The next benefit of a fixed-wing attack U/MCAV is that they can fly with greater weapon loads for longer periods of time since they require less power to remain aloft and thus burn less fuel because their props only need to keep the aircraft moving forward for air flowing over fixed wings while helicopters with rotary wings must keep their entire wing area spinning to create their own lift.

This is not a new revelation! We knew even back in the '50s during the Korean War that most jets fly too fast and helicopters not fast and long enough! Before the advent of jets, we had STOL "Grasshoppers" that acted as Airborne Forward Air Controllers (AFACs) for artillery fires or prop-plane P-47 and other USAAF fighter-bombers. The Grasshoppers could be co-located with ground maneuver units because they could take off and land off grassy fields and roads or be moved by trucks!

Our first stab at a AFAC for the jet fighter-bombers was using the AT-6 "Mosquito".

"Out on a Limb" by Jim Dietz www.jamesdietz.com

T-6 "Mosquitos" in Korea

Image Size: 13" x 24" 600 Public Edition (Limited Edition, Signed and Numbered) 100 Publisher Proof Edition (Limited Edition, Signed and Numbered) 100 Artist Proof Edition (Limited Edition, Signed and Numbered)

The 6147th Tactical Control Group, nicknamed the "Mosquitos", received a Presidential citation in 1951 for their performance in the Korean War. This citation was for the entire unit and without parallel in aerial warfare history at that time. The gallant Mosquito pilots flew unarmed and unescorted T-6 aircraft that were vulnerable to opposition from the air and ground. Yet these brave pilots flew at dangerously low altitudes over Communist positions searching for telltale signs of the enemies presence: freshly turned earth, footprints in the snow or a discarded tin can. Once a sign was spotted, the Mosquitos flew down into the flak and marked their targets with smoke rockets. The North Koreans called them "Mosquitos" because the sight of a North American T-6 buzzing down on them meant they were soon to be "stung". Shortly after the annoying buzz of the venerable Texan ceased, the screams of rocket-laden P-51s or the new jet fighter, F-84 Thunderstreak, were on their way downhill to deliver death and destruction to the Communist supply lines. The T-6 tactical coordinators of the 6147th Tactical Control Group may have been old and outdated, but as deadly hunting dogs that pinpointed game for heavily armed aerial hunters, they were universally feared by the enemy.

The speed of the fast fighter/bombers, particularly the jets, did not allow the pilots to adequately see and target the highly camouflaged positions and vehicles of the North Koreans. They needed small, slow yet maneuverable aircraft with an observer who could mark the enemy positions with smoke bombs or rockets. The T-6 was fast enough to evade enemy attacks, had adequate visibility to truly observe targets, could be equipped with the necessary communications gear (eight-channel AN/ARC3 radio sets) to talk the fighter/bombers into targets and could carry target rockets to mark sites. The men called to fly these missions lived a kind of gypsy life, they were moved from air base to airbase as the U.N. forces retreated southward from the North Korean flood. They were quite literally "Out On A Limb", not only needing to complete their operational objectives in the air, but also having to leave the ground staff of the group to move all their equipment to the next airfield down the line. We have largely forgotten the role of these daredevils in the T-6, but without the "Mosquitos" - a raging outfit of professionals of one stripe or another - the Korean air war might have been a different story. By the end of the Korean War, the 6147th Tactical Control Group lost 42 aircraft and 33 men. The Mosquitos flew over 40,000 sorties aiding in the destruction of 5 tank divisions, 563 artillery pieces, 5,079 vehicles, 12 locomotives, and 84 bridges.

In Algeria, the French cut-out the "middleman" and armed their T-6 Texans so they were their own fighter-bombers!

Here is an excellent account of the French success in COIN operations:

French COIN operations in Algeria, 1954-1962

The French then replaced their dwindling supply of Texans with faster T-28 Nomads that they improved for the ground attack role as "Fennecs".

We in the U.S. used to have this same long-loiter time, ready-to-attack capability with the magnificent A-1 SkyRaider (see above) during Korean and Vietnam but even at its peak need, the fast mover egotists in the USAF and USN were out to get rid of these slower attack/observation aircraft using the excuse that in some idealized ultimate combat type between nation-states, they would not fly fast enough to survive; while at the same time when their fast-movers get shot out of the sky, they expected an even slower moving helicopter to come rescue them. A-6 Intruders would fly attack bombing missions until, they were shot down in the Gulf War, so they were considered "too slow" and retired. The Navy's A-4 was effective as carrier and land-based CAS bomber from forward strips for the marines until they were gotten rid of in favor of vulnerable and failed V/TOL AV-8B Harrier jump jets. The AF thanks to some behind the scenes heroics was forced into replacing the A-1 with the fabulous armored A-10 CAS, but though 700 were built only a few are flying today (and maybe soon none) thanks to the fighter jock mafia with agendas other than joint service combat effectiveness.

Other countries and individuals when faced with the need for CAS have improvised with even lesser fixed-wing means. The Saab Supporter with an extra fuel tank in the back can fly for 800 kilometers (600 miles)! This is 4 times the range and endurance of current helicopters! The prop driving engine of an U/MCAV could be easily silenced so it wouldn't announce its presence to the enemy to react and fire at as current as-is helicopters do. An U/MCAV could loiter overhead and nearby Army Ground M113A3 Gavin ACAV troops providing the Maneuver Air Support (MAS) concept that Charles "Chuck" Myers has documented is needed to insure air recon and immediate strikes are available for ground troops even beneath overcast cloud conditions.

Therefore, we propose that we create a test Air/Ground Cavalry Squadron of the 1st Cavalry Division or the 2nd ACR using upgraded M113A3 Gavin ACAVs and a troop of armed micro-helicopters and U/MCAV micro-fixed wing attack aircraft "ASPs" and see what works best; the optimal solution will probably be a combination of both aircraft types; a force of "Killer Bees".

While the ideal U/MCAV ASP would be the Burt Rutan's ARES "Mudfighter" turbofan or ducted-fan jet with 25mm Gatling cannon shooting the same shells as the M113A3 ACAVs and BFVs shoot, we might get faster progress by using in-production and available in wide numbers, combat-proven SAAB Supporter CAS aircraft with auto engines that can burn common JP-8 fuel. Another aspect of the film, "Iron Eagle III" viewers may not realize is that the so-called enemy "German jet" that flies in the final scenes is actually the ARES "mudfighter" experimental attack jet---exactly the kind of fast when it needs to be, yet-agile-enough-to-fly-slow jet that we should have in the U.S. Army firing the laser-guided 2.75 inch rockets shot by the good guys in the film! The downside of the ARES is we would have to build them from scratch, taking money, time and political clout. However, another U/MCAV ASP possibility is the Argentine Pucara turboprop COIN/CAS aircraft which was greatly feared by the British in the 1982 Falklands War who went to great lengths to destroy them on the ground with raids like the Pebble island attack, though all the pesky aircraft were never fully found and neutralized. Pucaras are now fighting Tamil Tiger terrorists in Sri Lanka and available for purchase by the U.S. Army to form a more effective Air Cavalry for MAS. The smaller, less expensive Saab Supporter CAS aircraft also has a good combat history and OV-1 Mohawks are still flying and available. And as you'll see so are A-37s, A-7s, F-5s, and A-4s!

The Ultimate Army STOL "Grasshopper": the OV-1 Mohawk: well-designed COIN and FAC aircraft needed today!

The Army grasshopper concept reached its zenith with the OV-1 Mohawk which could be BOTH an observation and its own attack aircraft; eliminating for small targets the USAF "middleman". As you will see the weak-egoed USAF brass had a fit over the job they don't want to do and do not want anyone else doing it, either!

Detailed Mohawk photos: AMS Strike Photos!

In History: Naval Aircraft--F7U Cutlass through CH-53E, legendary Naval aircraft developer, George Spanenberg writes:

http://216.239.41.104/search?q=cache:Sm5mQ84_5-YJ:www.georgespangenberg.com/history2.htm+convair+p6y&hl=en&ie=UTF-8

SPANGENBERG: Then we did the Mohawk, the OF. This was a joint program with the Army. In those days the Department of the Defense would not let the Army do any development so when the Army wanted to start a new program they had to shop either the Air Force or the Navy. Most of the time they seemed to end up with us, with the Navy that is, because we didn't charge them anything for getting involved. It had to become a joint airplane for budget justification reasons so the marines and the Army got together on a joint requirement. The main thing that it provided was side-by-side cockpit with enough power. It was a pretty good flying airplane. It had enough capability to do the bird dog job a lot better than other things were capable of doing. We were still flying the Cubs, the OEs and so was the Army. The Air Force really wasn't flying anything in those days for that mission.

I still remember the marine guys arguing with the Army guys on whether it should be side-by-side or tandem cockpits and some of the same argument had gone on at the early days of the A2F.

RAUSA: Which do you prefer? Depends on the aircraft?

SPANGENBERG: It depends on what you're trying to do. The fighters I thought had to be tandem just for aerodynamic reasons. The subsonic stuff, the advantages of hand motions and communication without having to depend upon the ICS I thought were generally overpowering and during one conference one of the marines, obviously one of the sharp marines -- we were working in a working environment where we had partial bulkheads and the guy went over into the next room and then tried to be a part of the conference. He could hear but he couldn't see. It was a very dramatic way to prove that you're better off sitting at a conference table than have guys on opposite sides of a bulkhead without any visual stuff going on.

The airplane was a great success. The marines dropped out of the thing in order to buy C-130s for tanking.

RAUSA: Are we talking about the Mohawk now?

SPANGENBERG: Yeah. We the Navy had done an excellent job of providing a useful airplane to the Army for close support. The Army could not put bomb racks on an airplane because of the Air Force/Army fight about who does what. The Air Force had not done adquate close support for the Army at any time, according to the Army. They did their version of close support which was anything but what the marines call close support. In developing the airplane we had some 600 pound resupply containers which we put on wing stations. We got as far as testing the airplane with firing the guns and dropping bombs from those resupply container stations. Patuxent cleared the airplane and at the last minute the Air Force found out about it and prohibited the Army from ever using that capability. We thought we had foxed the Air Force and given the Army a close support capability not as good as they could have had if they had bought some Navy airplanes or had been allowed to by the Air Force but the Air Force seemed very jealous of that. And then we got out of the program and eventually the Army took over. The Army normally took over management after the development because they were allowed to buy "off-the-shelf" airplanes.

From Greg Goebel's Excellent Air Surveillance Web Site

www.vectorsite.net/avbtsv1.html

[1.0] The Grumman OV-1 Mohawk
v1.1.1 / 1 of 4 / 01 jun 02 / greg goebel / public domain

* The pioneer in the field of battlefield surveillance aircraft was the Grumman "OV-1 Mohawk", a twin-turboprop machine that served with distinction with the U.S. Army for several decades. This chapter provides a short history of the OV-1.

[1.1] MOHAWK ORIGINS: G-134 / OV-1A
[1.2] OV-1A DESCRIBED / JOV-1A
[1.3] OV-1B / OV-1C
[1.4] OV-1D / MOHAWK IN VIETNAM
[1.5] MODIFICATIONS & PROPOSALS
[1.6] CIVILIAN MOHAWKS

[1.1] MOHAWK ORIGINS: G-134 / OV-1A

* In late 1954, the U.S. Army issued a requirement for a battlefield surveillance and utility aircraft, and in early 1956, the Army met with representatives of six aircraft manufacturers to consider proposals. The proposals were used to generate a final specification, which was kicked upstairs to the Pentagon for approval in the spring of 1956.

At this point, the political wrangling began. The Department of Defense wanted the Army to talk to the U.S. Air Force (USAF) to ensure there was no duplication of missions between the two services. The US Navy, working on behalf of the marine corps, also became involved.

While Army officials haggled with their opposite numbers in the other armed services, in June 1956 the Army came up with a final specification for the new aircraft, indicating that it should have twin turboprop engines for combat survivability; carry a crew of a pilot and observer; be capable of short takeoffs and landings on rough airstrips; and be able to fly in bad weather conditions.

The Navy also wanted the aircraft to operate from small escort carriers. Although one of the consequences of interservice politics of the time was that the Army was restricted to operating fixed-wing aircraft with an empty weight of less than 2,270 kilograms (5,000 pounds), the limit was waivered in this case.

In March 1957, Grumman Aircraft Corporation was awarded the contract to develop the aircraft, which was given the company designation of "G-134". The contract specified development of nine prototype and evaluation aircraft, to be designated "YAO-1AF".

The relationship between the services over the G-134 was quarrelsome. The marines wanted a simple spotter aircraft to replace their old Cessna "OE-1 Bird Dogs", and were not interested in the sophisticated sensor payloads that the Army was considering for the G-134. The Marines also wanted the G-134 to have stores pylons to carry weapons, which annoyed the Air Force, which wanted to retain control of the battlefield close-support mission.

However, the Navy decided to build a fleet tanker vessel and didn't have the money to buy the marines a new observation aircraft. The Navy and marines pulled out of the program in September 1957, much to the relief of the Army. The Army reserved an "OF-1" designation for a Marine version in case the issue raised its ugly head again, and got on with development.

* The first Grumman YAO-1AF flew on 14 April 1959, with Grumman chief test pilot Ralph Donnell at the controls. The flight test program went very smoothly, with few major changes required to the basic design. The aircraft proved to be extremely agile, and had a low stalling speed and very good short-field performance.

It was also powerful and fast, compared to the piston-engined aircraft previously flown by many Army aviators, and in fact set a number of performance records for its class. The type's high performance would eventually lead to a number of deadly accidents, caused by pilots who became overenthusiastic at the controls. This was not really a fault of the aircraft, which flew well and was extremely strong. Although the YAO-1F was designed for a ten-year service life, fatigue tests demonstrated that it would probably be good for twice that, a tribute to Grumman's custom of building very rugged aircraft.

The YAO-1F was originally to be named "Montauk", following the Army's tradition of naming aircraft after American native tribes, but the Montauk tribe was judged too obscure and the name "Mohawk" was used instead. The Mohawk tribe was better known, and also had a reputation as a tribe of fearsome warriors.

The YAO-1F was ordered into production as the "AO-1F", going into US Army service in Germany in 1961 and in Vietnam in September 1962. In that month, the U.S. military services consolidated their aircraft designation schemes, and the Mohawk designations became "YOV-1A" and "OV-1A" respectively. The most distinctive difference between the evaluation and production aircraft was that the production aircraft were fitted with black rubber pneumatic de-icing boots on the leading edges of the flight surfaces.

[1.2] OV-1A DESCRIBED / JOV-1A

* The OV-1A carried a KA-30 or later a KS-61 camera in a bay in the rear fuselage. The camera could pivot from horizon to horizon. Boxy photoflash flare pods could be fitted above the wing roots to provide a total capacity of 52 flares, which were ejected upward to ensure that the flash was above the camera and so did not blind them.

One unusual feature was an AN/ADR-6 radiation detector ("radiac"), fitted in the rear fuselage to allow the aircraft to map radiation on a nuclear battlefield. The detector activated a cockpit alarm if radiation levels were high enough to put the crew at risk. The Mohawk was also fitted with a comprehensive suite of radio and navigation gear, as well as an IFF transponder.

The Mohawk had a bulged cockpit with a snub nose to provide a superlative view for its pilot and observer. Canopy side panels hinged upward to allow entrance and exit from the cockpit, with a boarding step sliding down from each side of the nose below the panels.

The two flight crew sat in armored Martin-Baker Mark 5 ejection seats, which fired through frangible canopy top panels. Ejection seats were adopted because the Mohawk had big props on either side of the cockpit that blocked a conventional bailout, and the Mohawk was intended to fly operationally at low altitudes, making a "manual" bailout impossible in any case. The Mark 5 seats could be fired from zero altitude, but required a minimum flight speed of 185 KPH (100 knots) to be used safely. Improved seats were later fitted that reduced the minimum safe flight speed to 110 KPH (60 knots).

The cockpit floor was 6.4 millimeter (1/4 inch) thick aluminum alloy plate for protection against small-arms fire; the windshield glass was bullet-resistant and 2.5 centimeters (an inch) thick; and the cockpit could be fitted with flak curtains on the forward and rear walls. Heavy-duty windshield wipers were provided to deal with wet weather.

The Mohawk had tricycle landing gear, with the nosewheel retracting backward and the main gear retracting outward into the wings. All the gear had single wheels. Low-pressure tires were fitted to heavy-duty struts for rough-field operation, and a small tailskid was fitted to protect the rear fuselage during steep short-field takeoffs.

The evaluation aircraft had been fitted with Lycoming T53-L-3 turboprops with 960 horsepower each, but in production the engines were updated to T53-L-7s with 1,005 horsepower each. The Mohawk is said to have been the first fixed-wing aircraft to be fitted with the T53, the engine already having been selected for the Bell "Huey" helicopter.

The engines were mounted on top of the wings, giving them some protection against ground fire, and "toed out" slightly to improve engine-out handling. The exhausts were on top of the nacelles, which would later give the aircraft a degree of protection against man- portable heat-seeking surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). The engines drove three-bladed Hamilton Standard propellers with a diameter of 3.05 meters (10 feet). The propellers were fully reversible to reduce landing roll.

The wings had a 6.5 degree dihedral, and were fitted with large-area flaps and full-span leading-edge slats to reduce takeoff roll. Interestingly, the leading-edge slats would prove ineffective in Vietnam and would be generally bolted down in that theater.

Take-off run was 358 meters (1,175 feet), in contrast to 1,160 meters (3,800 feet) for a Lockheed C-130 Hercules. Although an early G-134 mockup featured a high tee tail, this proved inconvenient for engine- out flight, and a distinctive triple-fin tail scheme was adopted instead.

A hydraulically-operated dive brake was fitted to either side of the rear fuselage behind the wing. Internal fuel capacity was 1,125 liters (297 U.S. gallons) in a single self-sealing fuel tank in the fuselage above the wings, giving the Mohawk an endurance of 2 hours 20 minutes. The tank was part of the aircraft's frame, and it was built very strong, with panels from it subjected to machine-gun fire in tests to ensure survivability.

In operation the Mohawk generally carried a 567 liter (150 US gallon) fuel tank under each wing, giving the aircraft an endurance of 4 hours 30 minutes. Double-size external tanks could be used for ferry flights, but these were rarely used. The aircraft was designed for easy maintenance, with direct access to the majority of systems through panels that could be reached without ladders or work stands.

* The OV-1A was designed to be fitted with up to six underwing pylons, but only two were fitted in production, to allow it to carry the two external tanks. The Army, claiming that they wanted the OV-1A to be able to fire rockets to mark targets and protect itself, had Grumman refit 54 Mohawks with all six pylons and install a Mark 20 fixed reticle gunsight in the cockpit for the pilot.

These modified aircraft were redesignated "JOV-1A", and evaluated with 7 round or 19 round 70 millimeter (2.75 inch) rocket pods; SUU- 12 12.7 millimeter (0.50 caliber) machine gun pods; 225 kilogram (500 pound) bombs; 140 millimeter (5 inch) Zuni rockets; and flares.

The Air Force saw the JOV-1A as a Army attempt to perform the close support mission, which they believed was their job. They objected loudly, and the Army formally changed the name back to OV-1A, though they did not remove the pylons or the gunsight. Many of these aircraft would serve in Vietnam, often carrying smoke rockets, and sometimes more lethal stores for "self-defense".

The Air Force remained very touchy about the issue, even demanding that Grumman drop company brochures that highlighted the Mohawk's attack capability. In 1965, the Pentagon handed down a directive dictating that the Army would not operate armed fixed-wing aircraft.

[1.3] OV-1B / OV-1C

* Even before the first flight of the OV-1A, plans were in place to develop two follow-on variants, the "OV-1B" and the "OV-1C", to exploit new sensor technologies as they became available. Despite their consecutive designations, the OV-1B and OV-1C were produced in parallel.

The prototype OV-1B was modified from one of the nine evaluation YOV- 1As. The primary enhancement was the addition of of the big Motorola "AN/APS-94 Side Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR)", with the radar antenna in a 5.5 meter (18 foot) long, boxy, yaw-stabilized fiberglass pod slung under the right fuselage. The OV-1B retained the optical cameras.

The APS-94 SLAR provided an imaging reconnaissance capability in day or night, in any weather. It shot radar signals to either or both sides of the aircraft and recorded the echoes onto photographic film strips, which were automatically developed in flight. The right-side flight controls were deleted and a sensor station was installed to allow an operator to monitor and control the SLAR. The SLAR also had a "moving target indicator (MTI)" capability to highlight vehicles in motion on the imagery.

The OV-1B featured an increased wingspan of 1.79 meters (5 feet 10 inches) to help lift the SLAR. Airbrakes were deleted to save weight, and only two stores pylons were fitted. An autopilot and Doppler navigation radar were added to help the aircraft fly nice neat radar mapping patterns, and a new VHF data link was installed to allow real- time relay of SLAR data to a ground station.

Late OV-1B production featured uprated Lycoming T53-L-15 turboprops with 1,150 horsepower each. Oddly, this was not done to improve flight performance. While the bugeyed canopy provided excellent visibility, it also turned the cockpit into a greenhouse in sunny weather, and flight crews could return to base sopping with sweat. Operations in the hot Vietnamese climate demanded a hefty air conditioning system, and the additional horsepower was to drive the air conditioning! Older aircraft were retrofitted with the T53-L-15 as well. 90 OV-1Bs were built.

* Initial OV-1C production examples simply amounted to an OV-1A with a "UAS-4 Red Haze" infrared (IR) sensor system in addition to its optical cameras. The UAS-4 could spot fires, hot truck engines, and other evidence of enemy activities at night, in poor weather, or under jungle canopy. The UAS-4 was originally mounted in the rear fuselage, but was later put in a blister on the belly just behind the wing, along with a panoramic camera and an anti-collision light.

As with the OV-1B, the right-side flight controls were deleted and replaced with a sensor control station, and the IR data was recorded on film strips. The UAS-4 was later replaced with the more sensitive "UAS-14", which included a data link to allow reconnaissance data to be transferred to battlefield commanders in real time. The OV-1C was also said to have featured a chute to allow the flightcrew to drop messages to field units. It is unclear if other Mohawk variants had this little feature.

After the delivery of a few initial OV-1Cs, production was changed to feature the wider span of the OV-1B, and the airbrakes were deleted as well. Late production OV-1Cs had a nose panel for a KA-60 panoramic camera that could take 180 degree pictures in front of the aircraft, and this feature was also retrofitted to older aircraft.

Late production OV-1Cs were also fitted with the uprated T53-L-15 engines, and these aircraft were sometimes called "Super Cs". As with the OV-1B, many older OV-1Cs were retrofitted with the uprated engines. 133 OV-1Cs were built, with final delivery in 1969.

[1.4] OV-1D / MOHAWK IN VIETNAM

* The SLAR and IR sensor systems greatly enhanced the Mohawk's capabilities, and it was logical to develop a Mohawk variant that could carry either, though not both, of them. The result was the definitive "OV-1D".

The OV-1D featured three fast-access compartments that allowed the IR sensor and the APS-94 SLAR electronics systems to be easily swapped out. The canoe pod for the SLAR could be bolted on or removed quickly. A full configuration change took no more than an hour. Both sensor systems used the same cockpit display and control panel.

The OV-1D had the wider wingspan of the OV-1B, but also was fitted with airbrakes. It featured an updated camera suite, including the panoramic camera in the nose, a panoramic camera in the fuselage, and a "serial frame" camera under the fuselage to provide along-track imagery.

Night imagery could be obtained using an electronic photoflash unit carried in a wing pod. Flares had proven troublesome to handle in the field, with improperly loaded flares said to have caused accidents in which the entire flare load lit off in the launcher pack. The photoflash pod was also used by older Mohawk variants.

Avionics improvements were added as well, particularly in the form of the "ASN-86 inertial navigation system", which provided accurate all- weather flight guidance. In addition, updated defensive countermeasures systems were added, and the aircraft could carry an "ALQ-147 Hot Brick" heat-seeking missile jammer on an underwing pylon.

A total of 37 OV-1Ds were built, and 108 older Mohawk variants were upgraded to the OV-1D standard, including four OV-1Cs rebuilt as the "YOV-1D" pre-production prototypes. Two OV-1Ds of this total were provided to Israel in 1974, though they were returned to U.S. service in 1976.

GRUMMAN OV-1D MOHAWK:

spec metric english

wingspan 14.63 meters 48 feet
length (no SLAR) 12.5 meters 41 feet
length (with SLAR) 13.69 meters 44 feet 11 inches
height 3.86 meters 12 feet 8 inches

empty weight 5,330 kilograms 11,760 pounds
max loaded weight 8,215 kilograms 18,110 pounds

maximum speed 490 KPH 305 MPH / 265 KT
service ceiling 7,620 meters 25,000 feet
range 1,520 kilometers 945 MI / 822 NMI

* Apparently the Army had some misgivings about the Mohawk at first, as the fussing over the type with the marines and the Navy had led to an aircraft that was more complicated and expensive than the Army had originally wanted. However, once the machine went into combat the Army decided they'd made the right choice after all. The Mohawk performed outstanding service in the Vietnam war, providing excellent intelligence on enemy positions and activities. It operated over South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and occasionally even North Vietnam. The Mohawk often flew in cooperative missions with U.S. Air Force, Navy, or marine forces.

The Mohawk's ability to operate from forward airstrips and provide real-time intelligence was a great benefit to Army field commanders, permitting immediate artillery or air strikes to be called in on enemy troop movements. It was also occasionally used to parachute supply canisters carried on underwing pylons to combat units in isolated locations.

Its agility, ability to fly low, and its relatively quiet turboprop engines allowed it to sneak up on the enemy unannounced, and the enemy is said to have referred to it as the "Whispering Death". Its combat survivability was very good, and its reliability and maintainability were outstanding, with the highest availability rate of any Army aircraft.

The lack of serious offensive armament was troublesome to field commanders, however, because in many cases the Mohawks found concentrations of enemy troops who would be gone by the time strikes could be called in. The field commanders argued at length but in vain against the Air Force restriction on armed Army fixed-wing aircraft. In many cases, the Mohawks were armed anyway.

In 1966, one Mohawk reputedly shot down a North Vietnamese MiG-17 fighter with 70 millimeter unguided rockets. The North Vietnamese pilot made a pass at one of a pair of Mohawks, the other loosed a salvo of rockets at the fighter, and to the surprise of all, managed to hit the MiG. However, one Mohawk was shot down by a North Vietnamese MiG in 1969, evening the score. This was the only Army fixed-wing aircraft loss in air-to-air combat during the war.

A total of 27 Mohawks were lost in combat action in Vietnam, including one destroyed on the ground, and a further 36 were lost in accidents. There is a story that the crew of one shot-up Mohawk ejected, and the aircraft then obligingly crashed into a scrapyard.

In 1972, Mohawks began to be transferred to the Army National Guard, but the type still remained in first-line regular Army service for two decades longer.

[1.5] MODIFICATIONS & PROPOSALS

* Several Mohawk modifications also saw service. Since it was designed for the reconnaissance role and could carry sophisticated sensors, it was well suited for modification to the "electronic intelligence (ELINT)" role.

The exact history of the use of the Mohawk as an ELINT platform is a little confusing, particularly because in some cases the modifications were secret. Apparently, in the early 1960s, one OV-1B had its SLAR removed and replaced by an "AN/ALQ-133 emitter location system", with antennas in boxy underwing pods and an antenna in place of the SLAR boom, to locate and target adversary radar and communications centers. Targeting data was relayed in real time back to ground commanders over a data link.

This aircraft was originally given the designation "EV-1D", though the designation was later changed to "RV-1B". This led to a formal program named "QUICK LOOK I" to update a number of OV-1Cs to a similar ELINT configuration based on the ALQ-133. Several dozen OV- 1Bs were later updated to the OV-1B airframe configuration, given an upgraded ELINT suite under the "QUICK LOOK II" program, and redesignated "RV-1D". There were also some classified ELINT modifications of the Mohawk whose details remain unclear.

In the late 1980s, a few OV-1Ds were modified as prototypes for an advanced "OV-1E" variant with a "glass cockpit", "Global Positioning System (GPS)" satellite receiver, and other modernized kit, but the military didn't buy off on the idea and it went no farther.

* There were a number of proposals for Mohawk variants that never happened. In 1960, Grumman proposed an "AO-1EF (OV-1E)", with the forward fuselage stretched 71 centimeters (28 inches) to accommodate a third seat for a sensor systems operator. The additional space could also be used for cargo. The OV-1E never went beyond the mockup stage.

One particularly adventurous proposal was the "Model 134E" Mohawk, which was to be a "tiltwing" vertical takeoff aircraft with four turboprops, a horizontal tail rotor, and a stretched fuselage to allow it to carry cargo or 11 troops. The Army wasn't interested, and the project never got beyond the paper stage.

Both Germany and France were interested in the Mohawk and performed flight evaluations with it in 1962 and 1963. The French Breguet company actually obtained a license from Grumman to build it, fitted with more powerful de Havilland Gnome turboprops, but the deal fell through.

Grumman also came up with a design for an extensively modified Mohawk "Model 134R" with an armored tandem cockpit and built-in gun armament as a "COunter INsurgency (COIN)" aircraft for the Army's "Light Armed Reconnaissance Aircraft (LARA)" competition, but lost to Rockwell International's OV-10A Bronco.

The Philippines later came up with a request for a COIN aircraft, and Grumman responded with a more conservative proposal to update 20 OV- 1Bs to a fully armed standard, while Rockwell proposed the OV-10A. However, the Philippine government came up short on money and the sale never happened.

One OV-1B was experimentally fitted with a midair refueling probe for ferry flights, but this scheme was not adopted. Snow ski landing gear was successfully evaluated for the Mohawk, but it was never used operationally.

There was even an early scheme to fit the Mohawk with water ski landing gear, in response to a marine request, to allow it to land on calm waters and taxi up to a beach. The concept was successfully tested, but it wasn't used operationally. Apparently pilots were not comfortable with the idea of setting an aircraft down on water with the prospect of sinking if taxi speed fell too low.

[1.6] CIVILIAN MOHAWKS

* In the post-Vietnam era, the Mohawk generally operated with the U.S. Army in Germany and South Korea, though it did see limited service in Central America as well.

It was also employed by civilian organizations. Army Mohawks were flown in missions to support the U.S. Forest Service to spot forest fires and obtain survey data on the spread of tree diseases. In 1980, Oregon Army National Guard Mohawks flew surveillance missions to monitor the eruption of Mount Saint Helens in southwestern Washington state. Army Mohawks also assisted the U.S. Coast Guard, the Civil Air Patrol, and state and local public-safety organizations in search and rescue operations, with the SLAR and IR sensors proving particularly useful in hunting for crashed aircraft in mountainous terrain.

In the early 1970s, the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) performed large- area mapping missions with an OV-1B fitted with a modified SLAR. The flights were part of a study to determine state water resources, and the aircraft was later used to perform survey missions in Alaska. During the Alaska missions, the aircraft carried emergency floatation gear on the underwing pylons to allow the flightcrew to ditch at sea in an emergency, since ejecting into the frigid Arctic environment would have given little chance of survival. The primary pilots for the USGS OV-1B were a pair of grandmothers who had tired of being secretaries, taken flight lessons, and became topnotch pilots.

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) used a specially modified OV-1C on loan from the Army to perform environmental surveys of the areas around nuclear power plants in the early 1970s, and a civilian engineering firm working for the Atomic Energy Commission also obtained an OV-1C to monitor underground atomic tests during 1972. The U.S. National Aeronautics & Space Administration (NASA) used a few Mohawks for aviation technology experiments, including one that was fitted with a small turbojet engine for noise tests.

In a particularly interesting application, in 1971 the U.S. Customs Service received four Army surplus OV-1C Mohawks, along with two ex- Navy Grumman S-2 Tracker ocean patrol aircraft, to hunt for drug trafficers. The Mohawks were fitted with a Texas Instruments forward looking infrared (FLIR) camera in a turret under an extended nose.

As the Customs OV-1Cs were sometimes fired on by drug runners, there was some thought of arming the Mohawks so they could shoot back, but despite the fact that Customs officers often carry some impressive personal firepower arming a Customs aircraft was judged against the rules. The Mohawks were phased out in favor of more modern aircraft in 1986.

At least three Mohawks ended up in private hands, and occasionally starred in TV series such as "AIRWOLF", with their unusual looks making them well suited to playing the "bad guy.

The last Mohawks in U.S. Army service were withdrawn in the mid-1990s. These aircraft were used to observe North Korean military activities along the demilitarized zone, and were replaced by De Havilland Canada DASH-7 / Airborne Reconnaissance Low aircraft, the subject of the next chapter. 34 U.S. Army surplus Mohawks were provided to Argentina in the early 1990s, and at last report these aircraft were still in service.

DEJA VU ALL OVER AGAIN: here is yet another irony in the U.S. military's CAS debacle...

In the post-WWII "jet" era, a funny thing has happened...time after time the prop-driven close air support aircraft has been "re-invented" by the necessity of the many small wars taking place. The reason is simple; jets fly too fast to see anything on the ground and burn up too much fuel to remain overhead.

Robert Johnson of Chandelle magazine has brilliantly documented this truth with inspired writing and skilled artwork in the following, must-read web pages!

Here is an excerpt: guess what this sounds like?

"The Sud-Aviation SE.117 Voltigeur ("Skirmisher") was, with the Dassault Spirale, a competitor for the twin-engined requirement. The SE.117 was a 2-to6-seat multirole aircraft armed with two 30-mm DEFA cannon in semi-external, fuselage pods. Underwing loads could include one 1000-lb and two 500-lb bombs, 24 rockets, or four AS.11 missiles. The pilot and co-pilot/observer sat side-by-side in an extensively glazed nose compartment, well ahead of the low-mounted wing. To facilitate air-to-ground operations at low level, large, perforated dive brakes were fitted on the rear fuselage. The first prototype, the SE.116, flew in December 1958 powered by a pair of 800-hp, Wright R-1300 Cyclone piston engines. Production versions would have had Bastan turboprops. The estimated maximum speed for the Voltigeur was 277 mph (236 mph cruising). Initial climb rate was to be 2677 ft/min and ceiling was 30,800 ft. Range topped 1100 miles and endurance was more than 5 hours. The airplane spanned 59 ft, was 40 ft 6 in long, and had a wing area of 443.5 sq ft.

Despite considerable interest and some off-shore procurement funding from the United States, the Voltigeur and the Epervier never saw production. The Algerian war was over before the intended turboprop engines became available, and France's greatly reduced postwar COIN needs were more than met by the many remnaining AD4N Skyraiders. A 67%-identical, commercial transport derived from the Voltigeur, the SE.118 Diplomate, also failed to attract orders."

Maybe the U.S. Army when it was drawing up plans for the Mohawk in the late 1950s they were studying from the French combats in Algeria, huh?

In Heart of Darkness: the Tragedy of the Congo, 1960-67 Robert Johnson explains how the CIA in a pinch created instant air forces using prop planes turned into attack aircraft to support Counter Insurgency (COIN) missions like the Belgian Congo crisis where U.S., Belgian and French Paratroopers have had to intervene several times to save hostages and restore order:

"The shorter-ranged T-28s could now be farmed out to fields around the country, where they could respond to calls for close air support much more quickly than the B-26s."

Even the Sri Lankan Air Force is better equipped with fixed-wing CAS aircraft than the U.S. military is now (under-utilization of A-10 is implied here)!

In an excellent article in the January 2003 Soldier of Fortune magazine, "Operation Oman" Jim Bartlett describes how Strikemaster jet trainers/attack planes were used fore low and slow surgical strikes against insurgents with less risk of killing the civilians the British SAS wanted to win over to their side in the 1970s. A "lesson" we should take to heart in our current blood-thirsty approach in Afghanistan. The time to be brutal was when Bin Laden and Al Queda terrorists were in Afghanistan to seal off the border areas with thousands of Paratroopers so they couldn't escape. Now is the time to primarily rid the country of the terrorists by aggressive civil affairs actions to show the government should be supported not the islamofascists.

In Combat Crop Dusters: the Turbo-Thrush NEDS and the V-1-A Vigilante, Rob Johnson describes how via necessity U.S. agencies have had to improvise low-flying CAS aircraft to fight drug wars in Latin America....

He describes how the marine-designed OV-10 failed as a combat drug crop duster in Drug wars revisited: State Department OV-10D Broncos in South America. Its ironic since before the "LARA" OV-10 flew the OV-1 Mohawk, a faster and better handling airplane was offered to the dumb marines as an attack/observation aircraft in a joint program with the U.S. Army. The marines quit and years later, stuck in a war in Vietnam, they found themselves in need of an observation/attack airplane so they wasted several million tax dollars on a new OV-10 when OV-1s were already combat-proven and available. Then----years later--------after a couple of Broncos are shot down in Desert Storm, they "give up the ghost" and retire the aircraft. Now, even a few more years later, high over Afghanistan we have no long-loiter manned observation/attack aircraft (UAVs see through a "soda straw") and they have no escort aircraft for their V-22s if they can be made to work! Is it a wonder the enemy escapes our "precision firepower"??? Stupid is what stupid does!:

The Bronco did not go unnoticed, however, in the mountain valleys of Bolivia, Columbia, Peru, Thailand, and Burma. The growers quickly recognized the threat and threw their considerable resources against the aircraft. Machine guns, automatic antiaircraft cannon, and shoulder-launched missiles were soon being fired against the Broncos, and it quickly became clear that they were not fully up to the job. They had not been designed for a high-threat environment and were known to be vulnerable to IR-guided missiles and light antiaircraft guns, particularly at the suicidally low altitudes necessary for precise spraying. The aircraft's handling had always been tricky, so it was hard to fly close to the ground, under fire, in high-altitude valleys. The commercial windmill, ducts, and spray bars could not be well integrated with a high-wing, three-pod airframe. The needless extra drag of the resulting, compromise arrangement must have seriously hurt performance and further degraded the aircraft's handling. It was clearly only a matter of time before a Bronco would be lost. After at least one aircraft had a canopy shot out during a low-level run, State apparently enquired into the possibility of up-armoring the aircraft. But the real solution was a new airplane, something better suited to the peculiar operating environment of a drug-eradication aircraft."

* Armored
* Available
* Can land operate fully loaded under 1000 feet dirtstrips
* Excellent low-altitude maneuverability to fly NOE
* Definately could be used as MAS COP test surrogates

Basically the "Deja CAS" cycle goes as follows:

1. Arming fixed-wing prop-planes (usually trainers) with rockets and guns

2. Adding Armor to the prop planes when they start receiving enemy fire doing CAS

3. Realizing the prop trainers are under-powered designing a specially-made attack airplane

4. OOPS! the war is over before the CAS plane is built

5. The prop planes are retired...

Until of course the next war flares up and they will be hurriedly armed once again...

Why can't we operate attack jets forward with the grunts in the mud? The Deja travesty continues!

Nation-State western militaries see war as an expression of man's ego and think they should be trained and equipped for high-tech battle against another nation-state army and look at things like they are in egotistical competition with each other for budget/glory. The CAS aircraft flying lower and slower gets the "short end of the stick" even though its RELEVANT to the wars that take place while the Mach 2+ Top Gun is mostly not. Jet aircraft are flown by pampered egotists who want to stay out of the mud and fly from safe bases in the rear where there is air conditioning and good chow. Grunts need CAS in a hurry and can't wait for the fly-boys to wake up and fly to drop ordance and fire guns forward where they are at; the prop or jets need to be near the front lines!

U.S. Army A-4 SkyHawks?

Legendary designer Ed Heinemann tried to work around this hubris by designing attack aircraft that could be simple, sturdy and fast when they needed to be--like the A-4 SkyHawk.

According to John Pike of Global Security, "765 A-4 aircraft worldwide. Pound for pound, the A-4 aircraft is one of the most effective and versatile light attack aircraft produced. The Skyhawk is 34 years old; yet export models are still highly regarded and undergoing modern avionics, weapons, and engine upgrades to maintain their flying prowess into the next century."

Maximum speed: 586 knots (with a 4,000 pound ordnance load)
Initial climb rate: 8,440 ft/min
Maximum ferry range: 2,000 nautical miles
Mounts two 20 mm guns internal to the wing root structure

Has one fuselage and four wing racks and carries a variety of external stores. May be provisioned for Sidewinder, Shrike, and Walleye missiles and 1,000 pound bombs

According to the SkyHawk organization web page: www.skyhawk.org/2C/productionhistory.htm, in 1961, two A4D-2 Skyhawks (BuNos 148490 and 148483) were borrowed by the U.S. Army and modified by Douglas for evaluation in competition with the Northrop N-156 (predecessor of the F-5) and an Italian Fiat G-91, for operations from unimproved airfields near front lines. Modificatons of the Army Skyhawk included large dual wheels on beefed-up main landing gear mounts; a heavier wing to house the larger landing gear; and installation of an A-3 Skywarrior drag chute. Flown by Douglas test pilot Dru Wood, the modified "Army" Skyhawk won the competition, but the project was cancelled when Army funds were diverted to helicopter procurement.

SINGAPORE

The Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) purchased 47 refurbished Skyhawks (40 A-4B, 7 TA-4) from U.S. in 1972. The aircraft were designated A-4S/TA-4S. The "T" version of the RSAF Skyhawk was unique in that, rather than the single "clam shell" canopy common to other TA-4 models, each TA-4S cockpit had a separate canopy.

From 1984 to 1989, the RSAF conducted a Skyhawk service life extension program. The 8,400-lb-thrust J65 engines were replaced with 11,000 lb. thrust F404-GE-100D turbofans. Other upgrades included modified engine air intakes; new structural mounts to accommodate the F404 engines; installation of new refrigeration, hydraulic pumps, air turbine starters, and oil coolers; new sensors, cockpit instrumentation, and state-of-the-art avionics; engine and environmental control systems; higher output electrical generators; and improved air-to-air and air-to-ground ordnance carrying and control capability.

Re-designated as A-4SU "Super Skyhawk," the refurbished Skyhawks became operational in 1988, and Skyhawk pilot training was fully operational in March 989.

With the total RSAF inventory of about 60 aircraft, the three Singapore Skyhawk units (142, 143, and 145 Squadrons), operating from Tengah Air Base, made up a numerical majority of that country's military aircraft.

In late 1997, the RSAF Skyhawk training unit (143 squadron) was disbanded as part of a new advanced jet training effort. The former 143 Squadron A-4SUs were shipped to southwest France in September 1998 where, at Cazaux Air Base, RSAF pilots will participate in advanced training through 2003. The French site was selected because it offers access to needed practice bombing ranges and airspace over the North Atlantic for ACM training, as well as opportunity for electronic warfare technique practice.

John Pike in his excellent A-4 SkyHwak web page states further:

"The Blue Angel Squadron donned a new aircraft in 1974, the McDonnell Douglas A-4F Skyhawk II. The new aircraft transformed the display team. The nimble Skyhawk was the opposite of the powerful Phantom. The Skyhawk was more aerobatic, and allowed tighter display in front of the audience. On 08 November 1986, the Blue Angels completed their 40th anniversary."

"The OA-4M, a two-seat Skyhawk, provided tactical air control services as well as many other utility missions. "

The A-4 is a VERY tolerant airplane re AAA/small arms, etc. due to designer Ed Heinemmann's design excellence.

Chuck Myers writes:

"I did the aircraft loss/damage analyses for SEA while working at WSEG. The A-4 had the best survivability rate for aircraft damaged from air defenses on missions into N. Vietnam. It came home to carriers on its damaged single J-52 when F-4s couldn't make it with damage to one of its J-79. The P&W J-52 was tough. Israeli A-4s flew with tailpipe extensions; the secret to taking damage from IR SAMs. IR SAMs are limited in warhead size. They love the AV-8 because: guess where the hot spot is?

Harriers had some success against Mirage because of advanced AIM-9L and the fact that they were there because they were STOVL and could fly from UK miniature carriers, not because of any other attribute. Harrier is a poor maneuvering aircraft. Very high wing loading!! Poor cockpit visibility. A-4 and Mirages attacking UK fleet were operating at the end of their tether. If they had prepared base in Faulklands, the fleet would never have gotten close enough"

Half the A-4s hit by the SAM-7 in the Arab/Israeli conflicts got home -but that was Also due to the little warhead of Grail but protection is more a function of what type countermeasures you apply, the basic aircraft is very robust. The A-4 is the antithesis of the AV-8. AND, it is VERY agile and small and hard to see (used in the film, "Top Gun"). Illustrates the stupidity of MC giving up the A-4 to go to AV-8 at about triple the life cycle cost."

The Navy still has eight A-4Ms flying in an aggressor squadron in Puerto Rico. They are good "dissimilar" aircraft since they are smaller and can turn tighter. Since smaller aircraft are harder to see and hit.

Even more interesting -some foreign Skyhawks had their 20mm cannon replaced with 30mm DEFA guns. That is the same ammo as the ASP-30mm, and of the M230s on AH-64 Apache attack helicopters that took out the backs of T-72 tank turrets at 4000m in Desert Storm. A few years ago, GE fitted the GAU-8 30mm gun pod to the A-4 ------the same tank killer the A-10 uses---imagine that! Can also use the podded 25mm which is internal gun for Harrier.

Currently there are 86 x A-4 SkyHawks in storage at the USAF's "boneyard".

Details (to include photos):

www.skyhawk.org/2C/amarcp.htm

MAS-WG OA-4Z SkyHawk Proposal for Maneuver Air Support (MAS)

U.S. Army N-156 (F-5s)?

The Northrop N-156F light strike fighter prototype was one of three jet-powered, fixed-wing attack aircraft selected by the Army in 1961 for competitive evaluation in the forward air control (FAC), tactical reconnaissance, and ground attack roles. The N-156F was chosen for testing primarily because of its relatively simple design, impressive load-carrying capacity, and ability to operate from unimproved forward airfields.

Northrop had begun development of the N-156 family of low-cost, lightweight supersonic aircraft in 1956, with the first design being that of the N-156F single-seat fighter version. Much to Northrop's chagrin the Air Force showed no real interest in the N-156F, though in June 1956 the service's Air Training Command did adopt a two-seat trainer variant as the T-38 Talon. In the spring of 1958 the Department of Defense renewed Northrop's hopes for the fighter version by directing the USAF to procure three N-156F prototypes for engineering and operational evaluation. The first of these aircraft (serial 59-4987) made its initial flight in July 1959, less than four months after the maiden flight of the first T-38. The Air Force's attitude towards the N-156F did not change appreciably despite the aircraft's excellent showing in the evaluations, however, and work on the number three prototype was halted prior to completion because the USAF did not feel that the remaining tests required a third aircraft. At the end of the test period the Air Force announced that it would not procure the N-156F, and Northrop was forced to temporarily suspend work on the fighter version. The company thus viewed the Army's 1961 decision to evaluate the N-156F as a possible reprieve and gladly supplied the first prototype machine and a complete ground support staff for the tests.

The N-156F was of fairly conventional layout with thin, slightly-swept, low-set wings, a fuselage characterized by a narrow area-rule section amidships, a one-piece 'all-moving' tail plane, a rather large vertical fin, and tricycle landing gear. The aircraft was built primarily of aluminium, and Northrop made considerable use of adhesive-bonded honeycomb as a stiffener in critical areas. The N-156F was powered by two afterburning General Electric J85 turbojets mounted side-by-side in the aft fuselage, and could be fitted with up to four 1,000 pound JATO (Jet-Assisted Take Off) bottles for operation from extremely short fields. More than a quarter of the aircraft's total fuselage area consisted of easily-removable access panels to simplify field maintenance, and both engines were attached to built-in overhead tracks for easy removal.

The Army's evaluation of the N-156F found it to be a well-built and capable aircraft, easy-to-maintain under field conditions and capable of carrying a significant offensive load while operating from the most rudimentary forward airstrips. These abilities were ultimately rendered meaningless, however, by the Army's decision to accede to Air Force pressure and abandon the quest for fixed-wing jet aircraft. The sole N-156F tested by the Army was susbsequently returned to Northrop, and was eventually converted into the prototype YF-5A Freedom Fighter.

U.S. Army A-7 Corsair II?

USAF boneyard has 227 x A-7 Corsair IIs!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

20 x are 2-seat A-7Ks! Could be great for AFAC work.....as "OA-7Ks".

Built originally on the airframe of the F-8U Crusader, the A-7 underwent a number of modifications since its 1965 introduction. The A-7 Corsair II, which is retired, was used by TAC for close air support attack missions.

TYPE:

Carrier-borne and land-based subsonic single-seat tactical fighter.

PROGRAM:

On 11 February 1964 the U.S. Navy named the former LTV Aerospace Corporation winner of a design competition for a single-seat light attack aircraft. The requirement was for a subsonic aircraft able to carry a greater load of non-nuclear weapons than the A-4E Skyhawk. To keep costs to a minimum and speed delivery it was stipulated by the USN that the new aircraft should be based on an existing design; the LTV design study was based therefore, on the F-8 Crusader. An initial contract to develop and build three aircraft, under the designation A-7A was made on 27 September 1965.

The A-7E was the final fleet version of the A-7. After more than two decades of service, however, it was replaced by the inferior F/A-18 Hornet.The A-7E had a 20mm gun and can carry payloads of up to 15,000 pounds of bombs and missiles. Eight ordnance stations were available. A-7E Corsair IIs were part of the two-carrier battle group that conducted a joint strike on selected Libyan terrorist-related targets in 1986. Together with carrier-based F/A-18s, A-7s used anti-radiation missiles to neutralize Libyan air defenses. F/A-18s replaced A-7Es in the carrier air wing mix. The last two squadrons transitioned in FY 1992. Replacing A-7s with F/A-18s gave operational commanders allegedly gives them more flexibility by allowing them to employ the F/A-18s in either the fighter or attack role, both poorly. Also, a smaller number of aircraft (85) are needed in an F/A-18 equipped carrier air wing than in an A-7E equipped carrier air wing (94).

DESIGN FEATURES:

Cantilever high-wing monoplane. Wing section NACA 65A007. Anhedral 5 degrees. Incidence -1 degree. Wing sweepback at quarter-chord 35 degrees. Outer wing sections fold upward for carrier parking and, in the A-7H, to allow best utilisation of revetments at combat airfields. One-piece all-moving tailplane, swept back 45 degrees at quarter-chord and set at dihedral angle of 5 degrees 25'.

FLYING CONTROLS:

Plain sealed inset aluminium ailerons, outboard of wing fold, are actuated by fully triplicated hydraulic system. Leading-edge flaps. Large single-slotted trailing-edge flaps. Spoiler above each wing forward of flaps. Tailplane is operated by triplicated hydraulic systems, and the rudder powered by two systems.

STRUCTURE:

All-metal multi-spar structure with integrally stiffened aluminium alloy upper and lower skins. The fuselage is an all-metal semi-monocoque structure. Large door-type ventral speed-brake under centre-fuselage. The tail unit consists of a large vertical fin and rudder, swept back 44.28 degrees at quarter-chord.

LANDING GEAR:

Hydraulically retractable tricycle type, with single wheel on each main unit and twin-wheel nose unit. Mainwheels retract forward into fuselage, nosewheels aft. Mainwheels and tyres size 28 x 9-12; nosewheels and tyres size 22 x 5.50. Nose gear launch bar for carrier catapulting. Sting-type arrester hook under rear fuselage for carrier landings, emergency landings or aborted take-offs. Anti-skid brake system.

POWER PLANT:

One Allison TF41-A-2 (Rolls-Royce Spey) non-afterburning turbofan engine, rated at 66.7 kN (15,000 lb st). The A-7E has a pneumatic starter requiring ground air supply; A-7H, TA-7H and A-7K engines have self-start capability through the medium of battery-powered electric motor that actuates a small gas turbine engine (jet fuel starter), which in turn, starts the main engine through the gearbox. The engine has self-contained ignition for start/airstart, automatic relight and selective ignition. Integral fuel in tanks in wings and additional fuselage tanks. Maximum internal fuel 5678 litres (1500 US gallons; 1249 Imp gallons). Maximum external fuel 4542 litres (1200 US gallons; 999 Imp gallons).

ACCOMMODATION:

Pilot on McDonnell Douglas Escapac rocket-powered ejection system. Complete with U.S. Navy life support system on the A-7E/H. Escape system provides a fully inflated parachute three seconds after sequence initiation; positive seat/man separation and stabilisation of the ejected seat and pilot. Boron carbide (HFC) cockpit armour.

AVIONICS: AND EQUIPMENT:

The navigation/weapon delivery system is the heart of the A-7E/H light attack aircraft. It performs continuously the computations needed for greatly increased delivery accuracy, and for manoeuvring freedom during navigation to a target and the attack, weapon release, pull up, and safe return phases of the mission. The system not only provides the pilot with a number of options during the navigation and weapon delivery, but also relieves him of much of his workload. The AN/ASN-91(V) navigation/weapon delivery computer is the primary element of the system, in constant 'conversation' with basic electronic sensors, and computes and displays continuously present position, using computed position and stored data to calculate navigation and weapon delivery solutions, and monitors the reliability of data inputs and outputs. An AN/ASN-90(V) inertial measurement set is the basic three-axis reference system for navigation and weapon delivery. AN/APN-190(V) Doppler measures groundspeed and drift angle. AN/APQ-126(V) forward-looking radar provides pilot with 9 modes of operation; air-to-ground ranging; terrain-following; terrain-avoidance; ground mapping, shaped beam; ground mapping, pencil beam; beacon cross-scan terrain-avoidance; cross-scan ground mapping, pencil; TV; and Shrike integrated display system. AN/AVQ-7(V) HUD receives and displays computed attack, navigation and landing data from the tactical computer; aircraft performance data from flight sensors; and discrete signals from various aircraft systems.

ARMAMENT:

A wide range of stores, to a total weight of more than 6805 kg (15,000 lb), can be carried on six underwing pylons and two fuselage weapon stations, the latter suitable for Sidewinder air-to-air missiles. Two outboard pylons on each wing can accommodate a load of 1587 kg (3500 lb). Inboard pylon on each wing can carry 1134 kg (2500 lb). Two fuselage weapon stations, one in each side, can each carry a load of 227 kg (500 lb). Weapons include air-to-air and air-to-ground (anti-tank and anti-radar missiles); electro-optical (TV) and laser-guided weapons; general purpose bombs; bomblet dispensers; rockets; gun pods; and auxiliary fuel tanks. In addition, an M61A-1 Vulcan 20 mm cannon is mounted in the port side of the fuselage. This has a 1000 round ammunition storage and selected firing rates of 4000 or 6000 rds/min. Strike camera in lower rear fuselage for damage assessment.

DIMENSIONS: EXTERNAL:

Wingspan: 11.80 m (38 ft 9 in)
Width, wings folded: 7.24 m (23 ft 9 in)
Wing chord: at root: 4.72 m (15 ft 6 in)
at tip: 1.18 m (3 ft 10 1/4 in)
Wing aspect ratio: 4
Length overall: 14.06 m (46 ft 1 1/2 in)
Height overall: 4.90 m (16 ft 3/4 in)

WEIGHTS AND LOADINGS:

Weight empty: 8668 kg (19,111 lb)
Max T-O weight: 19,050 kg (42,000 lb)

PERFORMANCE:

Max level speed:
at S/L: 600 knots (1112 km/h; 691 mph)
at 1525 m (5000 ft):
with 12 Mk 82 bombs: 562 knots (1040 km/h; 646 mph)
after dropping bombs: 595 knots (1102 km/h; 685 mph)
T-O run at max T-O weight: 830 m (6000 ft)
Ferry range:

max internal fuel: 1981 nm (3671 km; 2281 miles)
max internal and external fuel: 2485 nm
(4604 km; 2861 miles)

LENGTH (m): 14.06
HEIGHT (m): 4.90
WINGSPAN (m): 11.80
MAX T-O WEIGHT (kg): 19,050
MAX LEVEL SPEED (knots): 600
T-O RUN (m): 1830

Contractor: Link-Temco-Vought (Prime, now Northrop Grumman Corp.)

Accommodations

A-7E Pilot only
TA-7C or A-7K: Two seats

Performance (A-7E/TA/7C)

Maximum speed at 20,000 feet Mach .94
Range greater than 1,900 nautical miles

Avionics & Countermeasures

APQ-126 multi-mode nav/attack radar [Texas Instruments]
AVQ-7 raster HUD
ASN-91 INS, ASN-190 Doppler navigation system
ASU-99 projected map display
ALR-45 RWR
ALR-50 SAM warning system [Magnavox]
ALQ-126 ECM [ Sanders]
APR-43 tactical radar warning system [Loral]
ALQ-119 ECM [Westinghouse]
ALQ-131 ECM [Westinghouse]
ALQ-123 IR countermeasures [Xerox]
ALQ-126 DECM [Sanders]
ALQ-162 tactical communications jammer [Eaton AIL]
ALQ-162 radar jammer Northrop

Armament (A-7E/TA-7C)

One internally mounted M61A1 20mm six barrel gatling cannon
Six wing pylons
Two fuselage launch stations
Pylons can carry a large single weapon, multiple racks capable of six weapons per rack, or triple racks with three weapons per rack.
Can carry 15,000 pounds of payload

Compatible with practically all first-line ordnance used by the U.S./USAF/NATO.

Mission and Capabilities

Modern, sophisticated, integrated, highly versatile airborne weapon system platform capable of performing a variety of search, surveillance, and attack missions

Can carry four externally wing-mounted 300 gallon fuel tanks, coupled with a variety of ordnance on remaining stations.

Can conduct in-flight refueling operations

Capable of transferring more than 12,000 pounds of fuel

Fully integrated digital navigation/weapon delivery system is common to all current USN/USAF attack aircraft.

Avionics system which is based on state-of-the-art electronics, digital computing techniques, and an automation philosophy provides unparalleled mission effectiveness and flexibility.

The Forward Looking InfraRed (FLIR) capability means the A-7's night attack accuracy is equivalent to day attack accuracy.

Consistently capable of delivering bombs with an accuracy of less than 10 mils Circular Error Probable (CEP) and guns at less than 5 mils CEP.

During Desert Storm I, demonstrated more than 95% operational readiness and did not miss a single combat sortie.

Has flown more than 120,000 combat sorties and provided unprecedented response in Vietnam, Libya, Grenada, Panama, and Desert Storm I.

Survivability is enhanced via armor plating in critical areas and a state-of-the art DECM.

Modernized with a new solid-state rate gyro assembly in the Automatic Flight Control System and a wing enhancement program that virtually eliminates flight hours as a constraint for measuring aircraft service life.

Average scheduled/unscheduled direct maintenance man hours per flight hour is 11.

U.S. Army A-37s?

Aircraft: Cessna A-37B "Dragonfly"
Year: 1967
Type: attack
Manufacturer: Cessna Aircraft Company
Engine: 2 x General Electric J85-CE-17A
Power: 2,850 lb (1,293kg)
Wingspan: 35ft 101/2 in (10.93m)
Length: 29ft 3in (8.92m)
Height: 8ft 101/2 in (2.70m)
Wing area: 183.9sq ft (17.09m²)
Max take-off weight: 15,000 lb (6,804kg)
Empty weight: 5,873 lb (2,670kg)
Max speed: 478mph at 15,000ft (769km/h at 4,572m)
Service ceiling: 32,100ft (9,785m)
Range: 450mi (724km)
Crew: 2
Load-armament: 1x 7.62mm minigun; 5,400 lbs ordnance bombs, rockets, gun pods (2,450kg)

WarBird Alley writes:

History: In 1962, the U.S. Air Forces Special Air Warfare Center decided to evaluate the T-37 trainer as a future Counter-Insurgency (COIN) light attack aircraft. The T-37 "Tweet" had been in continuous service with the US Air Force since 1957, and had amassed an excellent service-reliability history. Two T-37Bs were tested with their original 1,025-lb thrust Continental J69 engines. The aircraft were loaded to a takeoff weight of 8,700 pounds, almost 33% above their normal maximum, and were understandably found to be somewhat lacking in performance. Subsequently, each aircraft was modified with a pair of 2,400-lb thrust General Electric J85-GE-5 turbojets, and were designated YAT-37Ds. Flight testing showed that the new aircraft could be safely flown at weights up to 14,000 pounds, which allowed for the carriage of a wide variety of weapons. Nothing became of the project until 1966, when the U.S. Air Forces involvement in Vietnam highlighted the need for a light strike-fighter. Cessna was contracted to convert 39 T-37B trainers right off the assembly line, and delivery of the new aircraft, now called the A-37A Dragonfly, began in May 1967. In addition to the larger engines, the aircraft was equipped with eight underwing hardpoints and wingtip tanks. The first 25 A-37As underwent operational evaluation in South Vietnam and were transferred first to the 604th Air Commando Squadron at Bien Hoa, then to the South Vietnamese Air Force in 1970.

Meanwhile, Cessna had built a prototype called the Model 318E which, while based on the T-37, had significant differences. Its airframe was stressed for 6 Gs, the fuel load was increased to 507 US gallons (1920 litres) plus 400 more gallons (1516 litres) in four underwing auxiliary tanks. In addition, the B-model had air-refueling capability, a 7.62 Gatling Minigun in the nose, gun cameras, and armor protection for the pilots. This prototype was first flown in September 1967 and deliveries, under the name A-37B, began in May 1968. In addition to service with the U.S. Air Force, the A-37 was supplied in small numbers to the South Vietnamese Air Force and the U.S. Air National Guard, where it remained in service into the early 1990s.

John Pike's EXCELLENT Global Security A-37 web page reports:

The A-37 Dragonfly was developed in 1963 by modifying the Cessna-built T-37 trainer. Although the A-37 resembled the T-37, in fact there were few interchangeable parts with that trainer. Prefix letters may also be added to the designation, as with the OA-37 Dragonfly, where the letter O prefix means that this attack aircraft has an additional role of observation. The aircraft was perfect for FAC (Forward Air Control) and a number of examples were modified into OA-37Bs, which consisted mostly in the addition of radios.

Hardpoints were added to the wings, as were wing tip fuel tanks. The cockpit got upgraded avionics as well as ejection seats. In flight refueling capabilities were also added to the aircraft. In addition there were retractable FOD screens to prevent debris from entering the engines and a 20mm gatling cannon was added. The modifications increased the weight of the aircraft so larger engines and stronger landing gear were required. It sported two General Electric J85-GE-17A turbojet engines, which developed 2,850 pounds of thrust. The wingspan of this plane was 35 feet, 10 inches. Its length was 29 feet, 3 inches and the plane's height was 8 feet, 10 inches. The aircraft weight 14,000 pounds fully loaded. Its maximum speed was 507 mph at 16,000 feet with a range of 460 miles. The ceiling for the Dragonfly was 41,765 feet. The armament of the A-37 consisted of a 7.62mm minigun mounted in the nose capable of firing 6,000 rounds per minute. The aircraft had also been modified by mounting eight hardpoints on the wing, which could carry up to 4,800 pounds of ordnance. Different configuration consisted of two machine gun pods, two 2.75-inch rockets and four bombs; or in place of the gun pods, two 250-pound bombs or four Sidewinder missiles. The aircraft had a crew of two.

Cessna built 577 A-37s over 10 years. Production ended in 1977. Its ease of maintenance and pleasant flying abilities make it well liked. They saw extensive service in Vietnam from the late 1960s onward. Many were turned over to the South Vietnamese Air Force and after that country was overrun by North Vietnam, many were left and operated by the victors.

As communist-sponsored insurgency grew in the 1960s, the Air Force delved into creating a low-cost, efficient aircraft to counter this threat. The increase in guerrilla type activity around the world necessitated a response by free society. Using a more expensive plane to deal with two or three dissident wasn't economically feasible, hence the Dragonfly. Vietnam became the proving ground for the A-37. The plane was refitted with a refueling probe in the nose; reticulated foam was added to the self-sealing fuel tanks to protect against fire or explosions if hit by incendiary anti-aircraft rounds. The cockpit was armor-plated and the undercarriage was strengthened to carry greater weight and to enable the aircraft to operate off rough remote airstrips.

The 604th Air Commando Squadron, in Operation Combat Dragon, moved from England Air Force Base, La., to Bien Hoa, South Vietnam, and was tasked to test it's a-37s in combat over three months. The pilots knew this plane well, having "cut their teeth" on the T-37 trainer. The squadron initiated its test Aug. 15, 1967, flying 12 combat sorties a day in support of ground troops and against enemy supplies being shipped into South Vietnam. The daily sortie reached 60 by the end of September. In October, some of the planes were shipped to Pleiku where pilots began flying armed and visual reconnaissance missions and night interdiction flights in Tiger Hound. Tiger Hound was an area roughly 90 miles long in Laos bordering on South Vietnam territory used by the North Vietnamese to infiltrate troops and supplies. It was also the code name of a special Air Force, Navy, Marine and Army task force that began interdicting southeastern Laos. When the testing period drew to a close, the Dragonflies had logged more than 4,000 sorties without a single combat loss. One plane went down as a result of an unfortunate maneuver after the aircraft returned to its home base. The squadron was then attached to the 14th Air Commando Wing at Nha Trang. The unit however, continued to fly out of Bien Hoa.

The test proved to be a huge success. The pilots were pleased with the planes' maneuverability. It accelerated and decelerated rapidly and its combat delivery system was highly accurate. The maintainers also heaped their praise on the aircraft. It was easy to fix. Turn around times often averaged just over 90 minutes between missions. Although the Air Force sought to purchase more A-37s than originally planned, the plane was subsonic and didn't fit into Tactical Air Command's long-range plans to develop an attack aircraft capable of meeting contingencies throughout potential world combat theaters. This wasn't the first time special operators were flying "low and slow," so to speak.

The A-37 made its debut in the special operations arsenal in 1967 when the 4410th Combat Crew Training Wing began training U.S. and Vietnamese Air Force in the A-37B. The first A-37B arrived at Hurlburt Field in December 1969 for the 603rd Special Operations Squadron. In July 1970 the 427th Special Operations Training Squadron assumed transition training in the A-37. When the 427th SOTS inactivated July 15, 1972, the mission of training Dragonfly pilots fell on the 6th Special Operations Squadron, which was redesignated the 6th SOTS. The mission now included all A-37B training for the Air Force military assistance program. Eventually the 6th SOTS became a part of the 1st Special Operations Wing.

The A-37 was operated by many ANG and Reserve units. The last OA-37 operated by U.S. Forces was retired in 1992. However, many of these airframes have been given/sold to friendly countries in Latin America including Guatemala, Colombia, Dominica, Uruguay, and others.

Past U.S. Army interest in the T-37: burned again by USAF egomania

During the late 1950s the Army Aviation Test Board and the Aviation Combat Developments Agency (ACDA) began to jointly explore the feasibility of using Army-operated fixed-wing jet aircraft in the artillery adjustment, tactical reconnaissance, and ground attack roles. Operational necessity dictated that any such aircraft be easy to maintain under field conditions and capable of operating from unimproved forward air strips, and these prerequisites indicated that any jet procured for Army use would have to be simple and relatively small, yet at the same time be of robust construction and able to offer a performance significantly better than that of the various piston-engined machines then in Army service. Cessna's diminutive T-37 twin-engined primary trainer admirably fulfilled all these requirements, and in early 1958 three examples borrowed from the Air Force were sent to Fort Rucker to begin a one year Army evaluation programme dubbed Project LONG ARM. The Army called the program, the "High Performance Army Observation Aircraft Program" or "HPAOA".

The Army's evaluation of the T-37 found the aircraft to be ideally suited for Army use and both the Aviation Board and the ACDA recommended quantity procurement of the type. However, mounting Air Force opposition to Army ownership and operation of fixed-wing jet aircraft eventually forced the Army to abandon the planned T-37 acquisition and all three machines used in the Project LONG ARM tests were returned to the Air Force in early 1959. The Army did field excellent OV-1 Mohawks that were armed until again the USAF assholes interfered and brow-beat them into not being armed and absurdly embracing helicopters as panaceas, a condition that harms Army Aviation to the present.

Years later, the T-37 became the A-37B "Dragonfly" attack aircraft that we gave away to the South Vietnames Air Force along with F-5s when we wouldn't give ANY to the U.S. Army. Is this BS or what? Legendary pilot General Chuck Yeager flew A-37Bs in combat in Vietnam and has good things to say about the type. Maybe we should act on his advice?

Today dozens of countries fly 2-seat A-37Bs and have better Observation/CAS capabilities than the U.S. military has all because of inter-service egotism by the USAF that refuses to fully employ A-10s (only has single-seat versions, no career field for dedicated officer FACs only ad hoc disgruntled ALOs on the ground) or let the Army do CAS since its lukewarm to the mission because the aircraft required to do these missions do not fly fast enough to make their manhood erect or pick up chicks.

A-37s can also employ powerful 12.7mm (.50 caliber), 20mm and 30mm gun pods to effect the same kind of tank and armored vehicle killing power as their larger and slower A-10s have.

Even better, A-37s can easily be ground mobile via trailers and sea/air/land containers:

Dragonfly-in-a-box

For an excellent history of the birth of the A-10 Warthog, the CAs controversy and the pros and cons of the A-37 and A-7:

Stravonski's A-10 History web page

So let's get this straight.

We retired the 300 mph A-1 SkyRaider (2 seat models available) in favor of a 500 mph A-6 which is also now retired. We gave up on an Army A-4 SkyHawk, the Army N-156 and the Army A-37 fixed-wing attack aircraft to buy inferior helicopters without much armament, eventually having to create an armed helicopter gunship, all because we didn't want to fight the asshole egotists in the USAF for our own very survival on the battlefield? If the USAF doesn't want to do CAS, then they need to shut the hell up and let the Army do it with fixed wing, even jet attack aircraft. The issue today hinges on what the USAF is going to do with the A-10 Warthog, the greatest armored CAS attack jet ever made but hated by the USAF fighter ace jock hierarchy. We don't think the Army should wait and rely on the USAF for CAS.

Meanwhile, we have marine aircrews that when shot down have no escort aircraft to protect their rescue helicopters with immediate suppression of enemies on the ground to effect pick-up since OV-10s were also retired.

We retired the A-4s which could take off from short runways with PSP planking which the marines did all during the Vietnam war, in favor of AV-8B Harrier IIs which cannot take-off with a bombload vertically but need the same rolling take-off an A-4 needs. A Harrier can only stay overhead for 1 hour before having to return to base to refuel. However, with engine thrusters and fuel co-located, if an AV-8B gets hit, its an exploding deathtrap. Two-seat conventional fixed-wing A-4s offer an extra set of eyes to acquire ground targets and good loiter time.

Thus, we have Army Soldiers and marines on the ground today in 2002, who can't get an air strike without over an hour's wait (if they get one at all) and its done by a stranger with little experience and not much control going over 500 mph. It sounds to me and a whole lot of others that retiring the Dragonflies, SkyRaiders and SkyHawks was a huge mistake and we should correct it by bringing them or something like them back perhaps with a turbine engine and/or turbofan. Fulling utilizing the over 700 A-10s we have rather than have them collect dust in the desert is not a bad place to start!

We could put a F404 turbofan engine into some A-4 SkyHawks (2 seat models for an observer) in storage like Singapore has done, paint in Army or AF sky-blue camouflage, perhaps put the bigger wing and double wheel landing gear to operate from mud and we'd have a low-cost CAS/MAS aircraft...

How short of a runway could Dragonflies/SkyRaiders/SkyHawks operate from?

Why not mount A-1s or A-4s or A-37s on a TRAILER and tow by an Army truck until the airfield is flattened and ready for them to operate?

The Army AFAC/ECAS Concept

Chuck Myers writes:

"Airborne FAC and emergency CAS work is not a mission activity to be performed sporadically on the third Tuesday of each month. You have to "live down there" at low altitudes. And, some guys will hit the target with the airplane once in a while. But, after a couple of months, we won't have any loses due to ground impact. Nobody in my squadron ever flew over a target area above 150 feet (that was considered too high for safety ---- the high guy is the target for the air defenses). Stay in the MASK stupid! Our helo folks understand that."

Weapons analyst Emery Nelson writes:

"Chuck, as someone who really believes that the A-1 (that's not a mistake, I mean the Skyraider of WWII, Korea and Vietnam fame) is still a better CAS platform than anything we now have, I couldn't agree more that slow and low is the way to live for a ground support aircraft. However the air force has moved on to "fast and high".The reason I believe that the CAS mission should be turned over to the Army is because the AF want to go higher and faster still and going in the other direction it would be like birds deciding to walk, possible but not reasonable. I understand that this would take an act of Congress, but that seems much more likely to me than the AF ever going back to 150ft. over a target. Of course maybe if we had another major war????"

Emery is right that a 300 mph A-1 SkyRaider is a better CAS platform than a slower 100 mph AH-64 helicopter, and is far more robust (armored, able to take enemy small arms fire hits etc.). However sadly, there are not dozens of A-1s in boneyard storage to return them to active duty. =o(

Army AH-64s can be made twice as fast by being made into compound helicopters like the AH-56 Cheyenne using Piasecki ring-tails; which would be a step in the right direction.

Since T-37s are retiring that could be made into A-37s, and thus are available and easy to maintain; why not supply them to the U.S. Army for FAC and emergency CAS duties?

SO YOU DON'T GOT MONEY, AND YOU DON'T GOT CAS, AND YOU DON'T GOT AIRCRAFT?

IF YOU HAVE CONGRESS YOU CAN HAVE AN ATTACK FORCE OF "KILLER BEES"

USAF stores old or unwanted planes at Davis-Monthan AMARC (does it matter what this stands for? Its the aircraft boneyard).

Guess what populates the boneyard?

Why, all the attack airplanes that could provide CAS to the Army and marines!!!!

The actual 2002 list has been removed from the web site for "security reasons".

I did find a 2 year old list and report the following probably still true things:

http://216.239.51.100/search?q=cache:oUJHdDyZVAcC:home.zonnet.nl/van_doorn57/www/amarc/amarc_list.htm+amarc+inventory&hl=en&ie=UTF-8

In storage now awaiting a use:

83 x A-4 SkyHawks (mostly late-model Ms) better than AV-8Bs

156 x A-10 Warthogs

and.........

227 x A-7 Corsair IIs!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

20 x are 2-seat A-7Ks! Could be great for AFAC work.....as "OA-7Ks".

So why not have the U.S. Army doing ECAS AFAC liaison work using either converted T-37s or A-10s or A-7s?

The aircraft are there (A-4s, A-7s, A-10s) or will soon be there (T-37s)...all we need is Congress to weigh in on the CAS and make our military have the capability it critically lacks!

WHO WILL ESCORT OUR HELICOPTERS?

For the sake of argument, if the marines can get their troubled V-22 tilt-rotor (Medium Lift Replacement or "MLR" aircraft) to fly faster than helicopters and not crash, what aircraft will escort it?

In his superb paper, Armed Escort For The Future marine Major Thomas R. Kovach states:

"The purpose of escort is to protect aircraft against ground and airborne threats that cannot be avoided ( flown over, under, or around ) or neutralized by defense suppression operations. Assault support operations must include attached armed escort in all but the most benign scenarios to ensure mission success and protect U.S. lives. The current AH-1W fulfills the escort role only marginally and enhancements will be costly and lengthy in time to complete. Even enhanced, the Cobra will not be advanced enough to escort the MLR."

Since we have retired all of our prop attack planes that can fly slow enough to escort V/TOL rotor aircraft and still be faster than them to fly ahead and engage air and ground threats we now need a "new" aircraft... Only the superb A-10 Warthog could do this mission, but the Air Force owns it and it cannot launch off small Navy amphib carriers since they don't have catapults like the big USN carriers have or ski jumps like the British small carriers have.

Major Kovach continues to describe this "new" aircraft which is essentially a "Killer Bee"...called a "VMAO" to meet this anticipated need:

"In a parallel program, the marine corps has developed a Draft Mission Needs Statement for a future attack aircraft to replace the Cobra, UH-1N, and OV-1OD. A complete list of requirements can be found in Tab A. This aircraft has been designated the VMAO because it covers the attack, utility, and observation roles of the three aircraft it will replace. The MNS envisions the VMAO as a tandem seat, 20 to 25 thousand pound maximum gross weight aircraft with a mission configured, unrefueled range (sea level standard day) of 500 NM, a sustained operating envelope of -45 KTAS to 325 KTAS, and a 30 minute dash speed of no less than 350 KTAS. It must be capable of routine shipboard operations with rolling/pitching deck conditions up to a maximum deck displacement of 15 degrees roll and +or- 3 degrees pitch. The aircraft must be capable of engaging and disengaging primary flight propulsion systems (engines, rotors, proprotors) in winds of 45 knots from any direction.

The VMAO aircraft will be capable of accomplishing assigned missions at low level and NOE altitudes at high and low speeds, during day/night operations, in adverse weather and during periods of reduced visibility. Over-the-horizon operations will be possible with the inclusion of a precision navigation system and long-range, low-altitude, jam resistant communications equipment.

Survivability has been carefully considered in the VMAO specifications. A ballistic tolerance to 14.5 millimeter rounds and crashworthy components are included in the design requirements. Economical incorporation of low-observable radar, IR, and acoustic signatures will be designed into the airframe. A fully integrated defensive countermeasures system will assist in identifying and decoying anti-air systems. The enclosed cockpit will provide NBC protection up to MOPP IV and zero-speed, zero-altitude ejection seats.

The VMAO will have a self-deployable range of 2100 NM with internal and external fuel tanks full. This flight will be completed in under 10 hours with defensive ordnance aboard. An inflight refueling capability will further extend the ferry limit.

Advances in avionics will give the VMAO an unprecedented fire control system tied into the HUD and a visor display. A FLIR/TV will give a night delivery system compatible with all on-board weapons. A minimum load of 12 precision guided munitions, 38 rockets, 2 AIM-9X, and 1500 rounds of 20/25 millimeter ammunition will is specified.

The VMAO will be cost effective for several reasons. Its design will make it suitable for a variety of additional missions. As stated in the draft MNS, the VMAO will take the place of the AH-1, UH-1, and OV-10. The VMAO will therefore be capable of performing close-in-fire support missions, command and control, utility transport including recon insert and extraction, and observation for the marine corps. In addition, this platform is attractive to the other services for such roles as anti-submarine warfare, combat search and rescue, and special operations. The VMAO will save money in the long term by providing a multi-mission aircraft which will have joint applications and maintenance cost-saving commonality. Additional savings will be realized in the force reduction of strategic lift currently required to deliver many of the platforms that the self-deploying VMAO will replace.

The issue now remains to identify an aircraft either available or near development that can meet the future threat, be compatible with the MLR, and be cost effective. From an assault support escort view, there are at least seven platform concepts that meet the previously discussed criteria. The General Electric XV-5A Remote Fan, the Canadair CL-84-1 Tiltwing, and the Sikorsky XH-59A Advancing Blade Concept Aircraft as well as tilt-duct and fan-in-wing concepts all warrant further investigation. However, only two platforms are flying today in the form of the McDonnell Douglas AV-8B and the XV-15 tiltrotor demonstrator developed by Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. to test concepts for the MV-22 Osprey.

The AV-8B Harrier is at first glance a likely escort for the MLR. It is already fielded, combat proven [yeah, right!], and forward-deployed in the marine corps. However, while the Harrier can work off of amphibious ships and hover, it pays a tremendous price in payload and endurance for operating in this regime. The Harrier has just over an hour of usable time in an attached escort role making it unsuitable for just about all amphibious assault roles. It is an excellent detached escort and will necessarily be limited to that mission in support of an assault force.

VMAO REQUIREMENTS

(1) Capable of sustained (OTH) operations from air-capable amphibious shipping and austere unimproved sites.
(2) Dual engine aircraft with autonomous self-starting capability. The aircraft shall be capable of powering all onboard systems for maintenance or pre-mission tests through its integral auxiliary power unit. It shall also provide sufficient power for engine starting while powering critical mission equipment without power interruption.
(3) Have sufficient engine power so that with one engine inoperative, cruise flight may be continued with full ordnance payload and sufficient fuel onboard to fly either the point of intended landing or return to the point of origin, whichever is shorter, and land (STOL) with a ground or deck roll of less than 100 feet (with a 15 knot headwind).
(4) In the event that all engine power is lost while in flight, the aircraft must be capable of a power off glide/auto-rotation to a survivable emergency landing.
(5) Minimum 30 percent dash speed advantage over the MLR.
(6) An expanded flight envelope and "g" range commensurate with air-to-ground and air-to-air flight profiles (minimum desired range -1.5 to +5.0).
(7) Capability to conduct continuous/extended (over 30 minute) hover operations while mission configured, without significant degredation to aircraft range, performance, and time on station.
(8) Have a self-deployable range of 2100 NM when configured with a full internal fuel load and external fuel tanks. Retain the capability to upload 2 AIM-9X missiles and 750 rounds of 20/25 millimeter ammunition when in the ferry configuration. Complete the 2100 NM flight in not greater than 10 hours.
(9) Have an inflight refueling capability.
(10) Expanded ordnance payload capability ( multiple universal weapons stations which facilitate and aircraft configuration of not less than 12 precision guided weapons, 38 rockets, 2 AIM-9Xs, or an equivalent load. The VMAO will be configured with an internal/ turreted gun capable of employing 1500 rounds of 20/25 millimeter ammunition.
(11) Ballistic tolerant (at least 14.5 millimeter)/ crashworthy cockpit and critical components.
(12) NBC protection up to MOPP IV level.
(13) Economical incorporation of low observable radar, IR, and acoustic signatures.
(14) Onboard, state-of-the-art mission planning system/data loader (paperless cockpit concept).
(15) Fully integrated observation (enhanced optics day/night with multi-powered zoom lens capability), detection, navigation, communication, and targeting systems, combining active and passive means to acquire, designate, and engage targets at ranges in excess of 10 kilometers.
(16) Heads-Up/ Heads-Out cockpit design. A computer driven holographic HUD capability, or existing state-of-the-art visor display systems, which facilitate mission accomplishment and the projection of FLIR/TV imagery in a heads-up/heads-out manner.
(17) Hands on Collective and Cyclic (HOCAC) cockpit design.
(18) Fully integrated defensive electronic countermeasures system capable of identifying, displaying, prioritizing and jamming/ decoying anti-air warfare systems to include ground and airborne delivered Anti-Tank Guided Missiles.
(19) Long range (OTH) precision navigation capability.
(20) an offensive air-to-air capability superior to anticipated threat helicopter/tiltrotor and low-performance fixed wing aircraft. A self-defense capability against high performance fixed-wing aircraft.
(21) Capability to transmit and receive digital data burst information from/ to ground and airborne platforms. Capability for real time data link of FLIR/Optical imagery to/ from ground or airborne receivers.
(22) Capable of sloped landings and take offs up to a maximum displacement angle of greater-than or equal-to 15 degrees.
(23) Incorporation of zero/zero ejection seats.
(24) Long range (OTH), low-altitude, secure and jam resistant communications capability."

To meet all of these VMAO requirements will require a fixed-wing attack aircraft! Sort of like reinventing....an armored OV-10 Bronco type-aircraft with a tail hook to recover onboard small Navy amphibs! (YES, the Navy will have to "bend" here a bit and provide arrester wires and a ski jump on the front of small amphibs to facilitate a fixed-wing VMAO so it doesn't have to be a fragile, costly and overly complex V/TOL or STOVL design.

SUCCESS STORY: THE SAAB SUPPORTER CAS ATTACK AIRCRAFT GOES TO WAR

FLY THE SAAB SUPPORTER VIA FLIGHT SIMULATOR!

www.redfoxdk.com/FS98TING/FS98_SAGER.htm

www.sitecenter.dk/ork/rdaft17/

This trainer originated with Malmö Flygindustri as MFI-15, the militarized version being designated MFI-9 and 17 and "Saab Supporter" when the project was taken over by Saab. The prototype first flew in 1969 called the MFI-9. The production variant, of which 150 were built, was powered by a 200 hp Lycoming engine. Military operators include Sierra Leone, Pakistan (as "Mashshak"), Denmark, Norway and Zambia.

Why were Pakistani-made Maskaks with an observation/attack capability not purchased for new Iraqi AF instead of the impotent and unarmed CH2000s being bought? Was Army Redstone Arsenal more worried about Iraqi pilots dying in flight training or accomplishing something for Iraqi national security after their training was done

http://216.109.117.135/search/cache?p=saab+supporter&prssweb=Search&ei=UTF-8&fl=0&xargs=0&pstart=1&b=31&u=pakakhbar.com/military/airforce/dai.html&w=saab+supporter&d=375D8DFE17&icp=1&.intl=us

Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC)
1.0 Aircraft Manufacturing Factory
1.1 SAAB Supporter/ Mushshak

This is a piston engine aircraft used for basic training and liaison. In 1974 Pakistan ordered 117 from Sweden, 23 of which were supplied from Sweden in completed form and 94 were assembled in Pakistan from knocked down kits under the local name of Mushshak, for both PAF and Pakistan Army. The component production was progressively taken over by the Aircraft Manufacturing Factory (AMF) of the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC) at Kamra, this was followed in 1982 by the subsequent transfer of the entire MFI-17 production line from Sweden to Pakistan. Therefore, since 1982 AMF has completely manufactured this aircraft, with Avco Lycoming four-cylinder 200hp (149kW) power plant being supplied by the original manufacturer, along with instruments and electrical accessories. PAC also acquired sales as well as production rights for the MFI-17 in certain areas of Middle East. AMF has over the years developed a considerable experience and has tried to enhance the performance and eliminate bugs, partly by means of changing equipment such as radio fit and partly by structural improvements.

Super Mushshak has been developed with an improved six-cylinder Lycoming engine. This allows the Super Mushshak to reach a cruise speed of 130 knots (240m/h) and a 1,700 ft/min (518m/min) rate of climb. Other improvements include cockpit air-conditioning, tinted canopy, and an optional electrical trim, all of this designed, manufactured and fitted by Pakistani Engineer & Technicians The AMF has so far produced over 300 examples of Mushshak/ Super Mushshak aircrafts with export to Iran (Mashak 25), Syria (Mashak 6), Oman (super Mashak 8) and Saudi Arabia (Super Mashak 20).

www.geocities.com/Baja/Dunes/1107/pac.htm

Aircraft Manufacturing Factory (AMF)

The Aircraft Manufacturing Factory came into operation in mid-1981, as a license production center for the Saab Safari/Supporter two/three seat light aircraft , which has the Pakistani name Mushshak. Progressive assembly of the first 90 of these aircraft began in 1976 from semi knocked down kits, and it is now being manufactured at Kamra from raw materials. By early 1988 about 150 examples of the Mushshak were in service with various units of the Pakistan Army and Air Force, with output continuing at the rate of 15 a year. In mid-1986 work began on installing a more powerful 156.6 kW (210 hp) Teledyne Continental TIO-360-MB engine, resulting in a considerable increase in performance. Production tooling was in hard in early 1988 for modifying additional aircraft, with series production expected to begin in December 1988 after U.S. certification to FAR Pt 23. At least 100 of the updated version are said to be required.

Major facilities at the AMF include equipment to to manufacture all GRP components of the Mushshak. Engines, instruments, electrical equipment and radios are imported, but almost all other items are manufactured locally. To date, around 275 aircraft have been produced and some have been exported to Iran, Syria and Oman

The AMF has developed an improved Super Mushshak varient, powered by a 195kW (260), Textron Lycoming IO-540-V4A5 with three-blade MacCauley propeller. The new variant offers improved speed, range, rate of climb, higher service ceiling, and a shorter take-off and landing distance. Other refinements include new instruments and cockpit air conditioning. The modification was done keeping in view Pakistan's hot climate. The original engine resulted in a very long take-off run and low rate of climb in the summer months. The AMF has the capacity to produce 24 Mushshaks annually. Around 30-40 of the Mushshaks at the air force academy at Risaplpur are to be retrofited. Other potential customers for export include Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan.

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Its most famous civilian use has been the relief work initiated by Count Carl Gustav von Rosen who airdropped sacks of grain using the wing ordnance hardpoints. Denmark and Zambia each took 20 aircraft, the former for training and liaison roles, and the latter for the training and counter-insurgency roles. Before using Saab Supporters to drop relief supplies, von Rosen flew relief supplies into Biafra using large cargo aircraft despite enemy opposition. Sterling Seagrave's Time-Life "Epic of Flight" book, Soldiers of Fortune, 1981, details how Count von Rosen created a "Minicoin" air squadron of MFI-9 Saab Supporters flown by western and native pilots that destroyed enemy MIG fighter-bombers on the ground allowing relief supply aircraft to land and saved the day for Biafra freedom fighters in Africa. He later used these type aircraft to drop food to starving people in war-torn Ethiopia.

Page 130

"Von Rosen had broken the Nigerian blockade, but he quickly realized that this was only a temporary solution to Biafra's agony. A fantastic scheme -- a plan that went far beyond the transportation of foodstuffs and medical supplies -- was beginning to take shape in his mind. It was the fate of the starving Biafran children that clinched it. 'I soon realized,' the idealistic Swede would later observe, 'that every priest, every doctor, every black and white man in Biafra was praying for arms and ammunition before food, because the idea of feeding children only to have them massacred later by cannon fire from Saladin armored cars or MIGs doesn't make sense.' His plan, von Rosen explained, 'was not to add fuel to the war but to keep the sophisticated war machine that the Nigerians have at their command away from the little children.'"

Pages 132 - 136

"After a whirlwind tour of the world in a fruitless attempt to mobilize humanitarian aid for Biafra on a massive scale, Carl Gustav von Rosen returned to that battered would-be nation just before Christmas of 1968. There he learned that the besieging Nigerians were getting ready to further constrict the flow of weapons to Biafra and destroy the vital airstrip at Uli. If anything was to be done for Biafra, von Rosen decided, he would have to do it himself. And he believed so strongly in Biafra's cause that he would offer his services without pay. He told Biafran officials of a daring plan that was taking shape in his mind and then returned to Sweden to start getting it under way.

In Malmo, where von Rosen maintained an apartment, his son Eric was working at the Malmo Flygindustri, and aircraft-manufacturing concern that was part of the Swedish industrial combine, Saab. The son had once asked his father to teach him how to fly in a small two-seater propeller sport plane produced by the company and designated the MFI-9B. Von Rosen had been impressed by the little plane's hot performance and nimble handling. He had also been impressed by a sketch of the military version, which had been designed as a light attack plane. The unusually strong wing structure enabled the aircraft to carry rocket pods, and the plane could not easily be hit by anti-aircraft fire or detected by radar because it could perform so adroitly at low altitudes. It was just what von Rosen needed.

Early in 1969, officials at the Tanzanian Embassy in Stockholm placed an order for five MFI-9Bs for a new flying school in their country. Tanzania was one of a few African states that recognized Biafra, but the significance of this fact seems to have escaped notice in Sweden at the time. An obscure Paris firm -- actually a front for the Biafran government -- paid $51,600 for the five aircraft. The planes were then flown by Swedish MFI pilots to an airfield outside Paris, where the pilots were surprised to find themselves in a military high-security zone. There, French air force armament experts measured the wings of the little craft for rocket pods, each capable of loading six French 76-millmeter rockets. Then the five planes were dismantled, crated and loaded aboard two Super Constellations. All the Swedes returned home except Per Hazelius, and engineer who was to reassemble the five planes in Tanzania. He boarded one of the Constellations, expecting to disembark in Dar-es-Salaam. But when his plane finally landed, it was on the opposite side of Africa, in Libreville, Gabon. Waiting to greet Hazelius was Count von Rosen.

Two other Swedish pilots and two ground crewman were the von Rosen. The pilots were Martin Lang, a 31-year-old flying instructor, and Gunnar Haglund, a 27-year-old pilot for a Swedish steel company. The ground technicians were Torsten Nilsson, 58, a retired Swedish air force pilot, and Bengt Weithz, a young engineer familiar with the MFI-9B. Like von Rosen, they acted out of idealism; their pay did not exceed their normal salaries. With them were two Biafrans -- pilot Willie Bruce and Augustus Opke, who at only 27 years of age was chief of the Biafran air force.

With everyone pitching in, Per Hazelius soon had the five aircraft out of their crates and assembled. Then the pilots flew the planes into the bush to a secret airfield outside Libreville, where the prefitted rocket pods were mounted on the MFI-9Bs and armed. Von Rosen dubbed the planes 'Minicoins', a play on words referring both to their low price and to their suitability for min-counterinsurgency operations. Later, the name was frequently corrupted to 'Minicon'. Per Hazelius was amazed at the transformation of the harmless MFI sport planes into lethal attack aircraft, each bristling with 12 deadly rockets. Then the ground crews painted out the Swedish markings and daubed on camouflage splashes. Von Rosen invited Hazelius to remain with the group, but the engineer chose to return to Sweden.

The first raid on Nigeria was launched at high noon on May 22, 1969.

'We wanted to get them when they were sleepy after their lunch,' von Rosen explained. Their target was Port Harcourt, where the Nigerians had a radar base for guiding their fighters. There were also several MIGs and Ilyushin bombers based there.

It was a blistering hot day. Von Rosen wore yellow baseball cap over his thinning gray hair to ward off the sun. He was 59 years old.

As the squadron of Minicoins approached the coast, one of the pilots sighted some large oil tankers offshore. He became excited at the prospect of sinking them and broke radio silence. Now the Nigerians knew they were coming.

They flew into Port Harcourt low over the trees and spotted a regiment of Nigerian Soldiers hastily trying to cover the airport's runway with leaves. All the antiaircraft guns were pointed in the direction of the approaching Minicoins and they started firing as soon as the aircraft came into sight; von Rosen's plane was nearly flipped over by the explosion of a shell from a Swedish Bofors antiaircraft gun. The pilots loosed their first rockets and the Bofors guns were immediately silenced. Then the rockets hit two parked MiGs, and the wings of one of the Russian fighters snapped off and cartwheeled through the air. Next the attackers struck at the Ilyushins, heavily damaging two of them before returning to their secret jungle strip.

The raiders took off again as soon as possible and struck Benin, wiping out the Ilyushin belonging to the notorious pilot nicknamed Genocide, and another Ilyushin, known as "the Intruder," that had harassed the airstrip at Uli.

Three days later they struck Enugu.

'They knew we were coming and had moved every available gun to the airport,' von Rosen reported afterward. But the small raiding force evaded the Nigerian ground fire and hit two bombers. 'A MiG taxied out to take off after us,' von Rosen recalled, 'but was shot up as he tried to lift off.'

Martin Land had a bad moment when his Minicoin lost altitude and was forced to touch down along the runway before regaining flying speed. But while his plane was on the ground Lang fired rockets into two parked planes, one of them a MiG.

In three sharp, sudden thrusts, von Rosen and his little squadron of heavily armed light planes had created pandemonium in the Nigerian Air Force -- and given a badly needed lift to beleaguered Biafra.

World reaction was mixed. Nigeria protested to Stockhom as soon as Von Rosen's identity was established. The Swedish government launched an investigation; Malmo Flygindustri expressed surprise; Transair knew only that von Rosen was vacationing. Stories on the daring raids filled newspapers around the world. While von Rosen returned to Sweden to face a government inquiry, his squadron continued its attacks. At home, von Rosen satisfied the Swedish government that he had not been involved in the actual purchase and shipment of the aircraft and had not violated any specific law. Transair agreed to scold him, but only for flying for somebody else while on vacation. According to von Rosen, half the population of Sweden would have volunteered to go to Biafra if asked.

His mission ended, von Rosen settle back in Malmo to resume what he could of his own life. Over the next few months, he was rumored to be back in Biafra, flying on Minicoin raids, like a latter-day knight-errant battling for the downtrodden. In the squalid world of the gunrunners who influenced the outcome of so many events in Africa, he had shown that it was possible to be motivated by instincts other than greed. But he had done all he could for Biafra".

Other Details:

www.canit.se/~griffon/aviation/text/biafra.htm

Operation Biafra Babies

On May 30th 1967, the densely populated, oil-rich, province Biafra with 14 million citizens proclaimed its independence from Nigeria. A blockade was already in force and on July 6th the military attack started by Nigerian troops, who then numbered 100, 000.

Throughout the war, Nigeria got support from abroad in the form of armour, artillery, aircraft and ammunition. Biafra got no official support from other nations, and had to manufacture about half the weapons used locally. They had only 3,000 troops when the war broke out, but still managed several successful counterattacks. When the collapse came early in 1970, they numbered 30 000.

Nigeria had, and got, MiG-17s, Il-28s, L-29 Delfins as well as DC-3s and helicopters. On the other hand, they had few pilots, and it's likely only one Nigerian pilot took part in combat operations. During the war, Nigerian air attacks were directed only against civilian targets and had no military significance.

The Biafrans had pilots, but very few aircraft. They had two B-25 Mitchells and one B-26 Marauder, which was captured on the ground as it was unservicable. Later on they got another B-26, which during Oct - Dec were used for night raids together with the B-25s and a converted DC-3. The B-26 and DC-3 crashed, the B-25s were captured on the ground.

The Nigerians also used DC-3s converted for bombing, for example of the airfield used at nights for relief flights from abroad. 5513 relief flights brought in 61,000 tons of foodstuffs, but Nigerian AAA never brought down any of the aircraft, and the only one shot down by a fighter was a Red Cross flight which had its flight plan approved by Nigeria. Still, 11 aircraft were destroyed and 21 pilots killed by attacks on the airfield.

One of the relief pilots in 1968 was the Swede Carl Gustaf von Rosen. He saw that Biafra was unable to acquire jet fighters, and brought up the idea of Minicoin with General Ojukwu.

In the spring of 1969 five MFI-9Bs were assembled in Gabon, painted in two green colours (Volkswagen car paint) in three large fields, given simple sights and two pods for six 68mm anti-armor rockets, and given an extra fuel tank in the fuselage. They were named "Biafra Babies". At first, the squadron had three Swedish pilots and three Biafran.

The first attack started on the morning of May 22nd with a transit over the sea, followed by an attack on the airport at Port Harcourt. Two days later, the second attack was a dawn attack against the airport at Benin. The third attack, also two days later, was a dusk attack against the Enugu airport via a very roundabout course.

This kept the Nigerian air force on the ground, making it easy for awhile for the relief flights. But after a while they started again, now attacking military targets like they hadn't before, because they were protected by AAA.

The fourth attack was against the important powerplant in Ugheli, which was out of commission for six months after.

On May 30th, the fifth attack had a troop concentration at a village outside Owerri. They never saw any target, in spite of the flight leader climbing to 100 m to try to locate it. Upon returning, they learnt from this that they had been under fire, which they never noticed, and that it was a correct decision not to fire at uncertain targets, as there were lots of Biafrans in the area.

After this, the Swedish pilots had to return to Sweden, leaving only one trained Biafran pilot in the air force. During July another Swedish made him company during 21 attacks.

In August pilot training was started in Biafra under von Rosen's leadership and with one Swedish teacher. Later, in September, Biafran pilots training abroad, for aircraft it was realized would never arrive, were recalled to Biafra to fly the Biafra Babies. 12 T-6s had been purchased, but they were all in bad condition, so only four could be made to fly. During the transit to Biafra, two were lost. The remaining two were used together with the MFI-9s, of which a total of nine were in service.

During the latter parts of the war, two MFI-9s were lost.

MFI-9 Technical description

Span: 7.43 m
Empty weight: 340 kg
Length: 5.85 m
Max t/o weight: 575 kg
Height: 2.00 m
Payload: 235 kg
Wing area: 8.7 m^2
Fuel: 56 kg
Max altitude: 4500 m
Max speed: 240 km/h
T/O run: 150 m
Vne: 305 km/h
Landing run: 130 m
Cruising speed: 236 km/h
Range: 800 km! Economy cruise: 210 km/h
Endurance: 4 hours
Stall speed: 80 km/h
Load factor: +4.4Gs/-1.76Gs

Armament: 12 x 68mm Matra anti-armor rockets

TACTICS

Normal tactic was to begin with to attack with 4 - 5 aircraft at a time. The unit was kept together approaching the target, with a separation of 50m or less, as a larger separation would lead to loss of visual contact between the aircraft. The very low flying altitude was necessary to avoid beeing fired upon, both over enemy and own territory, it was found. Radio silence was ordered except during the actual attack, when target information had to be passed on.

The tactic to ensure that a chosen target was destroyed before any remaining rockets were used on other targets was adopted. The rockets were only fired two at a time. Anti-armour rockets were chosen because it was decided that all attacks would primarily be anti-materiel, and only military targets attacked.

During the first attacks, pop-ups to 100m followed by shallow dives were made, but as this was when AAA was most effective and the rockets had very flat trajectories, it was found that it was enough to climb to 2 - 5m and fire the rockets during level flight. Firing range was usually 800 - 500m, but when firing at closer ranges, in no case were any aircraft damaged by its own fire. Dawn and dusk attacks were most effective, as AAA fire wasn't as good then.

For qualified targets, the day before was used for careful briefing and planning, that's why only one attack every second day. Later on, attacks with 1 - 2 aircraft were made with less planning against smaller targets. For close support work, metal sheets were placed on the ground close to own troops, and signal flares from the ground used to mark when the enemy was in sight. More than 5 minutes was never spent over the target.

Many aircraft were hit by small caliber fire, but managed to return with as many as 12 hits. Servicability was close to 100% in spite of this. At most three attacks per day were performed.

Statistics from the first 29 attacks (5 abandoned for different reasons) May-Aug:

432 rockets fired, more than 50% hitting targets. No aircraft or pilots lost.

................Destroyed/Damaged

MiG-17 3/2
Il-28 1/0
Canberra 1/1
"Intruder" 1/0
2 engine transport 1/0
Helicopters 2/1
Trucks 7/1
Radar 1/0
ATC tower 1/1
Terminal bldgs 2/0
Power plant 1/0
Ammo storage 1/0
Headquarters 3/0
AAA 2/0
Oil pump station 1/0

Enemy losses: 300 men at airports, 200 men at the front

All this from the book "Gerillapilot i Biafra" (guess I don't have to translate that) by Gunnar Haglund, 1988. It's got pictures and an English summary.

Text last updated 1993 OCT 27
The Swedish military aviation page
Last modified 1996 Jan 10 by Urban Fredriksson
griffon@canit.se

The largest operator is Pakistan, whose air force and army have more than 80 and 105 aircraft in the training and observation roles respectively, with counter insurgency a probability in time of conflict. From 1986 the aircraft have been re-engined with 210-hp Continental TSIO-360-MB for improved performance under hot and high conditions.

TECHNICAL DATA

Type: Multi-role aircraft.
Crew: Two or three seat.
Engine: 200-hp Lycoming IO-360-A1B6 flat flour piston engine.

Performance:

Range: 5 hours 10 minutes endurance.
Speed: 146 mph. at sea level.
Ceiling: 13,450 ft.
Rate Of Climb: 807 feet-per-minute.

Weight

Empty: 1,424 lbs.
Maximum take Off: 2,646 lbs.

Dimensions

Span: 29 ft. 0.4 in.
Length: 22 ft. 11.6 in.
Height: 8 ft. 6.4 in.
Wing Area: 128.09 sq. ft.
Armament: up to 661 lbs. of disposable stores.

Principal Versions

Supporter basic model
Mushshak Pakistani model

USERS

Denmark: Supporter
Iran: 25 Mushshak
Norway: Safari
Oman: 3 Mushak
Pakistan: license production
Sierra Leone: Safari
Syria: 6 Mushshak
Zambia: Supporter

---

In the Airpower Journal - Spring 1991, "THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN: LOW-TECHNOLOGY AIRCRAFT AND LITTLE WARS", CAPT GEORGE C. MORRIS, USAF proposes armed Cessna turboprop Caravans (U-27s) be used for STOL airland/airdrop transport as well as close air support. Quick-Reaction Paratroopers could jump from U-27s to secure tactical terrain objectives and maneuver on the enemy. The idea has merit for a 1st Cavalry Division since U-27s or UV-18A Twin Otters could be used to resupply its units. Both aircraft and the Saab Supporter can be fitted with floats to land on water and skis to land on snow/ice.

These type aircraft might be able to fire the ASP-30mm autocannon, shooting the same lethal 30mm DEFA NATO High-Explosive Incendiary ammo that the AH-64 Apache, MH-6 Little Bird and AH-60 Direct Action Penetrator shoot.

Part of the current UAV/UCAV mentality is that these aircraft will be hit by enemy fire and lost. Realizing this, the U/MCAV would have the latest countermeasures, flares, decoys and a ballistic-deployed recovery parachute (RP) to bring the entire aircraft down intact to save the pilot (and salvage at least parts of the aircraft) if disabled. With the U/MCAV there should never have to be a crash landing, use the RP if you can get to the friendly air base. Pilots of both the micro-helicopter and U/MCAV fixed-wing attack aircraft must realize their "mounts" might be shot out from under them and be wearing body armor, ballistic flight helmets, parachutes and Escape and Recovery gear to include a M4 5.56mm carbine and ammo to effectively fight off enemies beyond 300 meters not a mere 9mm pistol good for only short-range firing (less than 50 meters). A simple ejection seat for both craft should be standard, and least air bags for crash-landings. Costs for a fully-equipped U/MCAV would be around $200,000, a tiny expense compared to $3,000,000 bloated LAV-III as IAV deathtrap armored cars.

CAS expert Charles Myers writes an important conclusion to why this concept must be an integrated Air/Ground Cavalry:

"Its important to recall that my concept (Maneuver Air Support) evolved from scores of interviews with ground combat veterans and pilots who had significant air support experience and led to my definition of air support for smalll forces engaged, or who want engagement or are trying to avoid it. Solution is the Continuous Overhead Presence (COP) of a Joint Air Attack Team composed of a Spectre and a number of fixed-wing ASPs (Agile/Survivable/Potent) flown by trained/experienced pilots who have had extensive practice WITH the ground combat element they are supporting (unit cohesion).

The path to this includes insistence of Army (especially light armor and infantry) folks who understand and will demand it".

How do we get ASPs/Killer Bees (U/MCAVs) to the battlefield?

1. They can self-deploy using drop tanks--remember the Saab Supporter has a 600 mile range as-is!

2. In larger fixed-wing planes for airlanding like von Rosen's Minicoin Saab Supporters were crated into Super Connies for Biafra

ASP/Killer Bee (U/MCAV) wings must fold so at least 4 can get into a C-130 vice only the 2 x OH-58D helo's that can fit now in a C-130.

The C-130 lands on a dirt strip assault zone, the ASPs are rolled out, wings unfolded and fly missions ASAP. Will probably have to have containers to stack the ASPs to get 4 in a C-130.

3. If we do the containers right, the ASPs can be parachute airdropped!

Fixed wing aircraft are not wimpy fragile like helos....we can deliver ASPs anywhere they need to operate from...a M113A3 Gavin with a dozer blade makes a 300 foot long dirt runway....

4. The aircraft's wheels or the containers should act as TRAILERS so the ASPs can be TOWED by ground units from FAARP to FAARP--none of this "flyboy comfort zone" for working around the aircraft, ASPs go where the grunts go!

So where do we go from here?

1. The armored slow-to-fast USAF A-10 is great even though its full potential is not being exploited. It is being used to escort fixed-wing airlift aircraft and helicopters; the marines who ignorantly retired their OV-10s don't have anything to escort their helicopters except other unarmored helicopters. If they get the troubled V-22 to work, they'll have nothing to escort it.

2. The USAF X-45 UCAV is for SEAD NOT CAS despite what Tofflerian pundits think

3. Unarmored, too-fast JSF is to replace A-10 and status quo will get worse

4. Army UCAR will be rotary-wing and lack loiter/endurance/payload to be effective for COP, MAS or CAS

5. Army needs manned Continuous Overhead Presence (COP) aircraft (observation/attack) NOW; 2002

6. Restoration of at least one U.S. Army squadron of armed OV-1 Mohawks or armed C-12s (OV-12s) as Interim ASP COP aircraft to fight war on terrorism; GAU-19/A .50 caliber gatling gun pods and laser-guided 2.75" rockets. Experiments to be conducted at Fort Polk, La with 2nd Advanced Armored Cavalry Regiment.

7. Army Attack Pathfinders: extend Pathfinder school by 2 weeks and teach terminal guidance; first unit to be trained: 101st's Pathfinders

8. Army Requirements for an objective fixed-wing Unmanned/Manned Combat Air Vehicle (U/MCAV) along the lines of the Chuck Myer ASP to replace Interim COP aircraft since UCAV, UCAR and JSF will NOT meet CAS/MAS COP requirements to enable Army decisive MANEUVER in the 21st Century

An Army combat helicopter pilot remarks about what an OBJECTIVE U/MCAV could be:

"For my money, and I certainly admit I may have blinders on, the Army still needs to stay in the V/TOL business because it just has too much flexibility to make an airfield damn near anywhere (I have landed in a company of helo's in fields that would bog a tank company. Was scary pulling out of the muck the next morning, but hey).

So in our never ending friendly debate, I submit that tilt-rotor is a good answer. No one has said it cannot fly like an airplane. It is about the same speed as a A-10. So use it as an airplane that can land on a VERY small runway. You can rearm it closer to the action (no FARP action for A-10). You can put the airfield next to the brigade/divison TOC. A V-22 size "AV-22" carries almost the same load as a A-10, and, the cannon swivels, and it comes designed to carry a crew of two. So instead of it loitering for hours at an IP with all those evil radar's noticing their location and waiting for them to come into range. By the way, our RAND buddies don't care which side of the FLOT you are on. Zillion-mile range uberSAMs will kill you. Instead the TR attack aircraft sit outside the BDE TOC on the APU ready to be in the air in 15 minutes for days, or at flight idle that gets them in the air in two minutes or so for more hours than an A-10 can loiter, with Flight Lead sitting in the brigade TOC monitoring the fight with the brigade he is supporting. Or they can go and loiter someplace just like an A-10.

If there is somebody who really needs to get CASEVACed out or just plane out of Indian territory if worst-comes-to-worst an AV-22 can land and get them out. OK that last is a little stretch, but it is feasible and gunships in Vietnam were known to get troopers out if no one else was available."

The tilt-rotor as an OBJECTIVE U.S. Army attack aircraft has some merit compared to it as a troop transport....with ejection seats, and just a pilot/co-pilot we are not putting 2 dozen men at a risk with the whole-tiltrotor-has-problems-assault-landing paradigm...if something goes wrong..you eject. In a tilt-rotor transport all onboard crash/burn with no escape capability.

Point is we need responsive CAS and we are willing to take risks up front to get the attack bird close to the front via V/TOL and its A-10 like high speed is another pay-off rather than the RAH-66's using stealth approach.

So how about an OV-12 for RIGHT NOW?

Is there a fixed-wing aircraft already in U.S. Army service TODAY that could be modified to be an INTERIM observation/attack aircraft? An "AV-22" but without the V/TOL tilt-rotor aspects but good SHORT take-off and landing capabilities....

YES THERE IS!

Pappy Gunn (guy who armed B-25 noses with multiple .50 cal HMGs etc. in SW Pacific in WWII for Gen Kenney) and Jay Vanderpool (armed Army helicopters) look out!

The RC-12 Guardrail for ELINT and C-12 for flying the senior official ("the brass") around.

The RC/C-12 is a Raytheon (formerly Beechcraft) model KingAir 200 high-performance turboprop plane.

OK. Why not arm it?

The U.S. Army can logistically support/maintain and fly these aircraft for years at a time.

DoD owns and operates over 300 C-12s!

In case you doubt this, consider that in the book, "Chariots of the Damned" USAF Major Mike McKinney and Mike Ryan on page 8 describe how an U.S. Army U-21 turboprop aircraft--the forerunner to the C-12---was flown over Koh Tang island to gain observation/recon info. You have to use what's available to get the job done!

CONSIDER THE C-12's RAW PERFORMANCE POTENTIAL:

C-12 Overview

The C-12 Huron, an executive passenger and cargo aircraft, is the military version of the Beech Model 200 Super King Air. The prefix "Super" was later dropped by Raytheon (who had acquired Beechcraft) in 1996. The aircraft is a high-performance, twin-engine turboprop that accommodates a pilot, co-pilot, and eight passengers. It first flew on 27 October 1972 and was adopted by all U.S. armed services (except the Coast Guard), with more than 300 currently active.

The C-12 provides on-call, rapid response, modern air transport for high priority supply and movement of key personnel. Specifically, it is used for VIP transport or to deliver repair parts, equipment, and accident investigation teams wherever needed. Its support role also includes such functions as range clearance, medical evacuation, administrative movement of personnel, transportation connections, and courier flights.

The first three production King Airs were delivered in 1974 to the U.S. Army as RU-21J (later redesignated C-12L) electronic warfare and intelligence-gathering equipment testbeds. In the same year, standard King Airs were obtained off-the-shelf as staff transports by all four U.S. armed services simultaneously, the U.S. Army and USAF aircraft being assigned the designation C-12A, and those for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps (with cargo doors, more powerful engines and high-flotation undercarriages) being designated as UC-12B. All versions were given the name Huron.

Deliveries of the King Air 200 to the USAF as an operational support aircraft under the designation C-12F began in May 1984, these having side cargo doors and payload choices including two casualty litters plus attendants. Forty were purchased by the USAF after an initial five-year lease, six were supplied to the Air National Guard and 17 were delivered to the U.S. Army. The U.S. Navy also obtained 12 UC-12Fs (equivalent to the C-12F) and these, together with the some UC-12Bs, were upgraded to UC-12M standard from 1987.

Official Designation: C-12F
Primary Role: Staff transport

Specifications

Wingspan: 54 feet, 6 inches (16.61m)
Length: 43 feet, 9 inches (13.34m)
Height: 15 feet (4.57m)
Armament: None [We can fix this!]
Engines: Two Pratt & Whitney PT6A-42 turboprops
Horsepower: 850 shp (634kW) per engine
Crew: 2

Weights

Operating Weight: 8,060 pounds (3,656kg)
Max Takeoff Weight: 12,500 pounds (5,670kg)
Max Payload: 2,647 pounds (1,201kg) or 8 passengers

Performance Cruise Speed: 325 mph (523km/h)
Max Speed: 339 mph (545km/h)
Range: 1,965 nm (3,641km)
Service Ceiling: 25,000 feet (7,620m)

Beech C-12J

Generally similar to the C-12F except in the following particulars: Fuselage and tail: length 57 ft 10 in (17.63 m); height 14 ft 11 in (4.55 m); tailplane span 18 ft 6 in (5.64 m); wheel base 23 ft 10 in (7.26 m) Powerplant: two Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-65B each rated at 1,100 shp (820 kW)

Weights: typical empty 9,100 lb (4128 kg); maximum take-off 16,600 lb (7530 kg)

Fuel and load: internal fuel 4,470 (2027 kg); maximum payload 1,910 (866 kg)

Speed: maximum cruising speed at 25,000 ft (7620 m) 292 mph (471 km/h) Range: range with 15 passengers at high-speed cruising power 1,481 miles (2383 km)

Performance: maximum rate of climb at sea level 2,330 ft (710 m) per minute; service ceiling more than 25,000 ft (7620 m); take-off distance 3,250 ft (991 m) to 50 ft (15 m); landing distance 2,540 ft (774 m) from 50 ft (15 m)

RC-12N/P/Q

Endurance: 5.5 hours
Cruises at 300 mph
Weight with Guardrail sensors: 16,000 pounds
Range 1,400 miles

OV-12 INTERIM ASP PROPOSAL

Now consider if the C-12 had a new 9g stressed wing for attack profiles and ordnance carrying hard points....

1-2 x Observer/Gunners in the fuselage with two side-firing .50 cal GAU-19/As or 30mm ASP autocannon on left and right sides to prevent being limited to one type of turning attack like AC-130Us are.

FLIR and image intensifier sensors for target ID

Laser rangefinder and target designator

Dive brakes on fuselage.

Pilot's HUD with gun pod and rocket aiming imagery/fire control.

Hardpoints under the wings for .50 cal GAU-19/A gun pods, 2.75" Hydra-70 rockets and small bombs or Hellfire, Stinger, Sidewinder missiles.

Armor around pilot's area, engines and fuel tanks

Low-visibility Camouflage paint scheme

All crew wear bail-out parachutes and E&R gear.

Recovery Parachute to deliver entire aircraft to ground to be retrofitted later

ECM (chaff)/IRCMs (flares)

Yes, we can put a laser weapon in the OV-12 to burn the eyes out of MANPADS gunners. There I said it.

Some have suggested the tilt-rotor as a smaller "AV-22" gunship would make a good CS attack bird. Why wait for the tilt rotor? We got the fast forward flight from the fixed-wing and non-tilting engine C-12 NOW!

"OV-12" Sounds like its more advanced than the OV-1 and OV-10.....

Missions

MAS COP Observation
Attack
Forward Air Control
SOF/LRSU/Ranger Paratroop insertion/extraction
CASEVAC

Remove the side .50 caliber gatling or ASP-30mm guns. Fuselage is now free to airdrop either by static-line or rip-cord activated round or ram-air parachutes a SF team or a Long Range Surveillance Unit (LRSU) team covertly into an area from high or low-altitude. Has high t-tail not even close to a parachute or static-line/d-bag fouling with it! By being ARMED it can self-escort itself (AIM-9X or Stinger AAMs?) to and from the dummy and actual drop zones. Can land and extract Soldiers if suitable stretch of highway or road is determined. Saves the Army BIG $$$$ on "renting" large 64-92 seat USAF C-130s just to insert a small team of men into an area. Afghanistan SF Soldiers have expressed dis-satisfaction with the availability of aircraft to do missions--why not have 160th SOAR own and operate some attack/transport OV-12s?

Vanilla C-12 is $2 million. With weaponry and defensive countermeasures, armor and sensors say what, $4 million?

Drop-in-the-bucket compared to a F-22 or V-22 ($80 million each).

For price of one unarmed V-22 deathtrap that could insert at best 24 men (if it doesn't crash and burn first), we could have 20 (almost two squadrons!!!) of SAFE, ARMED OV-12s that could insert, gulp: 160 LGOPs Paratroops (Ranger Rifle Company and a half!).

Self-deploys from CONUS with external fuel tanks (YES!!! YESS! YESS!)

The Brass has been flying around 300 of these C-12s as VIPs...they are already in the DoD "system"....we are not buying a "new" aircraft"....have NG and USAR pilots who lost their UH-1s and AH-1s fly the OV-12s........Attack Pathfinders could serve tours as observer/gunners, too! A mirror image of what we want to do with the OA-10Bs: give the FAC an understanding from the-ground-up and from the-sky-down....

A Vietnam fighter-bomber pilot warns that the C-12 may not be up to the job without a new wing and high-g force modifications:

"I'd check the design G load - the '99 was designed as an airliner which would normally give it a 4-G limit - not really enough for evasive action. Also it would not have self-sealing fuel tanks meaning a good AK47 gunner would make holes in its fuel tanks. Personally I think a guy on the ground with a 51 or 14.5 would shoot many holes in such an airplane. A Stinger type 'black hole' guiding missile would be sure death. Problem is you got to get too close with a gun and once there you can't get away fast enough. The A10s in Desert Storm gave up strafe except in unusual cases like extraction/CAS because it wasn't worth it with the flak down there. Their Mavericks worked better from farther out. I know the Taliban probably won't have ZSU23s or ZSU23-4 (God help you if they did!!) but still massed rifle fire is a hazard and MGs make it worse. At least fighters can come in fast and out fast pulling hard G all the way. try that on a 99/C12 and the wings will fail pretty soon.

The 'wheels' won't let you burn out the flak gunners' eyes.

We tried to get some 500 LB photoflash bombs for 'Nam - they put out a jillion candlepower in one giant flash the idea being to rob the gunners of night vision for the next 30 minutes. Denied - there was a possibility of permanent retinal burns of anyone was looking at the bomb when it went off. (I wanted to wire a Mk13 day-night survival flare on the bomb to be ignited on release so they would be looking at it coming down . . .

The '99 wouldn't take rough field landings either. Is that the same airplane as used in the CEFIRM Leader project? Big whip antennae sticking out of the top and bottom of the wings - we used to have to chase them out of our bombing pattern in MR1. Curious bystanders but we were afraid we'd hit them while jinking hard coming up off the target."

OK, how about $1.6 MILLION U-27 Caravans?

Non-Linear Maneuver Brigade (NLMB)

NLMB Proposal

APPENDIX

Flying MAS type aircraft using Jane's Fighters Anthology Simulators

Get this flight simulator, fly the "Killer Bee" A-1 SkyRaider, A-37, SU-25 and A-10 and see what its like to try to destroy ground targets and not fly into the ground to get a better appreciation of the MAS concept.

I got a joystick and have been flying the Jane's Simulator, key points;

a. Air/Armor ID from 3D, moving
b. Fly 100 different aircraft from Vietnam to present
c. Excellent flight manual and weapons system data

I cannot praise this simulation enough! This will be the BEST $5 you will ever spend. Jane's doesn't do realistic simulations anymore, not enough Laura Croft booobage appeal to Gen Y. And even if your computer is old, you can fly these aircraft!!! Only need 90 mhz speed.

JANE'S FIGHTERS ANTHOLOGY by ELECTRONIC ARTS

The mother of all flight sims. It's every flyer's dream, the ultimate flight simulation game: three great sims--Advanced Tactical Fighters, NATO Fighters, and U.S. Navy Fighters '97--put one hundred of the world's deadliest aircraft at your fingertips. Go head-to-head against the best pilots in the world flying the best fighters in the world. Choose your plane, your mission, your opponents. Fly through missions and campaigns that take place all over the globe. Experience the rush of high-speed air combat as you race through lightning-fast dogfights and operate some of the most sophisticated weapons systems ever designed. In the skies above cities, jungles, plains, and seas, test your skills and reflexes in missions you can design yourself, or fly against the best AI of all--human opponents--in Fighters Anthology's multiplayer mode.

More than 100 planes
Hundreds of fast-paced missions
Unlimited game play
Take on the world's best
Dogfight on the Internet against the world's toughest aces

- Electronic Arts -

90 MHz Pentium (120 MHz Pentium or faster recommended); Microsoft Windows 95; 16 MB RAM; 101 MB hard disk space for minimum installation; 144 MB for full installation; 50 MB Windows 95 swap file after installation; 4x CD-ROM drive (6x recommended); Microsoft DirectX compatible SVGA (640 x 480 resolution) PCI local bus video card (PCI local bus video card with 2 MB video RAM recommended); DirectX compatible sound card; Mouse (joystick recommended); TCP/IP connection required for Internet play; Internet connection requires an Internet account (ISP) and 14.4 Kbps or faster modem; IPX/SPX compatible protocol required for network play; Network play requires a serial connection and 100% Hayes compatible 14.4 Kbps or faster modem

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FEEDBACK!

itsg@hotmail.com

A USAF Vietnam F-4 Phantom fighter-bomber pilot writes:

"One of the keys will be a good reliable multi-fuel engine with a fuel consumption rivaling a diesel. There is a light aircraft diesel under development in Europe. I just read of an outstanding electronic navaid in the latest issue of kitplanes that unites GPS and a 'chipped map' that could be upgraded to use UTM coordinates. (My handheld Lowrance GPS can display UTM).

Anyway the lightweight CAS is a decent concept.

Need some way to defeat Stinger type 'UV hole seeking' missiles plus survive under automatic fire. There will be a big 'give and take' problem/argument deciding what to use for armament and how fancy to go. The Mauser 27mm would be a good gun, missiles - 2.75s or hellfires?

Anyway it'd be a lot easier to deploy and operate than the F4s I flew out of DaNang on CAS missions."

I posed the following question to a tactical aviation expert:

Q. An A-4 SkyHawk flying at 400-500 mph below 10,000 feet BEHIND friendly lines and flying forward to the edge of the battlefield where enemy ADA would be supressed by friendly ground artillery fire.....would not be survivable because of....?????

His reply:

A. "The idea of doing any CAS low level these days is off since the SAMs are much too good. We already have a situation where much higher performance fighters like F-16/F-18/F-15E are vulnerable, and an A-4 no matter what the engine is a sitting duck.

There are three categories of problem SAMs:

1.Double digit: SA-10/20, SA-12, SA-11 - these are very lethal, long range with excellent low altitude capability.

2.MANPADS - SA-14, SA-16, Stinger etc.

3.Upgraded Single Digit: SA-2, SA-3, SA-6, SA-5 all fitted with digital processing and possibly with radar gear borrowed from the double digit SAMs. Networking the SAMs is now very popular.

The modern trend is for all of this gear to be mobile - even the Iraqis are putting the triple rail launcher on 8x8s. The idea is shoot and scoot between covered sites.

The best summary of Russian SAMs in existence is the recently published JED survey article:

www.jedefense.com/default.asp?journalid=4&func=articles&page=0207j12&ye ar=2002&month=7&doct=features&rsno=3

This article excludes the most recent upgrades, and the `home grown' upgrades. China has been especially active in upgrades and been busily exporting. These days you can get digital back end processing, command link upgrades, and FLIR/laser upgrades even for the older SA-3 and SA-6. The latter is especially dangerous since it is hard to detect and jam.

The `modern' approach to CAS is to come in at 30,000 -40,000 ft with a stealth fighter of some variety, eg F-22/FB-22, and drop guided bombs at coordinates which have been datalinked up to the fighter by the grunts on the ground. The Buff/Bone CAS in Afghanistan was an improvisation of this method using VOX (hence the errors in targeting, fat fingers and map reading errors etc) in a zero threat environment.

The name of the game is doing it survivably so you can keep doing it without hindrance to your CAS fighters.

A good primer on the weps game plan is here:

www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/kopp.html

www.popsci.com/popsci/aviation/article/0,12543,262063-1,00.html

The 500 lb JDAM with a DAMASK and datalink is the best strategy for a near term capability. Long term you go with SDB.

I would not be game to even fly a UCAV in at low level in daylight to do CAS, you would run out of UCAVs very quickly indeed.

The JSF/F-35 is becoming marginal as well, it needs a proper stealthy engine nozzle since it can get shot up the posterior in its current form. Watch this happen in coming years and the JSF cost creep up in turn.

This might not be what you expected but battlefield interdiction and CAS has been reinvented with Afghanistan and not everybody in the air power game has put two and two together as yet. SecAF Roche is right on target with the FB-22 proposals - it can loiter over the battlefield and pick off targets at will regardless of SAMs, it has the payload and gas to do this with good endurance.

Mobile digitised SAMs are a genuine headache and many folks have yet to realise that a mobile digitised SA-3 or SA-6 is not the SAM they know and love!"

My reply is:

1. the JDAMs are not terminally guided with only internal GPS and INS guidance and can go astray killing our own troops:

Three Special Forces killed, 19 wounded by friendly fire

Fort Drum Soldier dead

by Staff Sgt. Marcia Triggs

WASHINGTON (Army News Service, Dec. 5, 2001) - Three Special Forces Soldiers were killed and 19 were wounded north of Kandahar, Afghanistan, when a 2,000-pound U.S. bomb missed it's target and hit in close proximity to friendly forces Dec. 4.

The names are being withheld until next-of-kin notifications have been completed.

A B-52 that was called in to provide fire support to ground forces who were under fire, reportedly dropped it's ordnance about a football field away from two Special Forces teams and Afghan opposition fighters, officials said.

Two Soldiers were pronounced dead at the scene, and the third Soldier died while being transported to a medical facility in the region, officials said. Five Afghan opposition fighters were also killed and an unknown amount wounded, officials said.

"A close air-support strike is one of the most potentially hazardous types of missions used," officials said. "Simultaneously calling in air strikes on your own position and the enemy's position that you're engaged with takes very fine control, coordination and precision. Unfortunately, it doesn't always happen without causing our own casualties."

Officials said they would not speculate on the reason the precision-guided bomb missed its target, whether the wrong coordinates were given, wrong coordinates were entered on the plane or the system malfunctioned.

A second bomb was also dropped and it did hit the intended target, but officials said they did not know how much damage the bomb inflicted on enemy forces.

Since the war began this is the second U.S. bomb that has missed its target and hit in the proximity of U.S. troops. A stray bomb hit four Soldiers and an airman while they were helping Northern Alliance forces fighting armed Taliban captives in a fort near Mazar-e Sharif.

In an unrelated incident, an infantryman from the 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, N.Y. died Nov. 29 in Uzbekistan. Pvt. 2 Giovanny Maria, 19, was a native of Camden, N.J., and had enlisted in the Army in May.

Although the incident in under investigation, Maria's death was not the result of enemy action, officials said.

Link to original news item:

http://www.dtic.mil/armylink/news/Aug2002/a2002080282ndided.html

2. Trying to STEER bombs and missiles from a distant, offset location is problem-prone and gets worse the farther away you try to do it. Alleged "Precision" guidance on munitions has led to a lack of appreciation for the CAS strikes being guided by a FAC on the ground be it radio verbal directions and/or a laser spot for terminal guidance so the PHYSICAL aircraft delivery platform is lined up on the target so there is less physical "murphy" things that can go wrong. Munitions still bump into each other on release from the rack and fins get bent for example.

Carlton Meyers writes:

"G2 gem: GPS Guided Munitions and Fratricide

The May 2002 issue of the Marine Corps Gazette has an interesting article by LtCol John T. Rahm entitled: 'Bombing Accuracy for Idiots'. He points out the circular error probable (CEP) is commonly used to measure the accuracy of a weapon. However, he points out that "probable" means the circle, often very elliptical, where 50% a projectile or bomb is likely to hit. While that was good for ballistic weaponry, it is very misleading for GPS guided munitions. While they have great CEPs, many of their guidance systems malfunction and the bomb goes miles off target. LtCol Rahm states that testers disregard such failures when measuring CEPs anyway, and he worked at China Lake were the testing occurred. He writes this makes them too dangerous for close air support.

This explains the frequent 'mistakes' in Afghanistan where bombs landed far from any real target. The complexity of GPS guided bombs like JDAM, or the Navy 5-inch ERGM still under development, or the proposed 155mm Excalibur will often lead to friendly fire casualties which may be caused by any of these factors: a defective guidance system; a guidance system damaged during transport or installation; an incorrect GPS coordinate sent by the targeting system; and incorrect GPS coordinate entered into the bomb; GPS signal interference from nearby mountains, buildings, or solar flares; or GPS signal jamming. So if an aircraft drops a GPS guided bomb from several miles away, any guidance problem may prove disastrous. Even if 90% work great, that loose 10% may prove too dangerous".

Even the USAF is grudgingly admitting that it needs men on the ground to call in strikes:

European Stars and Stripes
August 15, 2002

Afghanistan War Showing Air Force The Importance Of 'Eyes On The Ground'

By Lisa Burgess, Stars and Stripes

ARLINGTON, Va. - Afghanistan has added a "new wrinkle"; to the Air Force's basic doctrine, according to the service's top analyst for the war on terrorism: Wars aren't won by air alone.

The rugged and unforgiving mountains of Central Asia have revealed many hard truths to each of the services. But for the Air Force, perhaps no single lesson resonates more clearly, Col. Fred Weiners said Tuesday: "Eyes on the ground" are essential to round out the advanced space- and air-based sensors, weapons and platforms that make up the service's inventory.

"You can have all the high technology you want, but it's these 25-year-old staff sergeants on the ground making strike decisions" that, according to Weiners, have in the past been made by high-level planning officers located nowhere near the battlefield.

Weiners is acting director of the Air Force's Task Force Enduring Look, and spoke with Stripes in an interview in his office in Arlington, Va.

Air campaigns traditionally have been planned in advance. Coordinates have been known, and target sets could be chosen from data gathered weeks or months in advance.

To hear an Air Force official emphasizing the need for "boots on the ground" is a significant shift in conventional U.S. military thinking.

The Army and Marine Corps both are founded on the principle that war is never won until "boots hit the ground" - when military personnel actually occupy the turf. The Air Force has tended to be dominated by officers who believe air operations alone can conquer an enemy.

In Afghanistan, however, forward air controllers and special operations forces -not planners sitting in Washington with maps and satellite photographs - have been responsible for almost all critical targeting calls, Weiners said.

"They are our most versatile and highly sophisticated sensor, and they are proving highly effective," Weiners said. "They dramatically enhance overall air power and bombing effectiveness."

Thanks to ground controllers, "We've enjoyed an accuracy like we've never enjoyed," Weiners said - and not only due to more sophisticated "smart" bombs, such as the Joint Direct Attack Munition.

Sensor-To-Shooter Loop

But Afghanistan also revealed a critical break in this "sensor-to-shooter" loop: Air Force pilots had not had enough practice working with the ground operators, particularly the special operations forces.

The service has moved with extraordinary speed to remedy that deficiency, Weiners said.

His task force first identified the need for more pilot training with ground forces in January, and by June, pilots at the Air Force Weapons School at Nellis Air Force Base, Nev., were "engaging special operations forces on the ground, including full mission profiles and simulations, to replicate what we were doing [in Afghanistan]."

Not every lesson coming out of Afghanistan is revolutionary. Much of what the Air Force is gleaning validates tactics and technologies that have worked well in exercises, but never have been proven in combat, Weiners said.

One especially critical validation to come out of the Central Asian campaign is proof that the Air Force's Air and Space Expeditionary Forces, which were designed for peacetime, also work in war, Weiners said.

As the Defense Department continued to pull back from its overseas bases throughout the 1990s, Air Force leaders decided they needed a way to keep the increasingly home-based service ready for action.

C-17 Proves Itself

One example: Afghanistan is the first major conflict for the Pentagon that has required "everything to come in and out by air," Weiners noted.

The Air Force's newest transport, the C-17, was key, Weiners said.

"The C-17 really proved itself, given the austere nature of our bases" in Central Asia, he said.

Creative aircrews also have found ways for the C-17 to perform that its designers never anticipated, Weiners said, citing in particular its function as a "mobile filling station."

Afghanistan has no fuel supply infrastructure, and roads there are so treacherous that trucking large amounts of fuel in is out of the question.

That means every drop of aviation gas and jet fuel needed by the U.S. forces is supplied by the Pentagon's fleet of KC-10 and KC-135 tanker aircraft.

Meanwhile, Army and Marine helicopters and the assorted special operations aircraft stationed at the rough airfields that dot Afghanistan "need a lot of gas," Weiners said.

During Operation Anaconda in March, when fuel was at an absolute premium, an unknown airman came up with a novel idea to get fuel to the fighters quickly: Combine the C-17's ability to land almost anywhere with its large fuel tanks.

"We would park a tanker in an orbit, and the C-17 would go up, tap the tanker, land and off-load the fuel - and now you have avgas [aviation gas]" where tankers can't land, Weiners said.

Bombers With Eyes

Another much-discussed evolution was the decision to use of Cold-war era strategic bombers in tactical combat.

The Air Force's B-1, B-2 and B-52 bombers all were originally designed to deliver nuclear munitions in end-of-the-world scenarios.

In Afghanistan, however, Air Force officials took advantage of the bombers' extensive payloads, range and high-altitude capability to deliver lethal strikes on enemy forces - all while being directed by ground-based forces.

The bombers proved very effective, Weiners said.

"The B-1s and B-52s flew approximately 10 percent of the sorties and delivered close to 60 percent of the weapons," Weiners said.

During the Gulf War, B-52s dropped some 30 percent of all U.S. bombs. Neither the B-1 nor the B-2 was deployed.

One reason for that is the versatility of the bombers: They can carry traditional "dumb" bombs, but thanks to modifications, they also can deliver a range of smart weapons.

Secondly, all this can be done with greater standoff. The bombers fly much higher than fighter craft with no need for a visual, using coordinates from forward air controllers - the eyes on the ground.

Change comes with difficulty for the military; it's a "risk-averse group," Weiners said.

But, he said, "this is a great time to question the old way of doing things."

Chuck Myers writes about what he'd hang onto A-10s for CAS/MAS:

"Afghanistan A-10 Thunderbolt armament for CAS?

Are they gun pods?

My favorite load is:

Main Gun
Two 30mm Gatling Gun Pods
Two .50 cal Gatling Gun Pods"

An Army Combat Aviator writes about whether aircraft can survive below 15K against a nation-state ADA system:

"Tough to say.

These days it is hard to figure what might happen. After ODS when asked why no one shot at helo's, Iraqi troopers said it was because they were afraid that a bomb or missile would get shoved up their ass. Not sure what the deal is in OEF. We don't like to brag about our survivability equipment because then someone will want to make better stuff. Not that SA-16/18 are not excellent ... in competent hands. It still takes a steady hand to shoot a missile, they ain't point and pull... yet. I am comfortable that if it emits that the USAF is going to work overtime to make it stop. The long range ADA is good even at lower altitudes, but they still cannot see through mountains and hills. Also if the choice is a helo popping in and out of clutter at 100 km or a F-15E smokin toward downtown or HQ... who do you think gets a supersonic telephone pole? I have been hearing about the demise of low alt air war all of my career, and yet as I have always said, there is no historical evidence to support MANPADs and SAMs are my worse enemy. To date the best killer of low alt air has been the Mark 1 eyeball, gray matter-directed, lead slinger or RPG."

The ADA is doomsday expert replies:

"Yup. Unless they are flying 100% NoE and using terrain cover, they are guaranteed toast.

I asked about hovering:

Or does sitting uder the tress and coming up to fire and see enough of protection?

"It depend on how you do it. With mast mounted gear (eg Apache Longbow) you are apt to be reasonably safe. I am not that sure about playing this game with the Euro-Tiger since it has to expose the whole rotor to take a shot.

Rotors have a distinctive radar signature.

Have you read this one:

www.csse.monash.edu.au/~carlo/archive/MILITARY/AA/longbow-aa.html

I then asked about stealthy helicopters:

Must we have stealthy RAH-66s to survive?

"Longer term this is the direction to take. Make everything hard to see on radar.

Then about UAVs.....

"Predators are toast below 15,000 ft in a MANPADS/AAA environment, and toast in any environment with serious SAM defences. Expect to see the Predator replaced by an X-45 derivative with a Predator style bomb bay payload.

The Serbs bagged plenty of UAVs in Kosovo. It will not get better in time."

Chuck Myers responds:

"Mike et al:

The response from the 'Low Altitude CAS is Impossible' author is classic thinking.

The frustrating part is that they 'don't hear' what we are saying.

Also, your suggestion re using the A-4 at 400-500 kts (too fast) below 10,000' sets the stage for their argument. I have always agreed that an airplane operating above the "terrain mask" (above 100') for periods in excess of 12 seconds over enemy forces is highly susceptible to a number of SAMs. Even an A-4. However, the A-4, next to the A-10, is the least "vulnerable" (can absorb hits) aircraft we produced. The Harrier being the most vulnerable. Operating in the "contact area" where air and ground can provide mutual support and using the tactics I described in my paper with pilots trained (with the grunts) for the job flying small, tough 'agile' fixed-wing aircraft, might work ---- the problem is that the host of modern aviators and analysts seem almost fearful of experimenting!!!!!

Why are they afraid to try????

I would suggest that your author of that response has not READ my paper:"

MAS concept paper

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For pictures of A-10s in combat in Afghanistan:

Return of the Cactus Air Force!

Swarms of Lightweight Scout/Attack Aircraft Home Page

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