- INTRODUCTION

Unlike the Soviet development of Airborne forces, the U.S. has progressed very little since World War II. The progress has been incremental - better airplanes, better cargo parachutes, better weapons systems. But essentially, the same missions are being accomplished in the same manner they were accomplished in 1944. Rather than having large numbers of Paratroopers airdrop to seize and secure tactical objectives, the conservative goal of seizing airfields was the standard tactic.

The U.S. Army was reduced from a fighting force of almost eight million men in 1945 to 680,000 ground troops, 300,000 airman by mid-1946. (41) By 1948 the Army was down to 525,000 men and only 10 skeleton Divisions, six of these Divisions were committed to occupation duties in either Germany or Japan. The conservatives in the military never liked the Airborne concept and as part of the postwar demobilization all Airborne units were either disbanded or redesignated as regular Army units, with the exception of the 187^th Airborne Infantry Regiment. The American atomic monopoly seemed to provide the perfect response to any threat and many Americans questioned the need for large ground forces. The assumption was that nuclear weapons could provide a "cheap" and effective substitute for large ground, naval and air forces.(42) America's "massive retaliation" policy would hit its first snag when, on 25 June 1950, thousands of North Korean Soldiers swept south across the 38th parallel into South Korea.

According to General Matthew B. Ridgway, who served as the commander of the Eighth Army in Korea, the Army was in a state of "shameful readiness" when the Korean War began. All American planning had assumed that the next war would be global and according to General Ridgway, "the concept of limited war never entered our councils."(43)

American conventional forces were not ready to fight, as demonstrated by the well known story of Task Force (TF) Smith, a battalion from the 24^th Infantry Division on occupation duty in Japan. TF Smith was hastily sent into battle in Korea with outdated equipment only to get overrun and lose over half its men in seven hours. The failure of TF Smith was a result of a misguided defense policy that under-funded an Army for the missions that it would be required to undertake. (44) The failure to fund a viable Airborne force as a strategic reserve is another example of the shortsightedness of the Defense Department. As one historian put it,

"Had the U.S. forces been more alert and prepared for the North Korean invasion that summer, Paratroops might well have stopped the drive against Seoul." (45)

As it was, the Airborne played but a small role in the Korean War. The 187^th Airborne Regimental Combat Team (RCT) conducted two tactical Airborne operations both designed to cut off retreating enemy forces and to linkup with advancing friendly forces.

The first, on 20 October 1950, in the vicinity of the North Korean towns of Sukchon and Sunchon, came too late and failed to cut off any sizable part of the North Korean forces. They did manage to capture over 3,800 North Koreans. The second Airborne operation, on 23 March 1951 near the South Korean town of Munsan-Ni, was another conservative use of the Airborne forces and the 187^th Airborne RCT linked-up with the United Nations ground forces that same day. Like the Airborne forces in World War II, the 187^th Airborne RCT was also used in Korea to fight as a regular infantry regiment as required.

Korea brought about many changes to the Airborne community. First, the XVIII Airborne Corps was reactivated and the 82^nd Infantry Division redesignated as an Airborne Infantry Division. Second, there was finally an improvement in airlift aircraft with the introduction of new C-119 Flying Boxcars. The C-119, which was replacing the C-47, significantly increased the Airborne's airdrop capability, by having a rear ramp rather than a side door for equipment airdrop and by having a Paratroop capacity of 46, versus 20 with the C-47. However, the higher airdrop speeds of the C-119 made the T-7 parachute dangerous, so the T-10 parachute was developed by quartermaster researchers and adopted in 1953. (46) (This parachute, with an updated harness, anti-inversion net and expanded pocket bands, is still in use today and there is no replacement parachute expected in the near future.)

[1998 Update Editor: we are finally developing a parachute to replace the T-10. It should be with the reserve integral to the back, and a canopy that can open as low as 250 feet so we can insert Airborne forces under radar detection.]

Finally, the most significant development to come out of the Korean War was the

rediscovery of the helicopter. Helicopters were actually used [by the U.S. Army Air Corps] during the last two years of World War II, primarily for administrative purposes. [OOPS! Negative: read this link about WWII RH-4 helicopter rescues:]

Unfortunately, with the postwar reorganization of the War Department, the Army agreed to procure all its air vehicles from the newly formed Air Force. The Air Force had but one mission (on which they would commit scarce research and development funds), to deliver nuclear weapons. So, when asked by the Army to continue the development of the helicopter the Air Force responded,

"The helicopter is aerodynamically unsound . . . no matter what you, the Army says, I know [you] do not need any." (47)

Despite the Air Force's parochialism, helicopters would soon become a dominant force in the military, thanks primarily to the Army and marines who conducted concentrated experimentation with helicopters in the 1950s and '60s.

The success of the Army in the Korean War caused a temporary increase in the size and the budget of the Army. But, following the Korean War, U.S. general purpose forces were allowed to quickly atrophy to a point where, by 1959, only 11 of the Army's 14 divisions were regarded as combat ready. At no time during the period 1945 - 1960 were the public, the Congress, or the President prepared to make the fiscal sacrifices necessary to provide the level of general purpose forces commensurate with the burgeoning U.S. defense commitments around the world. There was continued reliance on nuclear weapons and strategic air power at the expense of the conventional forces. Even after experiencing the limitations of the "massive retaliation" policy in Korea or witnessing the failure of the policy to deter communism in peripheral areas like French Indochina, the policy stood. (48)

In order to justify its existence and mission in a "massive retaliation" environment the Army had to develop a doctrine and an organization that would allow (53) ground forces to operate on a nuclear battlefield. The result was the "Pentomic Division".

The concept for combat in a nuclear environment would have a combat zone vastly larger in width and depth than previous wars. The larger combat zone would require many more ground troops. The tactical units had to be sufficiently small, so they would not present a lucrative nuclear target; combined arms, so they could defend themselves when isolated; sufficiently self-supporting, so they could fight without long logistical tails; and streamlined in command structure, so they could speed passage of information and decisions. (49) The result was a Pentomic Division that consisted of five battle groups, each smaller than a Regiment but larger than a battalion. Like the Soviets, when confronted with the nuclear battlefield, the U.S. looked to a lighter, more mobile force structure. However, unlike the Soviets, who mechanized or motorized all elements of their force and introduced a more streamlined tank army, the U.S. Army had to remain light enough to deploy rapidly to any trouble spot in the world. These strategic considerations greatly influenced the force structure. With the exception of the tanks, a Division's equipment was supposed to be transportable by long-range aircraft. This emerging concept of rapid deployment of ground forces throughout the world to limited engagements made the late 1950s the "golden age" of U.S. Airborne units. (50)

By 1959 the Army had a radically new structure with the Pentomic Divisions. However, this concept was jeopardized by additional reductions in the size of the Army, from 1,026,000 Soldiers in 1956 to 862,000 in 1959. The Eisenhower administration placed an even greater emphasis on strategic and tactical nuclear weapons at the cost of reduced conventional forces, even though the Army's leaders believed an atomic battlefield required more men and equipment because of its

greater dimensions. (51) In the final analysis, the Pentomic Division failed. The Army reacted to a strategic concept without considering their ability to technically execute the doctrine. "In short, the technology lagged behind the doctrine, and strategic concepts reached ahead of tactical (and budgetary) realities" (52)

During the late 1950s the likelihood that a conflict would be non-nuclear, continued to increase. With the arrival of the Kennedy administration, in 1961, came the new concept of "Flexible Response". Despite the Army's original purpose, the Pentomic division was primarily oriented toward nuclear warfare. Now the Army needed a new structure capable of dealing with conflict across the entire spectrum of warfare, from low intensity guerrilla wars to fully mechanized and even nuclear warfare. The result was the ROAD (Reorganization Objectives Army Division).(53) The basic feature of the ROAD division was a common division base to which a varying number of maneuver battalions were attached. The division could then "task organize" and tailor the unit structure at any level. The new Division also included three Brigade headquarters which primarily had a tactical function and could control from two to five maneuver battalions. While the ROAD Division added another artillery battalion tot he Division and doubled the Division's helicopters by adding an aviation battalion, the biggest change came with the introduction of fully mechanized infantry units.(54) By the mid-1960s the ROAD Division concept was implemented and even the Airborne Divisions were built on the common division base. On 29 April 1965, the recently ROAD reorganized 82^nd Airborne Division deployed, as America's strategic force, into the Dominican Republic.

Two battalion combat teams from the 3^rd Brigade of the 82^nd Airborne Division were committed into the Dominican Republic, as part of a Joint Task Force, to establish order in the strife ridden country. 3^rd Brigade's plan was to seize and secure the San Isidro airfield, expand the airhead westward and stand ready to assist in the evacuation of American personnel. While enroute to an intermediate staging base at Ramey Air Force Base (AFB), Puerto Rico, General York, Commander of the 82^nd Airborne Division, was advised of a change in plans. Of the 144 x C-130 aircraft in the initial assault force, 79 aircraft were directed to bypass the intermediate staging base and airland directly into the Dominican Republic, at the San Isidro airfield, and conduct "stability operations". Operation Power Pack eventually required all nine battalions and a cavalry squadron of the 82^nd Airborne Division and the bulk of the 4^th MEB (marine expeditionary brigade). As would be expected with the first strategic employment of the U.S. Airborne forces, there were many problems. Yet, despite the frustrations and problems the Joint Task Force succeeded in the stability operation, order was restored and a democratic government re-established. (55)

It was also in 1965 that the U.S. started its commitment of ground forces into South Vietnam, although American "advisors" had been involved in Vietnam since 1950. Because of the strategic and political considerations, the ground strategy remained that of a gigantic mobile defense. From 1965 until 1968, the U.S. units carried the brunt of the major fighting while the South Vietnamese troops emphasized pacification duties. After 1968, the U.S. gradually turned over the combat missions to the South Vietnamese, as part of the move toward U.S. troop withdrawal. Due to the small-unit tactics of the Vietcong (Vietnamese belonging to the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam) and the heavy vegetation and broken terrain, the war was characterized by

tactical operations of Brigade-sized units or smaller. Some large-scale operations did occur both to counter North Vietnamese Regular forces and to provide a protective shield for the small-unit operations.(56)

Notice this 173^rd Sky Trooper has 2 x 20 round magazines taped together, early in the war, the enemy's AK-47s had a 30 round magazine advantage, Olive drab quick-dry ripstop uniform, Claymore Anti-Personnel mine in bag slung across the left shoulder, and a full load of fragmentation/smoke grenades...

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The one major parachute landing of the war occurred on 22 February 1967 when the 2^nd Battalion, 503^rd Parachute Infantry Regiment, operating as part of the 173^rd Airborne Brigade, participated in Operation Junction City. The operation to quickly surround enemy forces in the area was a success but large-scale parachute operations would not be used again in the war. (57)

[Editor's note: Not true. SF Mike forces jumped several times to set up defended camps manned by natives trained as infantry.] Americans are lazy. The French Paras jumped constantly and fough weill in Vietnam. The rhosedian Fire Forces are yet another example.

U.S. Airborne operations in Vietnam were minimal for two main reasons. First, the Airborne concept of cutting off enemy forces or seizing key terrain did not work in a war that was non-territorial.

[Editor: More fallacy. The Vietnam War was all about territory. We came and left while the enemy stayed and increased control in rural areas because WE DIDN'T HAVE ENOUGH MEN TO CONTROL SOUTH VIETNAM. The French in the first war used Paratroop insertion extensively to reach out all over the countryside and only were defeated when allowed to be penned in a static defense, them at Dien Bien Phu, us at Khe Sanh]

And second, by 1965 the helicopter was a large-scale tactical troop transport that revolutionized the concept of vertical envelopment. From 1963 to 1965 the Defense Department conducted intensive studies of Airmobile organizations, equipment and tactics using the 11^th Air Assault Division (Test). The testing, conducted by a special investigatory board, under Major General Hamilton H. Howze strongly favored development and use of the helicopter as a battlefield vehicle and recommended the formation of "Air Mobile" Divisions. The recommendations of the Howze Board were implemented and, on 1 July 1965, the 11^th Air Assault Division (Test) became the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) and deployed to Vietnam.(58) In Vietnam, the Army fully developed the air-mobile concept of operations. In the low to mid-intensity environment of Southeast Asia, the helicopter added significantly to the tactical mobility and firepower of the infantry units. Airmobile concepts and tactics dominated the development of infantry tactics and organization and by the end of the war the U.S. had converted the 101^st Airborne Division to an Air Assault Division.

In addition to the increased use of helicopters in Vietnam, mechanized forces added significantly to the fighting capability of the ground units. Although there were initially some reservations about the use of mechanized forces in the heavily vegetated and broken terrain of South Vietnam, once committed they more than proved their worth. The mechanized units possessed an overwhelming firepower, armored protection and significant mobility. This firepower and capability for rapid reaction enabled them to control twice as much terrain as a regular infantry Battalion. When used to reinforce infantry maneuver units, they added a significant degree of offensive assault capability and mobility. Additionally, the movement by the mechanized units often forced the enemy to react, exposing him to discovery by aerial or ground observers or ambushes. On occasion, tanks were even used in a "jungle busting" role and could often move more rapidly in such terrain than foot Soldiers. (60) Unfortunately, Vietnam focused the Army's attention on small-unit counterinsurgency operations where U.S. forces enjoyed massive superiority over enemy forces. With the withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Vietnam by 1973, the Army was forced to refocus on the conventional-nuclear battlefield of Europe where the Soviets enjoyed a significant conventional forces superiority.(61)

As the U.S. shifted its focus from South Vietnam to Europe, the unexpected lethality and violence of modern combat became abundantly apparent in the 1973 Middle East War. "The startling violence and consuming nature of that war served to accelerate the transition from the previous focus on counterinsurgency to the new focus on conventional war."(62) An Army study of the 1973 War concluded that the combined-arms team was the most lethal instrument on the battlefield.(63) This combined

[Editor: The U.S. Airborne did begin to create a light tracked armored gun system during the 1950s.

Richard M. OGORKIEWICZ writes in "AIRBORNE ARMOR" -- AUGUST 1959/U.S. Army Military Review Document: RWP-02-347072 Fileroom Folder: 1950-1959/ 1959/ VOL XXXIX, NO. 05 - AUGUST 1959/ 03:

"Only the French Army had the foresight in 1946 to conceive a well-armed air-transportable tank- the AMX-13. Although too heavy for such tactical transports as the C-119 and C-123, and the French Nord 2501 Noratlas, the AMX has been carried successfully in the Bregurt 765 Saltara and is within the carrying capacity of such more recent transports as the C-130 Hercules and the British Lleucrlcy. Thus by the mid-fifties the AMX acquired the distinction of being the only battle-worthy air-transportable tank in service. It was only after the prototypes of the AMX appeared that the somewhat similar T92 air-transportable tank was designed in the United States. A little earlier came the 1949-specified T1O1 Airborne self-propelled gun, since standardized as the M56, At about the same time the Soviet Army also introduced into service an air-transportable 57mm self-propelled anti-tank gun."

Here is a piston-engined CH-37 Mojave lifting the prototype of the tracked T92 or T101 AR/AAV with a 106mm recoilless rifle (combat favorite) in the 1950s! Eventually the M56 Scorpion with 90mm gun was fielded in Airborne units in the '60s and went to Vietnam during the Tet offensive, but its gasoline propulsion and open nature was unpopular. Certainly could have been Air-Meched by helicopter as well as Para-Mech by fixed-wing.

The M56 Scorpion with 90mm gun which was used in combat in 1968 when the 82^nd Airborne Division deployed to counter the Tet offensive.

M56 SCORPION

Sources:

The Illustrated Encyclopedia of Military Vehicles, Ian V. Hogg and John Weeks.

War Machine Magazine, issue 13, An Illustrated Guide to Armoured Vehicles of the 1950s and 1960s. (Orbis 1983)

The Illustrated Encyclopedia of Artillery, Ian V. Hogg.

Basic information:

In service 1957, left service 1970, replaced by M551 Sheridan. Served only with 82^nd and 101^st Airborne Divisions (not with the marines, they had the M50 , which served the same role).

All welded and riveted aluminium construction, only armour being the gun-shield. Chassis based on M76 Otter, torsion bar suspension, steel reinforced rubber tracks. Four single roadwheels each side. Drive sprocket at front, idler at rear, no return rollers.

Power provided by Continental 6 cyl horizontally-opposed petrol engine, 200 hp.

Speed: 28mph, range 140 miles.

Weight: 7.03 tonnes. (Could of been heli-transported by CH-47 or CH-54s and/or parachute airdropped from fixed-wing C-130s)

Length: (with gun) 19ft 2in, length - hull 14ft 11.33in

Width: 8ft 5.5in

Height: 6ft 9.33 in.

Crew: 4

Gun: 90mm M54 with 29 rounds of AP-T, APC-T, HEAT, HEAT-T, HEP-T, WP, TP-T, HVAP-T or HVTP-T. The gun was served by a gunlayer and driver on the vehicle, with other crew standing on the ground. Effective range in A-T role was 2500M.

A few were supplied to South Korea, Spain and Morocco and they were used for fire support in Vietnam. The gun was too powerful for the chassis, upon firing the forward part of the vehicle lifted off the ground and the muzzle brake kicked up huge amounts of dust. Designed for air-dropping. Could be external-sling-loaded underneath CH-47 Chinook-type helicopters.

And there was the 106mm Recoilless Rifle mounted on jeeps and M274 MULE 4 x 4 vehicles used very effectively for shock action/anti-tank fires by he Airborne in the Dominican Republic and Vietnam.]

arms approach to modern combat was the same approach the Soviets had made some six years earlier, when they shifted their military strategy from that of a nuclear "single option" approach, to a conventional warfare approach, with nuclear escalation possible. While the Soviets had substantially modernized their forces, the U.S.'s preoccupation with Vietnam cost the Army a decade of modernization. (64) Additionally, the doctrine for employing mechanized forces in the Army had only changed slightly since 1945.

Given the technological advancements in firepower and mobility, there was a clear need for an improved Army doctrine. The Army's doctrines of "active defense" in 1976 and "AirLand Battle" in 1982 would answer the call for updated doctrine. However, the doctrine was designed primarily to deal with the Soviet's mid- to high-intensity threat in Europe. (65)

Again, as it had for World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, the Army would lurch to respond to their number one threat. That threat was the recently modernized conventional forces of the Soviet Union. But to respond to any threat, the Army needed funds and the post-Vietnam era was not a good time for financing a conventional force modernization. A by product of the Vietnam war was a strong anti-military attitude in Congress. The fact is that Presidents Nixon and Ford presided over the dismantling of the American military machine. As with the post-World War II demobilization, the bulk of the post-Vietnam defense spending went to strategic systems, such as the B-1 bomber, the Trident submarine and the Cruise missile, at the expense of the conventional forces. (66)

The Carter administration of the late 1970s was not much better, and until the Reagan Administration of the 1980s, the U.S. military continued to fall further behind the Soviets strategically and conventionally.

As the military spent the better part of the 1970s and 1980s trying to catch up with the Soviets conventionally, the focus remained on Europe and the Airborne remained a low priority. The defensive orientation of the European-type battlefield has given the Army its direction in the development of equipment since the Korean War and has exacerbated the problem of Airborne equipment development.

[Editor: Not a problem! the Airborne recieved the awesome M551 Sheridan light tank and made great use of it in 3 other conflicts when noone else in the Army wanted it]

The addition of the armored personnel carrier, the improvements in the tank (agility and mobility), the creation of mechanized artillery and the adaptation of the helicopter added significantly to the Army's tactical and operational mobility.

[Editor: WOW! That APC you are talking about, the 11-ton-easy-to-airdrop M113 Gavin is EXACTLY what the Airborne needs without any more "reasearch" money to be spent. Why has the M113 been ignored by the Airborne in the '60s, '70s, '80s, and now the 90s? when its ENTIRE PURPOSE intended by General Gavin was for our Airborne? Kazmierski doesn't seem aware of this!]

At the same time, there was a tremendous increase in the firepower of these systems, in an effort to make up for the disparity in the numbers of conventional forces in Europe. Unfortunately these improvements in tactical mobility and long-range, lethal firepower came at the expense of strategic mobility. U.S. forces became progressively heavier and more difficult to transport. (67) Unlike the Soviets' Airborne forces, the U.S. Airborne forces were not considered essential to successful combined arms operations in Europe, primarily because they were still a light, foot-mobile force. So, with the limited funds available, the U.S. development of special (light-weight, strategically deployable) Airborne equipment was not feasible.

[Editor: Its also not needed. WE HAVE A LIGHTWEIGHT AIR-DROPPABLE AFV ALREADY; ITS CALLED A M113A3 GAVIN!!!!!! WHAT IS THE MENTAL BLOCK HERE??? THE M8 AGS is READY TO BE BUILT, ALSO.]

For the Army, the modernization of the conventional forces incurred tremendous costs. These costs were associated with the designing of the new M-1 Abrams main battle tank, and the M-2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle in the early 1970s, and then equipping the Army with them in the early to mid-1980s.

[Editor: FINE. Give the 82^nd Airborne Division the M113A3 Gavins being "replaced" by the Bradleys.]

Throughout this same period, the Airborne forces would undergo two organizational changes, the 1970 TO&E (Table of Organization and Equipment) change to the H-series and the 1986 TO&E change to the L-series. There have been several studies reflecting the exact changes that occurred in the transition of the