Current Army transformation programs are not informed by the realities of modern combat or rigorous testing and experimentation. While it is gratifying to see interest in the concepts of rotational readiness and unit cohesion, the disastrous decision to keep American Soldiers and units in Iraq for 12 months at a time reinforces my broader reservations about Army transformation. Today, our ground force is apparently exhausted and incapable of securing the stretch of road from downtown Baghdad to Iraq’s international airport. Thus, my greatest concern is that the current thrust of Army transformation may actually reduce the Army's fighting power and operational flexibility just as the international environment is placing greater demands on our ground forces.

The Army right now has 4 divisions that are light without any armored vehicles that walks on foot or in rubber-tired trucks and 6 divisions that are heavy that are 50% in light, medium and heavy tracked armored fighting vehicles and the other half rides in the same rubber tired trucks as their light brethren use. The truck is thought to be acceptable because we will deploy to allegedly "safe" rear areas with the enemy to our front and we can shuttle men and supplies to this linear map geocoordinates without the enemy attacking our trucks. The non-linear battlefield of Iraq has smashed these wishful assumptions. However, for many the non-existent linear battlefield is still how they see the world. During 1990’s Operation Desert Shield the Army rapidly deployed its light 82^nd Airborne Division to stand in the way of a possible Iraqi tank invasion into Saudi Arabia but it only had a battalion of light tanks, with most of its Paratroopers on foot. During the 1999 Kosovo crisis the Army took a long time to deploy its medium and heavy tracks. So in 199, Army Chief Shinseki abruptly without any internal Army debate, analysis, testing and experimentation to decided to create Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs) based on the RAND Aeromotorization report using armored trucks to carry 9-man infantry squads calling them "Interim Armored Vehicles" (IAVs).

There are 3 main ideas or goals undergirding the chosen wheeled IBCT/IAV concept:

1. The fact is that the Army already owns 14, 500 M113 Gavin light armored tracks, with thousands in storage that at 10.5 tons are not only C-130 air-transportable they are certified for parachute airdrop. 5 can fly at a time to meet RAND’s desired C-17 criteria. Therefore, the Army already owns "IAVs" that are combat-proven and available at zero purchase costs.

2. With a 50 mph top speed, fitted with band tracks, M113 Gavins can attain the exact same 60 mph road speeds as trucks and have plenty of room inside to carry command, control, communications, computers, intelligence surveillance reconnaissance gear (C4ISR).

3. By having far lighter ground pressure by its wide tracks, M113 Gavins even with steel tracks are far more cross country mobile and are gentler on civilian roads than armored trucks with 20-40 PSI ground pressures. Since the Army already owns enough Gavins to fully transform all its light divisions the Army would save billions of dollars by not having to purchase new vehicles, only upgrade vehicles it has in storage. M113 Gavins are proven inexpensive to operate with the exact 3.5 mpg fuel rate of armored trucks but without the break down and repair costs.

Clearly, both the RAND authors and Shinseki lumped M113 Gavin light tracks in with the pitfalls of medium and heavy tracks and the latter miscalculated and misapplied the former’s concept.

The Army’s Stryker doctrinal manuals claim infantry will dismount early when its thought to be safe via computer network information-sharing so the Stryker vehicle will not have to be used by our troops to fight the enemy in close combat. Then later, these same manuals boast of how Strykers will protect their Soldiers somehow with its thin cocoon.

Perfect situational awareness, (SA) the key underlying assumption of the Army's Stryker brigades and future combat system is an illusion, or perhaps a delusion. Situational awareness promises that information about the enemy and his intentions will always be available when it is needed. It also assumes that everyone inside the battlespace will create and exploit information in exactly the same way.

As a result, situational awareness demands a greater level of technological capability than is attainable today or in the decades ahead. Most important, there is no evidence that plentiful networked information can replace killing power and inherent survivability, especially in close combat. Timely and useful information is critical, but it cannot substitute for firepower, mobility and armored protection.

During Operation Iraqi Freedom, despite unparalleled intelligence assets, most of the fighting on the ground was characterized by the participants as resulting from meeting engagements-battles in which American forces unexpectedly bumped into the enemy. The 3^rd Infantry Division’s After Action Review states:

No one should have been surprised. Land warfare is by its very nature chaotic. No technologies or systems exist to prevent such surprises in towns, cities or complex terrain populated by non-combatants and systems on today’s drawing boards are unlikely to be effective for many, many years-if ever.

As experience in Iraq demonstrates, another flawed assumption is the belief that strategic speed (deployment) is worth sacrificing protection and firepower. What the Army does after it arrives in a theater of crisis or conflict is much more important than how fast it gets there. Formidable Army ground forces can be organized, equipped, trained, and postured through a joint rotational readiness system to deploy a powerful force in a matter of days and decisively influence events. Getting a light force to the same place a few hours or days sooner does not have the same effect. In fact, it may produce a speedy defeat rather than a decisive victory.

Large quantities of light infantry with nothing more than the weapons they can carry after they dismount to attack from either up-armored HMMWVs or Strykers will sustain heavy losses. Light infantry is not designed to lead penetration attacks into urban areas or against any prepared enemy defense and should never be used in that role. For light Infantry to succeed, it must be integrated with real tracked mobility, devastating firepower, and armored protection so that it does not become a road-bound paramilitary police force subject to blockade and ambush. If we stay on the current intellectual path, we risk fielding Army units that will end up like the tracked vehicle-less 1^st Cavalry Division in the Ia Drang valley, calling for air strikes on its own position to avoid annihilation. The 3^rd ID AAR comments:

The greatest irony is that our current inventory of tanks and armored fighting vehicles actually arrive as quickly as the so-called light force. In the future, Army forces arriving from the air or the sea must include heavy and/or light, medium weight armor – M1 Abrams, M2 Bradleys, M113 Gavins and platforms similar to the M8 Buford Armored Gun System and Tracer equipped with hybrid-electric engines and band track, respectively. These platforms and systems are capable of augmenting light infantry and punching through enemy forces with devastating effect. Ultimately, airpower, armor, stand-off attack in the form of UCAVS, mortars and artillery, special operations forces, engineers and infantry all must cooperate in contemporary combat. But armored forces are central to dominating the enemy on the non-linear contested ground with impunity.

The current Stryker brigade combat team lacks the joint C4ISR, firepower, protection, mobility and organic logistical support to be a full-dimensional warfighting organization and its operational utility will continue to be limited to peace support or paramilitary police operations. A glance at the Stryker brigade in Northern Iraq provides ample evidence for this statement. The Army’s senior leadership wisely decided to keep the Stryker brigade remote from the scene of the action in Central Iraq where the lethal quality of close combat might inflict serious casualties on it. Frankly, in peace support operations, the block III LAV with its stabilized 25mm chain gun with stand-off engagement capability, though lighter and never designed for close combat, is more lethal and less expensive than the Stryker carrier which has just an impotent, must stop-to-shoot, unstabilized .50 caliber machine gun with 200 rounds.

According to its published doctrine, the Stryker brigade is designed to move light infantry quickly on primary or secondary roads to a point where the infantry will dismount and conduct combat operations on foot with unstabilized machine guns and, eventually, 105mm guns on Strykers in support, presuming the mobile gun system can be made to work.

This approach is familiar to anyone who has read tactical manuals for mechanized infantry in the 1960s training in the pinelands of Fort Benning, Georgia. In anything but an environment where the enemy’s anti-armor, artillery and mining capabilities are slim to nonexistent, these tactics are a prescription for mass slaughter. The lethality of small arms, RPGs and roadside bombs is simply too great.

Lastly, the claim that this formation can deploy into action anywhere in the world on C-130s in 96 hours is not supported by empirical evidence. Given the size, weight and volume of wheeled armored vehicles, the Stryker brigade is not suitable for strategic air lift and will deploy as a unit via sealift as seen quite recently when the Stryker brigade currently serving in Iraq arrived via ship in Kuwait City harbor.

Despite the M113 Gavin based IAV tracks beating the wheeled LAV-III wheeled trucks in both the platform performance demonstration and the later Congressionally-mandated comparison evaluations, the Army chooses to spend billions of dollars and precious time needed to get ready for actual war on handfuls of rubber-tired trucks. 4 years of this tinkering with a handful of brigades with very expensive LAV-III thinly armored trucks called "Strykers" results in the Army right now being unprepared for non-linear combats in Afghanistan/Iraq where the enemy can attack at any time in any direction, blowing our men up in their trucks with roadside bombs, rocket propelled grenades, molotov cocktail (lit bottles of fuel) and massed small arms fire. The 60, 70 and even 80 mph speeding on predictable paved roads in the Army’s trucks has not prevented the enemy from command detonating land mines instantly by remote cell phones and garage door openers to inflict the majority of the over 900 dead and 4,000 serious wounds our troops have suffered in Iraq.

The Russians were defeated in Afghanistan due in large part by the lack of mobility of their BTR 8x8 armored trucks very much like the Stryker 8x8 truck. Details:

The French defeat in the first Indo-China war was hastened by their use of wheeled armored cars and trucks that could not deviate from roads flanked with concealing vegetation rife for enemy ambushes.

ALL armored vehicles have a pyramid of design attributes they must balance; mobility, protection and firepower. All 3 of these factors interact and effect the other. You add heavy weaponry this costs you in weight and this reduces mobility. Having ammunition stored that can be set off if the enemy hits it adversely effects protection.

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Mobility

/ \

/ \

/ \

Protection------------------Firepower

The desire to fully armor enclose a 9-man infantry squad is NOT new. From the beginning of applying internal combustion engines to armored ground vehicles we have wanted to carry infantry safely inside. However, steel metal is very heavy. To get the needed volume for 9 plus men either your steel is very thin as in WWI tanks or you sacrifice protection with an open top as WWII half-tracks had. The steel we use today has the same limitation as we had back then. To stop a non-armor piercing, .30 caliber (7.62mm diameter) "ball" bullet you need ½ inch thick hard steel. To protect against explosions you need softer steel to absorb the blast and larger fragment shrapnel so a compromise is made in the smelter’s pot. However, try as we did after WWII, we could not fully enclose a 9-man infantry squad with adequate steel in an armored vehicle under 15 tons, we could do it at greater weight with the resultant poor mobility that the vehicle could not go where the infantry can walk. Infantry was still exposed. This reality for the most part still exists today. A turreted light tank that does not have to carry infantry is far more compact and has always been possible out of steel.

The solution for fully armor protecting a 9-man infantry squad is armored aluminum that is both hard and soft to stop both armor piercing bullets and explosion effects that is 3 times thicker than steel but at much less weight. The M113 Gavin is made out of 1.5 inch thick aluminum alloy armor and the LAV-III/Stryker is made out of thin ½ steel. The hull of an armored vehicle has to do two things:

1. Hold together the entire propulsion system
2. Armor protect

By choosing wheels for propulsion and steel for its hull, the Stryker has made poor design choices that adversely effect its mobility and protection. An armored box that sits ON TOP OF wheeled suspensions and drive trains ends up being 28% more heavy and large than an armored box on more compact tracks. Its counter-intuitive, but the hull weight of the larger armored box weight of a wheeled truck is greater than the lighter weight rubber tires compared to steel tracks/rubber pads around metal road wheels. Thus, the Stryker for roughly the same interior volume to carry a 9 man infantry squad ends up being 17 tons empty compared to the Gavin’s 10.5 tons, even though their hulls are .30 caliber bullet protective. While the Gavin is actually more protective to armor piercing bullet level and more roomy than the Stryker, its chief benefit is that its not used up all its engine power to move its hull around, it has extra power to fit multiple armor layers around it. The 1996 RAND report commissioned by Congress concludes the M113 can have 60% area coverage by reactive armor tiles compared to just 35% coverage possible by heavier M2 Bradley medium tracks. By choosing wheels and steel the Army has an overweight truck that cannot be upgraded with adequate armor layers without adverse mobility effects. The armored truck with its high hull sitting on top of its wheels makes for a bigger target that’s more easily hit by the enemy since height is the #1 visual give-away on the battlefield. Adding troops, gear and extra armor to these already overloaded trucks not only over-stresses their engines and drive trains causing constant break downs and rising repair costs, it makes these vehicles top heavy and prone to roll-over, killing and wounding our troops.

This entire chain of adverse causes and effects has resulted in the world’s most skilled combat Army, the Israeli Defense Force to reject Strykers even if offered for free by the U.S. through foreign military sales. To get to the protection levels against NLB threats the Israelis concluded they have to add too much costly and weighty armor to Strykers that could not handle this anyway.

Bad mobility decisions adversely effect protection. By using rubber tired wheels, the Stryker’s hull sits on top of 8 highly flammable chunks of rubber filled with air easily ignited by explosions and enemy firebombs. The gap between the tires and hull is a "dead zone" where shots are trapped not deflected. To try to mitigate against this, a 17 ton truck with 2 tons of C4ISR and troop gear, already maxed out for its engine and drive train has stick on ceramic tiles and a 5,000 pound bird cage to try to pre-detonate RPGs. The ceramic tiles come at a weight cost of 3 pounds per square foot so they must total in at 1,000+ of weight themselves. Because the Stryker’s truck wheels must turn to steer, it cannot have side skirts with just the required inches to stand-off pre-detonate RPGs as a tracked AFV like the Gavin can have.

Another reality is that all Army vehicles with solid armored hulls require drivers and "steerers" (commanders) working with heads and torso out to see properly. Vehicles with window glass can have troops operate from inside, but windows are restrictive in peripheral vision, get dirty and are vulnerable spots that cannot stop RPGs and heavy machine gun bullets even if made of "bullet proof" glass. As these Soldiers fight "unbuttoned" they need protection in front of their guns (gunshields) and themselves (shields). The Stryker does not come with shields for its Driver and Squad Leader though I have seen the HMMWV shield attached to the Gunner’s remote weapon system. While shields can be applied to Strykers this yet again more weight on the very top of an already top heavy and large target for the enemy. The M113 Gavin already has combat proven moving ACAV steel gunshields for the Track commander and rear compartment troops, the Israeli’s Kasman fixed shields have vision ports of ballistic glass and the vehicle’s maker offers clear shielding kits. These shields when fitted to the M113 Gavin neither make it top-heavy or weighs them down because extra reserve power to move this added weight exists and the vehicle is very compact with a low center of gravity.

The first Army miscalculation was not reading the RAND Aeromotorization report carefully enough; it called for 14 ton LAV-1s like the USMC uses. Instead, the Army Chief chose the much heavier LAV-III which at 17 tons "vanilla" ie: thin steel box on 8 rubber tires and engine is already too heavy for C-130 Hercules airland where there is no fuel facilities. The C-130 needs fuel in its wings not only for structural strength (re the firefighting plane whose wings snapped off) but to fly itself back to where it came from. MTMC’s Joe Cassidy wrote an unchallenged report that explains that the C-130’s payload limit for airlanding into unimproved runways is 16 tons. The 19-21 ton LAV-III/Stryker is already too heavy before putting C4ISR electronics, remote weapon system and troop gear on. Thus, to simply fit and not be too heavy to take off in a common USAF C-130H, each Stryker 9-man squad has to strip their vehicle of most gear and fly in another C-130, while only a driver and possibly the vehicle commander flies with the truck. Even after all of this, the C-130H can only fly a stripped down Stryker for 200 miles—unless we are fighting the enemy in Topeka, Kansas from Wichita, Kansas C-130s are not going to globally deploy Strykers anywhere. The Stryker with 5,000 pound bird cage will not even fit into a C-130, so it will land unprotected from RPGs. The Army demurs by saying Strykers will not airland into areas threatened by enemies, this excuse has been vetoed constantly by the enemy for over the last year in Iraq. Today’s 10 division Army cannot guarantee any of its ground is free of enemy attacks on the non-linear battlefield. This is not WWII where we had 100 divisions to fully clear out large swaths of the earth of all enemy belligerents. That the Stryker cannot fly combat ready, with its own 9-man infantry squad fully armed and ready to fight but has to be pieced together from two C-130s that can only go 200 miles tops disqualifies it as a C-130 air transportable vehicle for an U.S. Army that needs to cross thousand mile plus oceans. Stryker fails the first reason the Army stated it needed IBCTs for which is to rapidly air-deploy.

Another problem is that even the stripped down Stryker by being a space and weight inefficient wheeled truck blocks any safety aisle for the crew and any Army personnel on board from reaching the two side Paratroop doors and rear ramp to escape if the plane crashes and catches fire. The only way to reach the rear exits is by carefully climbing one man at a time over the top of the hight Stryker and squeezing between the remote weapon system. With an aircraft that can burn up and explode in seconds this is not acceptable. Flying the Stryker in a C-130 is unsafe from human escape needs as well as overtaxing 30+ year old airplane’s payload capabilities.

In sharp contrast, M113 Gavins by their more compact size and lighter weight can be transported long distances over 1,000 miles by C-130s to global hot spots fully combat loaded with their 9-man infantry squad on board, ready-to-fight. In fact, compact RPG resistant spaced armor can be fitted to the M113 Gavin and a safety aisle can still exist for troop safety. The Gavin is also far lower than the Stryker so troops can also easily climb over the top if wider reactive armor tiles are fitted. The point is the Gavin comes out of the Hercules ready to fight with full protection and it can do this without endangering the aircrew and troops on board the plane.

Because the Stryker is so wide, it cannot be loaded side-by-side even in the very wide C-17 Globemaster III jet. Since it has to be loaded sing file, and it being a very long 253 inch vehicle, only 2-3 Strykers can fit in a C-17; failing the RAND criteria that at least 4-6 vehicles fit for maximum transport efficiency. I say 2-3 because the third Stryker rests half on the aircraft floor and half on the raised ramp, an awkward and fundamentally unsound position in a cargo aircraft, but the C-17 is very robust. If I were a loadmaster, I wouldn’t do it, no C-17 has ever crashed since service in 1993 and I wouldn’t want to be the first by overtaxing the ramp hinge. With a maximum airland load capacity of 80 tons, the C-17 can airland 2 new M2A3 or 3 M2A0 old Bradley medium infantry fighting vehicles. Since the C-130 can’t air-deliver Strykers, why would any combat commander choose a pair of thin-skinned Strykers with an unstabilized mere .50 caliber heavy machine gun that cannot go cross country, cannot shoot on-the-move, easily mobility killed by attacking its rubber tires when he could have the same number of Bradleys? Bradleys can shoot-on-the-move with 25mm, TOW ATGM and 7.62mm medium machine gun weaponry, go off-road, are protected against 30mm autocannon, ATGMs and RPGs while carrying their infantry. Another option would be 5 M113A3 Gavins which not only are more cross-country mobile than Bradleys, are light enough to have Bradley and other type 20-40mm autocannon turrets fitted while still retaining C-130 transportability because we have more vehicle power and payload parameters to work within.

Before dismissing the need to airland ready-to-fight as just a "nice-to-have" consider that the Army recently chose to spend $500,000 to try to make the mobile gun system Stryker (Stryker-MGS) parachute airdrop for the 82^nd Airborne Division who actually requested M8 Buford Armored Gun System light tanks that are already Army certified for paradrop. The vanilla Stryker-Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV) cannot airland from a C-130 with just troops with rifles and machine guns yet the Army is trying to slap a 105mm gun and ammunition on top of the already oversized and overweight Stryker and parachute airdrop it. After a parachute drop, any vehicle must be combat ready not pieced together hours later. MTMC’s Joe Cassidy has also written a report on Stryker-MGS parachute airdrop and has concluded that at 22 tons its already disqualified from the 21 ton parachute system the Army uses. The 42,000 pound low velocity airdrop (LVAD) system is the maximum load a C-130 can drop since it doesn’t have to airland which has a 16 ton limit. So he then turns to the larger C-17 jet transport; the problem is that a larger LVAD system is needed; the 60,000 pound system is not certified and ready. Even if it were available, there is only 118 inches of rear ramp airdrop clearance on the C-17 and the Stryker-MGS stands at 106 inches high even after they redesigned the hull to lower it. The Stryker-MGS will have to sit on top of a type V airdrop platform on top of honeycomb shock-absorbing cardboard stacks attached to extraction and descent parachutes and clear the C-17’s rear ramp safely. If all air is removed from its 8 tires it will belly rest on the stacks and take the entire impact G forces into its hull and sensitive C4ISR electronics. Even if it can fit through the C-17 rear ramp with the uncertified 60K LVAD system, it like all other wheeled trucks needs a Heavy Drop De-rigging System (HDDS) which is nylon straps attached to front tires to pull itself OFF the honey comb stacks on the drop zone. HDDS requires inflated tires to grip and yank the bellied vehicle from the stacks. Whether HDDS can work while Paratroopers somehow generate compressed air under fire on an open danger area drop zone to fill up 8 rubber tires is doubtful and an unwise predicament to put our men in. Particularly since M113 Gavin infantry carriers and M8 Buford light tanks are readily available that can paradrop from existing 42K LVAD systems to include C-130 delivery without any problems.

When questioned by Congresswoman Loretta Sanchez about the viability of "air-mechanized" operations, Army Chief General Peter Schoomaker lied about the recent Airborne operation into Northern Iraq and tried to deceive Congress about the Stryker as being the only way to give light infantry armored mobility. First, he said we flew in "Tanks and Brads" (Bradleys) to reinforce the 173^rd Airborne Brigade’s Paratroopers who had seized a runway/airfield. This is not true; the majority of the force from the 1^st Infantry Division was two infantry companies in M113A3 Gavin light tracked AFVs, Then to further the deception he quipped that "had we had Strykers available we could have given the infantry better mobility". We had M113A3 Gavins giving the 1^st ID’s infantry armored mobility, these same vehicles could have and should have been supplied rto the 173^rd’s Paratroopers; they were and still are available. Trying to deceive Congress into thinking only Strykers are C-17 airland capable to render armored mobility for our infantry is not only immoral in light of the way or troops are suffering in combat now on foot and in HMMWV trucks, it’s a felony. General Schoomaker should be rebuked and called on the carpet for his lies on this issue, and made to not only apologize but start fully employing available M113 Gavins by our Airborne and Air Assault forces.

At 19-22 tons Stryker trucks are not even sling-load transportable by USMC CH-53E Super Stallion helicopters let alone the Army’s 12 ton payload limited CH-47D/F Chinooks. In stark contrast, the 10.5 ton M113A3 Gavin can be air assaulted by Army CH-47D/F helicopters if the Army chose to transform its foot-mobile 101^st Airborne (Air Assault Division).

Planet Earth is essentially unchanged from the time that Winston Churchill led the development of the tracked tank in 1916. Wheeled armored cars and trucks could not then and still cannot today traverse trenches, mud and soft soil conditions due to their high ground pressures of their rubber tires sinking into the ground and then slipping and/or becoming mired. Strykers in Iraq are constantly getting stuck when they try to venture off pavement so any claims by wheeled vehicle manufacturers that some sort of new wheeled technology has made the armored truck cross country mobile are false. Bigger, fatter tires with run flat inserts and central tire inflation systems (CTIS) have failed to make armored trucks cross country mobile. Stryker Soldiers drive in constant fear that if they venture off road they will be stuck; in contrast light tracked AFV crews can boldly venture off road with confidence that they will not be stuck; the latter is functional cross country mobility. If you cannot drive off road with confidence and decide to take paths cross country to perform missions then you are not cross country mobile. 19-22 ton Strykers are not cross country mobile because their weight smothers any possible tire floatation over soft ground. Its wrong to equate 4 wheel civilian truck enthusiasts in unarmored sport utility vehicles weighing less than 3 tons being able to go off road because they float via high engine torque (HMMWV) or fast RPM (Dune Buggies) with a 19-22 ton heavy Stryker truck with much higher ground pressures. Even wheeled SUVs will get stuck when their tires can no longer grip the ground due to mud and/or slope, obstacles that track-laying vehicles can rumble over.

When you poorly design a vehicle like the M114 and Stryker, you negate any positives, in this case having the hull overhang in front of the tracks and wheels causes it to snag on uneven ground ahead.

M114 track stuck in Vietnam

Stryker truck stuck...and struggling to negotiate small ruts

Strykers Cannot Avoid Road ambushes

When you cannot leave the roads it becomes very easy to ambush you, as the debacle in Iraq has proven. Driving 10, 20 or 30 mph does not change the fact that a roadside bomb and ambushers with RPGs, AKMs and firebombs can instantly kill you. Speed is no protection when you are going straight into a kill zone in a multi-vehicle truck convoy.

To get the fuel tank out of the LAV-1/Iis the LAV-III the Army has bought has a left and right rear fuel tank, a good idea taken from the M113A3 Gavin. But to do this, the LAV-III/Stryker lost its props and rudders to propel itself in the water. Strykers can no longer swim and are at the mercy of us having to take bridges and have landing craft for it to cross rivers and lakes. The M113 Gavin swims by its own tracks and can when fitted with waterjets and the Irtalian compasny of ARIS SPA, their "ARIS GATOR" nose piece to swim in oceans from ship-to-shore. Details:

The Stryker is a fatally blind vehicle that simply can't allow potential enemies to even get close: this also means that Soldiers can't let civilians get close to effect liaison safely from within the vehicle as is routinely done from M113s which also have gunshields available. Stryker Soldiers will have to always get out of their vehicle to communicate with civilians, and if they turn into an angry mob will be overwhelmed physically as 4 marines were recently during a foot patrol in Fallujah. If civilian mobs swarm around Strykers, their Soldiers cannot fight out from the top troop hatches to keep grenades and bottles filled with oil and gasoline from being tossed into their bird cages and at their rubber tires, immobilizing the vehicle and setting it on fire. You don't want to be in any vehicle full of ammunition, fuel and high explosives that has caught on fire.

The Stryker cannot be assumed capable of driving itself out of trouble, either. To turn a Stryker it must travel forward over its wheels and "Y" turn back and forth if there isn't the required hundred feet or so. In tight urban streets under enemy fire, we cannot afford our Soldiers to be playing "Austin Powers" trying to inch forward and back to get out of the enemy's kill zone. If the enemy has around the corner set up barricaded cars the Strykers cannot drive over them to get out like M113 or any other of the Army's tracked vehicles can. If the Stryker tries to drive over a barricaded car its belly will stick on the car body and its tires will spin futilely in the air, the Stryker will be stuck and a sitting duck target. Its 8 run-flats inside each 8 air-filled rubber tire will increase the flames as the rubber tires burn furiously, sending toxic smoke into the hull and igniting nylon troop gear and ammunition stowed all around and inside the vehicle. The Stryker's HALON fire extinguisher system will fire, killing the engine from operating again until fully cleaned and robbing the troops inside of all of the oxygen they need to breath. Faced with asphyxiating or burning-to-death, the troops will drop the rear ramp and get the heck out of the Stryker. The problem is that an enemy Soldier with an AK-47 assault rifle could be waiting for the ramp to drop open and empty a 30-round magazine of 7.62mm bullets into these American bodies just like how we saw D-Day recreated in the movie "Saving Private Ryan" when landing craft ramps went down in front of enemy machine gun fires.

The Army's "solution" is to not have Soldiers ride in Strykers!!!

How long will be able to define an "edge" of the battlefield when there are no lines of safety/danger is unclear? What is the point of a $3.3 million each truck that is too dangerous to ride in? The troops are having to march almost as far as if they had no vehicles at all.

The physical blindness of the Stryker cannot be excused away by just saying it lacked "testing" when those test results would simply be forged and altered to give the senior Army leaders--some of whom now work for GDLS---the results they wanted to see. What is going to happen unless Congress cancels any further Stryker purchases is the enemy is going to "blind side" a bunch of American young men thinking they are still somehow safe in the Stryker because they haven't reached their distant dismount point yet and are in some kind of fantasy "rear area" marked as such on a computer screen. There are no safe, rear areas on the non-linear battlefield. Enemy attacks can come from any direction at any time

Strykers simply cannot bring their understrength squad of Soldiers to necessary close dismount points out of fear of getting stuck or being ambushed--or worse, both---which forces them to dismount and walk long distances from their objectives negating any rest they received riding in a vehicle touted for its reduced vibration/noise. What's less of a hum-in-your-head if you now have to march 5-10 miles with 100 pounds of gear on your back because your vehicle is too fragile and has to stay out of danger at all costs? What happens if the enemy all around on the non-linear battlefield, refuses to cooperate and attacks your blind and mobility handicapped Stryker without any troops around to protect it like the Stryker that was torched by RPGs shot into its rear fuel tanks in Mosul? Remember they had to dismount and early short of the objective to try to keep the Stryker out of trouble? The Driver and Gunner jumped from the Stryker as it burned up and the Army then brags that the vehicle somehow "protected them" but fails to admit that the Stryker's inability to go where the infantry dismounts go put the isolated crew in the life-or-death predicament in the first place!

Firepower is an "icing" that is applied to the vehicle’s hull and propulsion "cake". If the vehicle can handle the weight, recoil and size of the weaponry, its firepower can be greater than what a man can generally hand carry. The Stryker uses a slow-turning Remote Weapon System (RWS) that has the gunner down in the hull looking through unstabilized day and night optics. The RWS shoots either a .50 caliber or 40mm heavy machine gun, the former with a box of 200 rounds that can be shot up in less than 1 minute of firing. The entire vehicle has to stop for the gun to shoot accurately, making it an easy target for enemies with vehicles with stabilized weaponry and foot Soldiers with RPGs, hand grenades, satchel charges ala Saving Private Ryan. To reload the Gunner has to open his hatch and expose himself to open up the machine gun, lay down the belt in the can or replace the can entirely, then lay the belt edge down into the open feedtray, close the feed tray, recock the weapon twice and then duck back down into the hull.

The "vanilla" M113 Gavin has the ability to mount .50 caliber and 40mm heavy machine guns behind gunshields fired by the track commander who is not limited by optics. The troops in back can stand and face outward behind gunshields rendering their automatics rifles and light, medium machine gun firepower in all 360 degrees of directions. This is what is needed to protect the vehicle from close-range attacks and prevail on the NLB. We wouldn’t have to settle for an impotent RWS with the Gavin since it has extra power and weight capacity; optimally a 1 man power operated, stabilized 20-40mm autocannon turret like used on the USMC AAV-7 would render Bradley level fire-on-the-move firepower while still enabling the troops in back to see out and contribute to the fight.

Too many equate "situational awareness" (SA) with a new electronic mental gadget. The first and most direct SA is the physical kind by operating your vehicle with your head out and eyes open behind gunshields.

Most Soldiers in Strykers ride buttoned up and NOT situationally aware: blind spots everywhere for those with their heads out.

The following explains the internal seating arrangement and functions of the baseline Stryker Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV).

The Driver sits at the left front, the diesel engine is to his right. He can raise his seat to drive with his head out from an open hatch but CANNOT SEE TO HIS REAR because the hull behind him blocks his view.

Squad Leader (SL) sits behind the Driver: he CANNOT SEE TO RIGHT OF THE VEHICLE because he is blocked by the Remote Weapon System (RWS)

The Gunner to the right of SL, sits under the RWS: he CANNOT SEE OUTSIDE OF VEHICLE at all, only through his optics.

The Platoon Sergeant or Platoon Leader (PL) sits behind the Gunner looking at the FBCB2 computer screen and CANNOT SEE OUTSIDE OF VEHICLE at all.

The remaining 4 (not 5) Dismount Soldiers cannot stand on seats to reach the two small top troop hatches which are for emergency use only escapes: they CANNOT SEE OUTSIDE OF VEHICLE at all. There are no gunshields to protect them if they could stand up through the two small hatches.

6 out of the actual maximum 8 Soldiers that can ride in a Stryker cannot even see outside their own vehicle! One can only see to his front and left. The Driver cannot see to his rear. The only person in a Stryker who can see somewhat in 3 directions is the DRIVER! The Squad Leader can't see through the remote weapon system on his right, a fatal blind spot for the enemy to attack with RPGs and/or molotov cocktails. He must spend most of his time directing the driver where to go and has no mounted weapon and gunshield to engage enemies even if he can see them. He must duck down into his hatch if the slow-turning remote weapon system machine gun is to fire to its left. The Gunner down in the hull, looks through an unstabilized optic so as the Stryker moves, all he sees is a blur; to fire, the vehicle must stop and be a sitting duck to the enemy. The PL or platoon sergeant (PSG) behind the Gunner can't see what's going on for real outside the vehicle like you can from the top troop hatch of a M113. He is staring at a computer screen and typing email messages, detached from physical reality around him. His real-world situational awareness is nil.

The Stryker is fatally blind and unsafe for combat; it cannot carry a fully-equipped 9-man infantry squad and should be immediately cancelled by Congress for failing to meet stated Army requirements.

The 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized) and Special Forces Soldiers say M113 Gavins with infantry facing out from top troop hatches behind gun shields are best for non-linear, urban combats. At just 73 inches high, the Gavin can be used to converse with civilians from the vehicle while being safe from most close-in attacks. Details:

Here is a picture of M113A3 Gavins on patrol in Iraq, demonstrating their excellent situational awareness from the top hatches though they lack the gunshields and extra armor they are supposed to have:

The 3rd ID lessons learned from the Iraq nation-state conflict, from Chapter 7 at:

An Army Special Forces Soldier in Iraq NOW during the sub-national conflict writes:

The 19-21 ton Stryker is already a top-heavy vehicle that is prone to roll-over by its very nature of being a heavy metal box slapped on top of 8 wheels and suspensions. Tracked vehicles are more compact and though its counter-intuitive, are 28% more weight/space efficient than wheeled armored vehicles because their hulls can be smaller to deliver a given volume of space. Though the M113 is smaller externally than a Stryker so its a harder to hit by enemy fires, it can actually easily carry a fully-equipped 9-man infantry squad because its got better available volume. Its compactness results in low center-of-gravity stability so its not top-heavy even when carrying lots of gear. Yet when all of the troop gear goes either inside or strapped to the outside of the Stryker, since its a 1/2 inch thin metal box SITTING HIGH ON TOP OF the 8 wheeled suspension and drive train every item carried is above the centerline of gravity making the vehicle dangerously top-heavy. When it was pointed out by DoD's Testing Director Tom Christie that the thin metal hull and 8 rubber tires will not protect against rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) the Army rushed to have a 5,000 pound "bird cages" bolted to the outside of every Stryker in Iraq to pre-detonate RPGs but at the cost of making the Strykers even more top-heavy and prone to roll-overs. In the first days of operations in Iraq, two Strykers rolled over killing 3 Soldiers. Afterwards in typical Army fashion of denying problems exist and solving them by admitting that the Stryker is a mistake, vehicle speeds were reduced and crews ordered not to leave paved roads.

But don't take my word for it, someone in Congress needs to subpoena or Freedom Of Information Act (FOIA) request from the Army Safety Center at Fort Rucker, Alabama to release all of the actual roll-overs and accidents the Strykers have had from Fort Lewis, to NTC and now Iraq. The Stryker holds the record for the most roll-overs ever by any unit at NTC and we just had another two Soldiers killed in Iraq when it merely swerved to avoid a civilian car. Its too bad Ralph Nader was not a military safety advocate to tackled this unsafe-at-any-speed "Corvair" in Army green.

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Mobility

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Protection------------------Firepower

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Reliability & Costs

The foundation for any vehicle to operate is its reliability against the forces of the earth itself which don’t want it to run at all and the human societal costs to keep it running. If your vehicle design pyramid is weak, heavy and inefficient its going to constantly collapse and have to be propped up by maintenance and constant repairs driving up costs. A wheeled armored truck pressing down heavily upon fragile drivetrains, suspension and steering is prone to break-down; a tracked armored vehicle is actually simpler. Details:

The Stryker is a constantly collapsing pyramid. Its bad enough that the army had the "sticker price shock" of $3.3 million each it now has spiraling maintenance costs to try to keep unreliable Stryker vehicles operating because they are fundamentally ill conceived by design (mobility, protection, firepower, situational awareness). To purchase Strykers, the Army had to neglect the majority of the rest of its Soldiers/units, to maintain and operate them this neglect robs the rest of the Army of needed armor, vehicle upgrades. The Stryker choice of a new purchase, wheeled armored truck was never feasible as a fix to transform the entire Army. To squander the majority of the Army’s funds on a handful of increasingly costly truck brigades when there are over 33 brigades to reform for actual, on-going non-linear combats is fiscally irresponsible and morally bankrupt.

What is the real cost of Stryker? If you look in the Jun 28th issue of Defense News, page 3, it states that the Army gave GD an order to complete the 4th brigade (the decision that wrecks

The 2ACR forever) to buy 106 vehicles for $163M. This order is in addition to the March 2004 contract for 212 vehicles at $282M; resulting in a total of 328 vehicles for $445M. Yet, this accounts for less than half of the over $950M appropriated for Stryker Procurement in the 2004 budget. Where does the other $500M go? Also, how much R&D is being spent on Stryker and how much O&M is going into GD's coffers? The Army keeps saying that the Stryker only costs $1.5M per copy; yet the Stryker program is costing them well Over $3M per vehicle; and it could be closer to $5M per vehicle fully loaded. It would be very interesting to demand that the Army disclose what it is actually spending on Stryker -- could be $1.5 to 2B per year."

1. The Stryker is unsound in all categories of analysis and should be cancelled for further purchases by the U.S. Army. Recommend that Congress curtail the acquisition of more Strykers and shift funds into the acquisition of more promising technologies and platforms with close combat capability in urban or complex terrain. Congress should also demand that the Army provide a plan for pooling existing Strykers in support of Army units rotating through peace support missions on the British Army model. A cost-effective alternative to permanently equipping light infantry with Strykers would involve the purchase of a limited number of wheeled armored vehicles for use by Army units rotating through routine peace support missions. The British Army uses this approach in Ulster and Cyprus with considerable success.

2. It is important however, that the Army have 3D maneuver forces that can rapidly air-deploy and then fan out with armored mobility on the ground to block and capture enemies fleeing our heavier 2D maneuver forces coming overland. Had we been properly organized for 3D air-mechanized maneuver in 2001 we might have gotten terrorist leader Osama Bin Laden in Afghanistan before he fled, and Saddam and his subordinates in Iraq before they went into hiding to start the on-going, bloody guerrilla war. The place to create these formations is in the army’s Light, Airborne and Air Assault units be transforming them with available light tracked armored fighting vehicles.

Monies that would have been wasted on Strykers should immediately be spent on upgrading thousand of M113 Gavins to MTVL standards to fully transform the Army’s Light Divisions beginning with their infantry battalion’s Delta Weapons Companies who drive in vulnerable unarmored HMMWV trucks so A, B and C companies can have armored mobility as needed. M8 Buford Armored Gun System and Tracer scout vehicles should also be purchased to Brigade RSTA Cavalry troops to work in conjunction with the infantry battalions. These light tracked AFVs are parachute airdroppable and the Gavins are CH-47D/F air assault mobile.

The "MTVL" standard M113 Gavin can far exceed the costly and impotent RWS and C4ISR "icings" applied to the physical unsound Stryker trucks. Most importantly, MTVLs can be created from the Army's 14, 655 M113 Gavins quickly and a very affordable price to actually fix the physical weaknesses of the U.S. Army which has 4 light divisions with no armored vehicles whatsoever and the unlucky half of our heavy divisions that ride around in unarmored trucks.

Multiple layers of armor protection are possible on up-engined MTVLs up to 7,000 pounds worth depending on what engine powerpack is chosen; 275 hp, 400 hp or 500 hp diesel-electric. Multiple and differing armor layers are required to defeat RPGs by reactive forces and spacing, defeat roadside bombs and land mines by blast absorption and shrapnel defeat, and counter kinetic energy bullets/shells by a hard strike face away from the hull to break up the projectile for the following layers to "catch" the fragments. Wheeled Strykers and so-called "up-armored HMMWVs" are already maxed out by weight and suspension load cannot have adequate armor layers fitted as the world's most combat experienced force, the Israeli Defense Force recently concluded when they rejected purchasing Strykers from the U.S.

The 1996 RAND report commissioned by Congress concludes that a M113 Gavin can receive 60% coverage by reactive armor compared to the just 35% coverage that can be applied to a Bradley with more complex hull and turret shapes.

Troops report from Iraq that the M113 is the only mount that enables them to fire and hit elevated urban targets. The open rear troop hatch with gunshields combination is widely used by the Israelis to prevail in urban combat for 360 degree all around firepower.

The Track Commander of "vanilla" M113s has a 360 rotating mount for .50 caliber and 40mm grenade heavy machine guns with his head out behind a gun and side shields that is effective on the move unlike the Stryker though not stabilized. Small stabilized 20mm-40mm autocannon turrets could be purchased for thousands of M113s using monies saved from cancelled Stryker purchases as many NATO nations have done to provide dominant firepower while still retaining the infantry in back's 360 degree vigilance out the top troop hatch. These turrets can also have strap-on anti-tank guided missiles or unguided rockets to destroy enemy armored vehicles and buildings/bunkers if required. These firepower additions applied to the basic 10.5 ton M113 vehicle do not disqualify it for C-130 air transport (17 tons is STOL landing limit) as they would if attempted on the Stryker starting at 17 tons.

The basic physical M113 design has EVERYONE; driver, track commander and troops able to see in all direction. This 360 degree coverage helps to keep any enemies from getting into a position to threaten the vehicle. When buttoned up, the only people who are blind are the dismount Soldiers in the back, but this can be compensated like the Israelis are doing using TV cameras at a fraction of the cost of the inward-focused computer network the Stryker has. Gunshields exist for troops in M113 Gavins to fight effectively from their mounts while above shoulder level to avoid grenades and firebombs. However, they are still able to converse with civilians from their vehicles for HUMINT.

The M113 at 78 inches high and 98 inches wide on wide tracks is not top-heavy and prone to roll over as the Stryker is. It has the safest operation record of any of the Army's armored vehicles and most of the Army's unarmored vehicles. There are multiple exits to escape even if the vehicle turns over: 3 top hatches, a rear ramp and a door in the rear ramp. If the vehicle tumble into the water it floats if its hatches are closed and doesn't sink like the Strykers did when 3 Soldiers drowned in Iraq.

The vanilla M113A3 Gavin has a 3.5 miles per gallon fuel cost and averages to be $1.53 per mile according to UDLP. M113s are known for reliability and low operating costs all around the world, such that with over 23 countries using them, Army forces deployed overseas could tap into host nation logistics to support our vehicles. The M113 was chosen to replace the M551 Sheridan tank as the OPFOR replica vehicle at the national Training Center at Fort Irwin, California due to its decreased operating costs, reliability and reduced environmental foot print. The M113A4 MTVL hybrid-electric variant at 7.0 mpg would most likely be 50% of current costs to even operate.

3. The entire Army must reorganize and requip for non-linear warfare; the minimum transportation standard must be a light tracked AFV not a wheeled truck.

That Army resupply vehicles are road-bound and cannot aggressively move off road has created a debacle in Iraq where Americans are dying each day by roadside bombs. More Americans have been killed and wounded by roadside bombs than any other cause in Iraq. This is largely preventable if we had tracked armored resupply vehicles.

The handicap of only having wheeled vehicles for resupply defeated the Germans in the Russian mud and winter snows in WWII concludes military historian B.H. Liddell-Hart. The inability to be resupplied away from roads led to the French not holding the high ground in the first Indo-China war at Dien Bien Phu.

In the USAF Air Chronicles article, "Stalingrad to Khe Sanh: Factors in the Successful Use of Tactical" Dr. David K. Vaughan, Air Force Institute of Technology Major James H. Donoho of the Air Combat Command write:

EXCERPT:

The good news is that the M113 Gavin family of vehicles can be modified into XM1108 MTVL type armored cargo carrying vehicles for off-road, protected resupply. The XM1108s can pick up and drop off palletized loading system (PLS) flat racks full of supplies without Soldiers even having to leave their armored cabs.

XM1108s have the baseline 7.62mm AP bullet protection of a M113 Gavin but since there is only a small cab to armor, could be fitted with multiple armor layers to defeat RPGs at lesser weight penalty than a full bodied vehicle so engine power can still be used to deliver supply payloads.

With H/E drive and band tracks, supply XM1108s can travel at 60 mph speeds like civilian cars on paved highways yet can operate off roads that automobiles--and gunmen in them with RPGs cannot.

Every vehicle must be able to fight back while on the move. To mount a machine gun in a ready-to-fire mode, a hard mounting is required with a gunshield for the gunner. The XM1108 roof is a hard cab that can fit a swiveling machine gun mount and gunshield so a gunner can be vigilant and fire at suspected enemies to spoil and failing that counter enemy ambushers.

With a crew of no more than 3 men, one driving, one gunning and the other navigating, the XM1108 would have adequate situational awareness to defend itself from enemy attack since it does not have blind spots like the Stryker has.

The XM1108 would benefit from the same low CG design of the basic M113.

By using the same reliable and efficient components as the 14, 655 vehicle M113 Gavin family, the XM1108 would be easy to maintain and operate.

Mr. Jose Caldas, a relative of Captain Ernesto Blanco of the 82nd Airborne Division who was killed in Iraq by a roadside bomb while in a HMMWV truck sums it up best:

Civilian leadership runs the U.S. military and America's Army belongs to the American people and its Soldiers not a small clique of general officers who want post-retirement employment with GDLS. Someone should also investigate and "follow the money" trail of GDLS and its subcontractors and see which politicians are getting re-election campaign donations, a linkage should become apparent of who supports the Stryker deathtraps despite all of the facts of its performance failings and fatal vulnerabilities .

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2. www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost/JPArticle/ShowFull&cid=10902082

By ARIEH O'SULLIVAN

Citing financial pressure, the IDF has decided to put a hold on a decision to procure the controversial 8x8 Stryker light armored vehicle from the United States.

According to military sources the decision was made earlier this month in a review of expected expenditures in the multi-year procurement plan. The decision was to delay the matter for two years, but military sources said that the idea of purchasing the Stryker was effectively "buried for good." The decision is also a blow for the battered image of the Stryker since America was hoping to enhance its status with its inclusion in the IDF arsenal.

The Ground Forces Services had been pushing for a "critical mass" of Strykers to equip at least two brigades. This would involve hundreds of vehicles at a cost of $1.5 million each. But they would have likely undergone reinforcement to make them more protected, boosting their cost by up to $500,000.

OC Ground Forces Services Maj.-Gen. Yiftah Ron-Tal has been a strong proponent of the Stryker to replace the aged M-113 "Gavin" APCs. The Stryker was designed as the vehicle tailor-made for urban conflict, but it has garnered mixed reviews in action with US troops in Iraq.

Some of the criticism has been that the Stryker has many blind spots and was not as maneuverable as tracked armored personnel carriers. The 19-ton vehicles are also said to be top heavy and prone to rollovers. After it was designed the American Army realized it wouldn't withstand RPGs so the US rushed through additional means to pre-detonate the RPGs, which made them even more top heavy.

It also needed to upgrade its protection against roadside bombs with Applique’ armor developed by an Israeli–based company.

"It's a piece of junk," said one former senior IDF field commander intimately involved with the Stryker. "I don't know why Ron-tal was pushing so hard for it." There was also criticism that the IDF was never really serious about purchasing the Stryker from the beginning and it was all part of a disinformation campaign, possibly to enhance Israel's indigenous APC production.

The IDF did not even seek out any possibility of upgrading Stryker armor from manufacturers in Israel.

"Nothing. They never even contacted us," said Dr. Michael Cohen, director of Mofet Etzion Ltd. His company, based in Kfar Etzion, has been supplying General Dynamics Land Systems based in Canada with applique armor for its US Army Strykers in Iraq.

Proponents of the 19-ton Stryker say it would have been more mobile and more responsive than heavier tanks and treaded vehicles in the digitalized, urban battlefields of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The ground forces wanted to use them to replace the Vietnam-era M113 APCs, such as the ones destroyed in the Gaza Strip last May killing 11 Soldiers.

Now that the Stryker is pass , it paves the way for accelerating the alternatives to the American APC.

According to a senior defense official, the state-owned plant which produces the Merkava tank and other upgraded APCs has put together a prototype of a heavy armored vehicle that rivals the Stryker. It is called the "Namer" or Leopard, and is built on the chassis of the Merkava I tank. It

too would cost between $1 million and $2m. each. The drawback was that US military grant money could not be used to pay for these since the bulk of the annual $2.2 billion in grants must be spent in the United States.

3. Wheeled Strykers were beaten by tracked M113A3s at the Fort Lewis Comparison Evaluation (CE) tests, yet Army lied in its report to Congress and continue to buy inferior Strykers when far better tracked vehicles could be upgraded at 1/2 the cost and time

The Soldiers who actually did the CE tests at Fort Lewis if placed under oath would testify that the M113 platoon beat the Stryker platoon in ALL categories of performance. Yet the Army official report called the tests a "draw". Because Strykers are overweight, top-heavy and roll on narrow air-filled rubber tires crews drive them with a constant fear of getting stuck or rolling-over. Since Strykers have to be driven gingerly at all times they cannot maintain proper vehicle battle formations to avoid bunching up and colliding with each other or being caught in the blast of one enemy shell or roadside bomb impact. On the other hand, the tracked M113A3s with a low 8.63 PSI ground pressure and little fear of getting stuck were able to maneuver boldly across all terrain types and get to their mission objectives long before their Stryker counterparts could. When M113s at the earlier platform performance demonstration swam across a lake at Fort Knox, Strykers without the needed props and rudders stood idle unable to propel themselves in the water. This means Soldiers in Strykers must avoid small bodies of water and lakes like a plague because they can't swim. In order to cross, enemy held bridges must be taken which WWII taught us can be a bloody mess. If the enemy blows up the bridges, Strykers are stuck unable to get to Soldiers where they need to go. WWII veterans with non-swimming vehicles learned from their mistakes and made sure when General Gavins drew up the requirements for an Airborne Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle Family of light tracked armored vehicles that they would be amphibious; resulting in the amazing M113, arguably the greatest armored vehicle of all time, ever. However, having the humility to listen to her Soldiers and doing what's best--even if its less costly---is not an Army bureaucratic virtue.

3. www.strategypage.com/dls/articles/20030912.asp

24 APRIL 2003

SUBJECT: Operation Iraqi Freedom After Action Review Comments

1. The purpose of this document is to provide after action review comments after combat operations conducted by TM C/3-15 Infantry, Task Force 1-64 Armor "Desert Rogues" during "Operation Iraqi Freedom.

2. All comments will be broken down into the following format: issue, discussion, and recommendation.

3. Doctrine/TTP's (Tactics, Techniques and Procedures).

Issue: Current Urban Operations Doctrine does not support operations conducted by this unit.

Discussion: The current doctrinal manuals on Urban Operations do not address how best to utilize armored forces in an urban environment. The enemy faced by this unit hid his tanks and vehicles under camouflaged covers, beneath bridge overpasses, inside of buildings on narrow streets, and under low trees. These enemy systems were not seen until they were only meters away. No degree of IPB (Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield) could compensate, alert, or prepare any US force for the massive numbers of RPGs (Rocket Propelled Grenades) stored in houses, shacks, lockers, and cars. The only way to counter RPGs fired from covered and concealed positions was to absorb the hit, identify the source of the fire, and respond with massive overwhelming firepower.

Recommendation: The BCT submit to the United States Army Infantry School and the United States Armor School an update to the current urban operations doctrine. Additionally, send only vehicles that can sustain RPG hits into urban combat zones.

Issue: Problems arising from the simultaneous conduct of SASO (Stability and Support Operations) and combat operations in Iraq.

Discussion: After less than 48 hours after the first battlefield engagement, members of this company team were tasked to conduct checkpoint operations southwest of An Najaf. With no training, Soldiers were expected to search vehicles, interact with civilians with no CA (Civil Affairs) or PSYOPS (Psychological Warfare) support, detain EPW's (Enemy Prisoners of War), and confiscate weapons. Less than 48 hours after this, the unit was again heavily engaged in combat operations. The radical and swift change from combat operations to SASO and back to combat operations over and over again causes many points of friction for the Soldiers and their leaders.

With the exception of a class given to the platoon leaders, there were not formal classes or training conducted by CA prior to the operation. No training on checkpoint operations or dealing with civilians was received.

Material resources continued to be an issue. The team brought extra CL IV on all vehicles in anticipation of having to conduct blocking operations but the capability to haul the quantities required by SASO was not there. Having emplaced checkpoints on four different occasions, by the time the unit reached Baghdad, there was no remaining CL IV (construction and barrier materials). The unit was in desperate need of materials for force protection. It took weeks for materials to arrive; in the meantime the unit utilized destroyed cars, flower posts, bicycle racks, and whatever else was available for force protection.

Interpreters were not available to the company team at any point during the operation. These interpreters are critical to the team's ability to interact with civilians, discern their problems, and broadcast friendly unit intentions. Often times the unit had crowds and upset civilians to deal with and absolutely no way to verbally communicate with them.

Lack of information from higher headquarters greatly complicated the task of converting from high intensity conflict to SASO. Weeks after occupying Baghdad in force, the unit is still unable to direct the civilian populace to humanitarian agencies other than the Red Crescent. We have no way to direct people to places to receive food and water, to search for loved ones, to located deceased personnel. The unit did not have the ability to answer any questions simply because of the unsynchronized and unplanned operations of the Civil Affairs community and other non-governmental organizations.

The problem with the switching from combat to SASO is the impact on the Soldiers and leaders of the unit. Transitioning from combat to SASO requires a substantial and fundamental shift in attitude. The Soldiers have been asked to go from killing the enemy to protecting and interacting, and back to killing again. The constant shift in mental posture greatly complicates things for the average Soldier. The Soldiers are blurred and confused about the rules of engagement, which continues to raise questions, and issues about force protection while at checkpoints and conducting patrols. How does the Soldier know exactly what the rule of engagement is? Soldiers who have just conducted combat against dark skinned personnel wearing civilian clothes have difficulty trusting dark skinned personnel wearing civilian clothes.

Recommendation:

A. Integrate SASO training into the unit METL (MISSION-ESSENTIAL TASK LIST). This was has provided ample instances where units are conducting both combat and stability operations at the same time. Thus, we should no longer expect to be able to compartmentalize ourselves as either "war fighter: or "peacekeeper". With the ever-present threat of terrorist attack, it is critical that Soldiers know the correct tactics, techniques, and procedures for providing security while also enforcing peace.

B. Heavy duty CL IV materials are required for blocking positions and should be maintained at the task force or BCT level. Lift and freight assets need to be responsive and capable of delivering reinforcing materials in short order.

C. Civil Affairs, pysops, and interpreters must be integrated at the company team level. Every checkpoint must have an interpreter and these interpreters must be with the company team throughout the operation as it is impossible to predict when you may be required to fight or keep the peace.

D. Improved information flow and the quicker establishment of Civil Military Operations Centers. Units occupying positions in built up areas make frequent contact with civilians. Information and a centralized theme must be passed to the company team level as quickly as possible to ensure the proper message is being sent to the populace, and in turn, input from the populace is reaching the highest levels. The company team level is the level where the interaction with the populace occurs.

E. We must train our leaders and Soldiers in the conduct of SASO operations. Leaders must be sensitive to the flux between war fighting and peacekeeping and the demands of each not only on the unit but the individual. We owe it to our Soldiers to train them on the differences. It is the responsibility of leaders to ensure PVT Plunger and PVT Snuffy know what the proper posture or attitude is and to enforce it.

Issue: The employment of Hunter Killer teams.

Discussion: This unit, while conducting combat operations, had great success through the utilization of hunter killer teams. The combination of scouts with LRASS (Long-Range Advanced Scout Surveillance System) and tanks and fighting vehicles proved invaluable at the detection and destruction of enemy vehicles and dismounted infiltration attempts.

By locating a scout section with LRASS, which could observe out to 10,000m, at a location that had maximum observation, the scouts, could provide real time intelligence and 10 digit grid locations to the company team enabling the company team to move to and engage with direct fires and/or utilize mortar fires to destroy enemy forces. This proved to be a great TTP (Tactics, Techniques and Procedures) while at OBJ RAMS, An Najaf, and while blocking on HWY 1.

Recommendation: Doctrine be published based upon the success of the task force operations utilizing hunters and killers, specifically, integrating scouts, infantry, and armor forces into an effective organization which can identify, assess, and destroy the enemy.

4. Training

Issue: Urban Operations Training for armor forces

Discussion: The armor platoon attached to this CO/TM was fortunate enough to receive UO (Urban Operations) training prior to operations in Iraq. They learned valuable lessons such as firing from the GAS sight at extremely close ranges, entering a battle sight range of 300m while in urban environments for the main gun, and decentralizing the location of CL I (food), water, and CL III(P) (fuel) on the tank in order to protect from losing all supplies due to a single hit or building strike. They learned to keep their tanks out of intersections and to scan the upper stories of buildings and rooftops for enemy forces. They practiced transporting infantry and coordinating direct fires with dismounted forces. These and other TTPs gave the platoon the confidence and experience required when attacks to Baghdad and raids south on HWY 8 were conducted.

Recommendation: All armor platoons should be trained and integrated into urban operations training. Although the tactics trained may not have been executed, the lessons learned regarding load plans, fire control system adjustments, fire patterns, and scanning responsibilities were instrumental to the platoon's success. Every effort should be made to teach these lessons prior to combat.

Tank platoons should also train with a dismounted squad under the control of a tank platoon leader. At a battle position in Baghdad, 3/A/1-64 AR was attached a weapons squad from an infantry platoon. These Soldiers were critical to the platoon's defense. They were tied in between two tanks along a dismounted avenue of approach. It was composed of a heavy tree line and thick vegetation that closed to within 50 meters of the platoon's position. The squad repelled an RPG team's attempt to infiltrate the platoon BP and also cleared seven bunkers full of weapons and ammunition. These feats could not have been accomplished without the task organized infantry squad.

Issue: Machine gun engagement training for loaders.

Discussion: Thanks to numerous live fire opportunities, the armor platoon loaders were all experienced in firing the loader's M240 machine gun prior to operations in Iraq. When battle came, these Soldiers comfortably understood the behavior of their weapons system and were able to place effective, deadly fire on the enemy. There was a dramatic improvement in their performance from the first time they fired their machine guns in training to the use of the weapons in combat.

Recommendation: Incorporate a loader's engagement into Tank Table VIII scenarios. This will compel units to train loaders on their weapon system and give loaders invaluable experience and opportunities to refine their techniques. This unit was fortunate enough to have the time and ammunition to learn these skills on their own; others may not have that luxury.

5. Equipment.

Discussion: During the conduct of urban operations by this unit, due to limited visibility within the turret and the threat encountered not only from the front but from both flanks of the vehicles, Bradley commanders were required to expose themselves outside of the turret in order to acquire enemy forces, to control movement, and protect their own vehicles. As a result of this, most BC's adapted to this and began to keep M231 port firing weapons and "bags of hand grenades" on top of their turrets in order to defeat enemy forces in close proximity to their vehicle or enemy forces on the side opposite of gun tube orientation.

Recommendation: A M240 machine gun similar to that mounted on the M1A1 tank for loaders, be mounted on the M2 Bradley Commander's Turret. This would enable the BC to defend his vehicle from threats opposite of the gun tube and also in close proximity to the vehicle. BC's would no longer be required to keep their personal weapons or hand grenades on top of the turret in order to repel enemy attacks.

Issue: Effective communication between tanks and dismounted Infantry.

Discussion: On several occasions, infantry squads were attached to the armor platoon in the CO/TM to provide additional security at checkpoints/blocking positions and to defend dismounted avenues of approach at battle positions. The tanks were forced to utilize Motorola "talkabout" radios to communicate with the squad. This was problematic for several reasons: 1. Lack of net security, 2. "Talkabout" radios are not integrated into the tank internal communication system, 3. Lack, or prohibition of "talkabout" radios in theater. This is the same problem encountered by infantry platoons due to the lack of dismountable frequency hop capable radios at the platoon level.

Recommendation: Issue PRC148, frequency hop capable radios, to all infantry squads or give each tank platoon an extra dismountable SINCGARS radio. TA1 phones mounted externally to the tank proved to be inadequate. They were unreliable and lacked the flexibility to successfully move with the infantry as they left their holes and cleared bunkers.

Issue: Loaders exposed to enemy machine gun fire at close range in urban operations combat.

Discussion: Loaders played a critical role in identifying, suppressing, and destroying enemy infantry, vehicles, and RPG teams on the flanks of their vehicles down alleys and behind buildings as we advanced in column along roads. The observation and suppression abilities of loaders are critical to the success of the tank and the unit and compel them to stay outside the loader's hatch. However, the only protection for loaders against enemy small arms fire came from the spall vests and effective suppression of the enemy. Had enemy fire been more accurate or intense, many loaders would have been killed or wounded.

Recommendation: Develop and employ an armor plate that attaches to the loader's M240 machine gun mount and covers the vital areas of the loader's body. It should be easy to add or remove quickly (within seconds) in order to facilitate the expedient closure of the loader's hatch. It must be capable of stopping 7.62mm fire.

Issue: Need for more effective anti personnel capability for the M1A1.

Discussion: The majority of enemy forces faced were dismounted infantrymen. They could be effectively engaged and destroyed by 7.62 and .50 CAL fire. This, however, took time, and forced loaders and tank commanders to repeatedly expose themselves to reload under close combat. These small arms also hindered the fast clearing of fields of fire in thick vegetation.

Recommendation: Develop and field 120mm anti personnel munitions for the M1A1. The additional shock and firepower of anti personnel main gun rounds such as white phosphorous and "beehive" would have facilitated the quicker destruction of the enemy and the collapse of his will to fight. Due to burning or shotgun like effects, these rounds also bring about the quick exposure of camouflaged enemy positions. This, in turn, translates, into safer conditions and fewer US casualties.

Issue: The lack of proper night vision equipment and target acquisition systems.

Discussion: Elements of this unit consistently hesitated to engage and destroy enemy forces due to caution and the inability to clearly identify the enemy in daylight, thermal, and passive night vision sights. The Army's current policy of outfitting light units with the newest night vision technology, specifically passive night vision, is seriously flawed as demonstrated during this conflict. The PVS 7As currently utilized by most members of the company team proved all but worthless. The light units simply followed the heavy units which reinforces the need for the mechanized and heavy units to have the newest in night fighting equipment as heavy units are much more versatile than light units ever dreamed of being. Several vehicles crashed into berms and wadis due to the lack of proper night vision equipment. GPS and TIS sights could not provide positive identification of small arms, RPG's, or mortars beyond 800m, thus making it impossible to determine enemy activity or presence on vehicles without closing range or aid from scout vehicles.

Recommendation: At a minimum, upgrade the thermal sights on the M1A1 tank and M2A2 Bradley. Provide the most up to date passive night vision to heavy units, even if it means taking it from the "premier" light units who in fact followed this unit throughout Iraq. It would be ideal to see 3rd generation FLIR, CITVs, and fourth generation passive night vision.

6. Manning.

Issue: Three 9-man squads vs. two 9-man squads and a 9-man weapons squad.

Discussion: While conducting multiple dismounted operations, the ability to commit two maneuver squads and still retain the flexibility to maintain an adequate suppressive fire platform from the ground was very critical to the success of this unit in combat operations. Having the weapons squad in its entirety, to deploy and maintain an overwhelming amount of firepower, under the control of one competent squad leader, enabled the two maneuver squads to execute their assigned tasks with all nine of their Soldiers. This allowed for the training conducted to be executed in the same manner. Through repetition, the squads were very proficient in the execution of room/building clearing. This allowed the squad leader and the platoon leader to concentrate on the clearing of the building.

Recommendation: The two 9 man rifle squads and one-man weapon squad should replace the current three 9-man squad concept. The current doctrine has one Soldier qualified on three weapon systems, depending on the environment of the operation. This concept does not provide for the loss of one of those personnel. The composition of the weapon squad should be as follows: 1 SSG squad leader, 3 M240B machine gunners, 3 M240B assistant gunners, and 2 Javelin AT gunners.

7. Logistics.

Issue: CL IX (spare parts) parts flow throughout the operation was non-existent.

Discussion: Throughout the conduct of combat operations, the only CL IX parts available were those brought forward by the task force or those, which were cannibalized off of destroyed or damaged vehicles. This made maintenance operations difficult if not impossible for long periods of time.

Recommendation: A CL IX package specific to the unit be loaded onto vehicles which have the capability to move forward with the speed of the combat units and the ability to mount weapon systems in order to expedite the movement of parts forward to the war fighter and the UMCP. Without this capability, the unit loses combat power critical to the conduct of the fight or stability operations.

8. Maneuver.

They learned valuable lessons such as firing from the GAS sight at extremely close ranges, entering a battle sight range of 300m while in urban environments for the main gun, and decentralizing the location of CL I, water, and CL III(P) on the tank in order to protect from losing all supplies due to a single hit or building strike. They learned to keep their tanks out of intersections and to scan the upper stories of buildings and rooftops for enemy forces. They practiced transporting infantry and coordinating direct fires with dismounted forces. These and other TTPs gave the platoon the confidence and experience required when attacks to Baghdad and raids south on HWY 8 were conducted.

Recommendation: All armor platoons should be trained and integrated into urban operations training. Although the tactics trained may not have been executed, the lessons learned regarding load plans, fire control system adjustments, fire patterns, and scanning responsibilities were instrumental to the platoon's success. Every effort should be made to teach these lessons prior to combat.

Tank platoons should also train with a dismounted squad under the control of a tank platoon leader. At a battle position in Baghdad, 3/A/1-64 AR was attached a weapons squad from an infantry platoon. These Soldiers were critical to the platoon's defense. They were tied in between two tanks along a dismounted avenue of approach. It was composed of a heavy tree line and thick vegetation that closed to within 50 meters of the platoon's position. The squad repelled and RPG team's attempt to infiltrate the platoon BP and also cleared seven bunkers full of weapons and ammunition. These feats could not have been accomplished without the task organized infantry squad.

Issue: Machine gun engagement training for loaders.

Discussion: Thanks to numerous live fire opportunities, the armor platoon loaders were all experienced in firing the loader's M240 machine gun prior to operations in Iraq. When battle came, these Soldiers comfortably understood the behavior of their weapons system and were able to place effective, deadly fire on the enemy. There was a dramatic improvement in their performance from the first time they fired their machine guns in training to the use of the weapons in combat.

Recommendation: Incorporate a loader's engagement into Tank Table VIII scenarios. This will compel units to train loaders on their weapon system and give loaders invaluable experience and opportunities to refine their techniques. This unit was fortunate enough to have the time and ammunition to learn these skills on their own; others may not have that luxury.

Issue: Attack aviation support was non-existent from LD throughout the entire combat operation.

Discussion: Throughout "OIF" from the crossing of the line of departure to the cessation of hostilities in Baghdad, the task force did not have any attack aviation support. As the brigade and division main effort, attack aviation should have been available at all times during combat operations or when enemy contact was likely. As it was, the aviators were not willing to fly to support the troops on the ground.

Recommendation: The method in which commander's plan to employ attack aviation as a combat multiplier needs to be reviewed. Currently, commanders and staffs rely too much on attack aviation being a combat multiplier when conduct combat ratios, when as in this fight, it is discovered to be unreliable or non-existent. Commanders and staffs must plan primarily for each fight without the support of "attack" aviation as the aviators are unreliable at best.

Issue: Special operations forces brought absolutely nothing to the fight during the conduct of combat operations but wanted support during SASO operations.

Discussion: Throughout this operation, special operations forces brought no information, which was of any value to the unit. In fact, never at one time did this unit have any special operations forces forward in zone or along an axis of attack providing critical information or intelligence. In fact, the situation was just the opposite. The special operations forces, hid or moved behind the protection of armored forces throughout the operation. This became especially evident during the transition from hostilities to SASO as this unit was tasked at least daily to provide either a QRF or transport to special operations forces into areas of the city to meet contacts or conduct "snatches".

Recommendation: Conventional ground commanders, the backbone of the army, cannot expect to receive any timely information from special operations forces during combat operations such as those experienced by this unit during "OIF". Additionally, the United States Army should review its current doctrine or lack of doctrine reference the integration of SOF and armor and mechanized infantry forces.

1. The Death Wagons of Iraq

By David H. Hackworth

In Iraq, a Humvee - the modern military's jeep - is involved in an enemy action or a serious fender bender or rollover almost daily. Lt. Gen. Thomas F. Metz's command has experienced 13 Humvee rollovers, resulting in 17 of his Soldiers dying. "Nine of the deaths occurred in the last 90

days," he says.

Gen. Metz says that most rollovers occur when "the driver has lost control of the vehicle." In a letter to his unit, he summed up other causes, such as "aggressive driving, lack of situational awareness, rough terrain, poor/limited visibility, adverse traffic conditions, improvised configurations and failure to wear seat belts."

Amen on the aggressive driving. If bad guys are firing rockets and automatic weapons and blowing off mines left, right and center, no one in his or her right mind would drive on the most dangerous roads in the world the way we oh-so-carefully drive by a parked police car on the

freeway. As longtime guerrilla-war veteran Lt. Col. Ben Willis (retired) puts it, "The MO would be to put the pedal to the metal."

The problem is that the soft-skinned Humvee was conceived as a light utility truck - not a close combat vehicle. "The Humvee is horribly thin-skinned and underpowered," says Army veteran Scott Schreiber, who drove one for six years. "It should be used in roles that don't call for

armor. If the role calls for armor, it's simple: use armor."

At the end of World War II, I was in a recon company in Italy. We started with armored cars - M-8s - but as Terrible Tito's terrorists started using roadside mines and staging ambushes similar to the mean stuff going down in Iraq, our leaders quickly got rid of those thin-skinned suckers and put us in light tanks - M-24s. Within a year, as the guerrilla war with Yugoslavia heated up, we were given Sherman tanks - M-4s - with their even-thicker armor protection. And when a

blown mine or ambush slapped shrapnel or slugs against the sides of our 36-ton tanks, we sat safely inside those steel walls, with our weapons turned full-bore on the enemy. Our armor protection gave us the critical edge our troopers should have today.

But here we are in Iraq after 15 bloody months still welding steel plate onto Humvees. Sure, our Soldiers gain a tad more protection, but it also turns the vehicles into rollover queens because it shifts their center of gravity.

What's further wrong with this picture is that Iraq has excellent steelworkers and first-class machine shops that could be put to good use upgrading captured Iraqi equipment into armored vehicles capable of protecting our warriors while also securing our long, exposed supply

lines.

Our modern generals might give a lot of lip service to protecting the force, but any way you cut it, what's going on in Iraq is criminal. Clearly there's a disconnect. The brass need to spend less time in their luxurious lakefront palaces and get down on the ground with the troops.

Maybe then they'll develop a greater sense of urgency about what's really needed on those killer roads the same way the 88th Division commanding general, Maj. Gen. Bryant E. Moore, did with us back in Italy and then again in Korea - where he was eventually killed as a corps

commander leading from the front.

And maybe our lawmakers should stop by Walter Reed hospital and get some firsthand skinny from the terribly wounded being treated there about what a death wagon the Humvee has become from the way it's presently being used.

"How many Soldiers and marines need to be maimed or killed by roadside bombs before Congress will get off their tails?" Mary Martino rightfully asks. "My son is serving his country with honor and pride in Iraq ...and has the right to expect that his country will do whatever it takes

to protect him in his duties."

--Eilhys England contributed to this column.

Col. David H. Hackworth (USA Ret.) is SFTT.org co-founder and Senior Military Columnist for DefenseWatch magazine. For information on his many books, go to his home page at Hackworth.com, where you can sign in for his free weekly Defending America. Send mail to P.O. Box 11179, Greenwich, CT 06831. His newest book is "Steel My Soldiers' Hearts." C

2004 David H. Hackworth. Please send Feedback responses to dwfeedback@yahoo.com.

2. SOF magazine, July 2004

TRACKS IN IRAQ

PDF version of the article

By Michael L. Sparks and Roy S. Ardillo II

The majority of our 100,000 troops in Iraq now ride in 10,000 vulnerable unarmored and quasi-armored 3-6 ton HMMWV "Humvee" rubber-tired trucks, that fail to protect them from roadside bombs (IEDs), RPGs, or mob violence. This is the same error we made in Somalia, emasculating our forces by putting them into wheeled trucks. The Iraqis have recently discovered they can throw bombs through the shoulder-high doors and windows of HMMWVs, then crowd around to set them on fire with containers of fuel.

There's been a lot of half-informed media criticism of the Army for not supplying enough "up-armored" HMMWVs. That caused the Army to increase production. Department of Army spokesmen insist that these Sport Utility Vehicles are the answer to our troop protection problems. Tragically, many American Soldiers have been killed in so-called "up-armored HMMWV" trucks, only slightly better protected than the gasoline-powered SUVs the four civilian Blackwater Security contractors (former Special Forces and SEALs) were killed in, burned and then dragged through the streets.

This is a sober reminder that being in superb physical condition cannot protect you from RPGs and bombs going off. Tracked armored vehicles that can be more than 28% more armored than wheeled vehicles are needed. CBS anchorman Dan Rather weeks before, showed one of the so-called "armored HMMWVs" with its windshield blown out by a roadside bomb that killed another two Soldiers.

The tragedy is that army leaders now admit privately that up-armoring HMMWVs is a mistake; General Larry R. Ellis, FORSCOM CG has distributed a memo recognizing the mistake, but calls for more wheeled trucks, this time Strykers, made in slow handfuls in Canada at $3.3 million each. Our troops need better protected M113 Gavin tracks, available now to be shipped/flown into Iraq to reverse the crumbling situation there.

Tracks: Ready to Go

Another Soldier died in an armored HMMWV after a bomb was easily thrown through one of its four windows. Waiting for inadequate armored HMMWV SUVs to be built is not the answer, and only serves to give the enemy easy propaganda footage of burning trucks. The Army plan to eventually supply our troops heavier HMMWV trucks ignores the fact that thousands of thicker armored, M113 Gavin light tracked vehicles--without windows/doors and rubber tires that burn--are sitting in depots around the country, ready to replace the thousands of vulnerable HMMWVs in use in Iraq.

Civilian contractors are on their own to supply themselves armored vehicles.

Researching this issue since 1994, we've discovered that 50% of an Army heavy division already moves by 10.5 ton M113 Gavin light tracks and in fact, 1,300 are in Iraq now, though the Army has not supplied the extra armor they should have fitted to their undersides, belly and gunshields on top. Yet the Army now wants the majority of its troops in Iraq to ride in vulnerable HMMWV wheeled trucks when they all should be riding in adequately protected M113 Gavin tracks, except for heavy cargo-carrying trucks. This bad decision in favor of HMMWV trucks is killing our men.

The many, de-centralized Iraqi opposition groups increasingly sense that Americans cannot defend themselves, much less keep order. The relatively few tracked armored fighting vehicles we have now in Iraq are not sufficient to be everywhere they’re needed, especially if there is a general uprising, or "intifada." Most troops will have to fight from HMMWV trucks until they are overwhelmed, and then try to move on foot, through the crowds that overwhelmed the vehicle.

Every Iraqi household is allowed an AK-47-type automatic weapon (AKM). Stripped of vehicular mobility, our troops on foot could be easily pinned down by automatic rifle fire from many directions. Their only defense would be to return fire---and there is a finite limit to how much ammo you can carry on your body. If the Iraqis sense they have the Americans pinned down, they can "pile on" with women and children shooting AKMs in the general direction of huddled American troops, as happened in Somalia.

To save our troops, maintain control in Iraq and win future non-linear battles against terrorists, as well as enemy nation-state armies, we must emphasize ground maneuver, using go-anywhere, adequately protected tracked armored vehicles, not wheeled trucks. Whether American forces can survive an imminent offensive throughout Iraq hinges on our troops being properly equipped with M113 Gavin light tracked AFVs, currently sitting back here in the U.S. Our troops cannot wait two years for an inadequate HMMWV armor cover-up; they need light tracks now to meet an imminent Iraqi meltdown.

Iraq may well collapse into civil war in June, when we turn over control to the new, but very likely impotent, Iraqi government. A general uprising could send thousands of angry unarmed Iraqi mobs swarming around our HMMWV trucks, forcing American troops to either fire on civilians, including women and children--a propaganda disaster in the Arab world--or flee their flimsy mounts lest they be incinerated in them when the mobs toss fire bombs inside and/or turn them over.

American troops could be forced to flee for their lives, back to their barricaded city areas, and a dozen fortified camps, then surrounded and trapped. How long will their ammunition, food and water last? They wouldn't be able to move in their wheeled trucks for resupply?

Peel ‘n’ Stick

Extra peel 'n’ stick armor that the troops themselves can apply, made by Armor Systems International of Vancouver, WA called Aztik, proven by Army Aberdeen Proving Ground tests to stop .50 caliber, half-inch projectiles moving at 3,000 feet per second, needs to be supplied to all Gavins. Gunshields for the track commander and troops on guard at the top troop hatch must be provided as soon as possible.

If Iraq falls apart in the coming months, we need an everyone-in-a-light-track AFV capability to rapidly put down the uprising and secure key governmental and religious centers, roads, power plants, shops and stores. We need to destroy all Iraqi arsenals and weapons installations where 155mm artillery shells, RPG rounds and explosives are stored.

We propose force structures formed with M113 Gavin light tracked AFVs sent to cover the border and cut off supplies and al-Queda terrorists coming from the outside. Surplus M113 Gavins should be supplied at no charge to civilian contractors, as well as the opportunity to buy extra armor and gunshields.

All of our troops need clear ballistic riot control face shields fitted to their helmets, riot control pepper spray hand grenades, and paintball guns, to withstand rock attacks and disburse angry mobs without killing people, which would start a cycle of revenge violence.

The non-linear battlefield requires that every ounce of vehicular protection be provided to our troops; we jeopardize our success by using wheeled trucks with windows, doors, windshields or $3 million Strykers which are 28% less space/weight efficient than tracks, all of which run on easily destroyed, air-filled rubber tires. Recently, in Mosul, a $3.3 million dollar Stryker armored truck was incinerated by thirty dollars worth of RPGs. At this exchange rate the terrorists will win by bankrupting us.

On the non-linear battlefield, the enemy can attack at any time in any direction. American Soldiers must have the ability to shrug off such attacks by being in a light tracked AFV with applique' armor and gunshields that resist RPGs, roadside bombs, mobs, barricades and firebombs. The minimum non-linear battlefield transportation standard for the U.S. Army must be an upgraded to M113 Gavin light tracked AFV, not flimsy armored HMMWVs or Stryker trucks.

Unsafe Step Backwards

The design of the M113 represents the wisdom of years of combat experience. Troops can fight from the top, with situational awareness, behind gunshields, yet can still talk to people outside from within the vehicle. They can dismount through the rear ramp, through the troop door inside the ramp, or jump out from on top. We lose all of this going to "armored" HMMWVs. This is an unsafe step backwards to what is essentially a civilian car with four doors, four windows, a windshield and air-filled rubber tires that offer little protection from grenades or Molotov cocktails.

Troops sitting in HMMWV bucket seats, if they are protected, have their doors and windows closed, and are not situationally aware, or able to fire back. Remove the doors and they are exposed to instant death if a bomb goes off. This is a lose-lose situation.

It takes two HMMWVs to move a nine-man rifle squad at five miles per gallon, and four men are taken out of the fight because they have to stay with their vehicles. The M113 Gavin with a 3.5 mpg fuel rate is easy to supply, maintain, operate and can go cross-country at will, to include swimming across lakes, rivers and even oceans (with waterjet kits), is gentle on pavement, and takes only a driver and Track Commander/Gunner away from the other seven dismounts, but can provide stubborn suppressive fires behind gunshields.

Furthermore, for just $400,000 per, the M113 Gavin would provide each squad increased capabilities, such as hybrid-electric drive, stealth band tracks, and 30mm 1-man AV30 autocannon turrets, shooting the same lethal ammo as the AH-64 Apaches. A C4ISR package (C4ISR package = Command, Control, Communications, Computers Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance suite; i.e.; a computer with display screen connected by radio to a tactical internet in a vehicle with image intensifier and infrared thermal observation devices to look out and spot the enemy) would give "FCS-like" (FCS-like = The Future Combat System's C4ISR features) capabilities right now for the war on terror, not ten years from now, at an unaffordable $10 million per vehicle.

SIDEBAR 1:

There are peel 'n stick armor panels, called Aztik, army approved by Aberdeen Proving Grounds to stop .50 caliber (half inch) bullets traveling at 3,000 feet per second. For $40,000 per M113 Gavin these can be fitted by the troops themselves instead of waiting for the Army bureaucracy to supply them and have depots change the vehicles. Since there are 1,300 x M113 Gavins in Iraq without any extra armor, we need to get them Aztik peel 'n’ stick ASAP. Weight is only 800 pounds.

Armor Systems International

110 Columbia Street

Vancouver, WA 98660

phone: (360) 993-5181

toll free: (866) 993-5181

fax: (360) 737-0743

www.armorsystemsint.com

STEP A: 1300 sets of peel n' stick Aztik armor for M113 Gavins in Iraq now. Troop welders should add racks on the sides to hold the Aztik panels against the M113 hull, and add troop stow gear to pre-detonate any RPGs.

Start building 1300 ACAV gunshield sets.

STEP B: Ship ALL the M113 Gavin tracks the troops in Iraq left behind to get as many of them out of HMMWV SUV trucks as possible. We need peel 'n' stick for as many as are shipped. Troop welders should add racks on the sides to hold the Aztik panels against the M113 hull, and add troop stow gear to pre-detonate any RPGs. Build same number of ACAV gunshield sets.

STEP C: Upgrade 800 M113A2s into M113A4 Gavin hybrid-electric drives with C4ISR, peel 'n stick armor, gunshields, RPG applique’ armor etc. and buy 400 M973A2 Ridgways for the 101st Air Assault Division with armor modifications to combat-ready the entire U.S. Army's light infantry divisions, which are now without any armored vehicles.

United Defense Limited Products, makers of the M113 Gavin, M2 Bradley, AAV-7s, M109 Paladins, reports that M113s have provisions to fit underbelly armor which extends back the first 1/3 of the vehicle.

SIDEBAR 2: LIGHT TRACKED VEHICLES ARE SUITABLE FOR NON-LINEAR COMBAT AREAS; WHEELED TRUCKS ARE NOT

Slapping two tons of armor onto what was originally a three-ton wheeled vehicle loads too much pressure onto too narrow wheels, suspensions and drive trains. In civilian life, an armored car has to be rebuilt several times because their armored boxes over-tax their drivetrains. The commanding general of Army Materiel Command, General Paul Kern has said the service takes an estimated eight hours to reset a HMMWV; some experts say that figure can skyrocket to 62 hours when the engine is pulled, whereas swapping the engine on an M1A1 Abrams tank requires only about 30 minutes.

When even thin armor is added to HMMWVs for minimal protection against roadside bombs, the weight places an additional strain on engines. During the 2004 Winter Symposium sponsored by the Association of the U.S. Army, Kern said. "I've got 800 of them right now, sitting around…trying to get back to the United States with a retrograde problem...the challenge I see is making decisions quickly enough and getting on with a new development, because the vehicles are wearing out pretty fast."

Army spokesmen told us that the M113 Gavin's light ground pressure tracks are somehow "too hard" on pavement and cannot go the daily distances required, when more than 1,300 M113s have been driving all over Iraqi roads and countryside for over a year without ill effects. Why not expand on this success and have all our troops ride in better-protected M113 Gavins? The M113 is seven times lighter than a 70-ton M1 Abrams heavy tank, three times lighter than a M2 Bradley fighting vehicle, and half the weight of a 22-ton Stryker armored car, while being better protected than the latter. The M113 weighs the same as an Army 5-ton cargo capacity truck but spreads its weight over long and wide tracks instead of narrow tires. The answer is to stop throwing armor on expensive, fragile HMMWV trucks and solve the troop protection problem by immediately shipping to Iraq some of the thousands of better protected, thick-skinned 11-ton M113 Gavin light tracked armored fighting vehicles the Army has ready today in storage, and the 235+ Gavins the National Guard's 30th and 81st Brigades left behind when they went to Iraq.

As General Kern alludes, tracked AFVs are mechanically simpler than wheeled trucks, spreading their weight over a larger area, to go easier on their running gear; a single light tracked AFV like the M113A3 Gavin with 275 hp engine can carry an entire 9-man

rifle squad with underbelly armor, gunshields, extra RPG-resistant armor at a 3.5 mpg fuel cost with far better armor protection than vulnerable HMMWVs with two windshields, eight windows, eight doors rolling on eight air-filled rubber tires that easily burn.

The M113 Gavins roll on metal roadwheels with steel tracks with rubber pads or band tracks--so they are easy on Iraqi pavement--you can have 50+ mph road speeds and vibrationless stealth for raids. The latest T150 track lasts for 10,000 miles--a lot longer than rubber tires that bust daily. M113 Gavins are the most successful vehicles in Iraq, for those units lucky enough to have them. It’s time every Army unit uses them, as the U.N. does when they go to a dangerous area.

The Israelis use up-armored M113s to convoy their troops from bases to foot-patrol areas and back--they don't lose a man a day in combat as we do in Iraq. While their troops talk to locals on foot, other Soldiers in M113s follow in the background ready to help or talk to locals from behind gunshields.

About the authors

Roy S. Ardillo II has a Bachelor of Science degree in accounting and a Master of Business Administration from Southeastern Louisiana University, and is a Health Care Services Division analyst. In the United States Army, he was a military intelligence analyst from 1971 to 1981, including combat service in Vietnam.

1. Defense Today

June 28, 2004

Pg. 1

By Nathan Hodge

An internal Army report casts doubt on whether the Stryker Mobile Gun System

(MGS) can be air-dropped from Air Force cargo planes, possibly an important requirement.

According to a draft report prepared by the Army's Transportation Engineering Agency of Newport News, Va., the MGS is too tall to be airdropped from a C-130 Hercules, a four-engined turboprop plane. What's more, the report said the gun system may be too heavy to be dropped from a larger, more powerful airlifter, the C-17 Globemaster III.

"The C-17 low-velocity airdrop weight limits are the same as for the C-130 and are based upon the current 42,000-pound airdrop system" that enables heavy equipment to roll off the ramp of an airlifter and sail to the ground by parachute, the report says. "The maximum gross rigged weight of an item to be airdropped is 42,000 pounds. The maximum item weight, which depends on the rigging requirements, is about 36,000 pounds."

In other words, the 44,000-pound gun system may be large and too heavy to be used on the existing airdrop system.

If MGS is not certified as air-droppable, it means the gun system might not meet a key requirement for the 82nd Airborne Division, which wants a lightweight armored gun to provide fire support in airfield seizure and other operations. The Army recently awarded a contract to General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS), which makes the MGS, to experiment with the parachute airdrop of the vehicle, and has tentatively scheduled a static drop test for the end of this month. Another armored gun already is airdrop certified: the M8 Armored Gun System made by United Defense, L.P. Four M8s are currently in storage.

However, the Army report does not rule out airdrop testing of the MGS. The report notes that prototype 60,000-pound airdrop hardware is available that could handle the heavier load. The Army developed and tested the 60,000-pound airdrop system, which can be dropped from a C-17 or a C-5 Galaxy, but it was never purchased.

"The components that make up the 60,000-pound airdrop hardware may exist from the original testing, but not as a fielded set," the report says. "If these components exist, the MGS could possibly be airdrop tested."

No immediate comment on the report was available from the Transportation Engineering agency; likewise, calls to a representative of the Natick Soldier Center, Natick, Mass., the agency responsible for evaluating the MGS for airdrop procedures, were not returned.

Peter Keating, a GDLS spokesman, said the MGS airdrop was a very ambitious project.

"They have the pallet to do it, but they just never had a vehicle that came in at this weight to need to try it," he said. "I don't know of any issues, but we'll know more after the static drop at the end of the month."

On June 30, the Army is planning to do a static drop at Fort Polk, La., meaning they will rig up an entire MGS, haul it up on a crane and drop it from several feet up.

In July, Keating said, the Army will airdrop a "surrogate vehicle": a tracked M113 Engineering Squad Vehicle with additional weight added to mimic the MGS.

The MGS, a variant of the Stryker wheeled armored vehicle, carries a 105-mm cannon. It is slated for a production decision later this year.

July 14, 2004

By <mailto:WebTeam@komo4news.com>KOMO Staff

MOSUL, IRAQ - Two Stryker Brigade Soldiers were killed and two others were injured when their vehicle rolled over in Iraq Wednesday morning.

The U.S. military says the Soldiers swerved to miss an oncoming civilian truck near Tall Afar around 11 a.m. and their vehicle went off the road and rolled down an embankment.

The injured Soldiers were taken to a military medical facility for treatment. The names of the Soldiers who were killed have not been released.

1. 1st Cav M113A3 Gavins on patrol in Iraq good/bad things evident

M113A3 Gavins on patrol in Iraq: infantry facing out but no gunshields/applique

This is further proof that the M113 Gavin is best platform for urban patrolling because infantry can face outward with weapons for 360 degree awareness and instant firepower. However, troops should be stowing gear/sand bags outside to pre-detonate RPGs since Army refuses to supply them extra armor. They should stack sandbags on top since Army won't supply them with gunshields.

Yahoo! News - World Photos - AP

http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?

tmpl=story&u=/040722/481/mac10407220854

PIC:

.iraq_baghdad_clashes_mac104.jpg

U.S. Army Soldiers patrol near Haifa Street in downtown Baghdad, Iraq (news - web sites), Thursday, July 22, 2004. One Iraqi Police officer and another Iraqi suffered gunshot wounds in an overnight clash in the area, which was also the scene of another gun battle earlier this

month. (AP Photo/Jim MacMillan)

1. National Defense Magazine: August 2004

by Sandra I. Erwin

The Army intends to field quick-reaction brigades that can respond to contingencies and help facilitate the deployment of a larger force. The goal is to avoid the lengthy buildups that preceded the most recent conflicts in the Persian Gulf.

The plan, however, may be overly ambitious, given the heavy logistics tail that must follow combat units. The Army already has begun to reorganize divisions into smaller but more agile "units of action," but there are no signs that the service will be able to make these units less dependent on massive logistics support.

That reality is not likely to change, said Lt. Gen. Claude V. Christianson, Army deputy chief of staff for logistics.

"Some laws of physics you can't violate," he told reporters. When a brigade shows up with 1,200 pieces of equipment, it still takes a certain amount of effort to unload and prepare for combat, he noted.

But Christianson still believes the Army can take a leading role in "opening the theater" for a follow-on joint force. It would do so by dispatching brigade-size units specially equipped and trained for that job. "They have to be able to run airports and seaports, receive forces off planes and off ships, marry them up with their equipment and deliver them into a tactical assembly area so the commander can get ready to do the operation," he explained.

Both military and industry logistics experts, for years, have tried to fathom ways to reduce the Army's support tail. Under the future combat systems program, for example, efforts have focused on fuel-efficient vehicles, techniques to make drinking water out of exhaust fumes, and other

ambitious technologies. But no silver bullet yet exists to shrink the logistics tail.

"Those technological breakthroughs are not on the horizon for anybody," Christianson said. "We can't just hope we'll get a 50 percent reduction in fuel and ammo requirements, because that's not going to happen in the future."

At best, he added, "you can work on the margins to drop down consumption," but the only way to achieve substantial results is to empower logisticians with better information about the supply and demand on the battlefield. "If you can see what the need is and you have a throughput that is rapid and precise, you don't have to carry as much stuff," said Christianson. "The only way we can gain leverage on logistics is to have absolutely 100 percent real-time visibility requirements everywhere and have a distribution system that is so good, that once you see the requirements, you can deliver precisely."

Even if the Army managed to achieve this ideal distribution system, it would still need to convince the Soldiers that it works as advertised. As a career logistician with 33 years of service, Christianson is aware that most Soldiers have little confidence in the Army's logistics system. "The reason is that they don't know if anyone is coming," he said. "They don't know that

the requisition they sent got there. They have no connectivity. . We've got to have 100 percent connectivity all the way back to the strategic base."

The Army has moved one step in that direction with the deployment of satellite communications terminals throughout the U.S. Central Command area of operations. The service spent millions of dollars on "very small aperture satellite terminals," which are helping ease the stress on Army logisticians in the field by keeping them connected up the chain of command. These expensive systems in the past were considered unaffordable luxuries for support units.

Army planners, meanwhile, remain skeptical about the prospects of lightening the logistics burdens in combat units. A cautionary tale is the deployment of the Army's new Stryker brigade, composed of about 300 eight-wheel light armored vehicles. Although the Stryker is considered a success story from a war-fighting perspective, many observers were surprised by the large logistics footprint that it required to sustain operations in Iraq. The Army put "enormous resources" into the logistics support of Stryker to make sure it was a success, noted a logistician during a private meeting with military and industry officials. The Stryker brigade has a dedicated logistics operations center in Europe and deploys with a large contingent of contractors from General Dynamics Land Systems.

These issues are fueling debate within the future combat systems program as to whether FCS can conceivably break any new ground in logistics. Of most concern is the inability of the support units to keep up with the speedy pace of combat operations, as was the case in the Iraqi conflict. "The tempo is dramatically different than at any time in history," said an industry expert. The current logistics structure is based on "tactical pauses every day," which may not be realistic.

Even if FCS vehicles are equipped with hybrid-electric engines, that only will reduce fuel consumption by a small amount, he said. The exhaust-to-water technology is too cumbersome and consumes too much fuel. Food packaging is another sticking point. The desire to simplify logistics in some cases runs counter to an Army culture that wants to create, despite the circumstances, a comfortable environment for the Soldier. Even something as mundane as providing hot meals can add tremendous pressure to the logistics operations, the expert noted. "We haven't yet figured out how to deal with that."

2. www.fa-57.army.mil/refs/transf-rpts/16-22Jan04.htm

FT. LEWIS & I CORPS (DAN KEIRSEY 253-966-0295 email:

keirseyd@lewis.army.mil)

SBCT PCC - All preparations are complete for the first ever "Stryker BDE" Pre Command Course which will be conducted at Lewis next week (26-30 Jan). Fifteen attendees who are slated to command current/future SBCT Brigade and Battalions and three future SBCT CSM's will go through the one week course. The schedule is a busy one and includes a live VTC with the 3rd SBCT currently in Iraq.

SBCT #1 - The first Stryker Brigade continues to consolidate their new positions with the 101st ABN DIV vicinity Mosul. The 5000 Soldier Brigade will replace the 25,000 members of the 101st and assume their entire area of operations in the next few weeks. C2 of the Brigade and the AO with other associated elements will be provided by a HQ drawn from the I Corps staff of about 100 which has been named TF Olympia.

In advanced planning for their ultimate return to Lewis, PM BCT has already estimated a 111 million dollar bill for refurbishing the Strykers. And with an expected avalanche of ETS (739 known losses) and PCS moves it is expected that the entire brigade will have to undergo a new NET. For planning purposes Jan-Jun of CY 05 have been designated as the RESET window for SBCT #1.

SBCT #2 - Elements of the Brigade have been training in Leschi Town (new CACTF) and preparing for LANCER SUMMIT, the final collective training event prior to their scheduled JRTC rotation in March. Lancer Summit will be a mix of live collective events and a CPX lasting from 25 Jan to 6 Feb. PEO STRI will support the exercise with lower fixed tactical Internet, TADSS and with camera operators and AAR analysts to cover training in the CACTF. On 17 Feb they begin rail deployment to JRTC for their final training event prior to reaching readiness for immediate deployment.

The schedule for JRTC is: LFX (7-18 Mar); STX (13-16 Mar); Stryker Plt deploys to Korea (16-18 Mar); Maneuver Box (20-28 Mar); Cleanup/Regeneration (30-31 Mar); Redeploy (31 Mar-8 Apr); Stryker Plt deploys from Korea (31 Mar-2 Apr) Note that during the JRTC rotation a platoon will deploy to Korea in conjunction with the yearly RSOI exercise as a demonstration. PEO STRI, JRTC and the Lewis TSC have been proactive in preparing for the JRTC MRE and no problems are anticipated in providing quality support. The Brigade and Corps have been pressing to have the Brigade deployed sooner rather than later. If the Brigade does not deploy by September, PCS losses will force the Brigade into an extensive retraining program which would have to include another CTC like event and massive re-NET of much of the unit.

MILES XXI for Stryker w/Slat armor - It now appears that although Lewis is slated to receive 27 sets of SLAT armor this month for training, only four Strykers will be configured prior to the JRTC

exercise. None of the SLAT has been applied yet. We still have a due out to work locally to see if we can reconfigure the current MILES XXI to mount over the SLAT armor prior to the JRTC and rail loadout for the unit. It appears doable and feasible buy we need an actual vehicle to validate the installation. The Brigade has assured me they will contact me as soon as they have a set installed.

MOUT/CACTF (Leschi Town) - Local units began actively training in a portion of the Leschi Town CACTF this month. Thirteen of the 52 buildings are open for training while construction continues on the remaining portions of the 800 X 300 meter complex. However the first thirteen buildings comprise the urban core of the "town" with numerous multi story buildings (including a five story). PEO STRI instrumentation of Leschi Town will not take place until the complex is complete sometime this summer. In the interim PEO STRI is providing camera operators (comprised of the personnel who willultimately maintain both Leschi town and the AAR facility) and completing the AAR facility instrumentation to insure that SBCT #2 training receives quality support. Additionally, PM DT will provide assistance with video editors.

EST 2000 Convoy Trainer - Training demand continues high for the initial vehicle. We are working some funding issues at Lewis, but the Corps CG has indicated that dollars will be made available for a direct purchase (through PEO STRI) of additional components to bring the trainer to our objective design. The Director of the Corps Warfighting Center is confident that he will have access to the funds soon. PM GCTT is standing by to assist as soon as we at Team Lewis quantify our "shopping list."

3. This press release says that 312 Strykers will have covered 9,000 miles in their first year in country. Thats a whopping 28.85 miles per combat vehicle. That confirms the stories we have that the Strykers are impounded inside of one of Saddam Husseins palace grounds. You don’t rack up many miles when you are hidden behind a walled-compound but you don’t have combat fatalities either. That would turn off the money spigot for the rest of the program. This is not transparency. We’re being shucked and jived.

How much real deterrence from terrorism is provided by 312 Strykers at $3.3 million each hiding behind walls running 28.85 miles each in a year? This is bogus!

Lonnie Shoultz

Aerospace Daily & Defense Report

May 27, 2004

Stryker vehicles used by the Army's first Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) are exceeding Department of Defense expectations, an Army official said May 26.

The first SBCT, the 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, was deployed to Iraq in October (DAILY, Oct. 13, 2003).

The Strykers have a 95 percent operational readiness rate and on average, 97 percent of their parts are available when needed, said Lt. Col. Bryan McVeigh (USA), product manager for Interim Armored Vehicle - Combat Support.

96-day turnaround

McVeigh spoke at the Institute for Defense and Government Advancement's Tactical Ground Vehicles conference in Arlington, Va.

There is a 96-day turnaround time for replacement parts and it takes only 16-20 days for parts to be shipped from the United States to the SBCT unit in theater, he said.

The first SBCT is operating within a 56,000 square-kilometer (34,796 square-mile) area and will have covered 9,000 miles by the end of their first year in theater.

The SBCT has been replacing four to five wheels a day on average and has increased battery capacity by using 20 sets of deep-cycle batteries, which cost more, but last three times as long. This allows the vehicles to conduct five-to seven-hour silent watches without starting the engines, he said.

Suvivability

The Stryker's survivability rate has been high, even though the interim slat armor solution was designed for only a 50 percent rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) protection rate, he said. The first SBCT has had no fatalities from RPGs and only one fatality, from a grenade. Two vehicles have been lost, to secondary fires, he said.

With 56 General Dynamics Land Systems contractors and 48 Soldiers working in theater, 24-28 vehicles have had slat armor kits installed per day, or 310 sets installed in 16 days, McVeigh said. "Over 80 Soldiers are alive today because of vehicles with slat armor," he said.

Meanwhile, the Army will make a production decision on add-on reactive armor for the Strykers this October. If the service decides to proceed with reactive armor, the reinforced vehicles will come off the production line by spring, 2005, he said.

The Army also is considering an active protective system for the Strykers that would defeat incoming enemy projectiles, "to see if it can be done, since there are lots of Soldiers outside the vehicle," he said.

The Army plans to field six SBCTs over five years, for a total of 2,100 Strykers. The second SBCT, the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, is in training at Fort Lewis, Wash., said an Army spokesperson.

--Lisa Troshinsky

4. Army Transcript: Beat-up Strykers will remain in Iraq

FT. LEWIS & I CORPS (DAN KEIRSEY 253-966-0295 email: keirseyd@lewis.army.mil)

GENERAL - Things have definitely slowed down this week as the second SBCT moves out to JRTC. Many of the Corps staff not in Iraq on TF Olympia are putting the final touches on this years COBRA GOLD exercise with the Thai Army in Hawaii.

The 81st eSB is winding up their NTC final train up. They have a final formal farewell at NTC on the 13th of March and then deploy directly to OIF. The 116th Cavalry BDE from Idaho and Oregon is on alert for mobilization and is expected to train at Lewis when mobilized.

SBCT #1 - Continues to operate in the former 101st ABN DIV AO vicinity of Mosul.

SBCT #2 - Lewis has still not seen the official OPORD/DEPORD but the decision has been made that SBCT #2 will replace SBCT #1 in Iraq. The general plan is for SBCT #2 to do a relief in place and fall in on SBCT #1's equipment. This will minimize the movement of equipment but will present some interesting challenges in reconfiguring the digital databases. Much remains to be sorted out in identifying just how this will all fall out before the actual deployment. Due to the anticipated timeline (Oct/Nov) the Brigade faces a major training challenge after they return from JRTC and the summer personnel rotation begins. A number of currently unresourced new NETs and a high volume of initial/collective training on the digital systems is anticipated.

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