to the Bradley
Fighting Vehicle. The XCH-62 was far too big for naval use abord ships so
the marines stupidly added the 3 engines to a CH-53D fuselage losing 2 tons of
lift and being unable to roll on/off light tracked AFVs like the M113 Gavin.
The XCH-62 was cancelled so the Army lost the ability to carry light tracked
AFVs, ISO containers without sling-loading that reduces air speed and is
inherently dangerous. The as-is CH-47 would have to soldier on. The CH-54
SkyCrane though able to carry 20 tons if fitted with more powerful engines/rotors
left Army service but fortunately Erickson AirCrane has all the design rights
and is now making new S-64F SkyCranes for fire fighting. Today, DoD is excited
about "sea basing" but doesn't have a 20-ton heavy lifter to enable
light tracked AFVs and ISO "Battle boxes" to come ashore in a timely
manner.
Transport Helicopter
Battle Box Mobility: the Next Chinook should be a SpeedCrane
SkyCrane carrying an ISO Container
Fiddler's Green reports:
www.fiddlersgreen.net/AC/aircraft/Sikorsky-SkyCrane/info/sketch-ref.jpg
The Sky Crane was a most
noteworthy program for the Army as it was desperately needed to off load
container ships in 'Nam" since "Nam" has no deep water ports to
accommodate large freighters.
Other research has found
that the U.S. Army's CH-54 Tarhe ("SkyCrane") heavy lift helicopter's
universal cargo pods also proved very useful, for they could be used to carry
up to eighty-seven troops in addition to serving as mobile hospitals, command
posts or barracks.
If the Army were smart, its
next Chinook should be a Piasecki SpeedCrane type helicopter that can transport
ISO container "Battle Boxes".
Details: www.geocities.com/equipmentshop/nextchinook.htm
Historical Discovery Below
from Naval Aircraft Combat Developer, George Spangenberg.
Our observations:
If the Army was not so
foolish wanting 22 tons for the XCH-62 Heavy Lift Helicopter (HLH) to lift the
MICV (the early version of the now 33-ton Bradley) we could have had a SkyCrane
that could lift 18 tons to lift M113 Gavins EASILY or the heaviest 40 foot ISO
Container Battle boxes. Carry people in a pod, what's the mental block here?
We think the Army is going
to make the same mistake with the 20-25 ton FCS that needs a non-existant
FTR/JTR/HLH with a huge fuselage. At the end of the day we might have another
BS medium-weight ground vehicle with no V/TOL aircraft to fly it. Not enough
money even in the U.S. of A.
We need to stop trying to
lift ground vehicles that are too heavy and make the light ones we have more
combat capable (multiple armor layers, 1-man autocannon turrets etc.) and fly
them with EXISTING AIRCRAFT for our 3D forces and use the heavier vehicles for
2D maneuver forces. Two basic forms of maneuver for the open and closed terrain
types we find on planet earth.
The CH-47F has progressed
to where it can carry the 10.5 ton M113A3 Gavin for short distances (about 50
miles). We think we should take the CH-53E's 3-engines and splice them to a
SkyCrane so we can lift the 17-ton M8 Buford
AGS light tank as well as ISO containerize the entire U.S. Army to get it
out of its garrison doldrums and be packed and ready for war at all times. The
SkyCrane configuration eliminates the sling-load swinging and 100 mph speed
restrictions that happens when you can't load the M113 Gavin or M8 Buford into
the CH-53E's fuselage. We could make the fuselage bigger but then you lose 2
tons of payload and can't lift ISO Battle Boxes.
SO GET RID OF THE FUSELAGE!
http://216.239.41.104/search?q=cache:Sm5mQ84_5-YJ:www.georgespangenberg.com/history2.htm+convair+p6y&hl=en&ie=UTF-8
George Spangenberg:
The
next program that also is not on the chart is the CH-53E and that's because it
didn't get started until after the chart was drawn, and also an HLH which also
would not have been on there because it turned out to be an Army program. The
whole effort really started when they deployed the CH-53A which you will remember
was started in '63, flew in '64 and then deployed in early '67 to Vietnam. When
it reached Vietnam the marines found that they had a problem, they had so few
of these helicopters available to them and if one went down in enemy territory
they could not retrieve it. The other helicopters, CH-46 for example, could be
picked up either by the Army Chinooks or the 'Cranes, CH-54, or by the H-53s
and brought back. It apparently became a severe enough problem that the marines
got together and came up with a requirement for a crane-type helicopter with
self-retrieval capability. In other words, if one went down a similar
helicopter could go in and pick it up. The marines were really working quite
closely with Sikorsky at the time and Sikorsky then came up with a study for a
modification of the CH-53 in which they added a seventh blade, increased the
rotor diameter from 72 to 81 feet, added a third engine of the same type as the
other two and went
to a crane-type configuration similar to the CH-54 which was also one of
their designs, of course. At the time it was estimated that configuration would
give a lift capability of about eighteen tons and that became really the
selling point for the program. NAVAIR was willing to buy the design. In other
words, if performance and the weights were agreed upon, we wanted to buy it on
a directed procurement. However, the ASN (R&D) decided that we should have
a competition and let other manufacturers bid. The program then ran into budget
problems. The crane configuration of course was a pretty specialized one and
eventually when everyone finally got together on the specification
requirements, a conventional fuselage on the helicopter was required. We
ended up losing a couple tons worth of lift capability when we did that so the
helicopters that resulted were more like a sixteen ton lift capacity.
We had proposals from Sikorsky, Vertol and Hughes, that I
remember, perhaps there were others too. The Hughes was the least attractive of
the three proposals. Vertol submitted a version of the Chinook. The Chinook was
always a competitor for the CH-53 but the height of the helicopter was enough
so that Vertol never did get around to really working out an arrangement where
it fit well on the ships. The tandem arrangement of course always gave a nice
compact spot, an advantage for shipboard use. Well, Sikorsky ended up winning
the competition and we had only lost a couple of years fooling around with the
competition rather than going with them in the first place. But it's also clear
that having a conventional fuselage on the design was a good decision.
When the item went into the budget it was unfortunately
called the "marine HLH." At the time the Army also had an item in the
budget for an "HLH", and as presented initially, the marine version
was described as an 18 ton lift, the Army design as 22 ½ ton lift capability. The
Army wanted the ability to lift any of the containers that went on container
ships which explained the 22 ½ ton lift requirement. It was basically a
crane-type helicopter, although they could put container pods on the bottom
to carry people as well. The Army did not have their program well defined
and for several years they refused to define their long-range plans and only
talked about technology, an R&D program, or a prototype program.
At the time within OSD there was an active duty Army colonel
assigned to DDR&E. Naturally, he pushed very strongly for all Army programs
over those of the competing services and did his best to, I'll say, mislead, he
probably said, to educate, his bosses into the fact that we could have a joint
program, with no need for separate marine HLH and Air Force HLHs. In his
version of the DCP (the Development Concept Paper), part of the acquisition
process at the time, he claimed by combining the two programs the country could
save a half a billion dollars. This related to the one billion that McNamara
had claimed that he could save on the joint TFX program. The Navy's stand on
the DCP was actually signed by the assistant secretary of the Navy, the R&D
secretary, Mr. Frosch. It seemed to him that we could probably save money by
doing separate programs, that the extra costs that the marines would suffer
from the size of the Army HLH was enough to pay for the development of the Navy
HLH. Well, it became a big issue for a long time. The general feeling was that
among those that just glanced at numbers that you certainly ought to be able to
compromise with a single project if you're only talking the difference between
18 tons and 22 tons. Unfortunately, that wasn't the whole story.
The Army requirement also said they should do the lift at
what I believe was a 4,000 foot altitude and at 95 at that altitude, a tough
requirement. The marines also had a high temperature requirement but it was 90
at sea level, really our standard hot day requirement for the Navy.
After the big argument on the DCP and with nobody being able
to agree, a joint Army-Navy-Industry study was set up in which the participants
tried to arrive at a common helicopter to serve the needs or meet the
requirements of the two services. It turned out about as expected that the
biggest one that the marines could accept provided too little capability for
the Army and the smallest one the Army would accept was too big for the marines
to operate from most of our ships.
About the same time there was a budget hearing in the
Congress and Mr. Foster, who was then DDR&E, was asked a question,
"Why can't you combine them?" and in widely read testimony he
promptly said, "Oh, we can. There's no problem to that." He obviously
did not know the background at all. Well a joint program then got directed,
despite the studies, by Mr. Packard, then DepSecDef. It was an extremely stupid
decision and since Mr. Packard was not a stupid man, all I can conclude is that
he had to have had bum dope. Eventually the working level part of the Navy and
of course the marines finally got to see Secretary Chaffee, Secretary of the
Navy, and appealed to him. He would not permit us to go directly to Mr. Packard
but he said give him the dope and he would go to Packard, which he did. Packard
made the decision then, "Well, we'll go ahead with this joint competition
with the Army requirements being specified as the most difficult to meet but
that it also should have shipboard compatibility requirements." If the
industry proposals then confirmed the statements that we were making to
Packard, he would reconsider the decision.
So the next step of course was to run the competition.
Actually the Army ran it. But we had to work with them on getting the specs out
and then of course later we had to evaluate the proposals when they came in.
The Navy's main input to the spec of course was just ship compatibility. The
marines wanted full shipboard compatibility with the LPH-2 (a former Essex
class CV) and this of course gave them more problems than if they had specified
a larger ship. OSD finally directed the Navy, or the marines really, to require
shipboard compatibility only with the larger LHA class, the first ship of which
was under construction. Since the total number of these ships wasn't really
very large there was a lot of opposition to the fact that the shipboard
compatibility requirements had been cut back. The Army set up their typical
remote location kind of an evaluation board. Evaluation was held at Ft. Eustis,
I believe. We had one representative that we sent down there and then evaluated
the helicopters in place at NAVAIR. We had five competitors who submitted
proposals -- Boeing Vertol, Sikorsky, Hughes, Kaman and even Gyrodyne. All the
designs came in just about as we expected. The Army versions running about
120,000 pounds gross weight, and really impossible to operate in any normal way
from ships. Obviously you could put them aboard the big carriers and you could
operate from the decks of the LHAs but there wasn't much clearance with the
island and getting them down below was impracticable. The Army ended up by
recommending the Boeing Vertol design, a tandem helicopter similar to the ones
that -- well, it was a big Chinook in a crane version. Had 90 foot rotors, was
150 feet or so long, with a huge operating spot on any ship. We obviously
couldn't accept any of the designs.
Eventually Packard reviewed the situation. Some of the Army
DDR&E people still wanted the joint program I presume because they thought
that we would never get approval for two heavy lift helicopters at once. So we
really argued that we (the marines) didn't have a heavy lift helicopter, we
certainly were on the low side of what the Army was trying to do. Packard
finally allowed us to get started again with the CH-53E. We finally got a go-ahead
for the CH-53E in November of '71, a decision delayed from January of '68, so
we had almost a four year delay between the time we wanted to buy the
capability and the time we were allowed to get started. The situation then went
from bad to worse as the acquisition system was being changed by the proponents
of prototyping, "fly-before-buy", and so on. The CH-53E production
release got delayed until actually 1976, although Sikorsky had built two
prototypes and then two preproduction models before that production release.
The first real production delivery didn't come about until late in 1980. I've
always used the program as one of our best examples of how not to buy aircraft.
It's very, very expensive to stretch things out that long. If a program is going
to take ten or fifteen years to go from concept to fleet it's going to have a
lot of changes and the costs are going to skyrocket. And when it gets there it
may well be obsolete A schedule comparison of the CH-53A with the CH-53E should
be instructive. If you compare the two programs, the E obviously took years
longer. In fact the first production E was the fifth actual aircraft built. It
was delivered some nine years after go-ahead while the fifth A was delivered in
less than two years from go-ahead. The four-year delay in getting the E started
was about four times as long as the delay introduced in the 53A program by
those in OSD who forced the poorly conceived Tri-Service Transport Program on
the services. Again, it's not the right way to buy aircraft.
To finish up the HLH, the Army went ahead with its Vertol
design, but advertised it as only a technology program, with some calling it a
prototype program. In their Congressional testimony, they claimed they had made
no cost estimates of either the engineering development or production. This
caused them all kinds of trouble in Congress of course and why they took that
tack I'll never know. If they had never made any cost estimates as they claimed
they should never have been allowed to get started and all the delays could
have been avoided. They ran the program for a while, let an engine contract,
but eventually cancelled the program after a year or two. I think that probably
ends my official involvement with helicopters. I had retired before the Black Hawk
and the UTTAS came along. Those were programs that probably should have ended
up by replacing the CH-46 as well. A replacement for the 46 could have been a
marinized version of the Army's Blackhawk."
Your best
bet on getting the technical skinny on the differences between Chinook models
is to look up earlier Janes's All Aircraft volumns and track their development.
Despite what the manufacture says, the CH-47D's practical slingload maximum is
about 18,500 lbs. The aircraft can sling-load about 22,000 lbs under ideal
conditions and light on fuel load. This gets M113 Gavins into the air for 3D
air-mech operations but not an escorting M8 Buford AGS light tank. The three
hooks underneath the CH-47D model are rated as high as 26,000 lbs but this is
extrememly dificult to achieve in real world operational scenarios.
After several wars, the
Chinook, upgraded and life extended still goes on strong but not indefinitely.
Just as time marches on, the Chinook will have to be replaced. We could re-open
the production lines and get the same aircraft with the same capabilities for
about $25 million dollars each.
While this is great, it
still doesn't advance the U.S. Army's vertical 3D envelopment capabilities any
farther than where we are now. However, if we do this right, and obtain a more
capable aircraft we can replace BOTH the Chinook AND the Blackhawk with the
next Chinook. A re-engined UH-1H Huey or OH-58C could take care of the LHX's
requirement's small "milk runs" without having to spend $2,000 a
flight hour.
The current CH-47D cannot
lift 15 tons which is what the next armored ground vehicle Future Combat System
(FCS) should be. While troops can slide down ropes from
a hover, the aircraft must LAND for vehicles to roll off. Troops still are
vulnerable to enemy fire as they slide down the rope. If hit while fast roping,
they can fall off
like a Ranger did in Somalia. If we externally sling-load vehicles we can
hover insert but the aircraft cannot fly an aggressive NOE
profile to dodge enemy air defenses so this method is used primarily behind
friendly lines to shuttle forward supplies/vehicles. The Chinook in Special
Operations MH-47E form has air-to-air refueling for infiltration ahead of the
mythical forward line of troops (FLOT) but at 150 knots it takes a long time
and a lot of in-flight refuelings to go over long distances. We need to be able to cross
oceans in a power projection U.S. Army. Then of course, the Chinook is
hardly "stealthy" if enemy radar paints it despite vigorous terrain
masking flight, it will show up on radar. If this isn't bad enough if the
wheels get punctured by enemy fire or hard landings, the Chinook is stuck if it
cannot lift off and fly. At Desert
One, a Navy RH-53D helicopter with McPilots busted the nose tires and had
to lift off to move for ground refueling creating a minor dust storm resulting
in a collision with a USAF EC-130 "fat cow" killing 8 men.
The good news is that we
can solve ALL of these problems when we replace the Chinook with a
state-of-the-art aircraft. The greater, world-beating capabilities of this
aircraft would far outweigh the higher costs involved, but as you will see they
will be far less than the troubled MV-22
Osprey tilt rotor program's.
THE FUTURE COMPOUND
HEAVY LIFT HELICOPTER (FCH)
The fact remains that the
Army's Future Transport Rotorcraft (FTR) program to replace the CH-47 has been
shelved indefinately; there simply is no money to maintain existing helicopters
and to research and design a new helicopter from scratch. The FTR should be
replaced by an extreme STOL fixed-wing aircraft as
the ATT replacement for the legendary C-130 Hercules
operated by both the Army and the USAF.
The good news is that until
then, it is not necessary to start over since Piasecki compound helicopter
technology can be applied to existing helicopters as their service lives are extended
and by upgrade your existing helicopters to compound configuration we can
attain 200+ mph speeds and 2,000 miles ranges with proven and safe technology:
In sharp contrast, the
Osprey tilts
its rotors to create a forward flight turboprop profile from an initial
helicopter arrangement for V/TOL. However, the Osprey
is a hydraulic nightmare that simply may not work, if an engine goes out,
the other engine must instantly spool up to cross shaft the other propeller or
the entire aircraft flips over. This already crashed Osprey #4 killing several
unfortunate people. More recently, 19
people died in another fiery V-22 crash. All of this to get 250 knots of
speed and 250 miles of range. The Osprey is so small it cannot even carry a HMMWV! If the Osprey externally sling loads a HMMWV it
flies as the most expensive helicopter ever at 150 knots. For the
$$$Billions$$$ we spend on the Osprey, all we get is a 12-24 foot slogging
troops per aircraft. We need to do better.
The way to do better is to
get 250 knots and 250 miles unrefueled range by a more technically sound
COMPOUND HELICOPTER. The Russian HIND is the fastest combat helicopter in the
world today because it has lift-creating wings to hold its munitions but
doesn't fully capitalize on this because it still has an anti-torque tail rotor
and nothing pushing it forward with thrust. The closest example of wings
helping rotors was the awesome U.S. Army AH-56 Cheyenne attack helicopter in
the 1960s which was extremely fast but still had an anti-torque
rotor in addition to a pusher propellor, so its 250 mph speed was only
possible through mechanical complexity.
Lockheed AH-56
"Cheyenne"
Attack helicopter, 1966
Development:
AH-56 was designed to fit the requirements of the U.S. Army's Advanced Aerial
Fire Support System (AAFSS) program. The helicopter won the competition and the
first prototype flew in September 1966. AH-56 was expected to enter service in
1968, but the program was terminated and the helicopter never advanced beyond
prototype stage. The helicopter's role was later assigned to the conventional
AH-64 Apache.
Data for AH-56A
•Crew: 2
•Main rotor diameter: 15.3 m
•Wingspan: 7.9 m
•Length: 18.3 m
•Height: 4.2 m
•Empty weight: 5315 kg
•Takeoff weight: 7709 kg
•Engine: 1x General Electric T64-GE-16, 3435 hp
•Max. speed: 400 km/h (248 mph)
•Climb rate: 17.4 m/s
•Ceiling: 7925 m
•Range: 1400 km
PHASE I: SpeedCRane NOW:
Exploit the existing CH-53E rotors & engines to a SkyCrane body with
Piasecki VTDP technologies
The follow-on to the CH-47
& CH-53 needs to be a quantum leap in speed and range but does not need to
lift more than the current CH-53E if it were a SkyCrane. Thus, this is do-able
within months not years! It should be considered a theater-wide asset and not
limited to the tactical arena.
1. Must cruise at 200-250
KIAS.
2. Have 2500 nm ferry range
on internal fuel, 1500nm with payload and have mid-air refueling capability.
3. Minimum payload = 18-ton
armored vehicle size of M113A3 Gavin or M8 Buford AGS light tank.
4. Internal payload for
drag reduction and maneuverability with delivery of armored vehicle and troops
via wench through bomb-bay type doors into Hovering Insertion Points (HIP or
"HIP-shoot") unpredictable to the nemy.
5. Stealthy, radar
invisible, infared minimal signature
There are two broad
configuration options for the aircraft.
QUAD TILT-ROTOR: Large
version of V-22 configuration. GWT 75K-90K pounds.
Overly complex. Twin
tilt-rotors doesn't even work. Disqualified.
COMPOUND
HELO: CH-53 type aircraft with a Piasecki-type Ring-Tail, GWT 75K-90K pounds.
The concept would be to marry the three engine transmission drive train on the
CH-53E to a lightweight composite SkyCrane fuselage. The tail rotor spline from
the transmission would be modified to power a Piasecki-type Ring-Tail ducted
fan similar to their compound helicopter "Pathfinder" test bed
developed in the 1960s and other follow-on studies done by Piasecki on the
AH-64 & AH-1W airframes (1980s).
a. Deployment Mode: The
main rotor blades are removed and stored internally or carried in a fixed-wing cargo plane. High Aspect ratio wings are
mounted on the fuselage. The aircraft takes off as an airplane using the thrust
from the Ring-Tail ducted fan powered by the three engines. No drag from a
wind-milling rotor and no additional engines needed. The wings would be
semitrical allowing the wings to be interchangeable. Estimated cruise = 225-300
KIAS
b. Tactical Mode: The
long-range wings are replaced with low aspect short span wings and the rotor
blades are remounted to the main rotor. Aircraft operates as a conventional
helicopter. The short wings would rotate vertical to reduce downwash pull
during hover and carry 25-50% of the lift load in cruise flight. This will
allow a reduction in rotor load and RPM that would delay the effects of
retreating blade stall and facilitate a higher than normal cruise speed of
about 175-225 KIAS but with stealthy construction and ability to aggressive fly
Nap-Of-the-Earth (NOE) flight profiles to evade enemy detection.
c. Tilt-Rotor Disadvantages
Disqualify it: we personally favor the compound over the tilt-rotor design.
Tilt-rotors involve two complete rotor systems and complex rotation of nacelles
or whole wings. A drive shaft between the two nacelles is required for safety in
the event of engine failure which is a real challenge concerning the flexing
wing. Ship board operations are tough because of the wing which will need to
fold like the V-22 and there is always the possibility of failure in the
airplane mode resulting in loss of the aircraft. The very aircraft to
helicopter shape required to tilt rotors and engines mitigates against stealth
technolgy being applied as they are radar traps. The flight profiles available
to a tilt-rotor flying essentially as a fixed wing aircraft are limited to
low-level terrain CONTOUR flight, not the NOE terrain MASKING flight profiles a
more agile helicopter can perform.
d. Compound Helo
Background: Sikorsky has done extensive work in the past on compound helos and
probably has the most experience and data to date. Sikorsky's early work with
compound helos such as the S-61F program of the 1960s approaches our concept
but the more recent Rotor Systems Research Aircraft (RSRA) project more closely
follows our proposal for a future heavy lift helo. As with the successful RSRA,
the core of the idea is an aircraft that can efficiently self-deploy as a pure
airplane then revert quickly to a heavy lift helo upon arrival in theater. The
key difference with RSRA is to employ the Piasecki Ring Tail in lieu of the GE
TF34 turbofans and use the power from the three GE T64 turboshafts for fuel
economical forward thrust.
Another
option would be to use CarterCopter (CC) gyroplane technology and use an
unloaded weighted end rotor and wings with the ducted ring tail to get a
hovering and V/TOL capable autogyro without the hydraulic nightmares that a
powered all the time rotor faces. Helicopters are simply to complex and
expensive to maintain and an Army in battle with an enemy doesn't need a huge
collection of mechanics on the ground in forward bases that have to be
protected from enemy attacks. A CC Future Compound Gyroplane (FCG) may be the
best overall answer to U.S. Army battlefield needs for light utility/attack.
The CarterCopter Option for
Helicopters
Adding the CarterCopter
option to existing / future helicopters should provide the following benefits:
1. Improve operations at
higher density altitudes on takeoffs / landings.
2. Double the cruise speed.
3. Triple the effective range.
4. Increase the maximum ceiling at cruise speeds.
5. Reduce the "dead man zone".
The CarterCopter option
would require the following changes:
1. Install a
CarterCopter-style high-inertia rotor with an appropriate airfoil.
The CarterCopter uses a
symmetrical airfoil because its rotor blade at mu>1 sees completely reversed
airflow over the retreating blade. The same will happen to a helicopter if the
rotor is unloaded to obtain the higher performance. A non-symmetrical airfoil
may work for converted helicopters – but would require research to prove the
feasibility.
2. Install wings having low
profile drag and low induced drag. Because the wings are not used for takeoffs
/ landings, they can be designed for maximum efficiency at high forward speeds
and high altitudes.
3. Install a way to provide
thrust once the rotor is disconnected from the engine.
A. One way is to use a
special jet engine like the one designed for the Sikorsky X-wing project. This
engine provides high shaft-HP to the rotor for takeoffs / landings, and for
hovering. The engine then provides high thrust once the rotorcraft is moving
forward and converts to the CarterCopter operating mode.
B. Another way is to use a
Piasecki-type Ring-Tail ducted fan similar to the one used on the compound
helicopter “Pathfinder” and on the AH-64 & AH-1W in follow-on studies.
Using the CarterCopter
option:
When the CarterCopter mode
is engaged during forward flight, the rotor is disconnected from the engine and
begins depitching/unloading. As the rotor unloads, the aircraft's weight is
transferred to the wings. Once unloaded, the rotor does not (essentially)
produce lift and slows of its own accord.
Rotational HP is a cubed
function of rotor-tip speed. By slowing rotor-tip speed to 100 RPM, the
rotational aspect of the rotor profile HP is reduced to approximately 1/27th of
the rotational profile HP at 300 RPM. The rotor can safely slow to this speed
because the 55-pounds of depleted uranium in each rotor-tip keeps the rotor
blade stiff due to centrifugal forces (like spinning a rock on a rope).
With the jet engine (or
ring-tail ducted fan) now producing high thrust, the helicopter is flying as a
fixed-wing aircraft. This accounts for the higher cruise speeds, longer ranges
and higher altitudes.
Should the engine quit, the
helicopter simply auto-rotates to the ground. It stores energy in the rotor
during descent by permitting the high-inertia rotor to greatly over-speed. Even
with a dead engine, the pilot can pull collective when landing and use the
stored energy to provide 5-6 seconds of hover.
e. Low Cost: Developmental
costs and time should be significantly less for a CH-53E based compound verses
an enlarged tilt-rotor. A proof-of-concept prototype could be built using a
modified CH-54 or S-64 SkyCrane with a pair of Ring-Tail ducted fans replacing
the Tail Rotor. The CH-53E already can sling-load a 12-18 ton payload. By using
the SkyCrane without a fuselage we gain 2 tons of lift. Which is easier to
accomplish, building new rotor systems on an enlarged version of the V-22 or
reconfiguring the CH-53E anti-torque tail rotor to the Ring-Tail design?
Future Army Option: A
possible Army option is to field about 750 Future Compound Helos/Gyroplanes
(FCH/FCG) to replace all 430 CH-47s and displace about 700 UH-60s assigned to
air assault organizations. FCH/FCGs would be organized into independent
brigades and designed to plug & fight with Light Armored Brigades
(LAB--what the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment at Fort Polk, La would become if
equipped with the M8 Armored Gun System and/or
M113A3) to form Air-Mechanized Task Forces (AMTFs).
Typical Scenario: An FCH/G
brigade self-deploys from California to an Initial Staging Base (ISB) in
Okinawa in about 72 hours and plugs into a prepositioned LAB to form an AMTF.
The AMTF conducts a mechanized air-assault from Okinawa to North Korea;
an AIRmechanized "Inchon".
a. Displaced LZs/PZs: The
landing zones (LZs) and HIPs are discreet areas displaced from the objective
areas by as much as 40-50 kilometers. This greatly improves aircraft
survivability and makes suppression of enemy air defenses easier through the
exponential expansion of possible LZs. The winching and bomb-bay door or
Assault POD feature of the FCH/G allows efficient air maneuver that comes with
an internal load and the advantages of sling loading in delivering a payload in
small un-improved/pathfinded
areas where airlanding space is unavailable. The armored vehicles can be
winched into tight fitting road spots along mountains or even
"through" light underbrush from HIPs. The inserted ground force
conducts mechanized maneuver to accomplish its mission and can drive to
multiple discreet pick up zones (PZs).
b. AIR-MECH-STRIKE 2D/3D
Maneuver Doctrine: The inserted battalions gain instant positional advantage
from their air assault and exploit the war principle of surprise by conducting
mechanized maneuver to further gain close tactical advantage. The inserted
armored vehicles more closely resemble the Army's version of an AEGIS Guided
Missile Destroyer packed with sensors and vertically
launched missiles (Enhanced Fiber Optic Guided Missiles--EFOGMs) than the
current battleship-type M1 tanks with their heavy direct-fire resistant armor
and cannons best employed for 2D maneuvers. Using organic UAVs, manned observation & attack aircraft, airdropped ground
sensors and even satellite imagery, the ground commanders begin locating and
attacking enemy armor and hidden infantry with their own vertically-launched
smart munitions from 8 to 20 kilometers away or target them for attack helos,
fast movers or even ship-born munitions. Enemy armor that survives these
Precision Guided Munitions attacks (PGMs) are maneuvered against and dealt with
by lightweight, direct-fire ("point & Shoot") Hyper-Velocity
Missiles (Line Of Sight Anti-Tank--LOSATs)
that deliver "SABOT" type penetrators. Well rested and heavily armed infantry then dismount from other air-inserted armored
3D maneuver vehicles based on the same family of chassis/engine to complete the
destruction and secure the objectives in concert with heavier 2D maneuver
forces.
c. Future Land Warfare: The
fruits of the alleged "information
revolution" (Mental Digitalization) will not be fully realized until
we develop forces that PHYSICALLY can move both strategically and tactically at
speeds that can exploit the gains made in battlefield situational awareness.
The Army's push to embed new digital technology on immobile Stryker trucks that
cannot even fly by C-130 STOL fixed-wing aircraft much less Army helicopters
does not yield us a 3D maneuver force to compliment the M1 and M2 tank-based 2D
maneuver forces. Digitizing vulnerable
and immobile Stryker trucks will yield only marginal tactical advantages
due to their excessive weight for infantry carriers (19-22 tons) and poor
strategic/tactical mobility (needs massive sealift
requiring days, weeks, months). However, a light tracked armored vehicle and
heavy-lift rotorwing aircraft combination can fully exploit the advances in
information warfare. The Army's efforts to look for a replacement for the CH-47
is the door to which industry can demonstrate the possibilities of a truly
AIRmechanized force. Now is the time to develop the computer simulations and
preliminary design work to shape the Army's forth-coming Chinook replacement
requirements. It would be an absolute shame if billions are poured into a
beefed-up, non-stealthy V-22 that has the same or less lift performance and
standard external hooks like a Chinook but only flys farther and faster! We
need a lift aircraft that is designed from the get-go to facilitate
AIRmechanized 3D maneuver warfare. We could build a CH-54/S-64 SpeedCrane in a
matter of months for less than $200M.
d. UH-60/Wiesel or BV206S Stepping Stone: we have
proposed like the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Shinseki, that need a
"Medium" AIRMECH force NOW, not later after 10-20 tears of developing
a new vehicle. U.S. Army Major Charles Jarnot's USACGSC
thesis and AIRmech
Strike XXI article in Military Review describes this "stepping
stone" toward AIRmechanization we follow the lead taken by the the former
Army Chief of Staff and the Germans and mechanize the 101st AIR ASSAULT
Division with about 500 German-built Wiesel
2 armored personnel/weapons carriers or Swedish Bv206S tracked AFVs. The Wiesel 2 is
a fully tracked mini-APC that is about the size of a minivan, carries seven
troops and weighs only 6,000 pounds. The new UH-60 Lima Blackhawks with their
newly increased gross weight and hook limits could sling-load a fully armed
Wiesel 2 and a seven man squad carried internally! The 7-ton Bv206S separates
into two "cars" so each can be UH-60L lifted. The Germans have
already equipped three small Brigades with an earlier four-man version of the
vehicle and uses CH-53Gs to transport them. (The Germans do not have any Super
Pumas or Blackhawks). The Wiesel is not large enough to accommodate the
missiles, communications gear, armor protection or infantry capacity (stretched
versions can carry a 5-man fireteam) to fully exploit AIRmech warfare but would
provide a significant improvement over the Vietnam-era
dismounted infantry air-assault doctrine currently employed by the
division. An AIRmechanized 101st Air Assault Division would be an excellent
"middle" force between our Ultra Heavy M1/M2 Armored 2D forces and
our ultralight light infantry 3D maneuver formations. The TRADOC commander
recently articulated to the Chief of Staff of the Army the real need for a
middle-sized airmechanized forces in a TRADOC doctrinal pamphlet. An
AIRmechanized 101st Division would also serve as an excellent test-bed to
develop AIRmechanized doctrine, procedures and institutional requirements for
the day when they upgrade to a 20,000-30,000 pound high-tech armored vehicle
air assaulted by the Future Compound Helo (FCH).
PHASE II: THE STEALTHY FUTURE
COMPOUND TRANSPORT HELICOPTER: MH-2000X
The
"next Chinook" could be a compound heavy lift helicopter/gyroplane
with instead of a tail rotor's power loss to counteract torque, a PUSHER
PROPELLER and ducting for directional control. The FCH/G would have wings so
that when transitioning from hovering take-offs it would become a pusher
propeller fixed wing turboprop aircraft without the risks involved with the
tilt-rotor concept.
A CH-54/S-64 SpeedCrane
could be made in a matter of months and then put into Low Rate Initial
production (LRIP) to field a 100 heavy lift helicopter for to enable Sea basing
and Air-Mech-Strike 3D maneuver warfare. After we get this going we might then
optimize the follow SpeedCranes with new design fuselages.
With compound helicopter
designs everything becomes simpler and stress reduced: after 150 knots the main
rotors are needed less so their loading decreases dramatically. The tail
propeller is a conventional aircraft propeller with just a single shaft to turn
it. Vanes duct the air to turn the aircraft left or right. Noone can walk into
the tail rotor. As the wings create lift speeds of 250 knots are achieved with
tremendous fuel savings = longer ranges.
The Sikorsky S-61F Research Compound Helicopter Program
sponsored by both the Navy and the Army in 1965. Two 2,900 lbs thrust Pratt
& Whitney Turbofan engines on pods. 32 foot wing span. A later version had
six blades.
In the '60s Sikorsky
modified a S-61 (USAF H-3 "Jolly Green Giant") with large wings and a
pair of turbofan engines that could upon a rolling take-off fly without its
rotors entirely!. Basically if you make the wings large enough, a compound heavy-lift
helicopter can fly like a turbo-prop fixed wing aircraft (300+ mph) carrying
its rotors inside for inter-continental deployments to an Intermediate Staging
Base (ISB). Detachable wings can be made so each wing is identical so it could
fit on either side. A semitrical wing design would allow you to turn the wing
over for use on the other side.
With extendable wings like
used on the Gevers Aircraft Company of Brownsberg, Indiana's
"Genesis" variable span amphibian, (pg 536 Janes All the World's
Aircraft, 1995-6 it would be possible to even have the rotors get shot off
in combat in forward flight mode and still fly to a safe rolling landing. This
is on top of the normal auto-rotation landing into any spot safety advantage
helicopters enjoy. The MH-2000X compound heavy lift helicopter/gyroplane would
be the safest aircraft on earth. Unlike past compound helicopters, the wings
would rotate 90 degrees to stay out of the rotor down wash during hovering
take-offs and landings---like a sail on a nuclear submarine busting through the
polar ice cap. With a rolling take-off capability unavailable to a tilt-rotor
(rotors too large to face forward on the ground), the MH-2000X can carry a FULL
mission payload even in high/hot weather conditions because it doesn't have to
make hovering take-offs.
A HEALTHY BODY IS A
STEALTHY FUSELAGE
The
low-cost way to create the next Chinook begins with the Sikorsky CH-53E Super
Stallion 3-engined heavy lift helicopter (using the 4,750 shp T64-GE-419
turboshaft engines in the MH-53E) and creating a stealthy, low observable
fuselage without a rear ramp streamlined back to a ducted pusher propeller.
Imagine a RAH-66
"Comanche on steroids" or "MH-53X" or "MH-2000X".
The 3-engine rotors of the Super Stallion are already proven and tested and can
lift 36,000 pounds (18 tons)--imagine if we lightened the fuselage by using a
SkyCrane or lighter materials---2 tons of more lift. Now we have a platform
that can fly behind enemy lines with confidence, speed, range and M8 Buford AGS
light tanks in the force.
THE HOVERING
INSTERTION/EXTRACTION PROBLEM
One of the
myths exposed/corrected at Pathfinder School
is that helicopters can just land anywhere--ones or twos maybe, but to get
any tactical value several aircraft must land at once to get a rapid build up
of combat power, not piecemeal. As you will note, the MH-2000X has no rear
ramp. Instead it has a bomb-bay floor that lowers itself rapidly by cables to
deliver vehicles, PLS flatracks, and men at a
hover, so the aircraft need not have to fit to land. The CH-54/S-64 SkyCrane
has a powerful winch to effect this capability. Or a POD system can be used so
units can pre-load "mission packages" without tying down aircraft and
wasting time aiting for the aircraft to arrive. Obvious open Landing Zones
(LZs) can now be avoided. A smart enemy like the VC/NVA leaves sentries at key
terrain to warn of aircraft troop insertions. Most importantly, aircraft can
now hover insert armored fighting vehicles like the plentiful 11-ton M113A3 Gavin without having to sling load, and
from higher hovers at a designated Hovering Insertion Point (HIP). This means
the MH-2000X can fly without the drag and risks associated with sling loads to
fly fully aggressive nap-of-the-earth
(NOE) profiles to dodge enemy defenses. If Paratroops/Rangers are inserted by
the bomb-bay floor, they can face out and fire their weapons on the way down,
landing as an intact fighting unit instead of ones or twos from a rope. This is
very important when assaulting defended rooftops in a rapidly urbanizing world.
It gets even better--not
only can vehicles now drive onto the lowered floor and be winched up, so can Soldiers be recovered after a recon mission without
having to dangle from a rope like in STABO, SPIES and FRIES.
Troops enter the aircraft
via side doors with ramps that can be used to roll on/off human powered
vehicles like bikes
and carts or
jumped from when the ramp/doors are opened or removed. With a wide wedge-shaped
fuselage, the MH-2000X should be able to land on the water to recover SEALs and
SF swimmers pehaps through a larger left side cargo hatch. Depending on the
complexity desired, the MH-2000X can have its landing gear extend to load
vehicles and/or a special ground loading ramp would be used to roll it up onto
for loading. If the POD system is used the pods would have spar rails which can
be reattached from a hover and brought back into the MH-2000X. Another option
would be to have the nose of the MH-2000X open up C-5B "Galaxy" style
for pod loading. If the landing gear doesn't kneel/extend the MH-2000X could
come to a hover and load the vehicle(s) and settled back down for tie downs
etc. If the bomb-bay feature is broken, a cargo hook for regular sling loads
would still be an option.
TRACK-WHEELS: THE BETTER
WAY TO LAND
Air-filled tires go flat
and lack traction--they can also simply sink into soft mud miring the aircraft.
The MH-2000X would have two long sponsons along the fuselage holding a recessed
mobil-trac type track-weels like used on the U.S. Army ESMB trailer. There would be no nose wheel to dig into soft
soil. The MH-2000X would be like a tracked vehicle with a skid wheel in the
tail in event of a hard put-down landing like the Apache and Blackhawk's tails.
These tracks would be rubber and free moving for running take offs and landings
and for extremely low ground pressures for soft soil operations. The tracks can
be removed for for the 12 wheels to roll, each is a foam spongy filled tire
--solid with no air pressure to go flat like we used on our militarized
all-terrain bikes for Operation
Dark Claw. The APU would power the front wheels for the MH-2000X to propel
itself over the ground slowly by pilot or crew chief walking ahead with a
remote control for tactical parking. The MH-2000X would have rotor brakes and
folding via the CH-53E components so the entire aircraft would fold up like a
moth to be moved from the open LZ to a hidden woodline or camouflage net for
dispersed parking, or land on ships.
SELF-PROTECTIVE SMOKE
SCREENS
Each MH-2000X would have
the ability to lay their own smoke screens via fuel directed onto their 3d
engine's exhaust like armored vehicles do. Smokescreens laid on the flanks of
landing zones can defeat optically aimed small arms and shoulder fired infared
missiles as smokescreen systems are now being
pursued vigorously on U.S. Army/Air Force ground vehicles. Helicopter
smokescreens would have prevented helicopters being shot down during recent
battles in Grenada, Panama and Somalia.
AIR-TO-AIR REFUELING:
STRATEGIC REACH
With an
extendable air-to-air refueling probe, the MH-2000X can fly indefinately from
any spot on earth to power project AIRMECHanized
U.S. Army Air Assault forces, or SOF. Utilizing AFSOC MC-130P tankers the
MH-2000X can project globally or regionally using its own drop tanks mounted
conformally on the landing gear sponsoons. Imagine a 173rd Airborne Brigade
from Vincenza, Italy flying to Africa to retrieve American hostages long before
the ship-based meu can even get loaded like what
took place recently using AFSOC MH-53J Pave Low III helicopters. Unlike the
Osprey force, the heavy lift MH-2000X carries an AFV equipped force that has
the firepower, mobility and shock action to win hands-down instead of foot
slogging at best even against more numerous third world country foes. The
1-508th Red Devil Paratroops
could parachute in by C-17s or C-130s to secure the airport as the MH-2000X
force flies in to the embassy and/or designated collection points to shuttle
the American citizens to the airport for long range jet flights back to CONUS.
PHASE III: JET POWERED
TRANSPORTS THAT BECOME HELICOPTERS: THE SPEED CRANE WITH MISSION PODS
INTRODUCING THE SPEED CRANE
OR POWER SLED CONCEPT:
Animated depiction
of Pod system in action
Lowering
pods from MH-2000X while at a hover
Un-Loading
pods as MH-2000X flies away
We hope to
build a 1/42 model. We call it the "Speed-Crane" or the
"Power-Sled" concept. The basic idea is to build a fuselage shaped
like a rectangular sled with a six blade counter-rotating rotor in the center
equipped with six retractable blades. The rear would have two large
turbo-fan/turbo shaft engines. A pair of swing wings (like an F-111/F-14/MRCA
Tornado etc.) and large 12 foot stork-like landing gear. The top of the
fuselage will have a retractable door like a pencil carrying box that will roll
up revealing the sunken rotor system. Hydraulic press will elevate the rotor
and the blades would start to rotate then extend as rpm stiffening took effect.
The forward part of the fuselage would have a compact cockpit with a rear set
of seats for additional crews or mission specialist. The height of the fuselage
would only be about six to eight feet and would provide a lifting body shape at
high speeds.
The idea is to build a
power sled and attach mission designed tubs or "pods" below! Small,
medium and large.
The small one would be
about three feet thick and carry extra fuel for self deployments, anti-sub
gear, phased-array radar panels to replace the E-2C Hawkeye AWACs, or even
standoff weapons for attack missions.
The medium size tub would
be for light cargo, & personnel and be about six feet to eight feet tall,
equipped with a back ramp which the marines love and side jump doors for
Paratroopers. All 3 doors could also be used rappelling and
fast roping Air Assault operations.
Then the Large tub for
carring an armored vehicle for AIRmechanized operations.
The tubs would be light
weight and inexpensive since the only need to carry weight suspended from the
fuselage and not have to meet the rigors of acting as a fuselage as wll like
the CH-47 & 53 cabin areas must do. A lightweight fiber outer panel would
provide the streamlining and a basket like floor suspended on light weight
cables provide the vertical strength. No need to tackle the fuselage torsion
and twisting of an aircraft, the upper sled takes care of that.
The concept of a pod or tub
is proven with the CH-54 Skycrane and was once considered by the USAF with the XC-120 using old
piston engined technology. General James Gavin in his visionary masterpiece,
"Airborne
warfare" advocated pod equipped aircraft for U.S. Army Airborne
forces. A science-fiction TV show in the early 60s called
"Thunderbirds" had a pod-equipped aircraft called "Thunderbird 2" which
was THE most critical part of the international rescue operation because its
versatility/flexibility allowed it to instantly load the needed rescue pod and
fly directly to the scene of the crisis. ISO Container "Battle Boxes"
should also be a carry option.
It worked in the past! It
will work even BETTER in the future!
Self-deployment could be
done in the pure airplane mode at USAF jet transport/airliner speeds (450-550
Knots) with excellent fuel economy! though air-to-air refueling capability
would be organic...The SPEED Crane aircraft could slow down to hover like a
helicopter for Air Assaults or drop Paratroopers from the medium sized mission
tub. Pre-packaged tubs could be prepositioned by the user in quantity for rapid
deployments or link up at an Intermediate Staging Base. The mission tubs
or "Battle Boxes" could be tailored to meet any service need and
since they are interchangeble could provide for excellent operational
efficiency by allowing maintenance to manage a fleet of sturdy sleds that are
weather resistant for outside storage vice separate specialized relatively
fragile aircraft! Each service could work with various subcontractors to
develop their mission tubs without the aircraft! So developmental time and thus
expense would by quick and inexpensive compared to today's methods.
The same sled and crew
could attach various tubs and thus replace the P-3 Orion, E-2 Hawkeye, Seahawk
ASW, Sea Stallion Anti-Mine warfare ship to ship replenishment at sea, search
air rescue, anti-ship and ground strike! The only mission it could not perform
is fleet defense as a fighter or air superiority machine. A future aircraft
carrier would only need the Speed Crane and a fighter, thus this could be a
joint Army/Navy project with USSOCOM sure to be interested. The compact size of
the sled configuration lends itself to ship storage and stealth technology application.
We estimate the sled would
weigh about 50,000 lbs, be able to cruise at 450-550 knots for 2,000 miles on
internal tanks and 5,000 miles on a small fuel tub. The swing wings could be
removed in theater and high efficiency non-retractable blades installed if the
sled were to be tasked to perform lift missions with short range requirements
like Korea. Or it could have a lighter weight fixed wing installed and a
passenger only tub with no winch for civilian commuter roles. Such a civil
aircraft could carry 40-60 PAX across the U.S. at airliner speeds and land on
roof tops or service smaller cities without the need for a airport. A
larger tandem rotor sled could carry 200 PAX plus and fly overseas! Landing
vertically!
THE AIRMECH CONSORTIUM:
EXPLOITING VICTORY
To make
these dramatic changes a reality we propose that a consortium of heavy lift
aircraft makers, AFV makers and the 101st Air Assault Division
be formed to finalize the requirements of the next Chinook. We are convinced it
should be a CH-53E-based compound SkytCrane helicopter NOT a tilt rotor.
Sikorsky, makers of
the Super Stallion, Erickson SkyCrane who own the rights to the S-64/CH-54
Skycrane and Piasecki--who happen to be the
experts in compound
helicopter design would be contacted and joined together to build a prototype
SpeedCrane within 12 months for $200M for Phase I. Thisd should be followed by
100 SpeedCranes at about $20M each. Phase II would be the MH-2000X prototype.
This synergism of brain power would insure we get an aircaft that can lift ALL
OF the Army's equipment up to 15-20 tons, and that armored vehicles to exploit
this mobility are created.
We can begin by a
"Louisiana Maneuver" where an Infantry Company of the 101st Air
Assault Division is reorganized with permanently assigned Blackhawks and
Wiesels or Bv206Ss, some with EFOGMs/LOSATs
and a notional UAV unit be fought at NTC as an OPFOR augmentee. This would show
the awesome capabilities even an AIRMECHANIZED capability would provide. This
would enable the 50-pound Javelin "fire and forget" ATGM to be fully
exploited via vehicle mobility.
Next, a Battalion's worth
of 60-80 German Wiesel 3-ton tracked AFVs or
BV206Ss would be provided to the 101st's designated Battalion to test a
surrogate FCS/Air Mobility Vehicle (AMV) using Blackhawks to move them as an AIRMECHSTRIKE
demonstrator until the Chinook replacement comes online. This would utilize
regular sling-loading techniques and equipment until a conformal aeropod system
for carrying vehicles closer to the Blackhawk is devised. The 82d Airborne
Division would receive a battalion's worth of M113A3 Gavins and M8 Buford AGS light
tanks to be their airdropped AIRBORNEMECHanized capable force--one Delta Weapons
company in one battalion in their three 3 Ready Brigades.
This would be our interim AIRMECHanized capability in the U.S. Army until the
SpeedCrane and MH-2000X comes online to lift M113A3/4 Gavin and M8 Buford AGS
AFVs and the FCS. We can ill afford to do without these capabilities in a
rapidly changing world, where these troops could fight anywhere within 18
hours.
The FCS should be a light
tracked tank that is air-droppable and air assault transportable by the MH-2000X
to supplement the M1 Abrams and M2 Bradley series 2D forces. The M113A4 Gavin
should be built with advanced lightweight armor construction as the objective
Air Mobility Vehicle (AMV) in either an armored infantry
"fighting/carrying role" and fire support "tank role"
configurations. One way to achieve this is is by an all-composite Armored Hull
which in 1985 at Baltimore, Maryland a M113 was field tested with an
experimental composite hull for future amphibious vehicles (see below). The
hull is reinforced plastic covered with ceramic tiles which provides greater
combat protection without an increase in weight. There are many applique armor
packages that can be added to the existing M113A3 Gavin AFV to achieve
RPG/auto-cannon levels of protection via conventional materials.
There is a slowly growing
ground swell among some senior officers to explore AIRmechanization, in part
due to the efforts of the German Army. The future of maneuver warfare is in
AIRmechanization and bravo to the corporation that postures itself to built the
aircraft and light tracked AFVs that will make it happen.
AIR-MECH-STRIKE!!!
FEEDBACK!