U.S. Army’s Modular Redesign: Issues for Congress

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Summary

In what the Army describes as the “most significant Army restructuring in the past 50 years,” the Army intends to redesign its current 10 active duty division force to a 43 or 48 brigade-level unit of action or UA force by FY2007. The Army National Guard will also redesign its force structure in a similar fashion. While the Army cites the need for a more responsive, deployable, joint, and expeditionary force, others suggest that the primary reason for redesign is the ever increasing long term troop requirements to support the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). The addition of up to 15 additional active duty and a yet to be finalized number of Army National Guard brigade-sized UAs could provide an additional force pool of deployable units to ease the burden on units presently deployed, and possibly to shorten the length of time that units are deployed on operations. The Army has two other concurrent initiatives underway which it considers inextricably linked to its brigade-centric redesign — restructuring to create new “high demand” units and stabilizing the force. Both initiatives involve substantial policy, organizational, and personnel changes from FY2004 - FY2009.

Many experts believe that modular redesign, selective restructuring, and stabilizing of the Army are prudent actions that should provide the Army with additional deployable units and also eventually bring stability to soldiers and their families. As long as no additional significant long term troop commitments arise, many feel that these initiatives could help ease the stress on both the active and reserve forces. While the Army has some specific planning and cost information for converting its combat forces, some analysts suggest that more needs to be done for support units of action both in the active Army and the reserves. This planning is considered crucial in light of evidence suggesting that the Army may have to contend with personnel and selected equipment shortages which could impede plans to build this new force. Some analysts and government officials also question the viability of the Army’s Future Combat System (FCS) which is intended to be the focal point of the so-called Future Forces. The Army contends that the FCS will enable the UAs to be even more deployable, effective, lethal, and manpower efficient than current redesigned units of action.

Restructuring and stability also raise a number of concerns. Some experts suggest that the Army will have to significantly change how officers and soldiers are trained and note that there does not appear to be a master plan dealing with training and its associated costs. Where these new units of action will eventually be based is also of interest to many analysts. In addition to the costs associated with basing forces, there are questions about how this re-basing strategy will enhance deployability and how changes to Army bases could effect local communities. This report will be updated.
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U.S. Army’s Modular Redesign: Issues for Congress

Issues For Congress

The United States Army is undertaking a total organizational redesign of its combat and associated support units in the midst of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) to better meet current and future operational requirements. This redesign effort, as well as associated restructuring and stabilization initiatives, are deemed important by proponents as they are intended to sustain both the active and reserve Army through a potentially long term, manpower and resource intensive war on terror.

The overall issue facing Congress is the necessity of such a radical redesign and the adequacy of the Army’s plan to accomplish its stated objectives. Also of critical importance is the completeness of the Army’s proposed budget requirements to fund these initiatives. Key oversight questions can be summarized as:

- Is this redesign necessary or desirable?
- If so, does the Army have adequate and realistic plans in place to accomplish its objectives?
- Has the Army captured the total costs of this effort and have these cost projections been shared with Congress?
- Will the Army have the required manpower, equipment, and appropriate basing to facilitate this change?

Congress’ decisions on these and other related issues could have significant implications for U.S. national security, Army funding requirements, and future congressional oversight activities. This report addresses the U.S. Army’s redesign of its current force structure, based on large divisions, into one based on brigade-level modular “units of action” (UA).¹ As part of this plan, the Army’s decision to restructure and stabilize the force will also be addressed.

¹ According to Department of the Army Pamphlet 10-1, “Organization of the United States Army,” dated June 14, 1994, a division consists of approximately 10,000 to 18,000 soldiers and a brigade consists of approximately 3,000 to 5,000 soldiers.
Background

Why Redesign the Army?

In what the Army describes as the “most significant Army restructuring in the past 50 years,” the Army intends to redesign its current 10 active duty division force to a 43 or 48 brigade-level unit of action or UA force by FY2007. The Army National Guard will also redesign its force structure in a similar fashion. While the Army cites the need for a more responsive, deployable, joint, and expeditionary force, others suggest that the primary reason for redesign is the ever increasing long term troop requirements to support the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). The addition of up to 15 additional active duty, and an undetermined number of Army National Guard brigade-sized UAs as a result of this redesign is intended to provide an additional force pool of deployable units to ease the burden on units presently deployed, and possibly to shorten the length of time that units are deployed on operations.

Of the active Army’s current 34 brigades, around 22 of these brigades are currently deployed on operations. Recent Department of Defense (DOD) announcements and press reports that a brigade task force from the 2nd Infantry Division in Korea and the Opposing Force Unit from the Army’s National Training Center at Ft. Irwin, California, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, will also be deployed, will raise the number of deployed brigades even higher. Some experts cite the deployment of these two particular units, which in the past had not been considered part of the “deployable Army,” as further evidence that the Army has almost exhausted its pool of active duty units available to fulfill the Army’s commitments.

History of Brigade-Sized Units

Since World War II (1941-1945), the largest permanently-organized combat unit of the Army has been the division of 10,000-18,000 soldiers, commanded by a major
general (an officer usually in his early to mid-50s with around 30 years of military service). Divisions in turn are composed of three smaller units initially termed regiments, but since the early 1960s, known as brigades, with 3,000 to 5,000 soldiers, plus several smaller logistical and administrative support units. Brigades are commanded by colonels, who are usually in their mid-40s and have 22-25 years of service.

In recent years, primarily due to criticism that the Army was becoming less relevant because of its inability to deploy forces rapidly and effectively, the Army began re-visiting brigade-sized forces as a means to rapidly project power. Colonel Douglas A. Macgregor’s 1997 book *Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the Twenty-First Century*, was seen by many analysts as a catalyst for serious debate within the Army about redesigning what many considered to be an outmoded, Cold War-focused Army. Macgregor’s controversial approach advocated reorganizing the Army into a number of mobile combat groups consisting of 4,000 to 5,000 soldiers.

**The Army’s Objective Force**

In November 2001, the then Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA), General Eric Shinseki, introduced the Army’s transformation strategy which was intended to convert all of the Army’s divisions (called Legacy Forces) into new organizations called the Objective Force. As part of this transformation, the Army adopted the Future Combat System (FCS) as a major acquisition program to equip the Objective Force. The FCS program has been described as an ambitious, multi-year effort to develop and procure “an array of manned and unmanned ground vehicles and unmanned aircraft and sensors and tie them together with a secure digital network.” In addition to a family of lighter combat vehicles, the FCS program also includes equipment for individual soldiers as well as new intelligence and fire support assets. Reported current Pentagon estimates that buying all associated FCS systems could

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8 Many experts consider the Army’s 1999 controversial Task Force Hawk deployment to Kosovo and Albania as the event that triggered the Army’s transformation. Reportedly, the Army deployed a unit consisting of units from different divisions that had never trained together commanded by a command and control organization that was unable to conduct joint operations. The most often cited criticism was that it took the Army more than 30 days to deploy 28 Apache attack helicopters from their bases in Germany to Albania and when they finally arrived, they were unable to conduct combat operations due to training and equipment deficiencies. The task force also consisted of mechanized maneuver and support elements competing for limited air lift insertion capabilities.


cost $92 billion puts the FCS program on the funding level of the National Missile Defense and Joint Strike Fighter programs.\textsuperscript{12}

This transformation, due to its complexity and uncertainty, would take place over the course of three decades, with the first FCS-equipped objective force unit reportedly becoming operational in 2011 and the entire force transformed by 2032.\textsuperscript{13} In order to mitigate the risk associated with the Objective Force and to address the near-term need for more deployable and capable units, the Army’s transformation plan called for the development of brigade-sized units called the Interim Force in both the active Army and the Army National Guard. These six brigade sized units,\textsuperscript{14} known as both Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs) or Stryker Brigade Combat Teams\textsuperscript{15} or SBCTs, are currently being fielded — with the last brigade being fielded by 2010.\textsuperscript{16} The SBCTs are organized around motorized infantry battalions and have a unique reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) squadron and are intended to be used primarily in small-scale contingency operations in complex and urban terrain in a variety of roles ranging from combat to stability operations. Some analysts suggest that the Stryker brigades, although originally intended to be part of a division-based Objective Force structure, were a necessary initial step in the Army’s 2003 decision to redesign the Army’s force structure.

The Current State of the Army

How the Army is Organized

At present, the active Army consists of four corps headquarters\textsuperscript{17} and ten divisions. There are currently seven different division and regimental designs:

- Armored (heavy);
- Mechanized Infantry (heavy);
- Cavalry (heavy);
- Light Infantry (light);
- Airborne Infantry (light);

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{14} The Army currently plans to field five active and one National Guard Interim Brigade Combat Teams.
\textsuperscript{15} The Stryker is the Army’s name for the family of wheeled armored vehicles which will constitute most of the brigade’s combat and combat support vehicles.
\textsuperscript{17} A corps, as described by Army Pamphlet 10-1, “Organization of the United States Army, commands one or more divisions plus supporting troops and numbers from 20,000 to 45,000 soldiers.
Air Assault Infantry (light); and
Medium (composite of Strykers brigades and other types of brigades).\textsuperscript{18}

In addition, the active Army has two separate infantry brigades and two cavalry regiments. In total, the active Army has 34 combat brigades consisting of:

- 17 Heavy Brigades (mechanized infantry, armor, armored cavalry regiments);
- 13 Light Brigades (airborne infantry, air assault infantry, light infantry, light cavalry regiments);
- 3 Stryker Brigade Combat Teams; and
- 1 new UA.\textsuperscript{19}

At present the Army National Guard consists of:

- 15 Enhanced Separate Brigades (mechanized infantry, armor, armored cavalry regiments);
- 19 Divisional Brigades (light and mechanized infantry and armor);
- 1 Separate Brigade; and
- 1 Scout Group.\textsuperscript{20}

**Where the Army is Committed\textsuperscript{21}**

As of May 31, 2004, the Army reported that it had approximately 227,000 Active, Reserve, and National Guard soldiers deployed on the following operations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation/Location</th>
<th>Approximate Number of Soldiers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) - Iraq</td>
<td>129,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>31,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIF - Kuwait</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Noble Eagle - United States</td>
<td>16,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) - Afghanistan</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{18} From a Department of the Army briefing to the media on “Building Army Capabilities,” Feb. 17, 2004.

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{21} Information on numbers of committed Army troops was provided from the Army Staff’s G-3 Congressional Affairs Office based on a CRS request to the U.S. House of Representatives Army Liaison Office on June 4, 2004.
While some experts suggest that training exercises and long standing commitments to the Balkans (started in 1995) and the Sinai (started in 1982) be eliminated or scaled back to free up additional troops for use in Iraq and Afghanistan, others argue that such an approach is short-sighted. These analysts contend that training and peacekeeping operations, which can be benign in nature, not only provide important training and experience needed by units that may eventually deploy on more demanding operations, but also provide stability and deterrence in regions of strategic interest to the United States. These operations are also viewed as economy of force operations - keeping a region stable with a small commitment of forces now could preclude having to deploy a larger force there in the future should instability and conflict ensue from a lack of presence.

### The Proposed Modular Army

#### From Objective Force to Future Force

In August 2003, the newly designated CSA, General Peter Schoomaker, changed the Army’s transformation plan. General Schoomaker redesignated the Objective Force as the Future Force, emphasizing the fielding of useful FCS program capabilities as soon as they became available instead of waiting a decade or more before they could be integrated into other FCS platforms and technologies under development.22 Some suggest that this was an attempt to deploy relevant technologies to forces actively involved in combat operations as opposed to the abandonment of General Shinseki’s transformation program. Under General Schoomaker’s plan, the Army reportedly intends to restructure the FCS program to place the emphasis more on the various networks linking Army forces together, as well as with units from the other services, than on the actual FCS platforms themselves.23 While this shift in emphasis on the FCS program was considered significant by many officials, the most widely publicized aspect of this change was the Army’s decision to activate 10 additional active Army brigade combat teams, designated “Units of Action” or UAs by the end of 2006 and possibly another five

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22 James Jay Carafano, p. 6.

23 Ibid.
active Army UAs by the end of 2007. In order to man these additional units, the Army received authorization from the Department of Defense for a temporary end strength increase of 30,000 personnel. While the plans for National Guard reorganization are not quite as well defined as the active component’s, the Army plans on reorganizing three National Guard brigades into UAs in FY2005 and then six brigade conversions each year during FY2006 - FY2010, if funding is available.

How the Units Will Be Redesigned

The Army plans to redesign its current division headquarters into ten commonly-configured Units of Employment (UE) “X” which will have the capability to serve as headquarters for at least six UAs (both combat and support UAs). Corps and higher level Army headquarters will also be converted into a number of UE “Y”s which are intended to conduct theater and strategic level functions. The Army’s eight current brigade/regiment designs will be reduced to three kinds of UAs - Armored, Infantry, and Stryker. The Army National Guard will have the same common UA design as the active Army but will retain a separate Scout group in addition to its Armored, Infantry, and Stryker UAs.

Supporting Units of Action Redesign. To support the Army’s new Armored, Infantry, and Stryker UAs, the Army also plans on reorganizing a myriad of supporting units into “Support Units of Action” which will provide aviation, artillery fires, sustainment, reconnaissance, security, and protection to the UAs. These Support Units of Action can range in size from a brigade-sized element down to platoon-sized (30 person) elements. While current publically available Army literature and briefings have detailed descriptions on how the UAs will be organized and equipped, there appears to be a lack of detail regarding how the various Support Units of Action will be organized. The Army has identified five types of supporting brigades — aviation; sustainment; maneuver enhancement; fires; and reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition — but specifics on how these units will be structured are unknown. Some suggest that the Army has not yet fully developed

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24 “The Army Campaign Plan (Unclassified),” The Department of the Army, Mar. 31, 2004, p. 11.
27 From a Department of the Army briefing to the media on “Building Army Capabilities,” Feb. 17, 2004.
29 Ibid., p. 6.
31 “Army Takes New Force Design to Regional Commanders, Other Services,” Inside the (continued...)
these structures because of the inherent complexity of reorganizing such a wide array of units and functions, or because they do not yet have a consensus on how these units should be reorganized. Another possibility might be that the resources needed in terms of personnel, equipment, and funding may not be available and that the Army is deferring further planning until this situation changes.

What Will the Brigade Units of Action Look Like?

The Army describes their proposed brigade UAs as “smaller and more lethal” than current brigades and it would benefit from having division-level artillery and reconnaissance assets as well as some assets from corps level as part of its organic structure. UAs could also receive an Army aviation package from redesigned aviation units of action if the mission requires aviation assets. Based on Army briefings and discussions with the Army Staff, the following paragraphs will provide a brief overview of what the ground combat brigade UAs will probably look like.

**Armored UA.** The Army envisions developing 20 to 22 Armored UAs in the active Army by 2007. By 2007, the Army also plans to develop up to 10 National Guard Armored UAs. At present, each Armored UA is planned to consist of approximately 3,800 soldiers, and will consist of the following subordinate units:

- One Brigade Troops Battalion including the UA staff; military police (MP) and security platoons; a signal company; a military intelligence company; and a joint fire coordination cell (to coordinate Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps fires in support of the UA);
- One Armed Reconnaissance Battalion consisting of three reconnaissance troops and one surveillance troop and a forward support company;
- Two Combined Arms Battalions with two tank companies and two mechanized infantry companies in each battalion as well as an engineer and a forward support company each;

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31 (...continued)

32 Gary Sheftick.

33 From a Department of the Army briefing to the media on “Building Army Capabilities,” Feb. 17, 2004.

34 Discussions with Army Staff’s Force Modernization Office (G-8), July 16, 2004.

35 According to Army Pamphlet 10-1, “Organization of the United States Army, a battalion consists of from 300 to 1,000 soldiers and is commanded by a lieutenant colonel.

36 According to Army Pamphlet 10-1, “Organization of the United States Army, a company consists of from 62 to 190 soldiers and is commanded by a captain.
• One Fires Battalion consisting of a target acquisition cell, and two batteries\(^{37}\) of self-propelled artillery and a forward support company; and
• One Support Battalion.

All of these subordinate units are intended to be linked with a networked battle command system designed to enhance situational and terrain awareness, transmit orders and reports, and exchange other mission-related items of information. This battle command system is not only intended to permit the UA to operate independently, but also to plug directly into other U.S. forces.

**Infantry UA.** The Army plans to form between 20 to 22 active Army Infantry UAs and 5 Army National Guard UAs by 2007.\(^{38}\) There will be basic Infantry UA design although these units may be delivered by parachute or helicopter based on mission requirements. The Infantry UAs will consist of approximately 3,000 soldiers and will consist of the following subordinate units:

• One Brigade Troops Battalion including the UA staff; a military police (MP) platoon; a signal company; an intelligence company, an engineer company; and a joint fires cell;
• One Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) Battalion with both motorized and dismounted reconnaissance units, a surveillance unit including ground radars, sensors, and unmanned aerial vehicles; and a forward support company;
• Two Infantry Battalions consisting of three rifle companies and one combat support company each; and a forward support company capable of moving one company by truck;
• One Strike Battalion consisting of a target acquisition platoon, an unmanned aerial vehicle unit, and two batteries of towed artillery; a forward support company; and
• One Support Battalion consisting of a transport platoon capable of moving almost an entire infantry battalion by truck.

Like the Armored UA, the Infantry UA will also be equipped with a network battle command system and will also receive augmentation from an Aviation UA when the mission dictates. Because the Infantry UAs lack the organic ground transport found in the Armored UAs, aviation augmentation will likely play a crucial role in providing the Infantry UAs with rapid battlefield mobility.

**Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCTs).** The Army plans to activate five active Army SBCTs by FY2007 and one National Guard SBCT by 2010.\(^{39}\) The

\(^{37}\) According to Army Pamphlet 10-1, “Organization of the United States Army, a battery consists of from 62 to 190 soldiers and eight artillery systems and is commanded by a captain.

\(^{38}\) From a Department of the Army briefing to the media on “Building Army Capabilities,” Feb. 17, 2004.

\(^{39}\) “The Army Campaign Plan (Unclassified),” The Department of the Army, Mar. 31, 2004, (continued...
first SBCT, the 3rd Brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division is presently deployed to Iraq and the second SBCT, the 1st Brigade of the 25th Infantry Division, has recently completed its certification training. The overall SBCT organizational design and fielding schedule has changed little since established by General Shinseki. The SBCTs consist of about 4,000 soldiers and are organized as follows:

- A headquarters company, a signal company, and a military intelligence company;
- Three Stryker Motorized Infantry Battalions with one headquarters and three Stryker motorized infantry companies each;
- A Reconnaissance and Surveillance Battalion;
- An Artillery Battalion;
- An engineer company;
- An anti-tank company; and
- A Support Battalion.

Like the Armored and Infantry UAs, the SBCT will also be equipped with a network battle command system and will also receive augmentation from an Aviation UA when the mission dictates. The SBCT is considered a medium force by the Army, designed to capitalize on its speed and situational awareness provided by an array of sensors in a variety of roles.

**Capability Considerations.** The Army has claimed that the brigade-centric modular redesign will enhance a number of critical capabilities. Three of the most frequently cited are deployability, lethality, and jointness.

**Deployability.** Deployability can be defined as the ability to move units to their intended areas of operation, and is commonly expressed as a function of time, usually in terms of hours or days. The SBCTs were originally designed to fill the capabilities gap between light forces which were rapidly deployable but lacked combat power and mobility and heavy armored forces which required too much time to deploy. The SBCTs were intended to deploy anywhere in the world in 96 hours (4 days), but a 2003 General Accounting Office (GAO) report found that it would take anywhere from 5 to 14 days, depending on the brigade’s location and final destination. Furthermore, over one third of the Air Force’s C-17 and C-5 transport aircraft fleet would be required to deploy just this one SBCT, and if sealift was used in combination with airlift, it could take significantly longer than 5 to 14 days to deploy the SBCT to some of the more remote regions of the world.
Similar deployability information for Armored and Infantry UAs is not publically available but, by comparing them to SBCTs, some observations can be made. The SBCT, consisting of about 3,900 soldiers and 1,500 vehicles (with the various Stryker vehicle configurations weighing about 19 tons) has reportedly reduced deployment requirements by almost 50 percent when compared to a current heavy brigade combat team equipped with Bradley fighting vehicles and Abrams tanks weighing 33 to 68 tons, respectively. While an Armored UA is smaller than the current heavy brigade combat team, it still has over 55 Abrams tanks, over 85 Bradley fighting vehicles as well as 11 self-propelled artillery systems in an addition to hundreds of other vehicles. In terms of deployability, using the SBCT as a benchmark, an Armored UA as currently envisioned is probably less deployable than the SBCT, but probably more deployable than current heavy brigade combat teams.

When compared to current light infantry brigades (not airborne or air assault brigades) the SBCT required twice the deployment resources. Infantry UAs, may be more deployable than the current light infantry brigades or possibly less deployable, depending on the number and types of vehicles and equipment associated with the particular UA configuration.

Other experts suggest that Army deployability might better be served by expanding military air and naval transport capabilities and also by increased reliance on commercial air and sea transport. Other possible considerations might be to further develop and incorporate technologies that can reduce vehicle fuel consumption and to develop lighter-weight ammunition to help decrease the logistics footprint of deployed forces.

**Lethality.** According to Lieutenant General John H. Curran, the Director of the Future Center at the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) the Army does not plan to increase the current numbers of “killing systems” found in brigades in the new UAs. Lethality will instead be increased because the UAs will be better equipped to find the enemy with their reconnaissance capabilities, and have increased ability to use joint fires (Navy, Marine, and Air Force air or Marine

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44 Ibid. p. 2.
45 From a Department of the Army briefing to the media on “Building Army Capabilities,” Feb. 17, 2004.
47 Carafano, p. 4.
48 TRADOC is the major Army command responsible for recruiting, training and educating soldiers; developing leaders; supporting training in units; developing doctrine; establishing standards; and building the future Army.
or naval gunfire).50 While the UA’s lethality may be relevant in combat operations against enemy armored and infantry formations, some believe that this type of lethality is not a major consideration in stability and security operations, and in the conduct of a counterinsurgency campaign — the type of campaigns being waged in Iraq and Afghanistan. These experts contend that it is more important to have enough forces or “boots on the ground” available to exert a “presence” in an area of operations to create a secure environment and adequate intelligence to permit these forces to conduct a counterinsurgency operation. In addition, others suggest that armored and infantry units are of limited value in a counterinsurgency role and that special forces units might be better suited in this type of operation. While the enhanced intelligence and reconnaissance capabilities of the UAs and the SBCTs may provide better intelligence than found in current brigade combat teams, it is not readily apparent that a single UA or SBCT provides more “boots on the ground” than does a single brigade combat team under the Army’s current divisional structure.

Jointness. Jointness can be defined as the Service’s ability to work together to achieve a common goal. From the Army’s perspective, the UEs and UAs must not only be prepared to integrate and operate with Navy, Marine, and Air Force units but also act in a subordinate role, perhaps becoming a member of a larger Navy, Marine, or Air Force-centric unit. In this sense, Army UEs and UAs must be able to “plug into” other formations and headquarters with little or no augmentation. While UAs and SBCTs have been designed with increased staffs and enhanced communications to facilitate joint operations, there are other “jointness” considerations that some analysts suggest are just as critically important. Some of these considerations are:

- Common operating procedures at the staff and unit level for all services;
- Extensive joint training exercises at all levels;
- Joint schooling, particularly for junior officers and non-commissioned officers;
- Basing joint forces at the same location to develop a habitual relationship; and
- Adopting commonalities in logistics (medical supplies, fuel, ammunition, repair parts, etc.) when possible.

Some of these considerations emphasize the human dimension of jointness as opposed to the technological aspect and present their own unique challenges. For example, while the services do routinely conduct joint exercises, priority is often given to service-specific training and when the operational tempo increases, some observers note that joint exercises are usually the first exercises cancelled. With increasing commitments by all services in the GWOT, some experts have questioned if the services will have sufficient time and resources to conduct necessary training.

Creation of Additional Deployable Units. The Army modular redesign is intended to produce an additional 10 to 15 active duty brigades (including 5 SBCTs) by FY2007 and reconfigure National Guard brigades into 34 UAs.
configuration (including 1 SBCT). According to Army officials, the primary intent of the Army’s brigade-centric redesign effort is to produce deployable and sustainable units in a relatively short period of time to be added to the pool of units that can be deployed to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The addition of these units is viewed as a means of relieving the much publicized stress on units which have been frequently deployed for lengthy periods of time — many in excess of a year — and bringing a sense of predictability back to soldiers and their families. Analysts also note that the creation of additional brigades could give the United States more operational flexibility should another major troop commitment be required, either in support of the GWOT or to respond to an unrelated military crisis, such as North Korea or Taiwan. Some analysts, such as Colonel Douglas Macgregor now retired but formerly with the National Defense University, suggest that additional brigade UAs might permit the Army to adopt not only a six month deployment cycle, but also a six month reconstitution and training cycle that might eventually lead to a joint cycle where all services adopt similar six month, training, deployment, and reconstitution cycles.

Critics of the Army’s development of UAs to increase its rotational base suggest that instead the Army should eliminate administrative and staff positions as well as end “nonessential overseas missions.” One example would be to reorganize the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and its numerous branch schools (such as the Infantry School, the Quartermaster School, etc.) into other commands. Other analysts suggest while there may be some merit to this suggestion, that any savings in terms of manpower and resources may not be realized in the near term and therefore contribute little to helping to expand the rotational pool of units to address near-term manpower needs.

**When Will These Units Be Developed?**

According to the Army Campaign Plan and discussions with the Army Staff the Army intends to activate its active duty UEs (division-level headquarters), UAs, and SBCTs as follows:

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51 Ibid.
52 From a May 27, 2004 meeting with the Army Staff’s G-8 Force Development Office to discuss the Army’s brigade redesign program.
54 Carafano, p. 8.
55 Ibid.
Table 2. Army’s Development Plan for Active Duty Combat Forces

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<tr>
<td>UEs&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt; Infantry Division</td>
<td>4&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; Infantry Division</td>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; Cavalry Division</td>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt; Infantry Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>101&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; Airborne Division</td>
<td>10&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; Mountain Division</td>
<td>25&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; Infantry Division</td>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; Infantry Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>82&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt; Airborne Division</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAs&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>One additional UA in the 3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt; Infantry Division</td>
<td>One additional UA in the 4&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; Infantry Division</td>
<td>One additional UA in the 1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; Cavalry Division</td>
<td>Two additional UAs in the 2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt; Infantry Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>One additional UA in the 101&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; Airborne Division</td>
<td>One additional UA in the 10&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; Mountain Division</td>
<td>Convert two brigades in the 25&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; Infantry Division to UAs</td>
<td>One additional UA in the 1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; Infantry Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>One additional UA in the 10&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; Mountain Division</td>
<td>One additional UA in the 25&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; Infantry Division</td>
<td>One additional UA in the 82&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt; Airborne Division</td>
<td>One additional UA in the 1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; Armored Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBCTs</td>
<td>Convert one brigade in the 25&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; Infantry Division to a SBCT</td>
<td>Convert the 1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; Battalion, 501&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; Parachute Infantry Regiment to a SBCT</td>
<td>Convert the 2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt; Armored Cavalry Regiment to a SBCT</td>
<td>Convert one brigade in the 25&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; Infantry Division to a SBCT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
- Each UE is intended to have 4 brigade-sized units associated with it. This can be a combination of UAs or UAs and SBCTs.
- This plan includes only UAs that are being developed to add a fourth brigade-sized unit to the existing division UE structure. Most current divisions have three brigades and this table does not reflect the reorganization of those established brigades into UAs.

**Current (FY2004) Efforts.** On May 26, 2004, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Division at Fort Stewart Georgia activated its 4<sup>th</sup> UA. The division’s 2<sup>nd</sup> Brigade had been previously redesigned as a UA and the 1<sup>st</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> Brigades are slated to be reorganized into UAs in July 2004. The 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Division is reportedly slated to be redeployed to Iraq as early as November 2004. The 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne and the

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<sup>57</sup> Ricardo Branch, “3<sup>rd</sup> INF Div Activates 4<sup>th</sup> UA,” *Army News Service*, May 27, 2004.


<sup>59</sup> Ibid.
10th Mountain Division are also scheduled to add one UA each this year. The 3rd Infantry Division and 101st Airborne Division headquarters will also reorganize to the UE structure during 2004.

The Army’s second SBCT, the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division from Fort Lewis, Washington is currently undergoing pre-deployment training in the United States and has reportedly recently received orders to deploy to Iraq in October 2004 to relieve the 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, the SBCT deployed to Iraq in the fall of 2003. The third Stryker Brigade based at Ft. Wainwright Alaska is presently receiving its new equipment.

**What Additional Manpower Will Be Required?**

According to the Army, approximately 31,000 additional soldiers will need to be added to active divisions as well as some non-divisional brigades to convert them to infantry and armored UAs. These figures include troops needed for UE headquarters, and aviation and sustainment UAs for the heavy divisions and approximately 2,200 additional support troops for light division conversions. Not included in these figures are additional troop requirements for the variety of support UAs which could prove to be significant considering that many troops previously assigned to supporting units have been “pushed down” and permanently assigned to the new UAs. While some of the new support UAs may not perform as many functions as in the past because these functions will now be preformed at the UA level, they still must be adequately manned, which could be difficult in the case of low density, high demand military occupational specialties. The following table provides by unit figures of additional personnel needed by current divisions as well as for some of the smaller units converting to the UA structure:

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60 Ibid.


62 Nathan Hodge, “Army Recasting Cav Unit as “Infantry-Based” Brigade,” *Defense Today*.

63 From a Department of the Army briefing to the media on “Building Army Capabilities,” Feb. 17, 2004.

64 Ibid.
Table 3. Additional Personnel Required by Unit to Convert to UE/UA Structure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Heavy Units</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Light Units</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Armored Div.</td>
<td>2,474</td>
<td>10th Mountain Div.</td>
<td>6,266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Infantry Div.</td>
<td>2,353</td>
<td>25th Infantry Div.</td>
<td>6,282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Cavalry Div.</td>
<td>2,729</td>
<td>82nd Airborne Div.</td>
<td>1,842</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Infantry Div.</td>
<td>922</td>
<td>101st Airborne Div.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Infantry Div.</td>
<td>2,227</td>
<td>173rd Airborne Bde.</td>
<td>1,358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Infantry Div.</td>
<td>2,786</td>
<td>1st Battalion, 501st Parachute Infantry Regt.</td>
<td>2,251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Armored Cavalry Regt.</td>
<td>Surplus 274 personnel after reorganized to UA</td>
<td>Total Personnel Required</td>
<td>31,216</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In order to meet the aforementioned personnel requirements as well as additional requirements that will likely occur once the Army finalizes its support UA structures, the Army plans on “civilianizing” up to 15,000 positions currently filled by soldiers, using the additional 30,000 soldiers temporarily authorized until the end of FY2007, and “rebalancing” the active and reserve Army to restructure over 100,000 positions. Despite congressional calls to the contrary, the Army, supported by the DOD, has frequently contended that no permanent endstrength authorizations are needed and that the Army plans on returning to its current authorized endstrength of 482,400 soldiers by the end of FY2009. With the Senate calling for a 20,000 soldier endstrength increase and the House a 30,000 soldier increase in the FY2005 Defense Authorization Bill, some experts believe that the Army will almost certainly see an increase to their endstrength, despite their current objections.

Some analysts suggest that the Army may not be able to meet the personnel requirements for the new units of action. In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, General Richard Cody, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, reportedly stated that Army planners had estimated that would require an additional 9,000 specialists to man the Army’s new Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition units and its new unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) units - - both critical.

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65 From a Department of the Army briefing to the media on “Building Army Capabilities,” Feb. 17, 2004.
66 Testimony by Lieutenant General Richard A. Cody, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, United States Army and Lieutenant General Franklin L. Hagenbeck, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1, United States Army, before the House Subcommittee on Total Force, Mar. 10, 2004.
67 Ibid.
units found in Armored and Infantry UAs as well as SBCTs. Other reports also indicate that the Army may be facing widespread personnel shortages throughout their ranks. According to one report, units returning from Iraq have shown “some alarming drops in re-enlistment, particularly amongst mid-career sergeants who form the backbone of the Army.” The former commandant of the Army War College, retired Major General Robert Scales, refers to this as “the canary in the coal mine” and noted that the disappearance of the professional noncommissioned officer corps broke the Army in Vietnam. There also appears to be shortages in the officer corps. According to an internal Army memorandum “the Army is short approximately 30% of its infantry officers in the grades of branch-qualified captains and above because of rapid transformation and expansion.” Experts also believe that it is difficult to predict future shortages while the Army maintains its “Stop Loss Program,” which is keeping soldiers in service longer than their duty obligations. Some suggest that if and when “Stop Loss” is rescinded, that there could be a significant exodus of soldiers and officers, primarily in the lower and middle grades.

**What Additional Equipment Will be Required?**

The Army is presently equipping the Current Force and developing the FCS for the Future Force. In terms of the Current Force, Army officials do not yet have precise figures on what additional equipment will be required for the modular redesign, largely due to the fact that many of the various supporting UA structures have not yet been determined. Army officials did, however, offer some general observations about equipping the Current Force:

- The primary equipment shortage will likely be wheeled vehicles of all classes — ranging from the high mobility, multi-wheeled vehicle more commonly known as the HMMWV to larger capacity trucks;
- Additional M-2 and M-3 variant Bradley Fighting Vehicles will also be required to equip Armored UAs;
- The Army will likely have a surplus of M-1 Abrams tanks due to the de-activation of some armor battalions;
- Additional unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) will also be required; and
- A significant amount of command, control, and communications equipment will be required not only to outfit the new UAs but also to permit them to “plug in” at the joint level. Army officials stated

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71 Ibid.

72 From the Infantry Senior Leader Update given by LTC Lee Fetterman, U.S. Army Infantry Branch Assignments Office, June 2004.
that some equipment originally intended for the FCS program will likely be pushed down to UEs and UAs to meet this requirement.\(^{73}\)

The Army plans to develop and field the FCS in increments with the initial operational capability (IOC) slated for December 2010 (one FCS equipped UA) with 15 UAs - - about a third of the active Army - - being FCS-equipped by 2020.\(^{74}\) The vast majority of the present systems and vehicles in both the UAs and SBCTs are intended to be replaced by the FCS. The FCS comprises a variety of 18 systems and the overall battle command network linking all FCS systems, and features an M-1 Abrams tank replacement, an M-2/M-3 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle replacement, and a replacement system for the Army’s current M-109 self-propelled artillery system. The General Accounting Office suggests that the FCS program, as presently envisioned:

\[
\text{... is at significant risk for not delivering the required capability within the budgeted resources. Three-fourths of FCS’ needed technologies were still immature when the program started. The first prototype of FCS will not be delivered until just before the production decision. Full demonstration of FCS’ ability to work as an overarching system will not occur until after production is begun. This demonstration assumes complete success - - including delivery and integration of numerous complementary systems that are not inherently part of FCS but are essential for FCS to work as a whole.}\(^{75}\)
\]

The Army reportedly acknowledges that risk involved with the FCS program and that the program’s approach and schedule could change.\(^{76}\) According to the CSA, General Schoomaker, “the toughest part of the program will be assembling the network that ties the system of systems together, and that ultimately, the program is going to require “extraordinary” management.”\(^{77}\) Some analysts suggest that potentially increasing operational and resource requirements associated with the GWOT and the program’s acknowledged overall risk will likely result in either scaling back the FCS to a smaller, less ambitious program or extending the program’s timeframe until critical technologies, including those associated with the FCS network, mature to the point where overall program risk becomes more manageable. Other experts contend that the FCS is likely to be converted to a test bed for technologies that can be “spun off” into the current force.\(^{78}\) Recent Army testimony to Congress has reportedly indicated that the FCS program will take longer than

\(^{73}\) From a May 27, 2004 meeting with the Army Staff’s G-8 Force Development Office to discuss the Army’s brigade redesign program.

\(^{74}\) Testimony of Paul L. Francis, Director of Acquisition and Sourcing Management, United States General Accounting Office before the House Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, April 1, 2004, p. 1.

\(^{75}\) Ibid.


\(^{77}\) Ibid.

planned and the program will be delayed by two to four years.79 While some experts believe that this delay, the program’s second to date, is of no serious cause for concern and reflects prudent risk management, others suggest that it is symptomatic of an overly-ambitious program.

Where Will These Units be Located?

While some experts assume that the redesigned UEs and UAs and supporting UAs will be located at their present duty stations, Administration efforts underway to re-examine the world-wide posture of U.S. military forces suggest that this may not be the case. In early 2003, the Administration reportedly “accelerated” an ongoing DOD review of the military’s basing structure, often referred to as the “Global Defense Posture” study, designed to look at the possibility of realigning the large concentrations of forces in Europe and Asia. While no formal plan results have been approved, the plan reportedly calls for the establishment of smaller, skeleton-type bases, at various points throughout the world where smaller units can be rotated through on a periodic basis in order to provide a quick response to current and potential areas of conflict, and also so the U.S. can deepen military ties with new allies in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, Africa, and Southwest Asia.80 As part of this plan, sizeable contingents of troops now based in Germany, Japan, and South Korea would reportedly be withdrawn, with some forces going to other overseas posts and with some coming home to posts in the United States.81 Some analysts argue that the ongoing war in Iraq will make it difficult to realign forces geographically in any predictable manner.82 Others suggest that many U.S. bases are unprepared to handle the housing and training needs of the thousands of soldiers and their families who would be brought back from overseas and it could take as long as ten years, for example, to bring two divisions from Germany back to the United States.83

Although a major objective of the Global Posture Review is to station forces where they can respond more quickly to global conflicts, a May 2004 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) Study, “Options for Changing the Army’s Overseas Basing,” states:

Restationing Army forces would produce, at best, only small improvements in the United State’s ability to respond to far-flung conflicts. The reason is that deploying Army units to many potential trouble spots from the likely locations

81 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
According to Army officials, as part of the Global Defense Posture study and also to accommodate the additional UAs, the Army is involved in an extensive survey of all U.S. domestic and overseas bases, as well as other potential foreign sites, as possible sites for the realignment of the new modular Army. Army officials have also looked at the possibility of co-locating UAs at U.S. air and naval bases as a means of speeding their deployment in the time of crisis. Also impacting on the Army’s basing decisions is the 2005 round of base closures under the base realignment and closure (BRAC) law authorized by Congress in 2001. The House has voted to delay base closings until 2007 which could be beneficial to Army planners as they try and determine where forces will be stationed. It is not known if the Army has finalized or gained approval for their basing plans for the redesigned Army, but experts say that it is unlikely that this will happen before the Global Defense Posture study has been approved.

Restructuring and Stabilizing the Force

Other Critical Army Initiatives

The Army has two other concurrent initiatives underway which have been described as “critical enablers” in the Army’s brigade-centric reconfiguration - - restructuring and stabilizing the force. Both initiatives involve substantial policy, organizational, and personnel changes from FY2004 - FY2009 and some observers contend that these two initiatives may be more be difficult to achieve than the creation of 10 to 15 additional brigade-sized units.

Restructuring the Force

In what the Army describes as its “most significant restructuring in 50 years,” the Army is presently converting a number of units deemed less relevant to the GWOT into units more appropriate to the types of operations ongoing in Iraq and Afghanistan. This change involves over 100,000 active and reserve personnel and involves decreasing certain types of units while increasing others as described in the following table:

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84 From the Summary of a May 2004 CBO Study titled, “Options for Changing the Army’s Overseas Basing.”
85 From a May 27, 2004 meeting with the Army Staff’s G-8 Force Development Office to discuss the Army’s brigade redesign program.
86 Ibid.
88 Ibid.
Table 4. Restructuring of Units, FY2004 - FY2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decrease</th>
<th>Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>36 - Field Artillery Units</td>
<td>149 - Military Police Units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 - Air Defense Units</td>
<td>16 - Transportation Units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 - Engineer Units</td>
<td>9 - Petroleum/Water Distribution Units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 - Armor Units</td>
<td>8 - Civil Affairs Units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 - Logistic Units</td>
<td>4 - Psychological Operations Units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11 - Biological Detection Units</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Army’s rationale for this initiative is to:

- Divest itself of Cold War structure to better fight the war on terrorism. The Army intends to capitalize on joint force air superiority and the demonstrated capability of joint precision munitions by decreasing the number of field artillery, armor, and air defense units.

- Relieve stress on high demand units. This plan calls for increasing the number of active and reserve military police, civil affairs, and psychological operations units which have often been cited as being some of the most in demand and frequently deployed units over the past decade.

- Improve the readiness and deployability of units. Many units are not fully manned in certain specialty areas and this restructuring could permit the Army to man more units at their authorized levels.

- Military to civilian conversions. By converting selected headquarters positions from military to civilian, the Army hopes to free up additional soldiers to man units.

While many analysts agree with the Army’s rationale and intent, some question how achievable this initiative is. Some suggest that the Army is oversimplifying the process of restructuring these units to create new units. One question posed by analysts is that of retraining of soldiers. It is not unreasonable to assume that some type of formal retraining is going to be required to convert, for example, a former armor soldier into a military police soldier. Non-commissioned officers and officers will also probably require some retraining in their new occupational specialties. There does not appear to be a comprehensive plan on how these 100,000 plus soldiers will be retrained and what the associated costs and resources will be. Army

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89 From a Department of the Army briefing to the media on “Building Army Capabilities,” Feb. 17, 2004.

90 Ibid.
officials acknowledge that there are a number of challenges to this restructuring initiative, including soldier retention issues and the ability to produce enough qualified specialists and leaders to man these new units.91 This being the case, it may not be possible to fully activate all the new types of units depicted in Table 4, but these numbers remain the Army’s overall goal.

Stabilizing the Force

According to the Army, force stabilization consists of two components, home basing and unit-focused stability. Under home basing, soldiers will stay at their base for six to seven years which is at least double the current three year average.92 The Army hopes that this will not only increase unit cohesion by having soldiers work and train together longer, but also provide their families with some stability and allow them to keep their children in the same school longer, or perhaps buy a home and establish some roots in their local community.93 Army officials plan on sending soldiers to professional education courses during this six to seven year tour, but having them return to their bases, as opposed to the current practice of sending them on to other assignments. Initially, this plan will reportedly not apply to tours in Korea (one year unaccompanied) or Europe (three years accompanied).94

Unit-focused stability is intended to permit soldiers to “arrive, train, and serve together for approximately 36 months.”95 During this 36 months, soldiers can expect at least one operational deployment (to Iraq or Afghanistan, for example) for six to twelve months.96 The Army hopes that this policy will enhance unit cohesion, improve training, and create more deployable units.97

The Army reportedly acknowledges that this will be a major “cultural change” for the Army which has, in the past, discouraged soldiers from “homesteading” or staying at a base for more than a couple of years.98 Some analysts suggest that in addition to overcoming cultural issues that the Army will need to make a substantial and permanent commitment to changing the Army’s training policies, professional education program, and personnel management policies which have their roots in the

91 Ibid.
92 Testimony by Lieutenant General Richard A. Cody, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, United States Army and Lieutenant General Franklin L. Hagenbeck, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1, United States Army, before the House Subcommittee on Total Force, March 10, 2004.
94 Ibid.
95 Testimony by Lieutenant General Richard A. Cody, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, United States Army and Lieutenant General Franklin L. Hagenbeck, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1, United States Army, before the House Subcommittee on Total Force, Mar. 10, 2004.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
post World War II era. Some experts suggest that while this sounds relatively easy - merely a matter of changing policy - that there are numerous second and third order effects for not just the Army bases and training centers involved, but also local communities near these installations. Such changes (depending primarily on an increase or decrease of soldiers and their families on a base) could have positive or adverse effects on local economies, housing, utilities and services, and local schools.

**Cost Considerations**

In his opening statement on March 11, 2004, during a Senate subcommittee hearing on Army Transformation, Senator Joe Lieberman, the Ranking Member, stated that the cost of creating 15 additional active duty brigades was estimated to be “over $20 billion.” According to publicly available information, the Army has estimated this cost from FY2004 to FY2007 as $12.4 billion broken down as follows:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manning</td>
<td>$208</td>
<td>$375</td>
<td>$918</td>
<td>$1,693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment a</td>
<td>$232</td>
<td>$1,596</td>
<td>$2,085</td>
<td>$1,650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training a</td>
<td>$83</td>
<td>$300</td>
<td>$594</td>
<td>$458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilities a</td>
<td>$45</td>
<td>$341</td>
<td>$355</td>
<td>$320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations and Support b</td>
<td>$16</td>
<td>$237</td>
<td>$512</td>
<td>$408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL $ (M)</td>
<td>$584</td>
<td>$2,849</td>
<td>$4,464</td>
<td>$4,529</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**

a. One time investment costs.

b. Operations and Support (O&S) costs including payments for salaries, fuel, maintenance, and many other types of recurring expenses. O&S spending is often associated with the maintenance of military readiness.

In addition, the Army would require $10.6 billion through FY2008-FY2011 to support the completion of the 48 active duty UAs, which puts the Army’s figure at $23 billion from FY2004 - FY2011.

99 Ibid.
101 From a Department of the Army briefing to the media on “Building Army Capabilities,” Feb. 17, 2004.
102 Ibid.
While this $23 billion dollar figure may be a reasonable estimate on the cost of establishing 48 active duty UAs, some analysts worry that many people assume that this is the total price tag for the total Army’s redesign, which is not the case. This estimate does not include costs for the National Guard’s conversion of its brigades. It is also not apparent that these figures include the conversion of ten division headquarters to UE “Xs”, and current corps and higher level headquarters into UE “Ys”. Also of concern to some experts is the cost of converting support units not covered in the UA conversion. In addition, it is not clear what the costs will be for redesign and rebalancing the force and the Army’s stabilization program. There is also concern of other related costs of modifying the institutional Army, as well as expanding posts to meet the needs of additional units. Some experts suggest that some of these initiatives will result in eventual costs savings as opposed to additional costs but there are few details currently available. Even if there are considerable costs savings, some experts suggest that the overall cost (excluding the FCS program) associated with the Army’s modular redesign and associated initiatives are well beyond $ 23 billion. Perhaps in recognition that not all costs have been adequately addressed, the Senate Armed Services Committee in Senate Report to the Defense Authorization Bill, S. 2400, S.Rept. 108-260, directs the Secretary of the Army to:

... submit a report at the time of the submission of the fiscal year 2006 budget request, which updates the Army’s modernization plan, including the strategies for resetting the rotational force and sustaining required levels of readiness, reorganizing the Army in a modular design, and equipping that reorganized force. The modernization plan will also contain detailed schedule and cost estimates for implementing those strategies.

The Army Campaign Plan assumes that “the Army base budget will remain at least at current levels through FY 07.” Supplemental funding will be available for new and ongoing contingency operations, and a portion of building up to 15 additional active component brigades.” According to reports, the Army has enough funding from the FY2004 Defense Supplemental (P.L. 108-106, Nov. 6, 2003) and from its Operations and Maintenance (O&M) accounts to convert seven of the ten active duty divisions. Some experts predict a $ 50 billion supplemental in FY 05, with an undetermined portion going to the Army’s redesign program. Some have criticized the Army’s plan to fund these initiatives purely through supplementals and the reprogramming of funds, suggesting that this strategy absolves the Army of the responsibility to conduct detailed planning, cost estimates that are part of the normal defense budgeting process.

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103 “The Army Campaign Plan (Unclassified),” The Department of the Army, Mar. 31, 2004, p. 5.
104 Ibid.
105 Joe Burlas, “Army Announces Modularization Schedule Through FY 2007.”
FCS Cost Considerations

The FCS’ FY2005 budget request is reportedly $3.1 billion which “represents well over one-third of the total army research and development budget request.” The House appropriations bill (H.R. 4613) would limit FCS spending to $2.2 billion unless the Army completes a number of tasks before November 2004 when the Army is scheduled to brief the Secretary of Defense on the program’s progress. These requirements include:

- An independent estimate of the program’s cost;
- A report on the maturity level of critical technologies;
- A report on the status of the system’s network; and
- A list of key performance parameters.

The Senate version of the appropriations bill (S. 2559) provides $3.03 billion for the FCS but reduced funding by $150 for excessive management costs. A conference report is pending.

FCS as a “Bill Payer”. Some analysts believe that the FCS program may become the “bill payer” for not only part of the Army’s modular redesign but also for congressionally-mandated end-strength increases. The Senate version of the FY2005 Defense Appropriations Bill (S. 2559) reportedly adds 20,000 troops to the Army in one year and funds it through a $25 billion supplemental appropriation attached to the bill. The House version (H.R. 4613) would gradually add 30,000 soldiers by 2007. A conference report is pending. Experts, who assume that the Army’s budget will not increase permanently to support the end-strength increase, suggest that these end-strength related costs will be borne by the Army’s operations accounts and the procurement account and suggest that FCS procurement funds are “the biggest target” to pay for these end-strength increases.

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108 Ibid.
109 Ibid.
112 Ibid.
113 Ibid.
Oversight Issues for Congress

Necessity of Redesign

Although the Army has initiated its redesign, restructuring, and stabilization program, Congress may wish to further examine the necessity of these efforts. Some analysts and members of Congress suggest that adding two more divisions to the active duty force structure would also address the issue of broadening the Army’s force pool and would avoid the turbulence and costs associated with redesigning the Army’s 10 existing active duty divisions. Others propose that the Army could develop units that focus on post-conflict security and reconstruction, which could free up combat formations that are presently conducting those operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Some analysts suggest that a hybrid solution, incorporating aspects of all three proposals might also be of benefit to the Army. Congress might benefit from examining all proposals “side by side” looking at their merits and costs, as opposed to focusing solely on the Army’s current plan.

Adequacy of Plans and Cost Estimates

Congress may wish to address the adequacy of the Army’s overall plan and associated cost estimates. Research suggests that while the plans and costs associated with active duty combat brigade redesign may be well represented, other aspects of redesign, restructuring, stabilization, and basing are not. More specifically, these include the following.

National Guard and Army Reserve. With the National Guard and Army Reserve reportedly making up over 40% of the troops in Iraq\(^\text{114}\) as well as sizeable contingents elsewhere, many experts contend that the Army Reserve and National Guard are at last “full partners” with the active Army. While the National Guard and, to a lesser extent, the Army Reserve are included in the Army Campaign Plan and other Army planning documents, some analysts note that plans for modular redesign and force restructuring are much more ambiguous than those for the active Army. Army officials told the Senate Committee on Airland during a March 11, 2004, hearing that the Army was “working on inclusion” of the Guard as part of the transformation program.\(^\text{115}\) In this same hearing, Senator Lieberman remarked that “we’ve seen no estimate for the cost of redesigning existing brigades in the Reserve components.”\(^\text{116}\) Congress, having noted this inequity, may wish to further examine how and when the Army plans to restructure the National Guard and Army Reserve and the associated cost estimates for this effort.


\(^{116}\) Ibid. 4.
Supporting Units of Action. While some detail exists on how Armored and Infantry UAs and SBCTs are being structured, manned, and fielded, not as much is known about Supporting UAs — particularly those that will fall outside of the UA/UE structure. These units, that in the past have been called “echelon above division” units, will also require personnel and equipment, and there will be costs associated with their redesign. It is also unclear if many of these units will be consolidated with other units or if, because of the re-design, they will no longer be required. In addition, it is not evident that many of these units have been placed on any sort of timeline for transition to their new configuration. In order to better understand the Army’s total redesign plan and get a better understanding of potential costs, Congress might consider asking the Army to provide more detailed information on Supporting Units of Action.

Future Combat System (FCS). Army leadership acknowledges the inherent difficulty and risk associated with the FCS program as it exists today. Some experts have expressed skepticism that the Army will be able to achieve its overall programmatic aims. They point to former, less technologically ambitious, single system program terminations such as the Comanche helicopter and the Crusader self-propelled artillery system and suggest that the 18 system FCS program may suffer a similar fate. Others suggest that the program’s long timeline, combined with a large price tag, make it a prime target for reallocating its program funds to cover expenses incurred in the GWOT. If the FCS program does not reach fruition or is scaled back or even terminated, it has potentially significant consequences for the Army’s plans for its Future Force. Congress may wish to consider asking the Army to examine a variety of possible end states for the FCS program short of full program implementation and comment on their likely impact on the Army and its ability to prosecute the GWOT and address potential future threats.

Restructuring and Stabilizing the Force. These two enabling initiatives, described as major cultural changes for the Army, will affect how the Army trains and how it functions on a day to day basis. Many components such as the institutional Army — its training base — and Army career patterns will likely change significantly. There are also a number of implications for Army families which could have some important impacts on soldier retention issues. In terms of second and third order effects, these initiatives could have both positive and negative impacts on communities surrounding Army bases. In all cases cited here, there will likely be issues and costs involved, although these issues and costs might be difficult to quantify at the moment. Congress may examine how these initiatives will be accommodated by the institutional Army and estimated costs associated with transforming how the Army trains its soldiers and officers. Other related topics for discussion could include restructuring and stabilization’s potential impact on local communities.

Basing the Forces. The Army’s final plan for basing its UEs and UAs both in the United States and overseas is still in development and will likely be influenced by the results of the Global Posture Review, the BRAC process, as well as political considerations arising from basing forces in new locations, and also from removing them from previous locations in Europe and Asia. No matter what the eventual outcome, there will likely be significant costs involved in terms of military construction, even for so called “skeleton bases” as well as a variety of other costs
associated with expanding or downsizing military bases both at home and overseas. In addition, the benefits in terms of deployability for some of the new proposed overseas bases have been called into question and could be examined in greater detail prior to making any final decisions. Some believe that basing impacts on local communities also merits additional consideration as major changes at existing bases could have profound impacts on local communities. Congress may wish to examine these issues in greater detail before a final basing decision for the new modular Army is made.

**Active Duty Personnel and Equipment Shortages**

As previously discussed, the active Army may face personnel and equipment shortages as it transitions to a brigade-centric force. In addition, the Army may not be able to field all of the MP and Civil Affairs units that it intends to develop as it restructures over 100,000 personnel billets. These potential shortfalls in personnel and equipment may result in the Army fielding fewer active duty UAs than planned for as well as not having as many of the high demand units as anticipated. Congress may consider further exploring these possible shortages and the Army’s proposals for addressing them.

**Additional Reading**

- CRS Report RS21754 - *Military Forces: What is the Appropriate Size for the United States?*