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The Land Power Journal |
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Vol. 1 No. 9/10 |
October-November
2003 |
www.geocities.com/equipmentshop/octobernovember2003.htm
LOOKS "SEXY" BEFORE:
NOW WHAT DO YOU THINK?
A U.S. Soldier passes a destroyed military vehicle after an attack in Baghdad,
July 21, 2003. A U.S. Soldier and an Iraqi interpreter were killed in the gun
and bomb attack a U.S. military spokesman said. "At 10:30 a.m. (2:30 a.m.
EDT) a first Armored Division Soldier was killed in action and an Iraqi interpreter
was also killed. It was a small arms and IED (improvised explosive device)
attack," the spokesman said, reading from a statement. Photo by Oleg
Popov/Reuters
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Table of Contents EDITORIAL ENOUGH IS ENOUGH:
HMMWVS ARE NOT COMBAT VEHICLES, SEND IN THE M113 GAVINs Army must focus
outward on enemy and mission FEEDBACK! 3D warfare requires
Air-Mech-Strike forces Deja Vu all over
again: WWII Soldiers hated riding into combat in trucks GEOSTRATEGIC Yes, its a guerrilla
war in Iraq Two War Strategy? OPERATIONAL The De-Evolution of
War TECHNOTACTICAL Why is the Army being
clobbered in Iraq?, Part 2: Army squandered money: where are the gunshields? DoD HOT LINKS Carlton Meyer's
www.G2mil.com August 2003 Articles Letters - comments from G2mil readers
G2mil Library Previous G2mil - July 2003 issue
Library Tour Visit G2mil's
library PME HOT LINK Deja COIN? Corum's Colonial Air
Control E-mail Land Power Transformation
Staff ON THE RADIO General David Grange's
Veterans Radio Hour
Return to Land
Power Transformation home page, click here MEETINGS TBA |
EDITORIAL ENOUGH-IS-ENOUGH: HMMWVS ARE NOT COMBAT VEHICLES; SEND IN
THE M113 GAVINS NOW We
have seen the last burned out HHMMWV unarmored truck We ever wish to see in
the above photo. Enough
is enough. Trucks
are not COMBAT vehicles. The chief vulnerability the enemy is exploiting
against U.S. forces in Iraq is THE SOFT-SKINNED WHEELED VEHICLES THEY ARE
RIDING IN. A
defense analyst writes: "You are very right. The Army is neglecting protection for thousands
of vehicles deployed in Iraq, while focused solely on fixing Stryker. It is
mind boggling. (I) Have talked to senior Army officials about it, but (get)
no traction. Keep pushing because you are right." If
senior Army leaders refuse to see this they need to be FIRED. If the new
incoming Army Chief of Staff doesn't see this (the need for tracked, armored
transport in non-linear warfare) then he shouldn't be confirmed by the
Senate. Play time with rubber-tired
vehicles is over. Our
men are getting killed in unarmored trucks while THOUSANDS of armored,
tracked, can-readily-be-made-RPG-proof M113 Gavins sit unused in war
stocks. Its time General Abizaid sent for the M113 Gavins, IMMEDIATELY
by C-17, staight into Baghdad. If his subordinates cannot break free of their
foot-mobile, ride-in-a-truck-its-macho mentality, then he needs to take
charge and fix the situation by getting leaders working for him who are open to do whatever it takes to WIN. The
Army does NOT have an SOP to sandbag harden in the best
way possible its HMMWV and FMTV trucks as it once had for the older
series trucks (FM 90-5 Jungle Operations). Soldiers in Iraq, using
these unarmored, rubber-tired vehicles, are falling prey to enemy automatic
and RPG weapons fire and vehicle accidents. Non-linear operations against
enemies makes it critical that ALL Army vehicles be battle- and
crash-hardened. We suggest the Army forms a small team of innovative experts
with unlimited funds to find a unit self-help way to solve this problem, akin
to the 1944 Cullins hedgreow cutter or the Apollo 13 rebreather fabrication: 1.
Determine the optimal EMERGENCY vehicle hardening that units in Iraq can do
NOW with existing, on-hand materials and with some modest welding and armor
plating. The team will create a working prototype of EMERGENCY armored HMWWV
and FMTV trucks, field and live-fire test it, and take still and motion imagery
within 30 days. Once the Emergency SOP is determined, the "Iraqi Freedom
Combat Vehicle Hardening Team" will deploy to Iraq and oversee the
immediate transformation of all of the vehicles at immediate risk.
2.
Begin emergency shipment of war-stock M113 Gavin light tracked AFVs to
the units deployed in Iraq in order to run ARMORED troop and supply shuttles
IMMEDIATELY by C-17 airlift into Baghdad. The Iraqi Freedom Combat Vehicle
Hardening Team will determine expedient hardening techniques for these
vehicles and expedite gunshield kits to be retrofitted to all of the Gavins.
The Israeli Defense Force (IDF) moves its men, at the minimum, by M113 Gavin light tracked AFVs and thus does
not lose a man a day like the U.S. Army does in Iraq. (See photo above). The Army must focus outward on the enemy not inward on its own
vanities Its
time for every reader to write his Senator/Congressman and DEMAND our
Soldiers move in armored, upgraded M113 Gavins in Iraq not Strykers
and other trucks. Carol
Murphy BACKGROUND:
On
the Lynch and 507th ambush, Rowan Scarborough writes on the Army's report
which totally misses the point that their vehicles were inadequately armed
and protected: Lynch convoy plagued by map error, fatigue By
Rowan Scarborough www.washtimes.com/national/20030711-121253-8432r.htm
A
commander's map-reading mistake, acute fatigue and a harsh desert environment
combined to imperil the 507th Maintenance Company in a fierce Iraqi ambush
that killed 11 Soldiers and produced the capture of Pfc. Jessica Lynch, the Army
says in a report. In
one of Operation Iraqi Freedom's most famous battles, the bushwhacked company
was dogged by sand-clogged weapons and an Iraqi enemy that fought by no rules
on that March 23 morning. "The
element of the 507th Maintenance Company that bravely fought through An
Nasiriyah found itself in a desperate situation due to a navigational error
caused by the combined effects of the operational pace, acute fatigue,
isolation and the harsh environmental conditions," the 15-page report states.
"The tragic results of this error placed the soldiers of the 507th
Maintenance Company in a torrent of fire from an adaptive enemy employing
asymmetrical tactics." Slowed
by heavy trucks stuck in the sand, the 18-vehicle company fell behind a
column march of more than 600 trucks and utility Humvees as the Army's 3rd
Infantry Division made an unprecedented speedy invasion from Kuwait toward
Baghdad. The
company commander, Capt. Troy King, was supposed to follow "Route
Blue" on the map to a
rendezvous point farther north called "Objective Ram." When he
reached an intersection south of the southern Iraqi city of Nasiriyah, which
required a left turn to stay on "Route Blue," he directed the convoy
straight north instead. This route took the Soldiers into the outskirts of
the city and then straight into the ambush. In
the end, nine 507th Soldiers and two other Soldiers traveling with it were
killed; six were taken prisoner, including Pfc. Lynch, who was rescued from a
Nasiriyah hospital eight days later by U.S. special-operations forces.
Sixteen Soldiers, including Capt. King, managed to escape from the ambush
when marines came to the rescue. Army
officials said its inquiry will establish "lessons learned" for
future missions, but it does not plan to punish any 507th Soldiers. "Once
engaged in battle, the Soldiers of the 507th Maintenance Company fought
hard," the report says. "They fought the best they could until
there was no longer a means to resist. They defeated ambushes, overcame
hastily prepared enemy obstacles, defended one another, provided life-saving aid and inflicted casualties on
the enemy. The Soldiers of the 507th upheld the Code of Conduct. ... It is
clear that every U.S. Soldier did their duty." The
report also does not discuss suspected war crimes by Iraqi military Soldiers
Criminal Investigative Division is investigating the war-crimes aspect of the
incident. The report says the details of how all 11 died in action are not
known. The
Army was due to release the report yesterday, but delayed it pending review
by the staff of Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld. The Army previously
gave copies to survivors of the 11 killed. The El Paso (Texas) Times
displayed the report on its Web site. El Paso is home to Fort Bliss, where
the 507th Maintenance Company is based. The
report says that as the convoy drove through Nasiriyah it passed armed
Iraqis manning checkpoints. But the Iraqis did not fire their weapons at this
point. The U.S. Soldiers held fire. The rules of engagement required the
enemy to show hostile intent. [Editor:
Aren't we at war? Shoot all armed enemies, period!] When
the convoy reached the northern edge of the city, Capt. King realized for the
first time that he had veered from the designated route. He had the company
make a U-turn and head back into the city, and ordered his troops to
"lock and load" their weapons. [Editor:
Why were they not already loaded?] The
Soldiers again missed the required turn and had to make a second U-turn.
Around this time, the 507th came under fire from grenade launchers and
rifles. An intense 60- to 90-minute firefight marked by chaos and bravery
ensued, with the convoy broken into three groups. Pfc.
Lynch, 19, the company clerk, rode in a Humvee driven by her close
friend Pfc. Lori Ann Piestewa, 23. In the front seat was the unit's senior
enlisted man, 1st Sgt. Robert Dowdy. Ahead of them, a tractor-trailer took
fire and stopped. Pfc.
Lynch's vehicle also took a hit from a projectile. Pfc. Piestewa lost control
and the Humvee smashed into the trailer at more than 45 mph. Sgt.
Dowdy was killed on impact; Pfc. Piestewa suffered serious injuries and later
died. Two Soldiers in the back seat also were killed, although the exact
circumstances of their deaths remain under investigation. [Editor:
Were they wearing seat belts? Were their vehicles sandbagged, machine guns
mounted?] Heat and violence hits U.S. troops By
Keith Adams The
recent spate of attacks on American troops in Iraq has had a profound effect
on the morale of the U.S. troops stationed here. Even though they are an army
of occupation, many Soldiers I have spoken to are surprised at the upsurge in
violence against them. They were told that the people of this country would
greet them as liberators. "We're here to help them!" said a Soldier
on duty at a checkpoint near my hotel. Her
commanding officer does not allow interviews with the media - but she did
agree to speak to me anonymously. She's only 21-years old, a newlywed from
Oklahoma, but Iraq is proving no honeymoon. "Of course I'm scared,"
she says "I wake every morning and wonder if I'm gonna still be alive by
nightfall." She tells me that life here would be a lot harder without
her belief in God. "I believe he has a plan for everyone, and if it's my
time to go, it's my time to go." Not all the troops were so
philosophical. Sneak attacks Another anonymous Soldier spoke to me through
the window of his humvee armoured vehicle. The humvee has become
the ubiquitous icon of this occupation, a squat, toad-like jeep from
which the troops warily survey the city. "I don't want say anything bad
about these people, but the way they're attacking us is just
so...sneaky," he says. "Shooting
at us from rooftops as we drive by ... and I wish they'd just like, stand up
and fight us." Street children are playing around us. The troops are a
constant source of curiosity for them - their minds are free from the
significance of their presence. "It's like with these kids. Some of the
Fedayeen get them to distract us, then they attack us. I mean, using
kids!" When asked if he would prefer to be part of an international
force, he doesn't hesitate. "Yes. That would help," he says.
Difficult conditions It was midnight, two hours past curfew, but the heat was
almost as impressive, and oppressive, as it had been in the daytime. The
Soldier stepped out of the humvee his face sweating. The U.S. troops
who work on the streets and the checkpoints wear their body armour at all
times. They're
not giving us enough water A
U.S. Soldier who must wear body armour in 50 degrees Celsius He revealed a
little of the conditions the army were working under. "It's terrible.
We're sleeping in this heat without any air-conditioning. I just wake up in a
puddle of sweat every morning... and they're not giving us enough water, just
a bottle a day!" The soldiers here expected gratitude for removing a
tyrant who exploited and abused his people. But speaking to Iraqis, one gets
a sense of their immense pride, and the scale of the humiliation they feel at
having foreigners on their soil, running their country. From
last issue of LPT: With
now over 200 dead American Soldiers, its time we face the truth that our Army
and Marines are poorly organized and equipped for 21st century non-linear
conflicts. Our current land forces are designed for non-existent linear
conflicts where huge land forces march on an enemy capital and thoroughly
clear out all enemy pockets of resistance as in WWII. While this took place
"safe rear areas" were created where Soldiers could shuttle
supplies back and forth inside unarmored, rubber-tired trucks manifesting
itself today in the ever-present and extremely vulnerable 5-9,000 pound HMMWV
and 22,000 pound FMTV type trucks. This is not WWII with 100 Divisions of
U.S. Army troops, this is 2003 and the enemy's center of gravity can be
knocked out with concentrated maneuver forces. The stability afterwards must
be won despite an enemy coming from ANY direction. There are no
"safe" rear areas in 4th Generation warfare. The
central idea that the Army's utility vehicle be an unarmored HMMWV truck is
incorrect and Soldiers are now dead from repeated ambushes. The idea that
general tasks can be done with a mass-produced, unarmored truck is one driven
by economy and cheapness with a subtle idea that the other option, a tracked
vehicle, will wear out if tasked to do this. The myth that a rubber-tired
vehicle can scoot around large areas without breaking down, in order to have
"operational mobility," comes from ignorance of basic laws of
physics and experience with what light tracked armored vehicles can do. The
Army is now losing its shirt replacing rubber tires that are bursting in
Iraq. The
U.S. Army at one time was much smarter and better equipped for non-linear
combat when it was a M113 Gavin AFV Army until the early 1980s with
the advent of the HMMWV and the too-heavy-for-general-use M1/M2 family of
heavy AFVs. Now we have light units in HMMWVs getting clobbered in combat
without ANY armored vehicles and heavy AFV units that cannot roam around as
needed without wearing out their tracks. In stark contrast, the Israeli
Defense Force (IDF) moves its troops around non-linear battlefields in light
tracked M113 Gavins with armor protection against small arms and with
appliqué armor against RPGs. The IDF is not losing a man a day like we are in
Iraq. Its
high time the U.S. Army relearn that a light tracked AFV should be the
primary troop carrier for ALL its units in combat situations not the HMMWV. A
light-tracked M113 Gavin AFV (under 11 tons) with current steel tracks
can go anywhere, swim, be airlifted (to include helicopters), and with a
light 8.63 PSI ground pressure get 10,000 miles on its tracks, which will not
burst as rubber tires do. The maneuverists who lust for the rubber-tired LAV/Stryker
armored cars need to go back through their notes to their favorite 1940 fall
of France battle and realize that "operational mobility" they are
so quick to praise as necessary to knock out enemy centers of gravity was
done by TRACKED light tanks that could go cross country through the
"impassable" Ardennes forest not road-bound, fragile armored cars.
Study the ACRs in Vietnam, their combat experiences with M113 Gavin
operational mobility saved the day during the Tet Offensive and saved Saigon.
The
quickest way to get M113 Gavins in Army light infantry units is to
re-equip their anti-tank (TOW) units with light tracked AFVs so they can now
give Alpha, Bravo and Charlie Companies armored mobility as needed. When not
used for troop transports the M113 Gavin's armored mobility renders
better firing positions for TOW units during anti-tank missions. If
we have folks who cannot accept the M113 Gavin because its not new,
they need to go take a look at the B-52. Planet earth doesn't care about
fashion, all that matters is what works. The unarmored HMMWV truck and
rubber-tired armored car do not work in combat against violent humans. The
light tracked AFV, the M113 Gavin, does and it needs to become the
prime troop carrier in the U.S. Army via modest upgrades other smarter armies
have done to keep its men alive and get the job done in a violent world. FEEDBACK! James
Otley of New Castle, Delaware wrote while surfing the net for modern/future
land warfare concepts after signing the Gavin petition; "Not only is the 3-D airmechanized concept an obivious
culmination of the past 100 years of land warfare innovation (ie: armored and
airborne), but also a practical and simplic answer of using manuver to solve
the timeless defensive obstacle of firepower. If the Army would develop the M-113A3
Gavin in its amphibious model, the marines maybe willing to help support
the program and therefore bear some of the inital program's cost. Lastly I
was thinking that the airmechanized concept could help one other aspect of
the Army "old" heavy formations - no long road bound logistical
tail. After delivering the combat elements, the transport helos could then
make continuous return sories anywhere into the battle area with supplies
and/or evac missions." An
Army infantry officer writes: "Couldn't agree more. The HMMWV has its uses, but we're seeing
too many HMMWV "presence patrols". Cut and pasted right out of the
Balkans. Just like Afghanistan, I'm sure the majority of the up-armored
HMMWVs are being used by headquarters units and slice units. The fighters are
making do with what they have. I guess it doesn't help to state the obvious: too few troops." Chris
Difani writes: "My father was commissioned on the battlefield in Europe in WWII
after D-Day. One of the few things he would talk about was the lack of
battlefield support, transport, or protection that the infantry had. The
trucks were useless during any fighting, but that was all they had. He always
wished that someone would do exactly what you are doing. Thank you," A
former Army intel analyst writes: "In ref to the Schoomaker attacks. He is absolutely the smartest
General I have ever met. I thought it was a serious waste of talent for him
to retire and I am glad he is coming back. I see that the author decided to
take a pot shot at Schoomaker for supporting the CV-22. Well, he didn't know
what a complete death trap it was when he served as COMSOCOM. None of us did.
Furthermore, Gen Schoomaker has initiated/supported a great deal of forward
thinking ideas during his tenure as Commander CAG, COMJSOC, CG USASOC, and
COMSOCOM. Most of these things are not public knowledge. Just because you
don't have visibility on an issue doesn't mean it hasn't been done. I was
just as suprised as everyone else at his selection, but I feel he is
defintely the right man for the job. The Army should be proud, they have a
real warrior for a CSA, he is going to set standards high and enforce
them." Editor:
since when do "standards" work against a thinking, seeing enemy who
is going to go out of his way to do UNSTANDARD things to attack us? We do not
need "high" standards that are inwardly focused on ourselves and
our vanities, we need outwardly focused on the enemy goals to achieve new
CAPABILITIES, and actually employ them to defeat the enemy's goals and
achieve our own. GEOSTRATEGIC
GENERAL ABIZAID: YES, ITS A GUERRILLA WAR IN IRAQ
THE
STRATFOR WEEKLY, 7 July 2003 by
Dr. George Friedman U.S.
Counterinsurgency Strategies in Iraq Summary
The
appointment of Gen. John Abizaid as head of U.S. Central Command opens a new
phase in both the Iraq campaign and the war on al Qaeda. In order to wage
follow-on operations against al Qaeda, an effective counterinsurgency
operation must be launched against the Iraqi guerrillas. This is a
politico-military imperative. Politically, the United States must demonstrate
its effectiveness against the full spectrum of opponents. Militarily, the
United States must show it can project forces from Iraq while the base of
operations remains insecure. Directly suppressing an insurrection without
indigenous support historically has been difficult, but Iraq has a built-in
opposition to the guerrillas: the Shiites in the south. But their desire to
dominate an Iraqi government -- and their ties to Iran -- runs counter to
U.S. policy. This means Washington will have to make some difficult choices
in Iraq, and in the end will give away some things it does not want to give
away. Analysis
U.S.
Army Gen. John Abizaid will officially take over as head of Central Command
during the week of July 7. His mission will be not only to stabilize the
situation in Iraq, but also to command the main U.S. offensive against al
Qaeda. The summer offensive that Stratfor has written about has begun, and
Abizaid's mission will be to wage war, integrate the various operations into
a coherent whole and achieve the goal of the offensive: to further undermine
al Qaeda's ability to strike at the U.S. homeland. In
war, no plan unfolds as expected. This war began in a completely unexpected
fashion on Sept. 11, 2001. As is inevitable, the course of the war has taken
unexpected turns. The most recent and significant turn of this war has been
the emergence of a guerrilla war in Iraq. To be more precise, it appears to
us that in Iraq, as in Afghanistan, the fighters on the ground understood
that they could not win a conventional war. Rather than engage in the sort of
conflict at which the United States excels, they put up token conventional
resistance, all the while planning to engage the United States in unconventional
warfare over an extended period. In
other words, the Iraqi forces understood that they could not defeat the
United States in conventional war. Instead, the Iraqi war plan consisted of
declining conventional engagement and subsequently engaging U.S. forces in
operations in which their advantages were minimized and their weaknesses were
exposed. This
has left the United States with the following battle problem: It must wage
the broader summer offensive while simultaneously containing, engaging and
defeating the Iraqi guerrillas. This is not an easy task, not only because it
spreads U.S. forces thinner than planned, but also because the challenge
posed by the guerrillas has trans-military implications, politically and
psychologically. Abizaid must not ignore these considerations and must
integrate them into his war plan. This is neither easy nor optional. It
is useful to begin by recalling the overarching strategic purpose of all of
these operations: the disruption of al Qaeda and potential follow-on groups
to prevent further major attacks on the United States. The Iraq campaign was
an element in this broader strategy, designed to achieve these three goals,
in increasing importance: 1.
The elimination of a regime that potentially could support al-Qaeda operations.
2.
The transformation of the psychological architecture of the Islamic world.
The perception in the Islamic world, developed since the U.S. withdrawal from
Beirut in 1983 and reaffirmed by events since then, was that the United
States was incapable of resolute action. The United States was seen as
powerful militarily, but as lacking the political will to use that power.
U.S. forces withdrew after taking minimal casualties in Beirut and Somalia.
In Afghanistan, the United States halted operations after seizing major
cities, apparently because it was unwilling to engage in more extended
conflict. The U.S. invasion of Iraq was designed to change the Islamic
world's perception -- accepting anger at the United States in exchange for
greater fear. 3.
The creation of a base of operations that would allow the United States to
bring political and military pressure to bear on a cluster of nations the
U.S. administration sees as directly or indirectly sustaining al Qaeda
operations -- in particular Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iran. Riyadh began
shifting its position prior to the Iraq invasion. Immediately after the end
of the campaign, the United States turned its attention to follow-on
operations against Syria and Iran. These operations have been primarily political
since the end of the Iraq campaign, but the constant threat exists that they
could move to a military phase at any point. The
guerrilla war in Iraq strikes directly at the second objective of the Iraqi
campaign. It is what Stratfor has called a trans-military goal: It is rooted
in a military operation but ultimately arrives at an issue that transcends
the purely military -- namely the psychological perception of the United
States and the credibility of U.S. military threats. As a secondary matter,
it also complicates the logistics of follow-on operations after Iraq. At the
moment, that is not the primary issue -- although it should be emphatically
noted that an evolution in the conditions in Iraq very well could undermine
the U.S. ability to use Iraq as a base of operations. The
problems that have arisen in Afghanistan and Iraq are rooted in U.S.
strategy. The United States invaded both countries as a means toward other
ends, rather than as ends in themselves. The invasion of Afghanistan was
intended to disrupt al Qaeda's main operational base. The invasion of Iraq
was intended to bring U.S. power to bear against al Qaeda's enablers in the
region. In neither case did the United States have an intrinsic interest in
either country -- including control of Iraq's oil. The
United States could achieve its primary purpose in each country without
complete pacification. In Afghanistan, the U.S. administration accepted from
the beginning that the complex tribal and ideological conflicts there would
make pacification impossible. U.S. forces seized the major cities and a few
strategic points, kept most forces in protected garrisons and conducted
military operations as opportunities to combat al Qaeda arose. U.S. forces
avoided any attempts at pacification projects, understanding that the level
of force and effort required to achieve any degree of pacification far
outstripped U.S. interests and probably U.S. resources. The United States had
a limited mission in Afghanistan and ruthlessly focused on that, while
publicly professing ambitious and complex goals. The
Iraq campaign took its primary bearings from the Afghan campaign. The goals
were to shatter the Iraqi army and displace the Iraqi regime. These goals
were achieved quickly. The United States then rapidly pivoted to use its
psychological and military advantage to pressure Syria and Iran. As in
Afghanistan, pacification was not a primary goal. Pacification was not
essential to carrying on the follow-on mission. But the U.S. reading of the
situation in Iraq diverged from that of Afghanistan. The U.S. administration
always understood that the consequences of the invasion of Afghanistan would
be the continuation and intensification of the chaos that preceded that
invasion. The underlying assumption in Iraq was that the postwar Iraqi
impulse would be toward stability. The U.S. administration assumed that the
majority of the Iraqi public opposed Saddam Hussein, would welcome the fall
of his regime, would not object to an American occupation and, therefore,
would work harmoniously with the United States in pacification projects,
easing the burden on the United States tremendously. The
U.S. administration expected the defeat of the Taliban to devolve into
guerrilla warfare. The United States did not expect the defeat of the Ba’ath
regime to devolve into guerrilla warfare. It did not expect the Shiites to be
as well-organized as they are, nor did they expect this level of Shiite
opposition to a U.S. occupation. In other words, the strategic understanding
of the Iraqi campaign took its bearings from the Afghan campaign -- and the
United States had no interest in pacification -- but at the same time, the
United States did not expect this level of difficulty and danger involved in
pacifying Iraq, because U.S. intelligence misread the situation on the
ground. At
its current level of operations, the guerrilla war does not represent a
military challenge to the United States. Therefore, the first and third goals
are for the moment achieved. The United States has displaced the Iraqi
regime, limiting its ability to engage in strategic operations with the
United States, and U.S. forces can conduct follow-on operations should they
choose to. But the United States is in serious danger of failing to achieve
its second goal: transforming the psychological perception of the United
States as an irresistible military force. It
certainly is true that the guerrilla war does not represent a strategic
threat to the United States. But on one level, the reality is irrelevant.
Perception is everything. The image that the U.S. Army is constantly taking
casualties and is unable to cripple the guerrillas undermines the perception
that the United States wanted to generate with this war. The reality might be
that the United States is overwhelmingly powerful and the guerrilla war is a
minor nuisance. The perception in the Islamic world will be that the United
States does not have the power to suppress Saddam Hussein's guerrillas. It
will complicate the politico-military process that the United States wanted
to put into motion with the invasion. It is therefore a situation that the
United States will have to deal with. The
United States has, in essence, two strategic options: 1.
Afghanistize the conflict. Move into secure base camps while allowing the
political situation on the ground to play itself out. Allow the tension
between Shiite and Sunni to explode into civil war, manipulating each side to
the U.S. advantage, while focusing militarily on follow-on operations in Syria,
Iran and elsewhere. In other words, insulate the U.S. military from the Iraqi
reality, and carry on operations elsewhere. 2.
Try to engage and defeat the guerrillas through counterinsurgency operations,
including direct military attacks and political operations. The
dilemma facing the United States is this: From a strictly military
perspective, Option 1 is most attractive. From a political and psychological
perspective, Option 1 is unacceptable. It also creates a military risk: The
insurgency, unless checked, ultimately could threaten the security of U.S.
forces in Iraq no matter how well-defended they were in their secure
facilities. On the other side of the equation, counterinsurgency operations
always require disproportionate resources. The number of insurgents is
unimportant. The number of places they might be and the number of locations
they might attack dictate the amount of resources that must be devoted to
them. Therefore, a relatively small group of guerrillas can tie down a much
larger force. A sparse, dispersed and autonomous guerrilla force can draw off
sufficient forces to make follow-on operations impossible. The
classical counterinsurgency dilemma now confronts the United States. The
quantity of forces needed to defeat the guerrillas is disproportionate to the
military advantage gained by defeating them. Failure to engage the guerrilla
force could result in a dramatic upsurge in their numbers, allowing them to
become unmanageable. The ineffective engagement of guerrillas could result in
both the squandering of resources and the failure to contain them. The issue
is not how large the guerrilla force is but how sustainable it is. At this
stage of operations, the smaller the force the more difficult it is to
suppress -- so long as it is large enough to carry out dispersed operations,
has sufficient supplies and the ability to recruit new members as needed. At
this point, the Iraqi guerrilla force is of indeterminate size, but it is
certainly well-dispersed and has sufficient supplies to operate. Its ability
to recruit will depend on arrangements made prior to the U.S. occupation and
the evolution of the conflict. This sort of guerrilla warfare does not
provide readily satisfactory solutions for the occupying power. The
classic solution of a guerrilla threat to an occupying power is to transfer
the burden of fighting to an indigenous force. Not accidentally, the Iraqi
guerrillas in recent days attacked and killed seven Iraqis being trained for
this role. Inventing a counterinsurgency force beyond your own forces in the
midst of conflict is not easy. Nevertheless, successful containment of a
guerrilla force must involve either an indigenous force motivated to suppress
the guerrillas or, alternatively, forces provided by a faction hostile to the
guerrilla faction -- an ethnic or religious group that shares the occupier's
interest in suppressing the guerrillas. The
greatest threat the United States faces in Iraq is not the guerrillas. It is
the guerrillas combined with a rising among the Shiites south of Baghdad. If
the guerrilla rising combines with an Intifada -- a mass rising that might
not use weapons beyond stones, but that could lead to a breakdown of U.S.
controls in the south -- it would represent a most untenable situation. An
Intifada, apart from its intrinsic problems, could complicate logistics.
Demonstrators likely would clog the supply routes from the south. Suppressing
an Intifada not only is difficult, it has political and psychological
consequences as well. It
is imperative that the United States prevent a rising among the Shiites. It
is also imperative that the United States find a native faction in Iraq that
is prepared to take on some of the burden of suppressing the primarily
Ba’athist guerrillas. The United States is afraid of a Shiite uprising, but
could use the Shiites in suppressing the Ba’athists. The Shiites are the
center of gravity of the situation. Shiite
leaders have made it clear that they want to dominate any new Iraqi
government -- and that they expect the United States to create such a
government. The United States has been concerned that Iran influences and
even might control the Shiites and that handing over power to the Iraqi
Shiites would, in effect, make Iran the dominant force in Iraq and ultimately
in the Persian Gulf. That is a reasonable concern. Indeed, it violates the
core U.S. strategy. The United States invaded Iraq, in part, to coerce Iran.
To argue that the only way to stay in Iraq is to strengthen Iran makes little
sense. On the other hand, if the United States continues to refuse to create
a native government in Iraq, the probability of a Shiite rising is
substantial. The
key to a U.S. strategy in Iraq, therefore, rests in Iran. If regime change in
Iran could be rapidly achieved or a substantial accommodation with the
Iranian government could be negotiated, then using the Iraqi Shiites to man
an Iraqi government and bear the brunt of the counterinsurgency operation
would be practical. The key is to reach an agreement with Iran that provides
the United States with substantial assurances that the Iranian government
would neither support nor allow Iranians to provide support to al Qaeda. The
regime in Tehran has no love for the Sunnis, nor do the Sunnis for the
Shiites. The events in Pakistan show how deeply sectarian religious violence
is rooted in the Islamic world. The United States cannot supplant Islamic
fundamentalism. It can potentially manipulate the situation sufficiently to
control the direct threat to the United States. In other words, if the United
States can reach an understanding with Iran over al Qaeda and nuclear
weapons, then the Shiites in Iraq could become a solution rather than a
problem. If
there is to be an agreement with Iran, the United States must demonstrate to
Iranian hardliners first that it has the ability to destabilize the Islamic
Republic, and second that it is prepared not to do so in return for Shiite
cooperation. Without this, any alliance with Iran over Iraq rapidly would
spiral out of U.S. control, and Iran would become uncontrollable. The key for
the United States is to demonstrate that it has leverage in Iran. The United
States does not want to overthrow the Iranian government. It simply wants to
demonstrate its ability to destabilize Iran if it chose to. If it can do that,
then other things become possible. It
follows that the United States likely shortly will work to reignite the
demonstrations in Iran -- in all probability in the next few days. The
purpose will not be to overthrow the Iranian government -- that is beyond
U.S. capabilities. Instead, it will be designed to persuade Iranian leaders
-- including Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei -- that some form of
cooperation with the United States over issues that matter to the Americans
is in their interest, and could result in something that the Iranians have
longed dreamed of: a Shiite-dominated Iraq. This
strategy is extraordinarily convoluted and fraught with difficulties. But the
prospect of fighting a counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq, alone, without
indigenous support, is equally fraught with danger. So too is attempting an
Afghan solution -- packing forces into air bases and army camps and allowing
the insurrection to evolve. There are few good choices in Iraq at the moment.
Alliance with the Shiites is extremely difficult and risky, but the other
choices are equally difficult. If the Iranian/Shiite play fails, then it will
be time to choose between counterinsurgency and enclaves. LEADERSHIP:
Lions Led by Donkeys in the Special Forces July
7, 2003: The U.S. Army Special Forces are having morale and recruiting
problems, and they are largely self-inflicted. Special Forces units are
already some 20 percent under strength and the situation is getting worse.
The first visible signs were seen in Afghanistan when the brass "cracked
down" on the Special Forces use of local dress and appearance (beards.)
They were ordered to shave and wear their uniforms. Aside from the fact that
this went against practical experience (going back to World War II), and put
Special Forces troops lives at risk, it demonstrated a callous disregard for
the expertise and professionalism of the Special Forces. The tradition
continued in Afghanistan where Special Forces troops were threatened with
punishment for having a beer or possessing "pornography" (a copy of
Playboy magazine.) Again, the Special Forces troops, professional as ever,
stood to attention, saluted and followed orders. But the number of senior men
who choose to get out is increasing. Being expected to perform extraordinary
mental and physical feats on the battlefield, and then being treated like a
wayward child has not gone down well with the troops. The
troops see the "Mickey Mouse" (mindless attention to useless
regulations") as symptomatic of larger leadership problems. The troops
have noted that as Special Forces officers rise in rank, and leave the A
Teams, they become more career minded. That, unfortunately, means responding
to the demands of the system that puts great emphasis on "zero
defects" and not doing anything that would embarrass a commander. This
makes the battalion and group commanders tend to be looking over their
shoulders rather than paying attention to what is happening out front and
what their troops need. These problems were played down in peace time, but have
become major sources of tensions because of problems in Afghanistan and Iraq.
There
are still problems with senior commanders in understanding what Special
Forces do, how they do it and how important it is. Especially in Iraq,
Special Forces would often uncover choice targets and soon find that the
brass were not interested, or didn't understand the importance of what the
Special Forces had in their sights. This goes back to the situations in
Afghanistan where the Special Forces literally had Osama bin Laden in their
sights, but had to get clearance, which sometimes was withheld, to pull the
trigger. Similar situations were encountered in Iraq. The
personnel shortages have been made up, in part, by calling up men of the two
National Guard Special Forces groups. But some of these men were kept on
active duty for over a year, causing personal hardship for the troops
involved. Using lots of National Guard Special Forces also brought another
problem to the surface. Promotions in the National Guard are often heavily
influenced by state politics. Apparently this disastrous (for battlefield
performance) practice resulted in some Special Forces promotions of
less-than-qualified officers who were well connected politically. The Special
Forces troops felt the loss in the field. Speaking
of losses, Special Forces officers are smoldering over the policy of giving
the sergeants and warrant officers the Special Forces Duty Pay of $225 a
month (when in a combat zone), but not the officers that lead the teams.
Officers don't like to complain, as it will mark them as a
"troublemaker" and hurt their career prospects. And
it's not just the special pay, but the general lack of attention to living
conditions for Special Forces in the field. Many Special Forces troops are embarrassed
when they set up shop in the field near foreign commando units, who receive
more generous financial allowances for field quarters. In such situations,
the shabby quarters of the Special Forces reflects poorly on the United
States, but is typical of the attitude the senior generals still have for
Special Forces. While
the generals at the very top may say they appreciate the edge Special Forces
provides American forces, many other senior officers in the chain of command
do not, or simply look on the Special Forces as a bunch of hot shot
troublemakers. And treat them accordingly, trying to impose
"discipline" where it is not needed. The Special Forces know they
are good, but they are often lions led by donkeys. The careerism of senior
Special Forces officers results in lack of support for the A-Team level
troopers who actually do the work and the intense Special Forces operations
of the last two years have forced these long standing problems to the
surface. At the moment, the Army is spending more energy trying to keep a lid
on the problem than in fixing it. Two War Strategy: Protracted War In The Middle East By
James W. McCoy Copyright © 2003 EDITOR:
Rod McCoy is the author of thirty books on warfighting and espionage. He is a
former paratroop officer and has a MS degree in Psychology. He is an expert
on the Operational Art, and a strong supporter of maneuver warfare and the
U.S. armed forces in general. His
books are described on his web site: http://www.geocities.com/quikmaneuvers
This
material is copyright protected and may not be reproduced in part or whole,
or sold without the express written consent from the author. All Rights
Reserved. In
1995, the Clinton administration was frightened and intimidated into giving
communist North Korea four free nuclear power plants, free oil for the next
decade, trade concessions and other big-time freebies. The Korean Reds had
terrorized the Clinton administration with their tough, threatening (feather
merchant) rhetoric and their "military (light infantry) threat."
Most people don't realize that South Korea has twice as many people as North
Korea. Who were the Liberal Democrats afraid of? Then
the Clinton administration compounded their ignorance by cozying up to Red
Vietnam and fanatical Islamic Iran. As a result, many subversive Muslim
immigrants were allowed into America and the bill for their up keep was
passed on to the American taxpayer. The Clinton administration also supported
the secret nuclear and oil alliance between Russia and Iran. When
President George W. Bush came to office, the problems with internal traitors
and foreign tyrant states, including Iran and North Korea, were out of hand.
Now, in 2003, both Iran and North Korea will soon have a viable nuclear
threat which they hope to use to threaten America into giving them whatever
they wish. Do you remember how the nuclear threat was held over America's
head for decades by the Soviets? RULED
BY OIL It
is too bad that the people who run America have artificially tied our economy
to oil, which is largely controlled by the Muslim mafia (OPEC). Yes, we could
obtain fuel oil which is much cheaper and safer than petroleum; we can obtain
It from the billions of tons of agricultural biomass refuse generated in this
nation annually. But America currently will not do that because the oil
companies and the automobile companies will not allow it. Therefore,
we must look at the world through the spectacles the American oil/automobile
cartel has forced us to wear. The Muslims are controlling oil that we need
and they are artificially increasing the per barrel cost of oil. As of March
2003, Muslim oil is $38 a barrel, the highest that it's been in two years.
That price is about $20 a barrel too much. Those prices are destroying the
American economy. Every $1 increase in the price of a barrel of oil reduces
America's GDP by $3 billion. As Spencer Abraham, the U.S. Secretary of Energy
has said: "We cannot rely on markets to safeguard the public
interest"…as regards the detrimental effect of oil prices in our
economy. When
President Bush moved our military into Iraq, America gained control of
available Iraqi crude oil worth over $1.6 billion and a production potential
of 500,000 barrels of Iraqi crude per day. (The world demand for oil is 67.5
million barrels a day.) By controlling Iraqi oil and threatening Iranian and
Saudi Arabian oil, America is now on the way to repair an economy that
desperately needs it. MIDEAST
GEOPOLITICAL REALITY Have
you ever wondered why the U.S. has no bases in Israel? Since this nation
gives the Israelis billions of dollars a year, they should at least provide
one army, one naval and two air bases, free for United States use. After all,
the United States is the real backer of Israeli security. Don't hold your
breath. In
any event, it is obvious that previous Middle Eastern allies, including Saudi
Arabia and Pakistan, may actually be luke-warm firends and even enemies.
However, we need bases so that we can react quickly to threats in
Afghanistan, Iran, Syria, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, as well as continue to
destroy Muslim terrorist organizations. We should be, and are, fighting in
their backyards, not ours. The
occupation of Iraq is providing us with the Middle Eastern military bases
that we need. With them we don’t have to go hat in hand to beg space from
"allies" like Israel, Turkey or Saudi Arabia. We are not in Iraq
merely to seek weapons of mass destruction (WMD). We need bases in the Middle
East that are located in the midst of our enemies. THE
OUTLAW NATION OF IRAN Iran
is the main threat to peace in the Middle East. That nation is full of
hate-crazed imams (religious leaders) who constantly whine for American
blood. The
fascist Iranian regime parades itself as a pious religious government of
"peace and love", while In fact the regime's claim to religious
leadership is widely rejected by most Iranians. The Iranian regime is not
seen by the Iranian people as being the embodiment of religious values. Such
opposition from within challenges Iran's entire self-conception. Major urban
riots against Iran's imam-ocracy have become a regular feature of Iran since
spring 1992, repeated on average every few months. In response, the
tyrannical imam regime has launched periodic suppression campaigns against
the people, involving up to 280,000 soldiers. Iranian divisions and corps
have carried out exercises In 170 Iranian cities, practicing the seizure of
public buildings and radio stations. Iranian troops have even closed sections
of downtown Tehran while they practice counter-insurgency tactics. Iranian
fanatics have a lot for which to answer. They seized the American embassy In
Tehran (444 days from November 1979 - January 1981). In 1983 they murdered nearly
300 marines in the Beruit barracks bombing. Tehran carried out at least
thirteen assassinations in 1997 alone, most of them in northern Iraq, with
targets including members of opposition groups such as the Kurdish Democratic
Party of Iran and the Mujahedin-e-Khalq. In addition, Iran is deeply involved
in international drug smuggling and is the most powerful sponsor of world
terrorism. Since
the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979, Iran has nakedly espoused
state terrorism as a legitimate means to further its ideological and
strategic aims, namely to “export the Muslim Revolution”. Iran assists
Islamic groups and organizations worldwide, especially in the Middle East, to
undermine and topple their national governments. Their
tyrant-president, Rafsanjani, came to power in 1989. Tehran then stepped up
its opposition to Israel's existence. The Iranian Majlis (parliament)
allocated $30 million for the Palestinian revolution. The Majlis also
launched a campaign to murder Iranian opposition leaders abroad. Iranian
murderers struck in Vienna, Geneva, Paris, Rome, and Berlin during 1989-92.
The State Department's report on international terrorism noted that under
Rafsanjani's leadership, Iran was the "most active and most
dangerous" sponsor of terrorism in the world. Iran's
1989 death warrant against British citizen Salman Rushdie for his novel The
Satanic Verses directly challenged the core values of European
intellectuals. In 1991, the Iranians murdered Shahpour Bakhtiar, a French war
hero and champion of French culture, under the nose of his elite French
guards. That assassination seriously embarrassed Paris. Bonn
was embarrassed In 1992, when Iranian killers murdered Sadeq Sharafkandi, a
Kurdish political leader attending a meeting of the Socialist International
In Berlin. In 1993, Iranian murderers killed dissident and former Iranian
chargé to Italy Mohammad Hussein Naghdi, while Naghdi was in Rome and under
Italian police protection. In Japan, Itashi Igarashi, the Japanese translator
of Rushdie's Satanic Verses, was murdered in 1991. Such
excesses don’t seem to bother some American businessmen. U.S. firms continue
to annually purchase some $4 billion of Iranian oil for delivery to third
countries, propping up the Iranian regime. The
Palestinian organization most loyal to the Iranian revolutionary ideology is
the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. After the deportation of its leader, Fathi
Shkaki, from the Gaza Strip, the ties between Iran and that terrorist
organization have been strengthened. IRANIAN
ASSISTANCE TO HAMAS TERRORISTS Since
1992, Iran has drawn closer to the Hamas terrorism organization, which is
perceived as one of the leading Islamic terrorist movements in the world.
Both Iran and Hamas agree that the disruption of the Israeli political
process and the undermining of the Palestinian Authority are their major
objectives. These common goals transcend the religious differences between
the Sunni Hamas and the Shi’ite Iran. Both Iran and Hamas participate in
frequent high-level meetings to coordinate terror campaigns world-wide. A
Hamas delegation headed by two top activists, Imad Alami (Chairman of the
Internal Committee) and Mustapha Qanua (the representative in Syria) visited
Iran in October 1995 and met with high ranking Iranian officials. The founder
of the militant Palestinian Moslem Hamas group recently visited the tomb of
Iran's Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and vowed to follow his footsteps. Sheikh
Yassin "vowed to continue the anti-Zionist path of Imam Khomeini. Iran
also provides Hamas with military assistance. Hamas' terrorists are regularly
trained at the Iranian-sponsored camps of Hizballah and the camps managed by
Iran's Guardians of the Revolution in Lebanon, as well as in Iran. Many
Muslim terrorists are trained there for suicide attacks. Numerous
Iranian-trained killers have succeeded at infiltrating back into the areas
under Palestinian Authority control. Israel has arrested Hamas terrorists who
admitted being trained by Iranian instructors in Lebanon's Beka’a Valley, and
in Iran. Hamas terrorist training has focused upon the use of light weapons,
explosives, photography (for Intelligence gathering) and sabotage methods. Iran
also gives Hamas financial assistance. In 1992, several million dollars were
transferred to Hamas’ account, including money originating from the Iranian
“Fund for the Fallen”, which grants assistance to victims of the “Palestinian
Uprising”. IRANIAN
ASSISTANCE TO HIZBALLAH TERRORISTS Hizballah
terrorists spearhead Iranian terrorism, especially in the fight against
Israel. Hizballah began its large-scale terrorism in 1982, when it blew up
the American Embassy in Beirut, killing 61 people and wounding more than 120.
Later, Hizballah bombed the marines' headquarters (23 October 1983) and the
French Military Headquarters in Beirut, in which 241 Americans and 56 French
Soldiers were killed. In the 1980s, Hizballah terrorists kidnapped Western
citizens in Lebanon, who were then held as hostages. Such Hizballah
atrocities were carried out under Iranian orders, either for the purpose of
obtaining economic or political concessions from Western governments, or
simply to instill terror. Iran
provides millions of dollars per year to support Hizballah. They also give
tactical assistance in terror attacks against Israel, through the Guardians
of the Revolution units posted in the Baka’a Valley. The Hizballah General
Secretary, Hassan Nasrallah, publicly admitted Iranian support in an
interview given to al-Wast (11/3/1996), when he confessed that his
organization received massive financial and political assistance from Iran In
order to continue, "the legitimate struggle against Israel". Iran
has been Hizballah's main weapon supplier since its establishment. Iranian
supplies Hizballah with every type of weapon and ammunition, including
mortars, Sagger anti-tank rockets, mines, explosives, and small arms. Six
trucks, carrying arms from Iran to Hizballah in Lebanon, were intercepted in
Turkey in mid-January 1996. Iran is now making extensive use of these land
routes to transfer arms to Hizballah; they must be interdicted. Iran
actively advises and supervise Hizballah's terrorist training program. Iran's
Guardians of the Revolution provides higher level training in Iran,
mainly at the al-Quds Force training base “Imam Ali” in northern Tehran. That
training includes courses for officers, company commanders, commandos, as
well as courses in communications and powered-gliders(for covert
infiltration). THE
IRANIAN REGIME'S WAR AGAINST ITS OWN PEOPLE Since
the Islamic regime seized power in 1979, it has consistently eliminated
Iranian opposition activists both inside and outside the country. Iran has
also invested considerable intelligence effort in the surveillance and
tracking of anyone perceived as a threat to the regime. Iranian
Liquidation of Political Threats *Iran's
former Prime Minister, Shahpur Bakhtiar, an opposition activist, was murdered
in France on August 6, 1991. The investigation of this incident led to the
arrest of three Iranians (including a diplomat), who probably belonged to the
Iranian Intelligence Department. The trial exposed the involvement of various
Iranian bodies (the Ministry of Communication, Diplomatic representatives,
commercial companies, “Iran Air”) - all of which assisted in the liquidation.
One of the accused was sentenced to life imprisonment, another was given a
10-year prison sentence, and the diplomat was acquitted owing to lack of
evidence and returned to Iran. *The
Liquidation of high ranking activists belonging to Iran’s Democratic Kurdish
Party at the Mikonos restaurant in Berlin on September 17, 1992. This
operation was carried out by a squad composed of Hizballah and Iranian
intelligence operatives, headed by a member of the Islamic Students
Association in Germany, Khat'm Dara'abi, who apparently was employed by the Iranian
Intelligence Department as the liaison between the Iranian Consulate in
Berlin and the hit team. Dara'abi and four other Shi’ite activists were
arrested by the German police. German security officials stressed the
involvement of Iranian Intelligence and the Guards of the Islamic Revolution
in the affair. The
latter affair has resurfaced recently due to the German Federal Prosecution’s
decision to issue a warrant for the arrest of the Minister of Iranian
Intelligence, Falahian, as the official who ordered the liquidation of the
opposition members. It would appear that the grounds for this far-reaching
decision (which has significant implications for the relations between the
two countries) was the testimony given at the trial, which revealed the depth
of Falahian’s involvement. Since
Rasfanjani's rise to power in 1989, scores of Iranian opposition members have
been liquidated worldwide, among them: *Abed
al-Rahman Kadmalo, General Secretary of the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran
(13 July 89) *Khat'm
Rajui Hamjahdin Hilek (in Switzerland, 24 April 90); *Mahmad
Hassin Nakadi, the Italian representative of the National Opposition Council.
THE
IRANIAN INTELLIGENCE AGENCY The
Iranian Intelligence Agency, headed by Hajet al-Aslam Ali Falahian, is Iran's
primary agency for the “Exportation of the Revolution” policy, the direction
of terrorist activity, and elimination of the opponents of the regime.
Falahian's "…deputy, Mustapha Fur Mahmadi is responsible for all Iranian
Intelligence Agency activities outside Iran, the assistance to the
Palestinian organizations and the Hizballah, and the directing of terrorist
activity against Israel and Western targets, as well as widespread subversive
activity in Muslim countries. Operating within the framework of the Intelligence
Agency is a department that centralizes the terrorist activity against
opposition targets. The Intelligence Agency has several branches worldwide.
Among the most prominent are: the one located in Lebanon, whose main purpose
is to disrupt the peace process; the branch in Sudan, which assists in
subversive activity in North Africa; and the branch in Germany which
centralizes the activity against the opposition organizations." IRANIAN
GUARDS OF THE REVOLUTION Iran's
Guards of the Revolution is also a key actor in Iran's sponsorship of
international terror. "The Department for Islamic and Arab Movements,” a
sub-agency of the Guards of the Revolution, is responsible for
developing ties with the various Muslim movements, and providing them with
financial and organizational assistance. It is understood that the terrorists
who make up those movements will assist Iran in various capacities. The
"al-Quds" is a branch of the Guards of the Revolution
skilled in training Islamic terrorist organizations at Lebanese camps (under
the Hizballah’s control) and camps in Iran. "Al-Quds" members are
known to be present in Lebanon, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Sudan and Iraq An al-Qud
training camp, the Ahmad Ali camp, is located in Northern Tehran. Terrorist
training of Hizballah and Palestinian terrorists takes place in that camp. Iran
works ceaselessly to mask its involvement in terrorism and cover up the
activities of the Intelligence Agency and the Guards of the Revolution
outside Iran. Iranian embassies usually include staffs that are much larger
than required by the diplomatic needs of the host countries. Iranian
embassies usually serve as a base and hiding place for Iranian and other
terrorists. In 1995-96, Iranian “diplomats” were deported from Germany,
Norway and Turkey. The
Guards of the Revolution regularly appoints ambassadors highly
experienced in subversive activity in Lebanon, including: Kamal
Magid (until 94 Ambassador to Sudan); Iran
wants a base and a stronghold in the Palestinian area In order to threaten
Israel. The purpose of the Iranian effort is to counter an Israeli threat to
the Iranian nuclear program through the use of terrorism. There is an
alliance between the Palestinians and Iran, which could evolve into a proxy
relationship like that between Hizbullah and Iran. This alliance constitutes
yet another Iranian reinforcement of world terrorism. Iran
is also a covert supporter of Osama bin Laden's al-Qaida network.
Iran, in fact, is hiding and providing sanctuary to high-ranking Al-Qaida
terrorists inside Iran. There is even stronger evidence that Iran Is
participating In the fighting against U.S. troops in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Iranian agents are also working to undermine both governments. At
an IAEA board meeting in Austria, the United States demanded that Iran submit
to more intrusive inspections after what it called a "deeply
troubling" report from the nuclear agency. U.S. Ambassador Kenneth Brill
has criticized Iran's nuclear program, noting that the U.N. report found the
Islamic government failed to declare how it used nuclear material. Iran's
chief representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Ali Akbar
Salehi, rejected allegations that his government failed to honor promises
made under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which aims to stop the
spread of nuclear weapons. "The international community must come
together to make it very clear to Iran that we will not tolerate construction
of a nuclear weapon," US President Bush told reporters at the end of a
meeting in the White House Cabinet Room. He also stated that:"Iran would
be dangerous if it had a nuclear weapon." Iran also has a sophisticated
array of ICBMs which could be used to bombard the US with nuclear explosives.
CURRENT
ANTI-REGIME RIOTS WITHIN IRAN Iran's
supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, recently called for hard-line Muslim
vigilantes to put down what he termed "riots" after two nights of
protests against the clerical regime. "I call on the pious and Hizbollahi
guards (hard-line vigilantes) to intervene wherever they see riots," Determined
to topple the Islamic Republic of Iran, thousands of Iranians who abhor the
super-terrorist regime controlling their nation have been rushing to the
streets every night since Friday October 11, 2001. The Iranian media has
reported that hundreds of thousands of Iranians, among them thousands of
students, workers, and a large number of minors under 18, have taken to the
streets. Many groups of young Iranians are venting their anger against over
twenty years of religious tyranny. The rioters frequently clash with riot
police and Islamic vigilantes in Teheran and elsewhere throughout Iran. Police
fire tear gas rounds at the demonstrators and club them with wooden staves.
Demonstrators fire back with pyrotechnics, stones and home-made explosives.
The rioting frequently lasts for weeks. Dozens of banks and shops across the
country have been burned down. Iranian rioters are calling for an end to the
hegemony of the ayatollahs. The authorities dismiss the unrest as hooliganism
and have set up special courts to try the thousands of people detained. It is
the worst and most widespread unrest seen In Iran since the revolution in
1979. The unrest is reminiscent of the violence that led eventually to the
downfall of the Shah. In
retaliation, Iran's religious vigilantes have confiscated satellite dishes in
an attempt to prevent people watching popular television channels broadcast
from the United States. Iranian officials have condemned the unrest and
speculated that foreign agents were orchestrating the protests with the help
of home-grown Iranian "mercenaries". Iranian Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has fraudulently claimed that Washington is behind
riots in the Islamic Republic and urged the nation and state officials to
remain vigilant. Washington has applauded the unrest, prompting Iran's
Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi to charge that American
officials' statements constituted a "flagrant example of interference in
Iran's internal affairs". In
Tehran, university students are the forefront of the unrest. Iranian
vigilante organizations such as the Basij militia, attack students In their
residences. According to media, police have arrested several people,
including plain-clothes vigilantes who have reportedly assailed student
dormitories and beaten up students. Such vigilantes also attack Iranian
journalists. President
Bush also urged Iranian leaders to treat protesters with "the utmost of
respect" as they seek the ouster of the Islamic government. Iran, which
President Bush has characterized as part of an "axis of evil" along
with Iraq and North Korea, might face military action under his policy
allowing pre-emptive attacks where he sees threats. OPERATIONAL
The
De-Evolution of Warfare
Copyright
2003 By
A. Scott Piraino Conventional
warfare is dead. More precisely, wars with national armies fighting across
opposing lines will be the exception in the future, not the rule. Instead the
twentieth century has seen the rise of guerrilla warfare and its vicious
stepchild, terrorism. The
Boer war was the first modern guerrilla war. In 1906, German settlers fought
the British Empire for control of South Africa's wealth. In a war of small
battles and skirmishes, Boers used hit and run tactics to stalemate the
British troops. The term "commando" was first used to describe
these small units carrying out raids and ambushes. The
tactics of guerrilla warfare are simple. Modern automatic weapons and
explosives make small groups of soldiers much more lethal. They can strike
quickly at occupying forces, then disappear into the native population. In a
war against a hidden enemy, the occupying army becomes demoralized and
withdraws. Terrorism
is a de-evolution of guerrilla warfare. Instead of targeting an occupying
army, an entire population becomes the enemy. Using anything from makeshift
bombs to weapons of mass destruction, small groups of fanatics can cause
death and destruction far out of proportion to their numbers We
can argue the morality of this new warfare, but we cannot deny its
effectiveness. Guerrillas have defeated the U.S. in Vietnam, and the Russians
in Afghanistan. A bombing campaign forced the French to withdraw from
Algeria. After ten years of terrorist warfare the exhausted British have
negotiated a peace settlement with the IRA. Western
Democracies have had few successes against this new form of warfare. Our
troops are brave and skilled, but our generals and political leaders order
the impossible. In theater after theater, they have sent armies to occupy
hostile territory, then lacked the stomach to prosecute the war as viciously
as the enemy. Only
repressive regimes can finally defeat guerrillas and terrorists. Since it is
futile to fight an elusive enemy hiding in hostile country, the solution is
to target the entire population. Ethnic cleansing has emerged as a cruel but
efficient military strategy, but liberal governments hesitate to use this
tactic. Again,
we can argue the morality of ethnic cleansing, but we cannot deny its
effectiveness. This is the truth of the new war; It is no longer possible to
conquer hostile territory without deporting or destroying the hostile population.
This does not bode well for conflicts raging around the world today. In
Chechnya, the Russians are seeking to avenge their failed invasion of 1996,
when the Red Army was humiliated by Chechen guerrillas. Unable to expel the
Russian army with conventional forces, The Chechens have resorted to
ambushes, raids, and terrorist bombings in Russian cities. The Russians
cannot win, but are unwilling to withdraw and admit defeat. They have
resorted to scorched earth tactics, in effect ethnically cleansing the
Chechen people. Israel
has been locked in an endless war of attrition with the Palestinians for over
thirty years. Of course Israel cannot withdraw from the conflict without
dissolving their country. So they endure uprisings, raids, and now suicide bombings
from the Palestinians who hate them. The bloodshed will continue unless both
sides make a lasting peace, or one group is deported or destroyed. Now
that the United States has been drawn into a War on Terror, we face the same
military dilemma. In response to the September 11th attacks, the US
immediately invaded Afghanistan. Operation Anaconda was a sweep of the
mountainous terrain in Afghanistan, seeking the terrorists responsible for
the attacks. We
have arrested many suspected terrorists, but we have certainly not destroyed
Al Qaeda, or captured Osama Bin Laden. Yet our Armed Forces are still
occupying Afghanistan. As of this writing eighteen peacekeepers have been
killed on duty in Afghanistan. Many more Soldiers have been wounded, and the
targets of terrorist attacks. After
September 11th, no one could deny our right to pursue the perpetrators of
such murderous acts. But the Bush administration has given up the moral high
ground with this reckless invasion of Iraq. Now in Addition to Afghanistan,
150,000 U.S. troops are committed to a hazardous occupation of Iraq. Operation
Iraqi Freedom officially ended on May 1st. Since then sixty five U.S.
Soldiers have been killed, by an increasingly hostile Iraqi population. There
were 85 assaults on our troops in May alone, and U.S. forces suffered an
average of twelve attacks per day in June. On June 26th, the U.S. Military
command in Iraq reported 25 separate attacks against US servicemen. Clearly
the international position of the United States is deteriorating. Egyptian
President Hosni Mubarak warned before the invasion that attacking Iraq would
create "one hundred new Bin Ladens". Recent events have proven him
right. In
Iraq, new groups of indigenous fighters have formed to fight the American
occupiers. Some of these organizations are using the Islamic news network
Al-Jazeera to call for new recruits. The Mujahideen of the Victorious Sect
have claimed responsibility for attacks against U.S. forces. The Popular
Resistance for the Liberation of Iraq has called for a Jihad against the U.S.
invaders. As
the U.S. invasion of Iraq devolves into a full scale guerrilla war, Defense
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld insists on referring to the Iraqi resistance as a
"terrorist network". Unfortunately, it doesn't matter what we call
the enemy, or whether we consider them Soldiers or criminals. The
United States cannot win the War on Terror by invading and occupying the
Middle East. This unwarranted invasion of Iraq has only fueled the grievances
of radical Muslims, and provided these militants with convenient targets by
placing US troops in their midst. The Bush administration would do well to
remember two earlier U.S. expeditions in Muslim countries. In
1983 the United States entered a civil war in Lebanon, then withdrew after a
terrorist bombing destroyed a marine barracks, inflicting hundreds of
casualties. In Somalia, a commando mission went awry, and a company of U.S.
Army Rangers was caught in a ferocious firefight in the city of Mogadishu.
The United States withdrew from both theatres after successful attacks by
terrorists and guerrilla fighters. And
these were only small interventions, with brigade sized units of U.S. forces.
One third of our standing army is now deployed in Iraq. If that nation rises
up in revolt against U.S. occupation, the result will not be a debacle, it
will be a disaster. TECHNOTACTICAL
By
LPT Staff Analysis Soft-Skinned
Army Getting clobbered in Iraq; Part 2: The Army squandered its money before
the war, now where are the gunshields?
Proverbs
6:6, 30:24-25 One
summer's day a Grasshopper was hopping about, chirping and singing to its
heart's content. An Ant passed by, bearing an ear of corn he was taking to
the nest. "Why not come and chat with me," said the Grasshopper,
"instead of toiling in that way?" "I am helping to lay up food for the winter," said
the Ant, "and recommend you do the same." "Why bother about winter?" said
the Grasshopper; "we have plenty of food now." The
Ant went on its way. When winter came the Grasshopper had no food and found
itself dying of hunger, while it saw the ants distributing corn and grain
from the stores they had collected in the summer. Aesop's
Fable: The Ant and The Grasshopper *******************************************************
Like
fad-conscious "grasshoppers," our Soldiers are dying in Iraq today
because we have squandered billions of dollars, and 4 years of preparation
time, on defective Canadian-made Stryker wheeled armored cars. Our men could
have been better protected, like "ants," had we diligently
economized and upgraded our existing and superior M113 Gavin tracked
armored fighting vehicles (AFVs) (that are actually in combat in Iraq), at
half the cost and time. We thereby would have ensured that we have enough
money to buy the body armor our troops need for the Afghanistan/Iraq wars. We
have chatted about "transformation" instead of making actual war
capability improvements until the enemy struck on 9/11/01. We could whine about
the difficult geo-political situation our Soldiers are in, but that's evading
the truth that the "world's best military" needs to better
anticipate the future and diligently use its resources to prevail. For the
first time since Somalia, U.S. Soldiers are occupying a country that is not
fully glad to see us there. In the past, after a brief war to overthrow a bad
government, U.S. forces could switch into a docile peacekeeping mode, not so
presently in Iraq. So let's face the problem head-on, shall we? The
U.S. military is populated by egotistical types of people. Like
"grasshoppers" these people in peacetime make decisions based on
feel-good style and not substance; the Army can be seen as divided into two
sub-camps; light and heavy. The light people think they can walk free of
having to care for motor vehicles anywhere on the battlefield and not need
any armor protection; they look down on the heavy people who fight from
armored vehicles. If the wars are in closed terrain, don't last too long, the
enemy is not difficult, light infantry can prevail with light casualties. If,
however, one needs to cross hundreds of miles of open desert, one can't walk
far with only the water you can carry on your back. We discover we
"need" the heavy forces whom we disparaged using words such as
"legacy," because they toil in a motor pool more than they do PT.
The heavy people are to blame for not wanting to take risks in anything less
than very heavy vehicles which are too hard to fly to a fight so the light
M113 Gavin AFVs our Army needs to move the light infantry and resupply
ourselves on the non-linear battlefield are neglected. Then came Iraq. In
open terrain without cover, with of cities full of lurking gunmen, we
discover we can't mouse-click steer firepower (Tofflerian RMA
mentality) to hold the ground and the peace, either. Holding this
contested ground with light infantry without ANY armored vehicles, we are
losing our men to gunmen, snipers, RPGs, and grenades. In the years leading
up to the second Iraq war, light infantrymen refused to wear body armor in
training saying they were overloaded (they are; more on this later). Then
came Somalia and the Ranger Regiment was rescued from soft-skin vehicle annihilation
by armored vehicles and hard body armor that could stop rifle bullets, called
"Ranger Body Armor" to make it acceptable. The full post-Somalia
response should have been requesting war-stock M113 Gavin light
tracked armored vehicles instead of continuing to drive around in easily
destroyed rubber-tired HMMWV and LandRover trucks - but Ranger egotism would
not allow this. To admit you need armor protection means you are less of a
man. However, the current rifle-caliber resistant body armor, "Interceptor
Body Armor" (IBA) has saved many lives in Afghanistan and now Iraq and
the other troops of our Army unashamedly want IBA even though there is not
enough to go around. Why
is there not enough IBA to go around? There
is not enough IBA for all our troops because in our pre-war training
fantasies our egotism and lack of professional understanding of the
battlefield did not make it a priority (i.e. we squandered our money on
defective Stryker armored cars). It should not take getting shot at to make a
so-called professional to see the need for armor on the automatic weapons
fire-swept battlefield. The basic problem with arrogance is a lack of RESPECT
for others; when you look down on the other half of the Army, is it a
surprise you do not respect the enemy? If you do not respect the enemy as a
clever human being, though fighting for an evil cause, you don't
"what-if" what he can do to you weapons-wise and thus you do not
take counter-measures such as armor-protecting yourself. As stated in the
first article, the force structure of our light infantry, that lacks ANY
tracked armored mobility, that depends on unarmored soft-skin vehicles for
re-supply, is madness on the current non-linear battlefield. This can
be quickly fixed by outfitting our light units with the world's greatest and
easiest to maintain light tracked AFV, the M113 Gavin, thousands of
which wait in the wings to rescue our Army from its descent into
all-or-nothing Light/Heavy madness that took place at the dawn of the '80s.
By canceling the overweight, road-bound, thinly armored Stryker
"medium" rubber-tired armored car one-size-fits-all delusion, we
can save over $9 BILLION dollars and be able to buy every Soldier in harm's
way IBA and upgrade their M113 Gavins into "A4" models with
RPG appliqué armor, nuke-chem-bio air filtration systems, digital
firepower/situational awareness, a shoot-on-the-move autocannon one-man
turret, band-tracks and hybrid-electric drive for stealth and up to 60 mph
road speeds. We would have the best general purpose troop and supply armored
transport possible on planet earth in 2003. 50% of an Army Heavy Division
moves by M113 Gavins now; all we have to do is fully exploit their
full potential throughout the rest of the Army to make its men and its
supplies mobile on tracks with basic armor protection as the IDF wisely does.
Why
is our Infantry on foot overloaded? Once
we respect the enemy (the earth itself!), we can properly employ and develop
future Army ground vehicles, creating the best force mixes possible with what
we can do today and in the near future. However, we can't fight successfully
only while mounted in armored vehicles because there are simply too many
places that are inaccessible to any vehicle, in a tactically prudent manner,
which require foot troops to secure. Here again, the light-itis egotism
strikes again; lacking a force-on-force feedback war game system that
requires ANSWERS, the light infantry revels in its overloaded weights it
carries and its heavy casualties it takes in peacetime
MILES "laser tag" training. Now that the bullets are real, they
are born-again believers in rifle-caliber bullet resistant IBA. However, due
to a lack of intelligent focus on the individual Soldier's load - actual
thinking and tinkering to get loads under 40 pounds to have 4 to 7+ mph foot
mobility - not hubristic chest beating to be "tough" - Soldiers
really are overloaded more than ever before. If you are a slow moving target
you can be more easily engaged by the enemy. The ability to be nimble and
evade being hit is not a solution to everything. Look at how the light
infantry, without body armor, has failed in those unavoidable situations
where you don't have cover/concealment to which to cling: deserts and urban
areas. Since we do not weigh our loads and try to trim them and move them
creatively (M113 Gavin AFVs, bikes, carts, pack mules, ATVs) in order
to acieve tactical speed march benefits, it is not surprising that we are
carrying unnecessary and overly heavy items into the field for comfortable
living. When actual ammo loads are carried, plus IBA, Soldier mobility goes
to nil. The solution here is to Army-wide change the
current sports-related PT test to a 6 mile 30-pound ruck march in full combat
gear for time with dummy ammunition. Whenever ANY Soldiers go to the
field they carry their basic dummy load of ammunition. This will force Natick
Labs, private industry, and combat-focussed leaders to find and use lighter
field living means than our current bloated tentage. The majority of the 30
pound weight of the rucksack should be ammunition and water. An Army that
trains as it would fight will not be surprised when it has to carry ammo and
wear IBA. Are
we a "hard" or "soft" target for the enemy? While
we are reorganizing our Army to use armored tracked vehicles for troop
transport/resupply in the new non-linear warfare paradigm, we will be stuck
using soft-skinned trucks. It is way overdue but THE BEST sandbagging
procedures for both the HMMWV and FMTV trucks need to be determined, and
published, immediately throughout the Army, as in the diagram found in
FM 90-5, Jungle Operations. The FMTV truck stands so tall over its
rubber tires that it needs a ladder for the troops to get in and out - this
is unacceptable. We need to find a way to rope the rear ramp in an open
position at an angle so troops can flop down and slide off onto the ground
for quicker dismounting. The M197 pedestal machine gun mount needs to be on
several of EVERY Army unit's HMMWVs so M249 LMGs are employed in a
ready-to-fire manner. Sandbagging, anti-mine hardening, and weapons mounting,
and Escape & Recovery training needs to be standard in ALL convoy
operations. This should be a CTT task done by every Army unit, every year.
This should have already been SOP throughout the Army; we are running late
and men and women are dead. Armored
MP HMMWVs now are receiving gunshields. The officer with the foresight to
push this forward should be promoted. Gunners exposed while firing machine
guns from vehicles are vital to convoy defense - the enemy knows this, fires
back and they are killed. The Russians know this and open their AFV hatches
FORWARD so they act as shields and have bullet deflectors in front of their
driver's hatches. Our AFVs don't have these protective features. The U.S.
Army learned the need for gunshields at the 1963 battle of Ap Bac, created
gunshield kits for its M113 Gavins but they languish now in supply
warehouses. Since it takes more work/red tape to mount gunshields we do not.
Every M113 Gavin right now in combat in Iraq should immediately be
fitted with the TC's gunshield kit. The already-too-high Bradley AFV
with its huge 2-man turret has neither forward opening hatches or gunshield
kits: www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/07/04/1057179167614.html
Yesterday evening, a sniper
killed a U.S. Soldier who was standing in the gunner's hatch of a Bradley
fighting vehicle while guarding the national museum in Baghdad. Yesterday the
museum opened its doors for a few hours - the first time since the war. The
Soldier was evacuated to a military hospital, but died of his wounds.
Attackers detonated an explosive on a highway in Baghdad's western outskirts
yesterday, injuring three passengers in a civilian car and two U.S. Soldiers
traveling in a Humvee convoy, according to an Associated Press photographer
on the scene. On Thursday, US troops near Baqubah, north-east of the capital,
attempted to draw out attackers by luring them into an ambush on a stretch of
road known as "RPG Alley" because of its frequent rocket-propelled
grenade strikes. One suspect was killed and three captured in the operation,
said Lieutenant Kurt Chapman, with the Army's 4th Infantry Division.
"We're trying to be a little bit more proactive and find them before
they get us," Chapman said. Compare
this to the fact that we have known for YEARS that Chechan snipers have
focused in on AFV crewmen and at JRTC OPFOR successfully does the same to
U.S. Army troops yet no gunshields for M1 Abrams or M2 Bradley
AFVs. The M113 Gavin gunshields are not mounted. Compare this tragic
story to the IBA success story described in the "Small Arms and
Individual Equipment Lessons Learned" gathered from 5 through 10 May
2003 from Soldiers serving in the Baghdad sector during Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Comments came from Brigade Commanders down to riflemen. The following units
were interviewed: HHC/1-187
IN, 101st ABN, 2d BCT, 82d ABN, 3-325 PIR, 2-325 PIR, 3-7 CAV, FSB, 1st BCT,
3 ID, 3-69 AR. Interceptor
Body Armor: Soldiers have great confidence in their body armor. As one
battalion commander stated, "Soldiers felt comfortable 'trolling for
contact' because they felt their body armor provided sufficient
protection." There were numerous comments about comfort and weight but,
in general, comments were positive. The comfort comments dealt mainly with
maneuverability. Soldiers indicated that it was difficult to maintain a good
prone firing position while wearing the IBA with plates. Their Kevlar
[helmet] interfered with the back of the vest and it was difficult to keep
your head up while prone. Also, the plates made it difficult to seat the
stock of the weapon into the shoulder as Soldiers are trained. The foam
impact pad in the Airborne Soldier's Kevlar [helmet] further exacerbated the
problem of contact between Kevlar and vest. Most importantly however, is the
performance demonstrated by the IBA during the operation. There were numerous
examples of impacts that could have been fatal that resulted in minor or no
injury to the Soldier. The A/3-69 AR XO's tank responded to a threat to the
field trains of about 60 dismounted enemy. While engaging the enemy with the
7.62mm MG, the loader felt an impact to his chest that knocked him back into
the turret. He told the XO he had been hit. The XO checked him for a wound,
found none and directed him to continue to engage the enemy. After the fight
they found the entry hole to the IBA, significant damage to the edge of the
SAPI plate and a 7.62mm round embedded in the protective liner of the OTV.
Other soldiers in A/3-69 AR made fun of the loader above because he wore an
IBA inside the turret of an M1 until he was hit in the chest and survived.
Vehicle crewman expressed a desire for similar protection. Some of the
Soldiers we interviewed said IBA was suitable for the turret. Others said it
was not. Due to the nature of the threat, M1 and M2 crews spent a significant
amount of time exposed in the hatches, engaging dismounted enemy around their
vehicles, as they pushed through. Vehicle crewmen took it upon themselves to
modify their issued Spall Vest to increase the protection. One crewman in 3-7
CAV took the protective pads from three different spall vests and put them
into one. The Soldiers in 3-69 AR found they could put IBA SAPI plates into
the spall vest. Where
is our Soldier face, neck and eye protection? Jim
Dunnigan's Strategypage reports: www.strategypage.com/search.asp?target=d:%5cinetpub%5cstrategypageroot%5cfyeo%5chowtomakewar%5cdocs%5chtinf.htm&search=molle
"May
16, 2003: More medical reports indicate that the new Interceptor protective
vest was, indeed, bullet-proof. Only nine percent of the combat wounds to 118
Army casualties were in the trunk, and these were either by larger caliber
weapons or shots that came in at odd angles and got around the Interceptor
(like via an armpit.) Autopsies of 154 dead Soldiers showed that the single
most common area hit was the head (neck and face, the rest is well protected
by the Kevlar helmet.) The next largest category is multiple wounds,
including ones that sever major [arteries] in the arms, and most dangerously,
in the legs." Non-linear
war requires a paradigm change; another that must change is the current SLA
Marshall men-against-fire mentality that units that are pinned down by enemy
fire are helpless and can only be rescued others not pinned down. In the days
before bullets infantry had SHIELDS. Over the years larger weapons like
artillery pieces, machine guns and rocket launchers have had gunshields to
protect their Soldiers employing them to get a line-of-sight (LOS) to hit
their targets. We have the technology today to take an Interceptor Body Armor
plate proof against 7.62mm bullets and attach it to the end of our rifles and
machine guns to be a man-portable gunshield. The 1st TSG (A) has created a
working prototype: We
should not have to fight an uphill battle against small-minded egotism and
"can't-do" to field small gunshields on our Soldiers in harm's way
now in Iraq. Portable gunshields that are separate from the weapon are in use
by the IDF and other military/police units. The paradigm change of giving the
individual Soldier a portable gunshield on his weapon would give him the
ability to defeat bullets/shrapnel away from his body and face, the latter
having no protection at all. A rifleman's gunshield would enable him in a
firefight to gain LOS to fire his weapon on the enemy and gain fire
superiority even if the enemy has "the drop" and has fired first at
him abusing the "peace" illusion created by surrounding civilians. Professional Military Education Hot Link In light of the protracted urban/rural guerrilla warfare
in Iraq, which is not any better in the AIR above without MANNED fixed-wing
observation/attack aircraft, Land Power Transformation suggests
reading our sister publication: U.S.
Army Aviation Journal, August/September 2003 And
specifically: Dr. James
Corum's "Colonial Air Control" Got
bad Soldier gear? U.S. bureaucracy not listening? Post
your gear requests/ideas to Brigade Quartermasters, they will get good gear
to the good guys (YOU) www.actiongear.com/bbactiongear2/main.asp
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