Like it or not, light infantry is truck-mobile. Denying this reality does not change the fact that this means we pack in like sardines a large number of men in the back of a 2.5 or 5 ton truck in a tactically unsound manner. They are facing inward not ready to fire at the enemy at the first sign of ambush, nor can they rapidly get out of the truck before it goes up in flames because the tail gate is held closed by a clumbsy piece of steel that is usually rusty and must be unscrewed. While we can and should sand bag vehicles and insure they have machine gun ring mounts, the truth is Soldiers/marines are lazy and want to stay comfortable in peacetime. It takes a war with their arms/legs blown off for vehicle hardening to be taken seriously and then its too late. With a MG ring mount, the M925 and M36 series trucks no longer have a canvass covered cab and Soldiers/marines want to stay warm from the cold, so the mounts do not get ordered or installed. Thus, there are MGs sittng in the arms room collecting dust.

Another problem is sandbagging is heavy and isn't the most efficient way to harden a vehicle from enemy weapons, using lightweight ballistic protective materials is. Its high time we put an end to this slackness and wishful thinking and harden vehicles RIGHT, in the best way possible NOW before more men die needlessly as 18 did in Somalia in 1993.

What we propose is that a family of armored modular boxes be built into PLS flat racks so that trucks that can now only move cargo can also move troops--armored troops that can defend the convoys with firing ports and weapons mounts as well as be impervious to small arms fire, RPGs and mines. An armored troop carrying "box" mounted on a PLS flatrack for convoy defense that would have:

ARMORED TROOP CARRIER BOX

Such a troop carrying box would turn any of our trucks into troop carrying vehicles.

In Vietnam, old M113 hulls were placed inside truck beds for expedient MG mounts/armored protection. Why not a high-tech, version using PLS and lightweight armor technologies?

The point here is that the armored box by its DESIGN would force Soldiers/marines to face outward with their weapons in a vigilant, ready-to-return-fire mode. It would insure they are armor protected and have ring mounts for machine guns, though they could still make excuses and keep the heavier weapons in the arms room so they do not have to clean them after training with them. But it would be a start. The Army has 4 light divisions, that are moved around by truck, as do the Marines with 2 1/2 divisions. Another important weakness is that troops on foot when exposed to Chem/Bio agents are not fully protected. Chemical protective gear on the body, will only last for a certain amount of time. If troops are going to be blowing up chem/bio stock piles, or moving through catiminated areas, they need to be in vehicles that are pressurized and have filter systems. The PLS box could have an air-filtration system to protect light infantry Soldiers. It would greatly assist combat leaders who right now are forced into having to jury-rig trucks into field expedient armed/armored vehicles all against the ingrained laziness and non-chalance of the peacetime military.

WHERE HAS ALL THE FIRE SUPPORT GONE?

Another pressing need confronting Light Infantry Divisions (LIDs) like the 82d Airborne Division which had its M551 Sheridan light tanks taken away and its M8 Armored Gun System (AGS) replacement cancelled is organic fire support. LIDs only have the weapons carried in their hands to fight the enemy with. The biggest vehicles used by Army LIDs are the 22,000 pound FMTV 2.5/5-ton truck family. Its like "pulling teeth" to get narrow-minded people in the Army to supply Army LIDs with even M113A3 tracked Armored Fighting Vehicles (AFVs) that weigh exactly the same as their 2.5/5-ton trucks: 22,000 pounds--to solve this problem. Ditto that for smug marines trying to get a 105mm/90mm gun or 120mm gun-mortar turret onto the 8x8 LAV armored car. Most people think air power is going to win our wars for us, as if the tragedy in Somalia wasn't a clear warning enough against this non-sense. Never mind that aircraft at 500 mph are not going to hit thugs in buildings danger close to friendly troops or nearby civilians whose hearts/minds e are trying to win to our cause. Perhaps the way to get through this mental block would be to create a PLS armored box with a 120mm gun-mortar turret that could be carried and fired by the 5-ton FMTV truck? Then all the Army/Mc would have to do is stop being cheap and narrow-minded enough to buy just the weapon system boxes...

While not as terrain agile as a 120mm gun-mortar turret on a M113A3, the 120mm mortar turret box on the FMTV would be better than nothing, which is what we have now. With careful driving and a ground guide, the FMTV can do very well off-road. A very large supply of 120mm mortar ammunition could be carried inside the PLS armored box to keep the 120mm mortar firing directly at targets, point and shoot or indirect fire at targets called in by FDC on communications links.

But the capabilities get better.

The entire 120mm mortar box can DISMOUNT from its 5-ton FMTV truck carrier and then fire in the defense. The box can be lowered into a hole dug by a SEE, and becomes a semi-permanent pillbox, impervious to enemy artillery and air strikes. This is a firing position that works even on pavement in an urbvan combat situation. But at any time the 120mm mortar can become a mobile weapon system by being lifted back onto a PLS equipped truck.

The PLS armored gun system box makes any PLS truck into a basically a wheeled Armored Fighting Vehicle (AFV) and fire support platform for the light infantry. Add-on armor panels to the truck's fuel tank, engine and cab complete the process.

MOBILE PLS COMMAND POST MODULES

I reluctantly offer the following application of the PLS armored box since knowing the general tendancies of rear area types is to seek their own comfort, but we do need some sort of MOBILE command post capability. The erection and tearing down of current canvass G.P. tents is time consuming and not tactical. What we need is a PLS armored box with a map board and radio stations for a Battalion TOC, that can remain mobile on its PLS truck and/or be dug in and camouflaged after being dismounted. This application maybe the only one that older-generation officers controlling the purse strings might find appealing, but its a start. I am sure they will want computer screens at each work station and a SATCOM uplink etc etc. This is all fine AS LONG AS YOU BUILD AND SUPPLY THE MEN FIGHTING AND DYING THE ENEMY KILLING, WAR-WINNING VERSIONS OF THE PLS ARMORED BOX (THE TROOP CARRYING AND HEAVY WEAPONS STATION ONES).

Is this asking for too much?

A noted U.S. Army weapons analyst writes in about the weapons version of the PLS armored box, his description of the "bean counter's paradox" is a classic:

"Seems to sound good, but we,ve been down this road before and it went nowhere. During WW II, and after, lots of folks (Free France, Israel, anybody on a budget who had U.S. surplus) tried to armor 2&1/2 Ton trucks and even armed them with all sorts of weapons, including 40mm Bofors, 75mm howitzers, even AT guns. Essentially, they wanted a cheap replacement for the armored halftrack. What they got was a heavier, less-mobile, unstable and less survivable truck that broke down way too often because it was overloaded and not designed to withstand the recoil shock of the weapons.

Problem goes back to armored car design, in general. Historians recognized long ago that purpose-built armored cars with the hull providing an integral structure are much better than taking a truck chassis and plating it over with armor. Yes, we went through WW II with the M8 "Greyhound" 6x6 with a 37mm gun because it was handy and available, but it was only an expedient design.

Problems with using PLS trucks: First, too much parasitic weight. The truck is structurally designed to haul cargo, then the armored box has to be self-contained, and the drive train is still vulnerable to everything, and the PLS mechanism is just so much more weight being hauled around.

Second, I dislike the concept of setting down so much stuff and having trucks depart, since they are immobile when the enemy surprises them. U.S. field artillery ran into this throughout WW II. They'd set up the 105mm howitzers and send the trucks back for other missions, only to find themselves stuck. And once under fire, the soft-skinned truck cannot get back to you, either.

Related issue: anything too big to manhandle (anything bigger than a 75mm pack howitzer) should be self-propelled. Also, a turreted 120-mm mortar in an APC is far more survivable than one set up in a dismounted firing position.

You must avoid the beancounter's paradox. They like to solve everything by selling you on multirole systems. The problem that they ignore is that you usually need either nothing (because the situation is peaceful) or everything at once (because there are the whites of his eyes). After all, you CAN haul an entire infantry battalion with only one truck, if you have the time to make so many trips. But is this practical?

The real issue is that we really do need armored transporters, whether they be APCs, wheeled vehicles like LAV, modern version of the armored halftracks, or whatever. The cheap fixes generally do not work well enough to be worthwhile, and they end up costing as much or more.

Distinct issues:

Yes, you can reconfigure seating and add survivability to existing trucks. Center bench seat facing out was common in WW II German 1&1/5 ton trucks. Russian BMP had it 30 years ago. We can easily fix tailgate. We can also have side gates. These are easy fixes.

Take a look at WW II White Scout cars and Halftracks. They had a very nice rail mount that allowed all the guns to swing around to any direction. It was essentially a ring mount that ran the entire perimeter of the cargo area. If you have an open-topped vehicle, this has merit. Regards folks not wanting to put ring mounts on cabs, well that's a leadership issue.

Remember, you have been arguing as long as I remember you for the M113 APC in light forces. (An alternative is to use LAVs (readily available) or to start with a fresh design.) The key is to have a family of vehicles to haul around the Soldiers and their supporting weapons. This means a family of personnel carriers, CPs, mortars, AT, ADA, signal, etc., etc. Define the operational transportability constraints and you then know the size and weight limits. I.e., M2A2 ODS far too big and heavy for C-130, needs C-141 instead. But how about an M113 with a Bradley turret? How about a purpose built variant that uses M113 drive and components but has lower and smaller hull and a 3-man "tank" crew manning the 25mm auto cannon?

You were right in supporting the M8 AGS, or at least something like it. Do not be diverted off onto a wild goose chase into "cheap and quick" alternatives.

On a related note, have you seen the latest Defense News? It announced that TRADOC's medium-weight strike force was disapproved by GEN Reimer as unaffordable, but he agreed to set up a 200-man HQ element commanded by a 1-star to act as a Strike Force HQ. No units, just lots of "contingency planning" work. RDF all over again. Don't you love it?

Keep up the fight".

FEEDBACK #2:

"Dear Mike,

You asked my opinion; well here it is. I HATE IT! I've thought about this for two days and it infuriates me to think we have to use such stop gap methods to achieve such and important end. The M113A3 or an armored car would be a much better and more versatile. I understand you are just trying to get something done but it's the long way around. By my estimation you could equip the 82nd with with 300 M113A3's for the price of about 22 Comanche's. The 113A3 would be lighter and cut down on components. You have made the point that trucks weigh about the same as the 113A3. If you add these boxes you are probably adding considerable weight to the equation. I have read your paper over and over and I think you are frustrated (and justifiably so) to the point where you are grasping at straws. Some of my feelings on this have to do with the fact that it involves adding components. I hate the idea of "parts". Any time you airdrop separate components they will be separated and and lost ( I think it mentions this in the Bible). I have observed this phenomenon over and over in my life and it scares me to think we would do this in a time of war when everything is falling apart and confusion rains supreme.

A few years back I read an article in the newspaper about the reality of the Soviet military. It stated that the Russians never had the ability to Airdrop more then 2.5 Airborne divisions with there equipment and vehicles and only two of those Div.'s had the new BMD-3's.(only two?). It all so stressed that Soviet Div.'s only had about 8,000 men and ours is much bigger and more versatile (I guess versatility means we aren't encumbered with all that mobility and firepower). The author also pointed out how dangerous Russian Airborne units were because the troops were dropped with their vehicles causing a number of fatalities to crews in vehicles. Now it's hard to know what the truth is from press reports but if only one Russian Div. is this well equipped the U.S. could at least equal it, with a couple of Brigades of M113A3's and drop the crews with the vehicles (I'm not sure what our capabilities are in this area ).

The CP has a lot of merit to be sure and I can see having some on hand for unforeseen tactical situations ( I love the idea of the 120 mm Gun-Mortar firing from a fixed dug in position. If something like this had been used by Task Force Smith in Korea perhaps they could have stopped the NKA for awhile). It's not that it wouldn't work; it would. But why not stick with the 113A3 or for that matter build BMD/P-3's under license. It's a proven system and with a great deal of firepower and cheap.

You are one of the few people who state the problems of light infantry clearly.

I have hated the concept for years because I felt it lacked 1. firepower and 2. mobility and depended on that false God "AIR POWER"! Aircraft that cost 20 million dollars are useless. As soon as a couple are shot down it's back to your bullet sponge theory, because those aircraft are going some where safe and the "GREAT COMMANDER IN THE SKY" will be directing you through the streets of some third world insane asylum. Your question about fire support (where is it?) is the right one. Punch needs to be added to the LID's. Shock action is really nothing more than projectiles in the air ( Patton stated that "it's impossible to have to many of them") causing wounds and death to our enemies. A light tank, SP assault gun ( I would love to see a 155 mm gun with a short barrel and low to the ground. I really don't know if this would work, but it's a thought), mobile heavy Mortar and some kind of shoulder fired anti tank system ( like the RPG) that will actually destroy tanks and can be used on buildings at close range are absolutely critical for light forces. If you have it and don't need it, no harm. If you need it and don't have it, you've got a problem."

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